JUNO BEACH

D-Day, 6 June 1944
The Landing Tables

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They were Waiting - German Defences

The Germans used millions of slave labourers during four years of occupation to construct the 'Atlantic Wall' - a modern fortification system along the coast of France. The fortifications consisted of a series of reinforced concrete gun emplacements supported by well protected infantry strong-points and heavy machine gun nests overlooking the beaches. These were surrounded by trenches with mortars and machine guns. The beaches were strewn with obstacles and mines. Tetrahedral obstacles - three iron bars intersecting at right angles had been constructed on the beaches. Fields of barbed wire and mines covered the land past the beaches. Also the seafront houses provided excellent observation and firing positions for snipers. There were 32 static Infantry Divisions of widely varying quality defending these fortifications along the French and Dutch coast.

This first line of defence was backed up by Panzer Divisions (Armoured and Motorized Divisions) positioned inland from the Atlantic wall. The strategy was, if the Atlantic wall were breached, these elite formations of crack mobile troops would strike as soon as possible after the landing and throw the Canadians and the Allies back into the sea. Within striking distance of the coast were five first-class divisions: the 21st Panzer Division with an estimated 350 tanks, the 12th SS Division with 150 tanks, the Panzer Lehr Division in the Le Mans area and two more tank divisions in the Seine. The proximity of 12th SS and 21st Panzer Divisions made it difficult for the British and Canadians to capture their objectives of Caen on D-Day.

The coastal defences along Juno beach were defended by 3 battalions of the 716th Infantry Division with a strength of 7,771 soldiers, all ranks. Although the division was made up of ordinary second rate troops, they proved to be strong defenders when concealed and protected by the coastal fortifications. The German plan was for the 716th Division to delay the Allied advance with artillery, mortars, mines and anti-tank guns until reinforcements from the 12th SS and 21st Panzer Divisions positioned near Caen could arrive.

The 12th SS Division positioned 50 miles behind the coast had 20,540 men and a full establishment of 150 tanks. The 12th SS was a fanatical Hitler Youth formation raised to believe in the German master race and the Fuhrer. Two thirds of these soldiers were 18 years of age and had received sophisticated battle training starting at the age of 16. They were a dangerous combination of patriotism, self-righteousness and brutality. Colonel Kurt Meyer commanded three battalions of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Meyer and the 12th SS would become the nemesis of the Canadian Army in Normandy.

On D-Day the 716th Infantry Division took the main weight of the Canadian assault and was virtually destroyed. By evening they had lost 80% of their artillery. The 21st Panzer Division was into action early on D-Day, unsuccessfully attacking the British Airborne to win back some of the bridges at Ranville-Benouvile. In the early afternoon the 192nd Panzer Regiment of the Division counterattacked the British on the west side of the Orne river. Parts of the regiment broke through to the coast but by 2100 hours had been stopped by the British. Having lost 25% of its armour and no prospect of reinforcement, the regiment fought its way back to Caen.
At 1505 hours General Speidal ordered the 21st Panzer Division, 12th SS Division and Panzer Lehr to be grouped under 1st Panzer Corps for a coordinated attack at the Anglo-Canadian bridgehead. The plan to rapidly commit armoured divisions to prevent the Allies from consolidating their positions had assumed that the armour would be in position and coastal defences were capable of holding the allied advance. By this time however, the Canadians had decimated the German regiments defending the coastal positions and advanced miles inland. With the 21st engaged against the British and the reserve divisions arriving in pieces it became difficult to launch this coordinated counter attack.
Force 'J' - The Passage

From D-6, Force ‘J’ vehicles loaded at hards at Stokes Bay and Southampton and then moored in the Solent. The LSI's loaded personnel while at moorings in the Solent. On the first and second days only LCM's and Rhinos were loaded, with the remainder starting on June 1st. In general loading went smoothly mainly because the ships and craft and the military units had practised several times in exercises. The driving of some ‘overheads’ was not good due to a lack of training and practice. There were delays of up to eight hours in loading some LST’s at Southampton hards. The chief cause of delay was the difficulty in backing trailers down the hards at low states of the tide. Some Movement Control Officers and Commanding Officers of LST’s admitted abandoning the loading plan and stowed awkward items as best they could.

Once the soldiers were embarked all security was lost. The dummy maps and code names used in briefing the troops, failed to hide the destination and the soldiers passed the information to the seamen who then could not be allowed to leave the ship or craft for routine administrative tasks. It had not been planned to brief seamen until the moment of sailing.

On D-1, Force ‘J’ sailed from the Solent and went first to Area ‘Z’ and then used swept Channels 7 and 8 to cross the Channel. Unlike Sword these were not used for fast and slow convoys respectively. Each Channel carried the ships and craft for one assault beach. This meant that careful timing was required since convoys would travel at different speeds in the same Channel. Time of arrival was the most important consideration so the time of departure was based on this. Some convoys would necessarily have to overtake others en route. This would not normally be a problem but bad weather, poor visibility, strong tides and currents, radio and radar silence all combined to create potential hazards.
It was planned that in general, Assault Group J1 and Assault Group J2 would leave the Solent by the same gate. In some cases the convoys of both Assault Groups are given the same time for passing the gate but in fact the J1 Convoy went first. Later and larger convoys were given times 15 or 20 minutes apart.

The northern entrance to each channel was marked by a FH830 sonic buoy. Developed for anti submarine warfare they were further developed as wreck markers and, as in this case, navigation buoys. They gave an underwater signal which could be detected by a ships sonar set. The entrances were further marked by Harbour Defence Motor Launch’s (HDML) stationed some five miles north of the actual entrance. Channel 7 had HDML 1393 flashing number 7 in the direction of oncoming convoys. Channel 8 had HDML 1407 flashing 8. Both also had type 78T homing beacons to assist navigation. This transmitted a signal which could be picked up by naval radar Type 286 and 291, carried by the various headquarters and control craft. In ideal conditions the positions of the HDML's and the sonic buoys would have been ideal, allowing convoys to line up on the channels. In the event it seems that some convoys managed to go astray between the two and enter the wrong channels. This would cause problems later.

**Force 'J' - Channel 7**

Apart from the Flag Group these groups were for MIKE RED and NAN GREEN.

**Group 301 - Flag Group**

The various components of this group sailed from different mooring areas and rendezvoused at North Gate which they were timed to pass at H-12 Hours. The group was to sail at 9 knots.
Landing Ship Headquarters (LSH), HMS Hilary, Flag - Force ‘J’, carrying commanders for:
Force ‘J’, ‘I’ Corps and 3rd Canadian Infantry Division

- CMB 103 (T/Lt NA Mounter), MTB 328 (T/Lt CHW Andrew, RNVR) and MTB 344 (T/Lt LC Radaway, RNVR) - joined from Cowes
  NOTE: CMB’s were early, small MTBs from WWI. ‘C’ for coastal. MTB 328, broke down and was towed back to Portsmouth
- 6 x LCI(S) carrying Commandos joined from Hamble
- 2 x LCI(S) joined from Hamble
  NOTE: These were spare craft which could replace any becoming casualties before sailing. If not required for that role they were to be used for close protection for HMS Hilary and for picket duties
- USCGC, a rescue cutter joined from Hamble from ResFlot1
- LCS(L)(2) 254, 255, 257 - Joined from Cowes
- HMCS Algonquin, (LCdr D.W. Piers, RCN) Escort

Group 310 - Minesweeper Group

- 9 Minesweeping Flotilla to sweep and mark Channel 7
  - Fleet sweepers HMS Sidmouth, Tenby, Bangor, Blackpool, Bridlington, Bridport, Eastbourne, Boston
- Danlayers: HMS Bryher, Ijuin, Dalmatia, Signa
  NOTE: A Danlayer was a type of vessel assigned to minesweeping flotillas during and immediately after World War II. They were usually small trawlers, fitted for the purpose of laying dans. A dan is a marker buoy which consists of a long pole moored to the seabed and fitted to float vertically, usually with a coded flag at the top.
- Mine Sweeping ML 185, 222 and 571.
  NOTE: Being shallow draught and unlikely to detonate mines they were to precede the sweepers
- HDML1393 (T/Lt RJ King, RNVR)
  NOTE: To mark the entrance to Channel 7
- HMS Faulkner and HMS Fury, Escorts

Assault Group J1 - Carrying 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade

Group 311 - Duplex Drive (DD) Tank Group

Passed the South Gate H-16 hours + 20 minutes:
- 8 x LCT3 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying DD tanks
  NOTE: LCT3 were not considered suitable for beaching in the assault phase and it was planned that they would launch DD tanks well out to sea. Because it was planned that the DD tanks would form the first wave of the assault it was essential that they should have assistance with navigation and station keeping off the beaches
- 3 x LCP(L) Navigation, 178, 202 and 134 joined from Hamble
  NOTE: These were to lead the DD tanks to as near the shore as possible. They carried navigation equipment and some were armoured
- 2 x LCP(Sy), 190 and 292 joined from Hamble
  NOTE: These survey craft were similar to the LCP(L) Navigation but were intended to follow the DD tanks and check their line of approach. They would then carry out survey work on the beaches
- ML 902 carried Flotilla Officer, 4 LCT Flotilla
  NOTE: This was to follow the DD wave and maintain communications
- 6 x LCP(L) from 205 Flotilla joined from Hamble
  NOTE: These were to lay smoke if requested to cover the DD launching position
- LCF 1 was to provide AA protection at the DD launching position and then give cover to the assault waves
Landing Craft Headquarters (LCH) 168 - Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group

MIKE RED

Speed 8 knots to Buoy BB then 5 knots

Group 312 - Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE) Group

Pass South Gate H-20 hours + 10 minutes

These craft were to form the second wave, Speed 5 knots:

- 8 x LCT5 from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying AVRE to create beach exits and clear obstacles
- 1 x LCT5 - A spare to act as rescue tug, to assist the LCT’s withdraw from the beaches
- 8 x LCT(A) from 105 LCT Flotilla carrying Centaurs of Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment.

**NOTE:** To give artillery support until the field regiments RCA/RA could land. Some were armoured and
therefor LCT(HE)

- 1 x LCT(CB) carrying 2 x 17 pdr Sherman Firefly Concrete Busters to engage strongpoints
- 1 x LCT5 - A spare to act as rescue tug to assist the LCT’s withdraw from the beaches
- 3 x LCM carrying engineer equipment for Field Companies, RCE/RE which were to work on
the beaches.

**NOTE:** They would collect personnel from the LSI's as they passed them

- 2 x LCF, 33 and 37, from 333 Support Flotilla
- 3 x LCG(L), 831, 1007 and 1062 from 333 Support Flotilla

**NOTE:** This group will be overtaken by Group 311 at which time the three LCG(L) will join it

- LCH 98 - Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group, NAN GREEN
- ML 246 carrying Deputy Senior Officer Group 312
- 703 LCP(L) Assault Flotilla.

**NOTE:** Will keep outside the swept channel in line ahead, keeping the westward buoys to starboard

- ML 297 (T/Lt M H French-Williams, RNVR) carrying Senior Officer LCP(L)
- 9 x LCA(HR) will be towed by the LCT carrying AVRE's and 2 X LCS(M) will be towed by
LCT(A).

**NOTE:** They would be left to make the run in to shore under their own power

Group 313 - Artillery Group

Pass South Gate at H-17 hours, Speed 6 Knots:

- 15 x LCT4 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying Self Propelled artillery
- 4 x LCT(R) 1 Division, 359, 367, 405, 437
- ML 146 (T/Lt C D P Cookson, RNVR) carrying Flotilla Officer 31 LCT Flotilla. Deputy Senior
Officer Group 313
- ML 151 (T/Lt D H Mason, RNVR) carrying Senior Officer Group 313
- 2 x LCS(L) 202 and 203 from 333 Support Flotilla
- HMS Wrestler, escort, rendezvoused at the gate

Group 314

A fast LSI Convoy. Vessels are listed in order of sailing and therefor order of arrival and mooring at the
Lowering Position. Passed North Gate at H-9 hours + 15 min.

Landing Ship Headquarters (LSH), HMS Lawford - Captain Assault Group J1

1st Landing Ship Infantry (LSI) Division

HMS Invicta
- SS Isle of Thanet - Carries an LCA(OC)
- SS Mecklenburg
- HMCS Prince Henry. Senior Officer LSI (Captain V.S. Godfrey, DSO)
- SS Duke of Argyll
- MGB 312 (T/LCdr JH Coste, RNVR) & MGB 316 (T/Lt CDA Price, RNVR) - Joined from Cowes
2nd LSI Division
HMS Ulster Monarch
SS Canterbury. Carries an LCA(OC)
SS Lairds Isle
MV Llangibby Castle
HMS Queen Emma
MGB 324 (T/Lt AR Burrell, RNVR) - Joined from Cowes
3 x USCGC - from ResFlot1 (CG-43 (83464))
Destroyers HMS Stevenstone, Venus and FS La Combattante (French) - escorts,
rendezvoused at the gate

Speed 13 knots

Group 315

Pass South Gate at H-15 hours, 30 minutes, Speed 6 knots:
• 5 x LCT from 36 LCT Flotilla
• 3 x LCI(L)
• 7 x LCT from 20 LCT Flotilla
• ML 205 (T/Lt B S Collins, RNVR) carrying Flotilla Officer, 20 LCT Flotilla

Force 'J' - Channel 8
Assault Group J2 - Carrying 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade

Using Channel 8 for NAN WHITE and NAN RED

Group 320

• 7 Minesweeping Flotilla - To sweep and mark Channel 8
  - Fleet Minesweepers HMS Peloris, Recruit, Fancy, Lennox, Pickle, Pincher, Plucky and Rifleman
  - DanLayers: HMS Farne, Stella Rigel, Stella Leonis and St. Barbe
• Mine Sweeping ML 138, 139 and 208
  NOTE: Being shallow draught they were to precede the sweepers
• HDML 1407 (T/Lt DL Hill, RNVR) - To mark the entrance to Channel 8
• 159th BYMS Flotilla - To sweep inshore
  - BYMS 2211 - T/LCdr SE Davis, RNR
  - BYMS 2055 - T/Lt SR Wakefield, RNVR
  - BYMS 2173 - T/Lt AL Molcare, RNVR
  - BYMS 2070 - T/Lt J Hobbs, RNR
  - BYMS 2071 - T/Lt WM McDugall, RNVR
  - BYMS 2032 - T/Lt PG Farmery, RNR
  - BYMS 2052 - T/Lt CE Haste, RNVR
  - BYMS 2157 - T/Lt D McGrath, RNVR
  - BYMS 2078 - T/Lt HR Walker, RNVR (attached from 157th BYMS Flotilla)
• HMCS Sioux (LCdr E.E.G. Boak, RCN) and HMS Vigilant - escorts, rendezvoused at the gate

Pass North Gate at H-16 hours + 40 min
Group 321

- 8 x LCT3 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying DD tanks
  NOTE: LCT3 were not considered suitable for beaching in the assault phase and it was planned that they would launch DD tanks well out to sea. It was planned that the DD tanks would form the first wave of the assault it was essential that they should have assistance with navigation and station keeping off the beaches
- 3 x LCP(L) Navigation, 196, 172 and 167, joined from Hamble
  NOTE: To lead the DD tanks to as near as shore as possible. Carried navigation equipment and some were armoured
- LCP(Sy) 290 joined from Hamble
  NOTE: These survey craft were similar to the LCP(L) Navigation but were intended to follow the DD tanks and check their line of approach. They would then carry out survey work on the beaches
- LCP(L) 179 joined from Hamble. Possibly standing in as LCP(Sy)
- 6 x LCP(L) from 702 Flotilla joined from Hamble
  NOTE: These were to lay smoke if requested to cover the DD launching position
- LCH 239 carrying Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group - Nan White
- ML 903 carrying Flotilla Officer, 11 LCT Flotilla who is also Deputy Senior Officer Group 321.
  NOTE: This was to follow the DD wave and maintain communications
- 6 x LCP(L) from 702 Flotilla joined from Hamble
  NOTE: These were to lay smoke for bombardment ships

Passing South Gate at H-16 hours + 20 min. Speed 8 knots to Buoy BB then 5 knots

Group 322

These craft were to form the second wave:
- 8 x LCT5 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying AVRE to create beach exits and clear obstacles
- 8 x LCT(A) from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying Centaurs of RMASR
  NOTE: To give artillery support until the Field Regiments, RCA/RA could land. Some were armoured and therfore LCT(HE)
- 1 x LCT(CB) carrying two 17 pdr Sherman Firefly Concrete Busters to engage strongpoints
- 2 x LCT5 - Spare craft as replacements if required
  NOTE: To act as rescue tugs to assist the LCT's withdraw from the beaches
- 3 x LCM carrying engineer equipment for Field Companies, RCE/RE which were to work on the beaches
  NOTE: They would collect personnel from the LSI's as they passed them
- 2 x LCF 21, 32
- 4 x LCG(L) from 331 Support Flotilla. Group 321 will overtake this group and the LCG(L) will join it
- LCH 167 - Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group Nan Red
- ML 123 (T/Lt W W Waugh, RNVR) - Flotilla Officer 106 LCT Flotilla. Deputy Senior Officer Group J22
- 9 x LCA(HR) were be towed by the LCT carrying AVRE's and 2 X LCS(M) were to be towed by LCT(A)
  NOTE: They would be left to make the run in to shore under their own power

Passing South Gate at H-20 hours + 10 minutes. Speed 5 knots

Group 323

- 16 x LCT4 from 22 LCT Flotilla carrying SP artillery
- ML 147 (T/Lt Cdr A S Bennet, RNVR) - Deputy Senior Officer Group 323
- ML 198 (T/Lt T H Titcombe, RNVR) - Senior Officer Group 323
- 4 x LCT(R) 363, 378 and 398, from 2 Division, 337 Flotilla
- 2 x LCS(L)1, 204 and 205
- HMS Beagle, escort, rendezvoused at the gate

Passing South Gate H-17 hours. Speed 6 knots
**Group 324** - A fast LSI convoy

**HMS Waveney - Captain Assault Group J2**

3 LSI Division
- HMS Brigadier. Senior Officer LSI
- SS Clan Lamont
- HMS St. Helier
- SS Lady of Mann
- MGB 317 (T/Lt NA Breeze, RNVR) & MGB 330 (T/Lt AM Watson, RNVR) joined from Cowes

4 LSI Division
- HMS Duke of Wellington
- SS Monowai - Carries an LCA(OC)
- SS Isle of Guernsey
- HMCS Prince David - Carries an LCA(OC)
- MGB 326 (T/Lt WJ Kempner, RNVR) joined from Cowes

Pass North Gate H-9 hours. Use Channel 8. Speed: 13 knots

HMS Kempenfeldt, HNorMS Glaisdale and HMS Bleasdale, escorts, rendezvoused at the gate.
3 X USCGC - from ResFlot1 - rendezvoused the gate

**Group 325**

- 7 X LCT4 from 36 LCT Flotilla
- 4 LCI(L)
- ML 269 (T/Lt J I Harley, RNVR) carrying Senior Officer, 36 LCT Flotilla

Pass Spithead Gate at H-15 hours + 20 minutes
Speed 6 knots

**Force 'J' - Assault Group J3**

This group passed Spithead Gate at H-14 hours + 55 min. It used Channel 7 at a speed of 6 knots

**HMS Royal Ulsterman** carrying Captain Assault Group J3
- 12 x LCI(L) from 261 Flotilla RCN sailed from Empress Dock, Southampton carrying the infantry of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade

**ML 247** carrying the Deputy Senior Officer sailed from Empress Dock, Southampton

The following all sail from Calshot:
- 10 x LCT4 from 36 LCT Flotilla
- 10 x LCT4 from 36 LCT Flotilla
- 4 x LCT3 Pre loaded stores for J1 and J2
- 2 x LCF 24, 29
- LCT(R) 125. Carries reloads for the LCT(R) remaining off the beaches
- HMS Versatile, escort, rendezvoused at the gate
- USCGC - Rescue cutter from ResFlot1
Group 332 - Landing Ship Tank (LST) group

This group passed Spithead Gate at H-11 hours + 30 min. It used Channel 7 at a speed of 6 knots:
- LST's 215, 180, 238, 239, 421, 199, 160, 416, 62, 65, 8 and 159 - All tow Rhinos
- M.H. Stephens - (Skipper T. Smith, RNR) Fire Boat
- HMS Petunia, HMS Clarkia and HMS Pink, escorts, rendezvoused at the gate
- HMT Northern Foam (T/Lt JA Crockett, RNR), trawler, rendezvoused at the gate

Group 333 - LST group

This group passed Spithead Gate at H-8 hours + 30 minutes. It used Channel 7 at a speed of 6 knots:
- LST's 425, 404, 410, 409, 405, 323, 413, 368, 80 and 402 - Three tow Rhinos
- HMT Northern Sun (T/Lt SG Fowler, RNVR), Northern Spray (Lt FAJ Downer, RNR), Northern Pride (T/Lt DO Humphrey’s, RNVR), Valeta (T/Lt Cdr A McKinlay, RNR), Lord Austin (T/Lt E.S.T. Robinson, RNVR). Escort trawlers

Group L1

From Assault Group ‘L’ which sailed from the Thames. It used Channel 7 and was timed to arrive at the Lowering Position off Juno at H+8 hours:
- 11 x LST US
- 7 x LCI(L) - 51 Division
- LSD HMS Northway (T/LCdr AJ Anderson, RNR) Carrying DUKW’s
- 12 x stores coasters
- HMS Cotswold, HMS Narcissus, HMS Oxlip and HMS Dansay. Escorts
Force 'J'

By H-6 hours there was a steady flow of ships and craft which reached from Area ‘Z’ to within 10 miles of the Normandy Coast. The Fleet Minesweepers had completed their initial task and had turned away from the Normandy coast. The inshore minesweepers were ready to sweep the anchorages. The first convoys were some 20 miles away from the Lowering Point, although the fast LSI convoys, which would actually arrive first, were some distance further back. The LST convoys were at Area ‘Z’ and had not yet entered the channels.

Force ‘J’ suffered several casualties. The first three happened early in the crossing as craft left the shelter of the Solent and met the severe weather and sea conditions in the open Channel.

LCT 413 of Group 313, loaded with priority stores, broke down and was towed back to the Solent. She made the crossing under tow later in the day.

LCT 2428 also broke down and anchored near Nab Tower. She later sank when in tow.

MTB 328 (T/SLT TE Hutton, RNVR) of Group 301 broke down and returned to Portsmouth in tow.

HMS Wrestler, escort to Group 313, spent the night rounding up stragglers and guiding stray groups into the correct channels. At 0645 hrs on D Day she was mined. "She was proceeding at speed and was one cable to the eastward of Channel 7" according to the report of Commander Force ‘J’. who also states "The commander had appreciated that the importance of the punctual arrival of these groups outweighed the risk to his ship by operating in unswept waters".

Several groups strayed into the wrong channels. Awareness of the errors was slow in developing and remedial action slow to be ordered. Group 312 carrying specialist armour for 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade got into Channel 5 instead of Channel 7, a considerable error. At 0112 hrs the Senior Officer reported that he was in doubt but it was not until 0306 hrs that Commander Force ‘J’ ordered him to increase speed and try to reach position QQ (the Lowering Position) on time. It was not easy to increase speed in the existing sea conditions and several of the smaller craft being towed foundered or had to be cast adrift. Some groups had problems maintaining the planned speed anyway.

Groups 311 and 313 got into Channel 6 instead of Channel 7 and Group 323 used Channel 7 instead of Channel 8. All of these were to the westward which suggests that they did not make enough allowance for the westward current and the conditions of wind and wave.

The number of escort vessels assigned to the convoys might seem rather small. However they were only a small part of the overall plan for protection during the crossing. It was obviously best to meet
any threat well away from the swept channels and there were strong forces on both the eastern and western flanks.

For the eastern flank, covering the British Assault Forces, Portsmouth Command deployed a large number of Coastal Forces craft, controlled by frigates and backed up by destroyers. A seven mile gun zone was established outside the channels. Any ship entering this area during the hours of darkness was to be presumed hostile. Four destroyers patrolled the outer edges of the gun zone and were only to enter the area if in close action with the enemy.

Four frigates were used to extend the range of radar cover beyond that provided by shore stations. The frigates could be used both to control coastal forces and to support them with heavier weapons. MTBs were deployed with some accompanying the frigates while others were lying stopped and silent in pre-determined positions. Coastal Forces were to be withdrawn at daylight unless visibility was poor. During daylight hours aircraft were on call.

Portsmouth Command had three Flotillas of MTBs with 24 craft, and two Flotillas of Fairmile ‘D’ with 15 craft.

**JUNO BEACH**

7th CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE - Brigadier H.W. Foster

**Assault Group J1**

7th Canadian Infantry Brigade was carried across the Channel by Assault Group J1 of Naval Force ‘J’. This embarked personnel and vehicles at the Solent ports and hards and sailed on D-1.

**Assault Group J1**

Assault Group J1 consisted of five groups. These are listed in orders dated mid May.

**Miniature Submarine X-20**, Lieutenant Ken Hudspeth, RANVR marked the DD Tank launching position for the DD tanks of Assault Group J1, and at 0400 hrs on the morning of June 6th, the crew of X-20 raised a navigation mast with a bright light shining only seaward. This bright directional light would be used as a beacon so that landing craft could easily navigate their way to the correct beach and to avoid obstacles and rock shoals to the east. Also, a radio beacon and echo sounder were installed that would allow them to communicate with mine sweepers and other ships that were making their approach to Juno beach without using a radio. X-20 moved to HMS Hilary after completing its task. It was taken in tow by the trawler Dartheena and returned to Portsmouth.

**Group 311**

Group 311 would be the first group to form up and move inshore from the Lowering Position. The main component was the flotilla of LCT3's carrying DD amphibious tanks and their escorts, navigation craft, support craft etc.
Landing Craft Headquarters 168, a converted LCI(L), was the headquarters craft for the Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group, MIKE RED. This craft had a comprehensive communications fit consisting of six B28 and one B29 Navy receivers and six army wireless set No 22. One set was a transmitter/receiver on the DD net for communication with the DD tanks and their LCT’s until they launched. A TCS VHF radio telephone gave access to Senior Officers VHF Wave. The army sets were transmitter/receivers for speech and Morse and were used for communications with the army DD net and SP Field Artillery net and brigade headquarters.

Eight LCT3's of 4 LCT Flotilla carried the DD tanks of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars). The Flotilla Officer, 4 LCT Flotilla was carried on ML 902. These travelled in two columns to the Launching Points.

Three LCP(L) DD Navigation Leaders 178, 202 and 134, were to lead the DD tanks to shore. These were generally fitted with armour and carried navigation equipment including HS2 navigation equipment. Possibly one at least carried a Combined Operations Pilotage Party Officer.

Two LCP(Sy) Survey 190 and 292 were to follow the DD tanks to provide a navigation check if necessary. They were then to survey the area off the beaches, partly to find obstacles and partly to identify the best landing places for LCT's.

Six LCP(L) of 205 Flotilla were available to lay smoke to cover the launching of DD tanks if required. This would normally be only if the DD tanks came under fire from shore batteries. They were also available to assist with launching and to act as rescue craft.

Three LCG(L) of 333 Flotilla, 831, 1007 and 1062, plus one LCF 1, were to cover the launch of DD tanks. If the tanks were fired on by shore batteries then they should return fire, otherwise LCG would engage beach defences from H-30 minutes. LCG 831 and LCF 1 were to engage beach defences on MIKE. LCG 1062 and 1007 were to engage beach defences on NAN GREEN. The LCG and LCF were to accompany the assault waves, giving close support as necessary. When no longer required for close support the Naval Force Commander was to informed and he would attach them to Forward Observers Bombardment for indirect bombardment. They were to concentrate in flotillas on the flanks and keep clear of incoming craft.

Group 312

The main components of Group 312 were the LCT5's from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying AVRE's and the LCT(A)'s from 105 LCT Flotilla carrying Centaurs of the Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment.

Group 312 was commanded by Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group, NAN GREEN on LCH 98. This was similarly equipped to LCH 168 above but with sets on the AVRE and RMASR nets. ML 246 carried the Deputy Senior Officer Group 312.

Ten LCT5 carried the AVRE's of the Breaching and Clearance Teams. Nine of the LCT5 each towed a LCA(HR) (Hedgehog) although only one survived the crossing.

Four LCT(A) and four LCT(HE) carried Centaur Close Support tanks of the Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment. One LCT(CB) (Concrete Buster) carried two Sherman Firefly 17 pdr tanks to engage concrete bunkers.

Three LCM carrying RE parties and their equipment for beach clearance.

Two LCF, 33 and 37, gave anti aircraft support on the approach and then were available for AA defence off the beaches.
703 LCP(L) Flotilla was to provide smoke. The Senior Officer LCP(L) was carried in ML 297.

Two LCS(M) towed by LCT's. These would carry Forward Observation Officers Bombardment RA for the Field Regiments of Group 313. They would observe the fall of shot during the run in.

**Group 313**

ML 151 carries Senior Officer Group 313.

Fifteen LCT4 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying SP artillery. ML 146 carries the Flotilla Officer, 31 Flotilla and Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group 313.

Four LCT(R) from 1 Division of 320 LCT Flotilla, 359, 367, 405 and 437. LCT(R) operated in pairs. In each pair one would fire a pattern of rockets at H-8 minutes and the second would fire at H-5 minutes. Both would aim at the same area which would extend across the beach to be assaulted and be 300 yards deep. From their assigned position they would need to aim the entire craft. LCT(R) 367 and 359 would fire on MIKE BEACH on bearing 184 degrees. LCT(R) 437 and 405 would fire on NAN GREEN on bearing 180 degrees.

Two LCS(L), 202 and 203, provided smoke and close support as ordered by Senior Officers Assault Groups.

**Group 314**

This was a fast LSI Convoy carrying the assault infantry battalions. Vessels are listed in the order of sailing and therefore order of arrival and mooring at the Lowering Position. One LSI in each division carried an LCA(OC), Obstacle Clearance, in place of an LCA.

**Landing Ship Headquarters (LSH), HMS Lawford**

Captain, Senior Officer Assault Group J1. HMS Lawford was a US built Destroyer Escort, Classed as Frigates in RN. They were 290 foot long, could manage 20 knots and as built carried three single 3 inch guns, two 40mm guns and ten 20mm guns. For the headquarters role they had the aft 3” gun removed and the superstructure extended to provide extra space. Two deck houses were added for communications equipment, a mast was added for arials and four extra radars fitted (Types 242, 253, 271 and 391). The crew was 200 and an extra 240 were carried in the headquarters role.

HMS Lawford was sunk off Juno on 8th June. It was reported that it had been hit by an aerial torpedo which is now thought to have been a guided bomb.

**1st Landing Ship Infantry Division**

The LSI's in this division were all similar in size and speed, being originally built as ferries. HMCS Prince Henry was larger being built for longer journeys but the rest were cross Channel ferries in peacetime. All were capable of more than 20 knots but were scheduled to travel at 13 knots on the crossing.

- **HMS Invicta - J15** - was a cross Channel ferry requisitioned while building in 1939. She was 4,178 tons, 347 foot long and capable of 22 knots. She carried five LCA and one LCS(M)(3) from 510 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla, and had accommodation for 250 troops.

| 510 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla: (LCA's LOST in Action in RED) |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| - LCA 774           | - LCA 808           |
| - LCA 775           | - LCA 809           |
| - LCA 807           | - LCS(M)(3) 47      |
• **SS Isle of Thanet - J14** was a Southern Railway cross Channel ferry converted to LSI from a FAA target ship in 1943. She was 2,700 tons, 337 foot long and capable of 23 knots. She carried an four LCA, one LCA(OC) and one LCS(M)(3) from **505 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla**

505 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla: (LCA's LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 520
- LCA 643
- LCA 644
- LCA 763
- LCA 767
- LCS(M)(3) 107

• **SS Mecklenburg - J17** was a cross Channel ferry built in 1922. She was 2,900 tons, 350 foot long and capable of 22 knots. She carried six LCA from **511 Assault Flotilla**

511 Assault Flotilla: (LCA's LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 684
- LCA 810
- LCA 815
- LCA 816
- LCA 819
- LCA 823

• **HMCS Prince Henry - J20** - Capt Valentine Stuart Godfrey, RCN, carried the Senior Officer LSI. She was one of two fast Canadian ferries converted to Armed Merchant Cruisers. She was extensively modified for the role and had the bridge moved further astern and had one funnel removed. She was 6,890 tons, 385 foot long and was capable of 22 knots. She carried eight LCA from **528 Assault Flotilla** and had accommodation for 550 troops. Armament: 2 x 4", 1 x 40mm, 6 x 20mm

528 Assault Flotilla: - Lt R.G. Buckingham, RCNVR, Flotilla Officer (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 736 (Lt Gordon W. Hendery, RCNVR)
- LCA 850 (Lt P. Buchnicky, RCNVR)
- LCA 856 (Lt J.C. Davie, RCNVR)
- LCA 925 (Lt S Moody, RCNVR)
- LCA 1021 (L/S D.E. Townson, RCNVR)
- LCA 1033 (S/Lt J.A. Flynn, RCNVR)
- LCA 1371 (A/B Mellway, RCNVR)
- LCA 1372 (Lt G.E. Nuttal, RCNVR)

**NOTE:** Replacement LCA’s, 7 June 1944 (for LCA’s lost and detached on D Day)
- LCA 1233
- LCA 1396

• **SS Duke of Argyll - J19** was a LMSR ferry built in 1928 and fitted out as LSI in 1942. She was 3,743 tons, 358 foot long and was capable of 21 knots. She carried five LCA and one LCS(M)(3) from **517 Assault Flotilla** and had accommodation for 250 troops

517 Assault Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 692
- LCA 706
- LCA 818
- LCA 834
- LCA 836
- LCA 1025

• **MGB 312 and 316** accompanied this fast convoy.

2 Division - Landing Ships Infantry

• **HMS Ulster Monarch - J11**, was an Irish Sea ferry. She was 3,790 tons, 359 foot long and could do 21 knots. She carried five LCA and one LCS(M)(3) from **521 Assault Flotilla** and had accommodation for 580 troop. Armament: 1 x 12 pdr, 2 x 2 pdr, 4 x 20mm

521 Assault Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 583
- LCA 721
- LCA 885
- LCA 886
- LCA 889
- LCS(M)(3) 44
• **SS Canterbury - J12**, was Southern Railway Cross Channel ferry built in 1929. She was 2,900 tons, 330 foot long and could do 21 knots. She carried five LCA and one LCS(M)(3) from **509 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla**

509 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla:

- LCA 596
- LCA 824
- LCA 1040
- LCA 647
- LCA 1039
- LCA 859

• **SS Lairds Isle - J13**, was an old ferry built in 1911. She had a varied wartime career including Armed Boarding Vessel and Target Ship. She was 1,929 tons, 323 foot long and could do 22 knots. She carried six LCA from **516 Assault Flotilla**

516 Assault Flotilla: **(LCA's LOST in Action in RED)**

- LCA 598
- LCA 661
- LCA 772
- LCA 831
- LCA 838
- LCA 875

• **MV Llangibby Castle - J16**, was a Merchant Navy LSI from the Union Castle Line. A large cargo liner built in 1929 she was 11,951 tons, 507 foot long and could do 15 knots. She carried eighteen LCA from **577 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla** and had accommodation for 1,500 troops

577 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla: **(LCA's LOST in Action in RED)**

- LCA 303
- LCA 1096
- LCA 1036 (Cpl Denneford)
- LCA 642
- LCA 1131
- LCA 830
- LCA 1146
- LCA 1090
- LCA 1016
- LCA 1382
- LCA 1017
- LCA 590
- LCA 1124 (L/Cpl Healy)
- LCA 1037
- LCA 1075
- LCA 1089
- LCA 989
- LCA 1173
- LCA 1093

Llangibby Castle was a hard working LSI which had already been used as a troopship, then as an LSI in the Torch Operation. After D Day she then made nearly seventy trips to Omaha and Utah Beaches and to Le Havre, carrying some 100,000 troops to the Continent. She then went to the Far East.

• **HMS Queen Emma - J18**, was a fast Dutch Cross Channel ferry built in 1939. She was 4,136 tons, 380 foot long and could do 23 knots. She could carry two LCM and six LCA but carried eight LCA of **526 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla** on this occasion. There was accommodation for 372 troops.

Armament was 2 x 12 pdr, 2 x 2 pdr, 6 X 20mm

526 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla:

- LCA 228
- LCA 411
- LCA 512
- LCA 538
- LCA 556
- LCA 557
- LCA 1031
- LCA 1336

• **MGB 324** accompanied this group

**Group 315**

- Five LCT of 36 Flotilla
- Three LCI(L)
- Seven LCT of 20 Flotilla
- ML 205 (T/Lt B S Collins, RNVR) Flotilla Officer 20 Flotilla - Senior Officer

All the above groups should have arrived in the above order and then form waves for the run in to shore. Some advanced groups had difficulty in finding their correct swept channels and used the wrong ones. This caused delays and problems later. Group 312 carrying the AVRE's for 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade got into Channel 5 instead of Channel 7. At 0112 hrs the Senior Officer reported that he was in doubt. At 0306 hrs Commodore Force J order Group 312 to increase speed and try to reach the Lowering Position on time. This increase in speed was probably the reason why all but one of the LCA(HR) being towed by the LCT's foundered or had to cut adrift. Group 311 carrying the DD tanks and Group J13 got into Channel 6 instead of Channel 7.
It was thought that the wind, tide and current carried the group westwards and into the wrong channel. All channels seem to have been correctly marked with dan buoys and the entrances to them marked by HDML's.

The delays caused by groups entering the wrong channels and by groups simply not been able to maintain the planned speeds meant that some adjustments to H hour had to be made. H Hour had already been altered when it was reported that the depth of water over rocks on the approach to the beaches was less than planned for. By 0630 hrs the Captains Senior Officer Assault Group J1 and Senior Officer Assault Group J2 reported that H Hour would be postponed on their beaches by a further 10 minutes. H Hour would now be 0745 hrs for Assault Group J1 and 0755 hours for Assault Group J2. The Commander Eastern Task Force also ordered that Assault Group J1 should not wait for the group carrying AVRE's for 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

As a result of the postponement the first waves of landing craft would not now land in front of the beach obstacles as planned but would have to land among them. It was also not possible to clear the obstacles before the LCT's arrived. The effect was that a great many craft were damaged when either beaching, or more often when retracting.

In the event the final approach of the assault craft was not the orderly sequence of groups and timings of the tables, diagrams and exercises.
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade were to land either side of the town and port of Courseulles and the River Seulles. This meant that in the early stages the two assault battalions and their supporting units were cut off from one another.

The two beaches, MIKE and NAN GREEN, were different in character. MIKE was an area of coastal deposition where the drift along the coast from west to east deposited sand to form dunes. These dunes had built up until they were between one hundred and two hundred yards deep. On MIKE GREEN to the west this had affected the drainage so that the area inland tended to be damp and liable to flood. A series of drainage ditches had been dug to help drain the land. On MIKE RED the deposition had blocked the River Seulles access to the sea and forced it into a loop. A harbour and docks had been built so as to cut off the loop. The area inside the loop was largely waste or oyster beds. MIKE did not have the beach villas which were a feature of much of the coast. There were so few landmarks that incoming craft had difficulty in identifying the correct point on which to beach.

NAN GREEN was an area of coastal erosion and here there were the various works to prevent, control or delay the effects. There were groynes built out to sea to try and stop the movement of sand. On D Day the presence of the groynes together with the strong current along the beach and the beach obstacles made landings, and lateral movement along the beach tricky. Most of the coast was further protected by sea walls. Inland were the buildings of Courseulles.

The main defences were naturally on either side of the Seulles estuary and port. Strongpoint WN31 to the west of the river had a 75mm field gun in a casemate facing west along the beach, a 50mm gun in a casemate and another 50mm gun in an open pit emplacement at the western end of the position. There was a 50mm gun in a casemate that could fire east or west overlooking the harbour. The rear of the position was protected by the loop of the river.

WN 29 was on the east of the river. This had a 88mm anti tank gun and two 75mm field guns, one German and one French, all in concrete casemates and firing east. There was a 50mm gun in an open pit emplacement and a Tobruk pillbox with 37mm gun. There was a substantial anti tank ditch inland.

"A" Company of the 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment were to land on the right flank to clear a single gun position.

By H+120 minutes 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade had succeeded in landing its three battalions and most of their tactical transport, although much of this was still waiting to exit the beach. 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) was ashore and although most of the DD tanks of the first wave had been able to move inland the reserve squadron was delayed at the exits. Similarly the Field Regiments, RCA were ashore but had to deploy on the beach until they could use the exits.

MIKE BEACH
H – 5 Minutes

6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Lt Col. R.J. Colwell

The squadrons each landed with eighteen Sherman MkV DD tanks. These were carried in four LCT MkIII per squadron. All the DD tanks were 75mm armed, no Sherman Firefly’s were converted although some would join the squadrons later.
Each LCT was to be accompanied by a LCP(L) Smoke, primarily to provide a smoke screen if the enemy opened fire on the Launching Point or on the DD tanks on their swim in, but they were also available to assist with launching the DD tanks and to act as rescue craft.

The intention was that “A” Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) would be launched from the LCT’s 6,000 yards out to sea and then swim to shore. It would land on MIKE GREEN and MIKE RED in support of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles.

Four LCT3’s from 4 LCT Flotilla carry ‘A’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)

![51]

‘A’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Major W. Dudley Brooks

MIKE GREEN

Serial 1000 is LCT3 306 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying
- 4 Sherman MkV DD Tanks & 20 crew from ‘A’ Squadron, 1 Tp (Lt Lees, Cpl Kay), 2 Tp (Lt Mills)

Serial 1001 is LCT3 7010 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying
- 5 Sherman MkV DD Tanks & 25 crew from ‘A’ Squadron, Sqn OC (Maj Brooks), BC (Capt Fyfe), 2 Tp (Cpl Houle), 3 Tp (Cpl Pockiluk)

MIKE RED

Serial 1002 is LCT3 390 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying
- 5 Sherman MkV DD Tanks & 25 crew from ‘A’ Squadron, Sqn 2i/c (Capt Powell), 3 Tp (Lt Goff, Sgt Lumley, Cpl Beverly)

Serial 1003 is LCT3 441 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying
- 4 Sherman MkV DD Tanks & 20 crew from ‘A’ Squadron, 5 Tp (Lt Little, Sgt Kenyon), 4 Tp (Lt Pattinson, Sgt Pitcher, L/Cpl Stanfield)

The run in to shore by the LCT’s started in good order but when the planned launching point was reached it seemed that the weather would not permit the tanks to swim in. The Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group ordered the DD tanks to remain in the craft, which were then to be beached. When the craft reached 1000 to 2000 yards from the shore the DSOAG changed his mind and ordered the DD tanks to be launched. These changes caused some confusion. When ‘A’ Squadron received the order they were not in the correct formation for launching and were under mortar fire. Two LCT launched their DD tanks successfully. A third LCT launched only one DD tank before the ramp chains were shot off by enemy fire. This LCT proceeded to the beach with the remaining four DD tanks. It hit a mine and developed a list. It later hit a second mine but managed to land one DD tank. A second DD tank damaged its screen and sank. The remaining two DD tanks were trapped in the damaged craft and were not landed until the afternoon. The fourth LCT accompanied the damaged craft to shore and landed its DD tanks.

Thus eleven tanks were successfully launched but one was lost after being run down by an LCT(R) and two drowned near the shore. Six of the remaining tanks were landed from the LCT’s which beached and two more landed in the afternoon.

The first tanks reached the shore just after the initial infantry waves but timings are confused. One tank was knocked out on the beach and the squadron second in command’s tank had its gun disabled.
'A' Squadron claim to have knocked out two 75mm guns, one 50mm gun and six machine guns. The Squadron Commander reported that shortly after the tanks deflated and began to engage the fortifications the enemy surrendered, not having expected to encounter tanks at such an early stage. An hour to an hour and a half elapsed before the tanks could move off the beach. As soon as the exits were open the squadron split into three groups:

- Two tanks to support ‘C’ Company, 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- Four tanks to support ‘B’ Company, Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- Four tanks to support ‘D’ Company, Royal Winnipeg Rifles

**MIKE BEACH - The Breaching Teams**

**H Hour**

On Juno, the Breaching Teams were separate from the Obstacle Clearing Teams. The units of the Assault Squadrons RE did not initially have a role in obstacle clearance, although they could be called on to assist later. The Breaching Teams were given two additional LCT which were given the suffix A. These carried reserve vehicles for the half squadron. Each LCT towed a LCA(HR) but only one arrived safely, the others having foundered or being cut adrift, apparently because they were towed too fast through heavy seas.

**26 Assault Squadron, RE - Major A.E. Younger, attached from the 5th Engineer Assault Regiment, RE, 1st Assault Brigade RE, 79th Armoured Division, AND**

**"B" Squadron, 22nd Dragoons, Major E.B.G Oates, attached from 30th Armoured Brigade, 79th Armoured Division**

26 Assault Squadron, RE and "B" Squadron, 22nd Dragoons, landed under the command of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Five LCT5 from 162 LCT Flotilla carried Breaching Teams which were to make two exits from the beach.

**MIKE GREEN - Green Gap (M1)**

1 Troop, 22nd Dragoon’s - Lt. Ian Hammerton

**Serial 1018** is **LCT5 2296** from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Sherman Crab & 10 crew from 2 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons - Lt M.C.Barraclough
- 1 x AVRE with Bobbin & 6 crew - 1 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer & 2 crew - 1 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE

**Serial 1019** is **LCT5 2336** from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 1 x Sherman Crab & 5 crew from 1 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons - Captain Hewitt
- 1 x AVRE with Fascine & 6 crew - 1 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x AVRE with SBG Bridge & 6 crew - 1 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x BARV & 6 crew - 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME

**MIKE RED - Yellow Gap (M2)**

2 Troop, 22nd Dragoon’s - Lt Micheal Charles Barracloug

**Serial 1020** is **LCT5 2399** from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 1 x AVRE with Bullshorn Plough & 6 crew - 2 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE - Tows a Porpoise
• 1 x AVRE with SBG & 6 crew - 2 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE Command & 6 crew - 2 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE - Major Younger, OC & Lieutenant Pratt

**Serial 1021** is an LCT5 2243, Sub Lieutenant Eric Wilkinson from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 1 x Sherman Crab & 5 crew - 2 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
• 1 x AVRE with Fascine & 6 crew - 2 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE with SBG Bridge & 6 crew - 2 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE & 6 crew - 2 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE - Capt Hendry 2 i/c

**Half Squadron Reserve**

**Serial 1019A** is an LCT5 from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 3 x AVRE & 18 crew - 2 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE - Lt Sharp
• 1 x BARV & 6 crew - 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME

The Landing Table carries a note that the LCT5’s were fitted with rollers.

1 and 2 Troops, 26 Assault Squadron, RE had perhaps the most difficult task but demonstrated versatility and initiative and succeeded in opening a gap with few casualties, although somewhat behind schedule.

1 Troop touched down at 0800 hrs but in the wrong location, opposite Yellow Gap (M1). This was mistaken for Green Gap and so work was started. Flails made a lane to and through the dunes. On the far side of the dunes they came to a crater some twenty foot by 9 foot and attempted to by pass it. In doing so they both lost a track to mines. It is not clear why but presumably they had to raise the flail booms. The third flail then cleared a route forward to a point 150 yards inland where a culvert had been blown and dammed to form a water obstacle sixty foot wide and twelve foot deep. This was surrounded by shallow flooding which made the limits of the obstacle difficult to see. The flail reversed to clear the path for AVREs but became ditched in deep mud. It remained immobile for the rest of the day but continued to use its guns in support. The fascine AVRE approached the obstacle in order to place its load but it misjudged the edge due to the flooding and fell in and became submerged. The crew baled out but were mortared and three were killed and three wounded.

In the meantime 2 Troop had touched down at 0810 hrs at its correct place and found 1 Troop already at work. It placed its SBG bridge to the right of the gap and its flail crossed, but hit a mine and blocked the route. 2 Troop then moved up to assist 1 Troop. The remaining flails had damaged their booms on landing and could not flail but did give covering fire. Fascine's were placed in the first crater and a SBG bridge was brought up to the culvert. The fascine of the submerged AVRE was pushed into the water and the bridge dropped onto the submerged tanks turret. Chespales and logs were carried up from the beach and used to make a causeway. This work was done by sappers on foot and under fire, but with the support of the guns of the disabled flails and a number of DD tanks which were in the dunes.

At 0915 hrs the first DD tanks of 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) were able to cross the causeway, together with some infantry. When six tanks had crossed the SBG began to slip and traffic was halted while it was secured. Four more tanks crossed but the fifth slipped and became...
bogged. This was towed off by an AVRE which was standing by for the purpose. Soon afterwards the first SP gun attempted to cross. This became so firmly bellied on the bridge that it took three bulldozers linked together and two AVREs to clear it. While traffic was halted the opportunity was taken to improve the causeway with various materials including rubble from damaged houses with the help of a horse and cart impressed from a French farmer. 2 Troop then opened the weir which was causing the flooding in the culvert.

By 1000 hrs Beach Group sappers were working on the causeway, the exit and the road. This lane was reported to be working satisfactorily at 1140 hrs. This formed SBG bridge remained in operation from until 1330 hrs. Later the culvert was filled in, covering the AVRE.

2 Troop took an SBG bridge inland but it was not used. The Officer Commanding then carried out a reconnaissance of the route to Courseulles, removed mines from a bridge, operated a swing bridge and opened a route between MIKE and NAN Beaches at 1200 hrs. The lateral road along the coast and behind the dunes was also open by this time.

While work was being carried out on Yellow Gap parties had carried out a reconnaissance to the flank and Green Gap was opened and ready to carry traffic by 0930 hrs. This does not seem to have presented any problems. Manual labour and dozers made a gap in the dunes, chespale track was laid and mines cleared.

MIKE BEACH - H Hour

**2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment**

3 Battery - ‘P’ & ‘Q’ Troop - A/T/Major M.B. Johnson RM

‘A’ Flotilla of LCT(A)HE will land with Centaur tanks of 3 Battery, 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment. These LCT’s will also carry teams of engineers and personnel for beach obstacle clearance. Orders and Landing Tables refer to LCT(A) HE. Naval sources are clear that craft were either LCT(A) which were armoured or LCT(HE) which were not. The 4 craft landing Centaurs on MIKE were all LCT(A)

**MIKE GREEN - 3 Battery - ‘P’ Troop** (supporting Royal Winnipeg Rifles) - Capt L.L.A McKay SAUDF

Serial 1008 is LCT(A)HE 2428 from 105 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment towing Porpoises MkII - Lt V.J Syborne, RA
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment. Ammunition handlers
- Space for 50 rounds extra ammunition stowed loose
• 2 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 4 men vehicle party - Headquarters RCE, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment
• 1 x Car 5 cwt 4x4 (Jeep) & 3 crew - 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 11 men and an Airborne Truck - 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE

LCT(A)HE 2428 was forced to turn back on the evening of 5th June with engine trouble and was later taken under tow by the Rescue Tug Jaunty. The tow failed and LCT 2428 capsized spilling its tanks, bulldozers, vehicles, troops and crew into the sea. LCT 2428 continued to float for some time until finally sunk by gunfire

Serial 1009 is LCT(HE) 2240 from 105 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
• 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
• 1 x Sherman Tank & 5 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt
• Space for 50 rounds extra ammunition stowed loose
• 2 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 4 men vehicle party - Headquarters RCE, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment
• 13 men and an Airborne Truck - 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 12 men - 'A' Company, 8 Kings Regiment. Beach Group

Serial 1010 is LCT5 2076 from 105 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 4 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer & 8 men vehicle party - Headquarters RCE, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment
• 24 men and an airborne trailer - 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 3 x Carriers Mortar with 6 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
• 9 men - Royal Winnipeg Rifles

MIKE RED - 3 Battery - 'Q' Troop - (Supporting Royal Winnipeg Rifles) Capt K.R.M.Perrott RM

Serial 1011 is LCT(A) 2051 from 105 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
• 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
• Space for 50 rounds extra ammunition stowed loose
• 4 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 8 men vehicle party - Headquarters RCE, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment
• 24 men and an airborne trailer - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 12 men from 'B' Company, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group

Serial 1012 is LCT(A) 2120 from 105 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt Towing Porpoises
• 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
• 1 x Sherman Tank with 5 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
• 1 x Carrier Universal with 2 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
• Space for 50 rounds extra ammunition stowed loose
• 6 men - 'B' Company, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group
**Serial 1013** is LCT(CB) 2041, Lt Edward Prentice, RNVR carrying:
- 2 x Sherman Vc Firefly & 8 crew - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Lt Irving and Sgt Lamb
- Space for extra ammunition

The two Sherman Vc Firefly were to give fire support in the final stages of the approach. It was found that the 17 pdr guns were very effective against concrete pillboxes and they could be called on to give support to the DD tanks or the infantry. During the approach the two Fireflies had a list of specific targets which they were to engage and destroy. It is reported that they carried out the plan but it is not known with what success. Both seem to have landed and eventually moved inland. While doing so one was knocked out by a 50mm anti tank gun and the commander, a Lieutenant was killed.

‘P’ and ‘Q’ Troops of 3 Battery, 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment were unlucky on the Channel crossing. During the night a large vessel was reported to have driven through the flotilla and split it. One craft with two Centaurs of ‘Q’ Troop on board was lost at sea, one did not arrive until D+1 and the others did not beach until later, between 0900 hrs and 0945 hrs, thus arriving at the same time as the artillery regiment they were supposed to be standing in for. When they did land they were held up on the beaches and three Centaurs of ‘P’ Troop were immobilized when their tracks were damaged in the shingle. No calls for fire were received but they did round up some prisoners and silence a machine gun nest.

**MIKE BEACH**

**H Hour**

**Obstacle Clearance Teams**

The Landing tables that were prepared in April 1944 were later modified to take into account the increased number of beach obstacles that were being installed. As yet no Landing Tables have been found for some of these units.

For this purpose it was equipped with explosives and bulldozers. The intention was to break the obstacles up and then collect them on the beaches above the high water mark where they would be out of the way of incoming craft and traffic. 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE would provide four sections for each assault brigade front and be assisted by one platoon of 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE and two RN LCOCU per beach.

18th Canadian Field Company, RCE was a Divisional Field Company. Initially it was to land with the Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment to assist with the clearing of beach obstacles. 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment was also to land from LCT’s carrying Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment vehicles for obstacle clearance. The beach obstacles were submerged soon after H hour and the clearance teams did not succeed in clearing many obstacles before they were forced to abandon the task. The teams were set to work on first clearing mines from the beach, although few were found, and then working on the beach exits until the tide went out and they could continue their clearance task.

The Landing Tables show three parties each with 24 men and an airborne trailer from 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE and four D7 Bulldozers from 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment. In addition there was a jeep and airborne trailer, presumably from Company Headquarters.

Since the craft carrying the Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment were late arriving it follows that the sappers of 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE and the D7 Dozers of 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division Special Bulldozer Increment were also late since they were carried in the same craft. Since it was not possible for these units to perform their task of obstacle clearance because of the high tide the late arrival was not crucial and is not specifically mentioned in reports. It does seem however that none of the 18th Field Company, RCE vehicles or personnel were on the LCT(A)s that failed to arrive. 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE did land, slightly behind schedule.

Two platoons of 262 Field Company, RE per beach would land at H+20 minutes and reinforce the obstacle clearing parties.

RN Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units (1, 5, 11 and 12 LCOCU)

The army engineers were assisted in the task of clearing obstacles by RN Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units. These were specially trained and equipped to deal with obstacles in more than three foot of water. They were also to mark the gaps and any obstacles within them. 1 and 5 LCOCU landed on 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade front. Each unit had its own LCA which carried the units special equipment and they landed with the first wave of infantry. They soon found that the water was too deep for them to work on the seaward belt of obstacles and they moved on to those further up the beach. When they had to abandon this task they used their skills and equipment to assist with rescue work on the beach. There are reports of them taking ropes out to landing craft for personnel to hang on to as they waded through the waves. They also used their underwater gear to attach tow ropes to vehicles so they could be towed ashore.

MIKE BEACH
H Hour

Assault Infantry

Royal Winnipeg Rifles land with ‘C’ Company (Major D. G. Crofton) 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment under command.

Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Lt Col John M. Meldram

The assault battalion landing on MIKE Beach, on the right of the brigade front. ‘C’ Company (Major D. G. Crofton) of 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment was under command, and landed on the right. ‘D’ Company, Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Major Lockie Fulton) landed in the centre and ‘B’ Company (Captain Phil Gower) on the right. Each company was accompanied by a party of sappers from 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE. Battalion Headquarters, ‘A’ Company (Major Fred Hodge) and ‘C’ Company (Major Jimmy Jones) landed at H+20.

Serials 1032 to 1036 were LCA’s 596, 647, 824, 1039, 1040 of 509 Assault Flotilla from LSI J12, SS Canterbury, carrying:

- 127 men - ‘D’ Company Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Major L. R. Fulton
- 7 men - Royal Winnipeg Rifles Pioneer Section
- 3 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer

Serial 1037 was LCS(M)(3) 89 of 509 Assault Flotilla from LSI J12, SS Canterbury, carrying:

- 4 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Bombardment FOO No 2. To land as required.

NOTE: three Carriers Mortar from the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were also to land from LCT(A) although probably not at this time.
1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish Regiment - Lt Col F.N. Cabeldu

MIKE GREEN

1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment was the Brigade reserve but ‘C’ Company (Major D. G. Crofton) landed at H Hour under the command of Royal Winnipeg Rifles.

Serials 1026 to 1030 were LCA’s 583, 721, 885, 886, 889 of 521 Assault Flotilla from LSI J11, SS Ulster Monarch, carrying:
- 127 men - ‘C’ Company 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment - Major D. G. Crofton
- 7 men - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment Pioneer Section - To clear wire with Bangalore's
- 3 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer

Serial 1031 was an LCS(M)(3) 44 of 521 Assault Flotilla from LSI J11, SS Ulster Monarch, carrying:
- 4 men - 13 Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Bombardment FOO No 2

NOTE: to land as required. To observe the effects of the bombardment by field artillery during the run in and to control the fire of Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment Centaurs in support of the infantry companies.

Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Lt Col John M. Meldram

MIKE RED

Serials 1038 to 1043 were LCA’s 598, 661, 772, 831, 838, 875 of 516 Assault Flotilla from LSI J13, SS Laird’s Isle, carrying:
- 164 men - ‘B’ Company Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Major R. M. Lendrum
- 8 men - Pioneer Section Royal Winnipeg Rifles - To clear wire with Bangalore’s
- 3 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 18 men - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Demolition and mine clearing teams

6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Maj T. R. Murphy

A 3rd Canadian Infantry Division unit. It provided assault demolition teams and mine clearing teams for the assault companies.

Each assault company had one assault demolition team of five men organized as:
- NCO, leader
- Beehive Team, 2 men each carrying a section of a 75 lb Beehive on a Yukon pack
- Beehive man carrying a light (40 lb) Beehive
- Flame man carrying a portable flame thrower

The Beehive was to kill the occupants of concrete emplacements by firing Beehive charges against the roof or walls. Flame was used to kill the occupants by firing it through the apertures in an emplacement.

Each assault company also had a four man mine clearing team.
MIKE BEACH
H + 20 Minutes

The Reserve Companies of the Assault Battalions land together with attached personnel and reconnaissance parties from units due to land later.

Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Lt Col John M. Meldram

Serials 1056 to 1061 were 6 LCA's of 577 Flotilla from LSI J16 MV Llangibby Castle carrying:
- 127 men - 'A' Company, Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Major F. E. Hodge
- 15 men - Battalion Headquarters, Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 man - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Padre attached Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 3 men - Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Unit Landing Officers party
- 3 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer (FOO) attached Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 7 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Reconnaissance party to prepare for the landing of the Field Regiment
- 1 man - Inns of Court Regiment - Unit Landing Officer
- 3 men - Regina Rifles - Unit Landing Officers party
- 3 men - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment - Unit Landing Officers party
- 2 men - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Unit Landing Officer
- 7 men - 'A' Company, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group reconnaissance party
- 6 men - 85 Field Company, RE - Reconnaissance party
- 2 men - RN Beach Party
- 3 men - RN 13 Beach Signals
- 4 men - 14 Beach Signals

Serials 1062 to 1067 were 6 LCA's of 577 Flotilla from LSI J16 MV Llangibby Castle carrying:
- 90 men - 'C' Company, Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Major J. M. D. Jones
- 15 men - Battalion Headquarters, Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 3 men - Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Unit Landing Officers party
- 2 men - 'J' Section 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 man - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Platoon Commander
- 3 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 5 men - Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 19 men - 14th Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC - Assault Section Plus 8 spaces for Medical Stores
- 3 men - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment - Unit Landing Officers party
- 2 men - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Unit Landing Officer
- 7 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Reconnaissance party
- 7 men - 'A' Company 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group reconnaissance party
- 6 men - 85 Field Company, RE - Reconnaissance party
- 2 men - RN Beach Party
- 3 men - RN 13 Beach Signals
- 4 men - 14 Beach Signals
The following will be ferried ashore from a LCH by LCA as required:

**Serial 1080 is LCH 168:**
- 7 men - Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Command Group
- 3 men - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Contact Detachment
- 3 men - RN Forward Observation Bombardment Unit F 64
- 1 man - 'J' Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 3 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Commanding Officer
- 2 men - 'E' Section (12th Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 15 men - RN Beach Parties
- 8 men - RN 13 Beach Signals
- 8 men with 4 handcarts -14 Beach Signals

**MIKE BEACH**

**H+45 Minutes**

This and subsequent timings for beaching of craft are the time aimed at. They may be varied as the situation demands by the Brigade Commander in consultation with Captain, Senior Officer Assault Group J1 (RN).

The Reserve Battalion of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade lands together with personnel from supporting units and Beach Group.

**MIKE GREEN**

1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment - Lt Col F.N. Cabeldu

LCA's 228, 411, 512, 538, 556, 557, 1031 & 1336 from LSI J18 - HMS Queen Emma
LCA's 692, 706, 818, 834, 836 & 1025 from LSI J19 - SS Duke of Argyll
LCA's 736, 850, 856, 925, 1021, 1033, 1371 & 1372 from LSI J20 - HMCS Prince Henry

- 127 men - 'A' Company - Major Plows
- 18 men - Battalion Headquarters - Commanding Officer’s party
- 19 men - Battalion Headquarters - Second in Command’s party
- 8 men - Pioneer Section
- 127 men - 'B' Company - Major R. M. Lendrum
- 127 men - with 127 Folding Bicycles from 'D' Company - Major MacEwan
- 1 man - Headquarters 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade - Padre

**NOTE:** 'C' Company landed at H Hour under command of Royal Winnipeg Rifles

Plus
- 2 men - a handcart from 'J' Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 3 men - Forward Observation Officer, 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 3 men - Forward Observation Bombardment Office - Forward Observation Bombardment party F66, RN
- 5 men - 'A' Company - Reconnaissance party - Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 3 men for Traffic Control on the beach - 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars)
- 2 men - Canadian Press Relations Services
- 19 men - 14th Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC - Assault Section
- 49 men with 4 handcarts - 85 Field Company, RE
- 15 men with a handcart - 1 Field Dressing Station, RAMC - For Main Dressing Station
- 15 men with a handcart - 2 Field Dressing Station, RAMC - For Main Dressing Station
- 14 men - 'A' Company, 8 Kings Regiment. Beach Group - Reconnaissance party
- 2 man - Headquarters Company, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group
- 16 men - 242 Provost Company - One section for control of the exits
"C" Squadron, Inns of Court Regiment - Lt Col R.A.C. Bingley, was under the direct command of 1 Corps

The Unit Landing Officer had already landed at H+20 minutes to prepare for the landing of the squadron.

MIKE GREEN - Serials 1104 and 1105 were two LCT 4's specially allotted to the Inns of Court Regiment who were responsible for their tactical loading. These vehicles were to be given first priority through the exits. All vehicles were to fly a red and yellow flag to aid in their identification.

Serial 1104 is LCT4 513 carrying: (Maj Strakosch, Lt's Young, Hunt, Wigram, Sinnott, Shaw & Gwynn-Jones)
- 7 x Daimler Scout Cars
- 8 x Daimler Armoured cars
- 49 men
- 6 x M5 Halftracks
- 20 men from a Special Detachment, RE - Carried in M5 Halftracks above (Lts Lofts & Symm RE)
- 2 men with a balloon from 51 RAF Balloon Unit
- Chespales to be loaded in this craft

Serial 1105 is LCT4 507 carrying: (LCol Bingley, Capt Warren, Padre Du B Lance, Lts Black, Reeve, Cooke & Wall)
- 6 x Daimler Scout Cars
- 2 x Humber Scout Cars
- 6 x Daimler Armoured Cars
- 1 x Staghound Armoured Car
- 49 men
- 6 x M5 Halftracks
- 20 men - Special Detachment, RE - Carried in M5 Halftracks above (Lts Petworth, Bridge & Taylor RE)
- 2 men with a balloon from 51 RAF Balloon Unit
- Chespales to be loaded in this craft

NOTE: 5 Officers and 35 men - Special Detachment, RE - Carried in M5 Halftracks above Serials 1104 & 1105. The personnel came from 73 Field Company, RE

NOTE: LCT 507 hit mines on landing, destroying vehicles listed in narrative below

The squadron was formed into twelve half troops each of:
- 1 x Daimler Scout Car
- 1 x Daimler Armoured Car
- 1 x M5 Halftrack

These would leave a Squadron Headquarters of:
- 1 x Staghound Armoured Car
- 1 x Daimler Scout Car
- 2 x Daimler Armoured Cars
- 2 x Humber Scout Cars

NOTE: One of these vehicles would be for the officer commanding RE detachment. It seems that only nine half troops carried engineers and explosives.
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew followed at H+7 hours.
3rd Canadian Infantry Division orders also include information on the "C" Squadron, Inns of Court Regiment, as it was likely that it would operate partly in 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions area. Units were to be aware of the likelihood of their presence and that the armoured cars would identify themselves by a yellow band round the turret, having the gun facing to the rear and by yellow smoke.

**The Plan (See Appendix ‘V’)**

Once the enemy defences had been breached and there was a gap through the beach minefields the squadron would be ordered to advance. This order was to be given by the Commander of the right assault brigade. After passing through the assault brigade the force was to reach the River Orne as quickly as possible. Its tasks were:

- To delay the advance of enemy reserve formations moving to the counter attack west of Caen
- To carry out general reconnaissance

The force was to prepare for demolition all road bridges over the River Orne from Thury Harcourt to St Andre sur Orne, and as a second priority all rail bridges. Priority was from south to north. All the bridges in the given area were to be blown rather than be allowed to fall into enemy hands intact.

If the force failed to reach the River Orne it should create an obstacle on the line of the River Odon instead. The River Odon did not present an obstacle to tanks so in addition to blowing bridges, roads should be mined cratered and mines laid.

Once the demolition belt on either line had been blown the squadron was to delay the enemy for as long as possible, gradually withdrawing and reporting enemy movement. A classic reconnaissance action! Finally the squadron would come into Corps reserve near Douvres.

If possible the force would report on the strength, composition and direction of enemy movement.

In the event that the line of the River Odon was not reached the task of the squadron was to report the strength, composition and direction of all enemy movement seen. Secondly it would use its engineers and explosives to the best advantage in the circumstances to delay the enemy.

**The Reality**

The LCT’s 513 & 507 landed as planned at 0830 hrs. LCT 507 struck two mines in shallow water, one armoured car, three scout cars and two halftracks were knocked out. This meant that vehicles could not land for six hours when the tide receded and the LCT was dried out. Because of a lack of exits and congestion on the beach, permission was not given for the force to advance until 1030 hrs. It is known that the six troops crossed the River Seulles from 1500 hrs onwards but after that the movements are not clear. It seems that increasing opposition held them up and despite clear recognition signs one armoured car was destroyed by a British tank. The next officially recorded fact is that the headquarters harboured for the night in the area of Vienne en Bessin.

On D+2 one half troop was attacked by US Thunderbolts aircraft at Jerusalem Crossroads. One halftrack carrying explosives blew up and destroyed other vehicles and buildings.

It seems that none of the objectives were reached and no bridges were blown. The squadron carried out a reconnaissance role before returning to 1 Corps Headquarters. It was then reorganized and used as Phantom style contact detachments with 1 Corp units and as liaison with XXX Corps.
‘C’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Major A.D.A. Marks

Three LCT 4’s, Serials 1106, 1107 and 1108 are carrying the wading vehicles of 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars). ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons had landed with DD tanks. Now ‘C’ Squadron and Regimental Headquarters land.

Serial 1106 is a LCT4 506 carrying:
‘C’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Sqn OC (Maj A.D.A Marks)
- 2 x Sherman Mk Vc Firefly
- 5 x Sherman Mk III
- 1 x Stuart Light Tank
- 1 x Valentine Bridge Layer (from 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade)
- 2 x Jeep
- 43 men in vehicles above
- Porpoises to be loaded into this craft

Plus
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1107 is a LCT4 522 carrying:
‘C’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Regt CO (Lt Col Colwell)
- 1 x Sherman Mk Vc Firefly
- 6 x Sherman Mk III
- 1 x Stuart Light Tank
- 1 x Valentine Bridge Layer - 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 40 men in vehicles above
- Porpoises to be loaded into this craft

Plus
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 4th Canadian Provost Company
- 1 x Motorcycle with 1 crew - 4th Canadian Provost Company. Carried on Jeep above
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 1 man - Canadian Press Relations Services
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1108 is a LCT4 517 carrying:
‘C’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Regt 2i/c (Maj F.E. White)
- 2 x Sherman Mk Vc Firefly
- 6 x Sherman Mk III
- 1 x Stuart Light Tank
- 2 x Jeep
- 46 men in vehicles above
- Porpoises to be loaded into this craft

Plus
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit
Total vehicles, ‘C’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars):
- 5 x Sherman Mk Vc Firefly
- 17 x Sherman Mk III
- 3 x Stuart Light tank
- 2 x Valentine Bridge Layer - 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 4 x Jeep

‘C’ Squadron and Regimental Headquarters landed from LCT’s at 0820 hrs. At this time the exits were not open and the beaches were congested. A number of troops were despatched to deal with snipers and machine guns which were hindering work on the exits. When the exits were open Regimental Headquarters moved to its rally at Grays sur Mer, losing the CO’s tank on the way. ‘C’ Squadron supported 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment in its advance towards Banville.

MIKE BEACH
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade Headquarters

Serial 1109 is a Headquarters Ship, HMS Lawford. The following personnel will be ferried ashore by LCA’s as required by the Brigade Commander:
- 10 men - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 5 men - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals
- 2 men - ‘E’ Section (12th Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals
- 3 men - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Contact Detachment
- 3 men - RN Forward Observation Bombardment party F67
- 4 men - 12th Canadian Field SP Regiment, RCA - Artillery Group Command
- 2 men - Canadian Press Relation Services

Serials 1110, 1111 and 1112 are Motor Launches (ML). They will transfer personnel from the Landing Ship Headquarters and take them close to shore where they will be landed by LCA’s.

Serial 1110 is ML
- 11 men - RN Beach Parties
- 3 men - RN 13 Beach Signals

Serial 1111 is ML
- 12 men - RN Beach Parties
- 3 men - RN 13 Beach Signals

Serial 1112 is ML 151 - (T/SLt D H Mason, RNVR)
- 11 men - RN Beach Parties
- 4 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer

The LCA’s were those which had landed assault troops in the first waves. While most LCA’s returned to their ‘mother’ LSI and were hoisted aboard for the return trip to the UK a number were to be retained for Ferry work off the beaches. Their place on LSI’s was taken by returning LCA(HR).

The Brigade Commander’s party landed about 0930 hrs and moved to the Main Beach Signal Station. This had been operating for the past hour and would act as the headquarters communications centre until the Brigade Main Headquarters and its signals vehicles arrived. The Brigade Main Headquarters was established ashore at 1215 hrs at Graye sur Mer.
The following personnel and vehicles for 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade Headquarters were scheduled to land at H+75 minutes but were delayed and held up on the beaches. See below:

- 9 men - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Army Air Support Unit - Tentacle
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 8 men with a James Motorcycle - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Liaison Officer
- 1 x Jeep towing an airborne trailer with 1 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 13 men with 2 handcarts - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 1 crew - ‘J’ Section 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals - Attached Brigade Headquarters.
- 1 x Motorcycle - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals. Carried in above halftrack
- 1 x Jeep - 2 crew from RN Forward Observation Bombardment party F67. Attached to Brigade Headquarters

It was an essential part of the Air Support Signals Unit role that it was independent of the formations to which they were attached. The vehicles, wireless sets and personnel could not be reassigned by local commanders or Signal Officers. Thus they were always available for their primary task of air support.

The Self Propelled (SP) Field Artillery lands

Canadian Self Propelled Field Artillery were equipped with M7 Priest 105mm Self Propelled guns. As on other beaches they were to fire on the approach and then wait offshore until the beaches were sufficiently clear to accept them. Each of the assaulting brigades had a Field Artillery Group of two regiments. 12th Canadian Field Artillery Regiment Group, RCA consisted of 12th and 13th Canadian Field Regiments, RCA and was to support 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Forward Observation Officers landed with the infantry assault brigades. Each assault battalion had five FOOs, plus a spare and a CO’s artillery representative. Reserve battalions in each assault
brigade had one FOO and there was one at each assault brigade headquarters. There was also one Forward Officer Bombardment per Brigade Headquarters and one per infantry battalion. Each Field Artillery Regiment landed a reconnaissance party with the infantry and then landed the guns of 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA at H+75 minutes, and 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA at H+105 minutes.
Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment landed with the assault infantry at H Hour to give support on the beaches until the field artillery regiments landed. They would then be attached to the field artillery regiments.

The British Artillery Regiments assigned to these Groups were "follow on", landing on D+2 and D+3. Until the end of Phase II, the capture of the intermediate objectives, the above organization would remain:

**Divisional Royal Canadian Artillery** - Brigadier P.A.S. Todd, which consisted of two Regimental Groups of:

**12th Canadian Field Artillery Regiment Group, RCA** - Lt Col Webb consisted of:
- 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 6th Field Regiment, RA - Landed on D+2
- 3 Battery, 2nd Armoured Support Regiment, RM
- Four FOB Detachments, ‘A’ troop, 3 Bombardment Unit, RN
- Plus the assigned divisional anti tank and anti aircraft batteries

On landing 12th and 13th Canadian Field Regiments, RCA were to go to Gun Area "Mary" between Croix sur Mer and Banville. 3 Battery, RM would remain deployed on MIKE GREEN, MIKE RED and NAN GREEN.

**14th Canadian Field Regiment Artillery Group, RCA** - Lt Col H.S. Griffin consisted of:
- 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA (attached from First Cdn Army Troops)
- 191th Field Regiment, RA - Landed D+3, and
- 79th Medium Regiment, RA - Landed D+2

14th and 19th Canadian Field Regiments, RCA would go to Gun Area "Jane" astride the road Courseulles to Beny sur Mer. 4 Battery, RM would remain deployed on NAN WHITE and NAN RED.

In Phase III the Field regiments would leap frog forward in support of the infantry. There would always be two batteries per regiment deployed for action at all times. The RM batteries were to deploy to the North of the gun areas and be ready to deploy in the forward areas to support infantry during the night.

War Diaries for the artillery regiments and infantry battalions have little to say about the actions of the artillery on D Day. All regiments landed more or less on time and were delayed on the beach. They supported infantry from positions on or near the beach before moving inland later in the day.

- 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - 11th, 16th and 43rd Batteries, RCA
- 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - 22nd, 44th and 78th Batteries, RCA

**12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA** - Lt Col Webb

At H Hour, two - three man Forward Observation Officer teams landed with the assault companies. Available to land from LCS(M) as required and direct the fire of the Centaurs of the Royal Marine Support Regiment were two - four man Forward Observation Bombardment teams.

At H+20, two further three man Forward Observation Officer teams landed with the follow up companies. The Commanding Officer with two other personnel and a seven man reconnaissance party also landed.
At H+45 two men from ‘F’ Section, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals landed to provide signals for the Commanding Officer.

12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA Landed at H+75 minutes.
13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA landed at H+105 minutes.

No artillery landed on NAN GREEN

MIKE GREEN
12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Lt Col Webb

Four LCT4’s from 31 LCT Flotilla land carrying three troops of 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA plus a variety of other vehicles for 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

**Serial 1113** is LCT4 667 from 31 LCT Flotilla, 'K' LCT Squadron carrying:
- ‘A’ Troop, 11th Battery, 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
  - 2 x Sherman OP
  - 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP towing Porpoise MkII & 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
  - 1 x Carrier AOP
  - 2 x M14 Halftrack
  - 1 x Jeep
  - 56 men

Plus
- 1 x Carrier Universal with 2 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 2 x Carrier with 4 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x Jeep with 4 crew - 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 8 men with a handcart - ‘A’ Company, 8 Kings Regiment

**Serial 1114** is LCT4 569 from 31 LCT Flotilla, 'K' LCT Squadron carrying:
- ‘B’ Troop, 11th Battery, 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA:
  - 2 x Sherman OP
  - 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP towing Porpoise MkII & 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
  - 2 x Carrier AOP
  - 1 x M14 Halftrack
  - 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 - Medical
  - 55 men

Plus
- 2 x Carrier Universal with 4 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 2 x Carrier Mortar with 4 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 8 x men with 2 motorcycles - Royal Winnipeg Rifles

**Serial 1115** is LCT4 709 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- ‘C’ Troop, 16th Battery, 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA:
  - 2 x Sherman OP
  - 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP towing Porpoise MkII & 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
  - 1 x Carrier AOP
  - 2 x M14 Halftrack
  - 52 men
  - 1 x Jeep with airborne trailer and 2 crew - ‘E’ Section (12th Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

Plus
- 3 x Carrier Mortar with 6 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 9 men - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 3 x Motorcycles and 3 crew - 4th Canadian Provost Company. Loaded onto carriers above
Serial 1116 is LCT4 509 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 1 x Churchill ARV with 6 crew - 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 2 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals. Attached to 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x Motorcycle - ‘J’ Section (7 Brigade), 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals. Carried in above halftrack
- 1 x Humber Scout Car with 2 crew - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars).
- 1 x Jeep with 4 crew - 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - RN Forward Observation Bombardment party F66 - Attached to 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish
- 1 x Jeep and airborne trailer with 1 crew - 12th Canadian Field Company, RCA Artillery Group Command
- 2 men - ‘E’ Section (12 Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisional Signals. Carried in Jeep above
- 1 x Armoured D7 Angle-dozer towing a Jahn trailer with 3 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
- 1 x Armoured D7 Angle-dozer towing a flat bed trailer with 2 crew - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company, RCE
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - RN Forward Observation Bombardment party F65. Attached to Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Army Air Support Unit - Tentacle
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 69 Infantry Brigade - Liaison Officer
- 1 x Carrier Universal with 2 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x Motorcycle - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x Carrier Universal with 2 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Motorcycle with 1 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 17 men with 3 handcarts - ‘J’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 9 men - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 2 men with a handcart - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Contact Detachment
- 2 men with a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

NOTE: This craft carries 1 Jeep and airborne trailer with 1 crew from 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Artillery Group Command. This vehicle carries 2 men from ‘E’ Section (12th Cdn Field Regiment, RCA), 3rd Canadian Divisional Signals. These will be ashore and waiting for the Commanding Officer 12 Artillery Group (CO 12th Field Regiment, RCA) when he lands from 7th Canadian Infantry Brigades HQ ship.

MIKE RED

Serial 1117 is LCT4 514 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying:

‘D’ Troop, 16th Battery, 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA

- 2 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP towing Porpoise MkII & 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 2 x Carrier AOP
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 2 x Jeep
- 54 men

Plus

- 2 x Carrier with 4 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 2 x Motorcycle with 2 crew - 4th Canadian Provost Company. Carried on above Carriers
- 1 x Carrier Mortar with 2 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 4 men and a motorcycle - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 8 men with a handcart - 242 Provost Company
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit
Serial 1118 is LCT4 500 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying:
‘E’ Troop, 43rd Battery, 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA:
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP towing Porpoise MkII & 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 1 x Carrier AOP
- 2 x M14 Halftrack
- 52 men
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 7 crew - ‘E’ Section (12th Field Regiment) 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 10 cwt trailer and 2 crew - ‘E’ Section (12th Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

Plus
- 1 x Jeep with a motorcycle and 2 crew - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1119 is LCT4 508 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying:
‘F’ Troop, 43rd Battery, 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP towing Porpoise MkII & 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 1 x Carrier AOP
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 52 men
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 7 crew - ‘E’ Section (12th Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

Plus
- 8 men and a handcart - ‘B’ Company 8 Kings Regiment. Beach Group
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit
Serial 1120 is LCT4 510 from 31 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 1 x Churchill ARV and a Motorcycle with 7 crew - 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 1 x Armoured D7 Angle-dozer towing a Jahn trailer with 3 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - RN Forward Observation Bombardment party F67. Attached to Brigade Headquarters
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Liaison Officer
- 2 x Jeeps and a Motorcycle with 4 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x Amphibious Jeep with 2 crew - RN Beach Party
- 1 x Jeep towing an airborne trailer with 1 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Division Signals
- 13 men with 2 handcarts - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Division Signals
- 1 x Carrier Mortar with 4 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x Carrier Universal with 2 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x Motorcycle - Royal Winnipeg Rifles. Carried on Carrier above
- 2 x Jeeps and a motorcycle with 4 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 2 x Jeeps and a motorcycle with 4 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 4 men and a motorcycle - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 1 crew - ‘J’ Section 3rd Canadian Divisional Signals. Attached Brigade Headquarters
- 1 x Motorcycle - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Divisional Signals. Carried in above halftrack
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 8 men with a James Motorcycle - Headquarters, 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 2 men with a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Junction of MIKE GREEN and MIKE RED

Serial 1121 is LCI(L) 117 - Lt Richard Laurence Gordon, RCNVR, carrying personnel for work on the beaches:

- 47 men - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 54 men - 190 Company, Pioneer Corps
- 49 men - 85 Field Company, RE
- 16 men - ‘A’ Company, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group
- 16 men - ‘B’ Company, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

MIKE GREEN

Serial 1123 is Motor Launch 146 - T/Lt C D P Cookson, RNVR carrying the following to be put ashore by LCA:

- 4 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 10 men - RN Beach Parties

The observation and reconnaissance parties of 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA landed with the infantry but suffered casualties including three officers wounded. The regiment landed around 0900 hrs when the foreshore was very congested and the exits not yet open. The regiment came into action on the beach. The enemy were still very active and very close. The guns engaged targets over open sights and lost several men to sniper fire. The regiment eventually reached its gun area at 1700 hrs

Observation and reconnaissance parties landed with the assault infantry and had severe officer casualties including three killed and two wounded. The Commanding Officer landed at 0830 hrs and the guns landed at around 0930 hrs
Serial 1124 is LCT 706, Lt James Kirkwood, RNVR carrying:

‘A’ Troop, 22nd Battery, 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA:
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP
- 1 x Carrier AOP
- 2 x M14 Halftrack
- 1 x Jeep
- 56 men
- Space for extra ammunition. Porpoises to be loaded in this craft

Plus
- 1 x Jeep with 4 crew - 242 Provost Company
- 2 x Jeeps with 8 crew - Pioneer Platoon, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group.
- 3 men - Pioneer Platoon, 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group.

Serial 1125 is LCT 781 carrying:

‘B’ Troop, 22nd Battery, 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA:
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP
- 2 x Carrier AOP
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Medical
- 55 men
- Space for extra ammunition. Porpoises to be loaded in this craft

Plus
- 2 x Carrier Mortar with 4 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 8 men and 2 motorcycles - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x Carrier Loyd with 4 crew - Headquarters 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group Intelligence Officer’s party.

*NOTE: The Loyd Carrier may have been replaced by a Weasel.*

Serial 1126 is LCT 876 carrying:

‘C’ Troop, 44th Battery, 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA:
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP
- 1 x Carrier AOP
- 2 x M14 Halftrack
- 52 men
- Space for extra ammunition. Porpoises to be loaded in this craft

Plus
- 1 x Jeep with airborne trailer and 3 crew - ‘F’ Section (13th Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Division Signals

- LCT 876 UNLOADING ON JUNO BEACH

- 1 x Carrier Universal with 2 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x Motorcycles and 1 crew - 4 Canadian Provost Company. Loaded onto carrier above
- 1 x Jeep with airborne trailer and 4 crew - 242 Provost Company. Officer Commanding
Serial 1127 is LCT4 528 carrying:
- 1 x Churchill ARV and a Motorcycle with 6 crew - 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 1 x Armoured D7 Angle-dozer towing a Jahn trailer with 3 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
- 1 x Amphibious Jeep with 3 crew - 21 Army Group Movement Control - Military Landing Officer
- 1 x Jeep Ambulance towing an airborne trailer with 3 crew - 2 Field Dressing Station, RAMC - Senior Medical Officer
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 2 x Carrier Universal towing 6 pdr AT guns with 4 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4 with 2 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 10 men and 1 Motorcycle - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x Bulldozer D4 towing a flat bed trailer with 2 crew - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company, RCE
- 1 x Carrier (L) with 4 crew - Headquarters, 8 Kings Regiment - 7 Beach Group Command - For reconnaissance
- 1 man - Signal Platoon 8 Kings Regiment. In carrier above
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 3 crew - 85 Field Company, RE - Officer Commanding
- 1 x 15 cwt GS and 1 Motorcycle with 4 crew - 242 Provost Company.
- 2 men with one balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1128 is LCT4 575 carrying
‘D’ Troop, 44th Battery, 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA:
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP
- 2 x Carrier AOP
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 2 x Jeep
- 54 men
- Space for extra ammunition. Porpoises to be loaded in this craft

Plus
- 1 x Jeep and 1 Motorcycle with 2 crew - 4th Canadian Provost Company.
- 2 x Jeeps with 3 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Contact Detachment.
- 2 x Motorcycle with 2 crew - 4th Canadian Provost Company. Carried on above Jeeps
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1129 is LCT4 574 carrying - Midshipman Brian F Bennett
‘E’ Troop, 78th Battery, 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA:
- 3 x Sherman OP
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP
- 1 x Carrier AOP
- 2 x M14 Halftrack
- 59 men
- Space for extra ammunition. Porpoises to be loaded in this craft

- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 7 crew - ‘F’ Section (13th Canadian Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 10 cwt trailer and 2 crew - ‘F’ Section (13th Canadian Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 man - Headquarters RCA, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Padre for 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - H/Capt H.L. Chappell

Plus
- 1 x Jeep with an airborne Trailer and 2 crew - ‘J’ Section (7 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals.
- 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit
Serial 1130 is LCT4 717 - T/Lt Alan Hardie Good, RNZNVR carrying:
   ‘F’ Troop, 78th Battery, 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA:
   • 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP
   • 2 x Carrier AOP
   • 1 x M14 Halftrack
   • 52 men
   • Space for extra ammunition. Porpoises to be loaded in this craft
   • 1 x M14 Halftrack with 7 crew - ‘F’ Section (13th Canadian Field Regiment), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals.

Plus
   • 8 men and a handcart - 242 Provost Company
   • 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1131 is LCI(L) 177, Lt William Cooper Gardner, RCNVR carrying:
   • 54 men - 190 Pioneer Company
   • 19 men - ‘A’ Company, 8 Kings Regiment
   • 19 men - ‘B’ Company, 8 Kings Regiment
   • 27 men - 293 Pioneer Company (Medical) - 1 Field Dressing Station (MDS)
   • 27 men - 293 Pioneer Company (Medical) - 2 Field Dressing Station (MDS).
   • 2 men - Headquarters, 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
   • 22 men - 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots)
   • 7 men - 103 RAF Beach Section - Liaison Officers party
   • 3 men - 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Party - Medical Officer & party - 2 Field Dressing Station
   • 2 men - 21st Army Group Movement Control - Military Landing Officer’s staff
   • 1 man - 114 LAA Regiment, RA - Medical Officer for 1 Field Dressing Station
   • 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

MIKE BEACH
H + 135 Minutes

MIKE GREEN

Three LCT4 landing craft with bridging vehicles plus vehicles for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and Beach Group.

Serial 1132 is LCT4 531 carrying:
   • 2 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Decking
   • 1 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Ramp
   • 6 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Panels
   • 1 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Accessories
   • 1 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Grillage
   • 1 x Bulldozer D8 with 2 crew - 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME
   • 2 men and a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1133 is LCT4 770, Sub-Lt Roy Clark, RNVR carrying:
   • 4 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Decking
   • 1 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Ramp
   • 2 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Panels
   • 1 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Accessories
   • 1 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Grillage
   • 1 x ARV with 5 crew - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
   • 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
Serial 1134 is LCT4 768 carrying:

- 2 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Decking
- 2 x 3 ton GS - 1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Bailey Panels
- 1 x Armoured D7 Angle-dozer towing a Jahn trailer with 3 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, REME
- 2 x Carrier Universal with 4 crew - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 2 x Motorcycle - Royal Winnipeg Rifles. Carried on Carriers above
- 2 x Carrier Universal towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns with 4 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 with 2 crew - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x Motorcycle - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x Amphibious Jeep with 2 crew - RN Boom Command
- 8 men - RN Boom Command
- 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - 'J' Section 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 80 AA Brigade, RA - Command
- 5 men - Headquarters 8 Kings Regiment - Beach Group
- 2 men - 21 Army Group Movement Control - Military Landing Officers staff
- 3 men - Signal Platoon 8 Kings Regiment - Beach group
- 3 men - 297 GT Company, RASC - Reconnaissance
- 2 men with a balloon - 51 RAF Balloon Unit

1622nd Bailey Platoon, 106 Bridging Company, RASC - Maj P.S. Bean

CRE 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was responsible for the construction of Two Class 40 Bailey bridges over the River Seulles at Colombiers and Pont de Reviere. The estimated time of completion was H+11 hours for Colombiers and H+7 hours for Pont de Reviere. The main party of 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE moved forwards with the infantry to the River Seulles and carried out reconnaissance and classification of the bridges. Both the bridges were found to be intact and safe to use so no bridge construction was required and the platoon of 106 Bridging Company, RASC was not called on at this time.

7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
NAN GREEN - H - 7 minutes

‘B’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Major Duncan

Four LCT3’s from 4 LCT Flotilla carry ‘B’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)

Serial 1004 is LCT3 311 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 4 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 20 crew - ‘B’ Squadron, 1 Tp (Lt Pease, Sgt Erskine, Cpl Shier), 2 Tp (Lt Allen, Sgt Gristey)

Serial 1005 is LCT3 372 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘B’ Squadron, Sq OC (Maj Duncan), HQF Sgt (Sgt Johnstone), 2 Tp (Cpl Simpson), 3 Tp (Cpl Floyd), 5 Tp (Sgt Bailey)
Serial 1006 is LCT3 422 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying:
  • 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - 'B' Squadron, Sqn 2i/c (Capt Smuck), BC (Capt R Wildgoose), 3 Tp (Lt McLeod, Sgt Gariepy), 2 Tp (Cpl Cook)

Serial 1007 is LCT3 703 from 4 LCT Flotilla carrying:
  • 4 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 20 crew - 'B' Squadron, 4 Tp (Lt Seaman, Sgt Smith, A/Cpl Cybulski) 5 Tp (Lt Deans, Cpl Laroche)

The squadron was told that they could not launch and would be beached. The LCT's proceeded slowly forward towards the shore on a zigzag course. At 5000 yards the sea had improved and the order to launch at 4000 yards was given. Launching took some time because of the LCT's rolling in the rough sea. Nineteen tanks were launched but one failed to start and was landed later. The DD tanks then made for shore. One tank was lost almost immediately when its engine stalled and two more sank when their screens collapsed in the rough seas. The Squadron Commander's tank was hit and disabled some 200 yards from shore and the crew escaped in their dinghy.

Only 14 tanks touched down on the correct beach, one came ashore later some distance to the east. They were however still ahead of the infantry. Two tanks were drowned after deflating, having been caught by the rapidly rising tide. One tank was knocked out on the beach.

The squadron gave support on the beaches and knocked out a number of gun positions. When the exits were opened they advanced inland supporting the Regina Rifles in the task of clearing Courseulles.

**NAN GREEN**

**H Hour**

**Breaching Teams**

Five LCT5 from 162 LCT Flotilla carried Breaching Teams which were to make two exits from the beach.

There were some redistribution of the loads for some craft between 14 April and 6 June but the numbers and types of vehicles remained the same.

26 Assault Squadron, RE - Major A.E. Younger, was attached from the 5th Engineer Assault Regiment, RE, 1st Assault Brigade RE, 79th Armoured Division, AND

"B" Squadron, 22nd Dragoons, - Major Oates, was attached from the 30th Armoured Brigade, 79th Armoured Division

26 Assault Squadron, RE and "B" Squadron, 22nd Dragoons, landed under the command of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade

3 Troop, 22nd Dragoons - Lt W. Shaw

**Blue Gap (M3)**

Serial 1022 is LCT5 2246 from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:
  • 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 3 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
  • 1 x AVRE with Log Carpet and 6 crew - 3 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
  • 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 3 Troop 26, Assault Squadron, RE - Lt Ash
Serial 1023 is LCT5 2270 from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 3 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x AVRE with Bobbin and 6 crew - 3 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x AVRE with Plough and 6 crew - 3 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE. Tows a sledge
- Half Squadron Commander - Captain Richard B. O. Boase
- 1 x Caterpillar D7 Armoured Angle-dozer with 2 crew - 3 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE

NOTE: There is some disagreement as to whether the D7 or an AVRE was carried in Serial 1023. In either case the other vehicle was carried in the reserve, Serial 1023A.

Half Squadron Reserve

Serial 1023A is an LCT5 from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 3 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron 22nd Dragoons - Lt W.G. Shaw
- 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 2 x AVRE with 12 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE

4 Troop, 22nd Dragoons - Lt Civil Burbidge

Red Gap (M4)

Serial 1024 is LCT5 2047 from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 3 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons.
- 1 x AVRE with Log Carpet and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x AVRE with SBG Bridge and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE - Capt R J Mare

Serial 1025 is LCT5 2077 from 162 LCT Flotilla carrying:

- 1 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 2 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE - tow a Porpoise
- 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x AVRE with SBG Bridge and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE - Lt David

The LCT5’s are listed as being fitted with roller doors.

The two troops assigned to NAN GREEN both arrived late. 3 Troop arrived at 0815 hours and 150 yards east of the planned gap. At this time the tide had covered the beach obstacles, the infantry had
landed but were still on the beach and the DD tanks were firing from the surf or advancing up the beach.

4 Troop arrived even later, at 0831 hrs, but in the correct place, where 3 Troop were already working. Flails from 3 Troop gave covering fire while a Flail from the Reserve mounted the dunes and continued inland, opening up a way to an anti tank ditch. An AVRE of the Reserve with a fascine followed and dropped its fascine in the gap and then crossed over. A second AVRE with fascine from 3 Troop dropped its fascine in the ditch further along. 4 Troop had now landed and flailed a second route to the crossing and then laid a further fascine alongside the other. Both crossings were improved by armoured D7's and a route to the first lateral was open by 0900 hrs. No mines were encountered as the route passed through the defended locality.

AVRE's were then used singly or in half troops to assist the infantry in the town.

Blue Gap was opened by having an armoured D7 bulldozer construct a ramp and then the Bobbin AVRE laid its matt to allow wheeled vehicle to use the exit. AVRE's had to stand by to tow vehicles through the soft sand to the exit.

At 0915 hrs Red Gap was blocked when a trailer towed by a bulldozer overturned at the ditch. An AVRE with a SBG bridge was sent to lay a bridge over the ditch but it slipped and fell off when crossing the dunes. A second SBG was sent up and was positioned successfully by 0945 hrs. This then carried traffic all day. Later a further fascine was dropped in the gap and logs used to make a wheeled crossing twenty foot wide.

When the tide went out six AVRE's and two armoured D7's were used to clear the beach obstacles. There were hedgehogs, Element C and ramps with mines or shells attached.

2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
3 Battery, ‘S’ & ‘T’ Troops

The four LCT4's from 105 LCT Flotilla carried 3 Battery, ‘S’ and ‘T’ troops, 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment.

3 Battery - ‘S’ Troop - (supporting Regina Rifles) Capt. J. Brown RM

Serial 1014 is LCT(A) 2010 from 105 LCT Flotilla:
- 2 x Tanks Centaur with 10 crew - ‘S’ Troop, 2nd RMASR towing Porpoises MkII
- 5 men (ammunition handlers) - ‘S’ Troop, 2nd RMASR
- Space for additional ammunition - 50 rounds
- 2 x D7 Bulldozer Armoured and 4 men - HQ RCE 3 Canadian Infantry Division (Special Bulldozer Increment)
- 13 men and an airborne truck - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE

Serial 1015 is LCT(HE) 2076 from 105 LCT Flotilla:
- 2 x Tanks Centaur with 10 crew - ‘S’ Troop, 2nd RMASR towing Porpoises MkII
- 5 men (ammunition handlers) - ‘S’ Troop, 2nd RMASR
- Space for additional ammunition. 50 rounds
- 1 x Sherman OP with 5 crew - ‘S’ Troop, 2nd RMASR
- 2 x D7 Bulldozer Armoured and 4 men - HQ RCE 3 Canadian Infantry Division (Special Bulldozer Increment)
- 1 x Car 5 cwt 4 X 4 (Jeep) and 3 men vehicle party - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 11 men and an airborne truck - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
3 Battery - 'T' Troop - (Supporting Regina Rifles) Capt. R. Kaye RM

Serial 1016 is LCT(HE) 2313 from 105 LCT Flotilla:
- 2 x Tanks Centaur with 10 crew - 'T' Troop, 2nd RMASR towing Porpoises MkII
- 5 men (ammunition handlers) - 'T' Troop, 2nd RMASR
- Space for additional ammunition - 50 rounds
- 6 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group.

Serial 1017 is LCT(A) 2263 from 105 LCT Flotilla:
- 2 x Tanks Centaur with 10 crew - 'T' Troop, 2nd RMASR towing Porpoises MkII
- 5 men (ammunition handlers) - 'T' Troop, 2nd RMASR
- Space for additional ammunition - 50 rounds
- 1 x Sherman OP with 5 crew - 'T' Troop, 2nd RMASR
- 12 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group.

'S' and 'T' Troops landed on NAN GREEN between 0820 hrs and 0845 hrs. 'T' Troop received no requests for fire while on the beach but 'S' Troop was requested by a Forward Observation Officer of 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA to engage a tower containing a machine gun. The two troops exited the beach about 0930 hrs and harboured just to the east of Courseulles. 'S' Troop assisted 'A' Company, Regina Rifles in taking the strongpoint in Courseulles.

**NAN GREEN**

**Assault Infantry**

![56](image) Regina Rifles - Lt Col F.M. Matheson

'A' and 'B' Companies land together with assault demolition parties and mine clearance parties from 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE. Two Forward Observation parties from 13 Field Regiment, RCA, one per company, and two Forward Observation Officers Bombardment teams also land after directing fire of the SP guns on the run in.

Serials 1044 to 1048 were LCA's 520, 643, 644, 763 & 767 of 505 Assault Flotilla from LSI J14 SS Isle of Thanet carrying:
- 127 men - 'A' Company - Major Duncan Grosc
- 18 men - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Demolition and mine clearing teams
- 3 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer

Serial 1049 was LCS(M)(3) 107 of 505 Assault Flotilla from LSI J14 SS Isle of Thanet carrying:
- 4 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Bombardment Forward Observation Officer No 1 - To land as required

**NOTE:** To observe the effects of the bombardment by field artillery during the run in and to control the fire of Royal Marine Centaurs in support of the infantry companies.

Serials 1050 to 1054 were LCA's 774, 775, 897, 808 & 809 of 510 Assault Flotilla from LSI J15 HMS Invicta carrying:
- 127 men - 'B' Company - Major F. L. Peters
- 7 men - Regina Rifles Pioneer Section - To clear wire with Bangalore's
- 12 men - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Demolition and mine clearing teams
- 3 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer

Serial 1055 was LCS(M)(3) 47 of 510 Assault Flotilla from LSI J15 HMS Invicta carrying:
- 4 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Bombardment Forward Observation Officer No 2 - To land as required

**NOTE:** To observe the efectos of the bombardment as per Serial 1049

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We do not have details of individual craft loads but from other beaches we can guess that the following will be included. In each company three LCA would each carry a platoon. This would not be complete but would have thirty three men, leaving space for equipment. The platoon officer would be accompanied by his batman carrying a wireless set No 48. Two LCA would carry Company Headquarters, attached personnel and equipment. One craft would carry the Company Commander, and batman, while the other carried the Company Sergeant Major. There would also be snipers, stretcher bearers, battalion signallers, intelligence personnel, regimental police and runners, plus the engineers, observation teams and pioneers listed on the table.

The two assault companies of the Regina Rifles came under only desultory fire on the run in but met with heavy machine gun fire as soon as the LCA's ramps were lowered.

- ‘A’ Company - Major Duncan Grosch, on the right touched down at 0805 hrs on NAN GREEN. One objective was a strongpoint to the east of the mouth of the River Seulles. This was behind a 10 foot thick concrete sea wall and contained six machine guns, a 50 mm gun, a 75 mm gun and an 88 mm gun. All of these were intact despite the air and sea bombardment.

- ‘B’ Company - Major F.L. Peters, landed at 0815 hrs, further to the left against light opposition and cleared portions of Courseulles. No supporting armour had landed at this time.

- ‘C’ Company - Major C.S.T. Tubb, landed at 0835 hrs, ‘C’ Company joined in the clearance of Courseulles where there were now DD tanks and Centaurs.

- ‘D’ Company - Major J.V. Love (KIA 6 June) landed at 0855 hrs and suffered heavy losses due to mines and obstacles which sank two LCA. Only 49 men from the company landed. After re organizing it advanced towards Reviere at 0930 hrs.

- Battalion HQ's - Lt Col F.M. Matheson, landed at 0900 hrs

The Regina Rifles were the only unit whose task immediately on landing was to clear a built up area. The town of Courseulles was divided into twelve blocks, each to be cleared by specific companies. The battalion had trained in street fighting and house clearing and had studied photographs and maps of the town. The strongpoint in Block 1 occupied ‘A’ Company for some time while ‘B’ Company cleared Blocks 2, 3 and 4. ‘C’ Company on landing moved to clear Blocks 8, 9, 10 and 11. ‘A’ Company reported that Block 1 was in their hands and they were ordered to Block 5, 6 and 7. ‘B’ company reported Block 4 clear and was ordered to Block 12.

‘A’ Company next reported that it was being fired on from Block 1, which it had just cleared. It seems that enemy troops had returned to the strongpoint via tunnels and trenches. ‘A’ Company had not foreseen this and had not left a force behind to prevent it. They returned and cleared it again with the assistance of two troops of tanks before moving to Blocks 5, 6 and 7. The tanks were probably one troop from ‘B’ Squadron, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) and ‘S’ Troop, 2 RMASR.

Eventually the entire battalion concentrated at Reviere. The remnants of ‘D’ Company had arrived at about 1100 hrs. ‘C’ Company followed on completion of their tasks. Battalion Headquarters arrived around 1500 hrs. ‘A’ and ‘B’ arrived later.
Regina Rifles - Lt Col F.M. Matheson

Serials 1068 to 1073 were 6 LCA's of 577 Assault Flotilla from LSI J16 MV Llangibby Castle carrying:

- 127 men - ‘C’ Company Regina Rifles - Major C.S.T. Tubb
- 15 men - Battalion Headquarters Regina Rifles
- 8 men - Regina Rifles Pioneer Platoon
- 6 men - Regina Rifles Mortar Platoon
- 6 men - Regina Rifles Anti Tank Platoon
- 3 men - Regina Rifles - Unit Landing Officers party
- 3 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 1 man - Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Padre for Regina Rifle.
- 5 men - ‘A’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 1 man - 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars) - Traffic Control Officer
- 2 men - RN Beach Party
- 3 men - RN 13 Beach Signals
- 4 men - 14 Beach Signals

Serials 1074 to 1079 were LCA's 684, 810, 815, 816, 819 & 823 of 511 Assault Flotilla from LSI J17 SS Mecklenburg carrying:

- 127 men - ‘D’ Company, Regina Rifles - Major J.V. Love
- 15 men - Battalion Headquarters Regina Rifles
- 7 men - Regina Rifles Mortar Platoon
- 6 men - Regina Rifles Anti Tank Platoon
- 3 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 2 men with a handcart - J Section (7 Brigade), 3 Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 19 men - 14th Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC - Assault Section
- 1 man - 7th Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars) - Traffic Control Officer
- 1 man - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Platoon Headquarters
The following will be ferried ashore from a LCH by LCA as required. This would be when the assault and follow up companies ashore and communications were established. The Commanding Officer Regina Rifles would decide when the time was right to transfer from the headquarters afloat to that ashore.

**Serial 1081** is LCH 98, Lt Cdr Thornton:
- 7 men - Regina Rifles - Command Group
- 3 men - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Contact Detachment
- 1 man - 'J' Section (7 Brigade), 3 Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 2 men - 'F' Section (13th Field Regiment), 3 Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 3 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Commanding Officer
- 3 men - RN Forward Observation Bombardment Unit F 65 - Forward Observation Bombardment Party 65 was to support Regina Rifles on NAN GREEN.

*NOTE: It was allocated HMS Fury with which it communicated on Forward Observation Bombardment frequency Jig 2. A Jeep with heavier wireless sets lands later, H+60 to H+75*

The following were aboard LCH 98, **Serial 1081**, but were to be landed directly on MIKE RED by LCA. intended for MIKE RED:
- 15 men - RN Beach Parties - For MIKE RED.
- 8 men - RN 13 Beach Signals - For MIKE RED.
- 7 men with 3 handcarts - 14 Beach Signals - For MIKE RED.

LCA's were from the assault wave and were assigned as required by Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group

The following was the time to be aimed at and at which the craft should be prepared to land. The time could be varied according to the situation ashore by the Brigade Commander in consultation with the Captain commanding Group J1. Presumably varied in this case means delayed since it would be difficult to advance it.

**NAN GREEN**
**H+75 minutes**

**Serial 1122** is LCT5 2343 carrying vehicles for the Regina Rifles plus engineers of 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE:

**Regina Rifles**
- 2 x Carrier Universal with 4 crew.
- 1 x Motorcycle. Carried on Carrier above
- 5 x Carrier Mortar with 10 crew
- 1 x Motorcycle. Carried on Carrier above
- 2 x Carrier Universal towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns with 4 crew.
- 5 men
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Forward Observation Bombardment party F65 - Attached to Regina Rifles

**Plus**
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 2 crew and a motorcycle - 'J' Section (7 Brigade), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals - Attached to Regina Rifles
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 24 men - 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 1 x Armoured D7 Angle-dozer with 2 crew - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company, RCE towing a flat bed trailer loaded with trackway material.

*NOTE: D7 to work with 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE*
Bombardment Force ‘E’ was the force assigned to give support to Juno Beach and was under the command of Force ‘J’. There was a potential problem in that the commanding officer of Bombardment Force ‘E’, and also the Flag Officer 10 Cruiser Squadron, was a Rear Admiral while the commanding officer of Force ‘J’ was only a Commodore. Naval etiquette would not normally permit a Rear Admiral to be under the command of, or even in support of, a Commodore. However the Rear Admiral agreed to waive his seniority on this occasion.

Bombardment Force ‘E’ does not appear as such on the Force ‘J’ orders and tables. The cruisers HMS Belfast and HMS Diadem were to sail as Convoy 12A of Force ‘G’, and to use Channel 6. The destroyers of Bombardment Force ‘E’ crossed as escorts to Force ‘J’ convoys.

There were few targets requiring bombardment from the cruisers. They would anchor in Fire Support Area ‘E’ off Juno Beach and provide counter battery fire with air spotting as follows:

- **HMS Belfast** - 150mm battery at Ver Sur Mer. This was on Gold Beach and until it was destroyed or captured, HMS Belfast would be under the command of Force ‘G’. It would then revert to Force ‘J’

- **HMS Diadem** - 105mm battery at Beny Sur Mer.

Spotting aircraft for HMS Diadem were assigned for only 90 minutes. If the Beny Sur Mer battery continued to be active after that time fire was to be without observation using ranging data from...
unattached spotting aircraft. Any army Forward Observer Bombardment able to observe the battery was to inform the HQ ship immediately so that HMS Diadem could be attached.

Having escorted convoys across the Channel the destroyers were a met by BYMS and proceeded to the Fire Support Areas ‘X’ and ‘Y’, to the east and west of the DD Tank Launch Position.

Three destroyers and two Hunt Class were to give fire support to 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade from Fire Support Area ‘Y’.

Fleet destroyers HMS Venus, HMS Faulkner and HMS Fury each had four 4.7” guns. Hunt Class FS La Combattante (French) and HMS Stevenstone each had four 4” guns. HMS Venus was in reserve. HMS Faulkner and HMS Fury fired at beach defences on LOVE from H-40 minutes until H Hour. FS La Combattante gave close support fire on MIKE and HMS Stevenstone on NAN GREEN.

Four destroyers and two Hunt Class were to give fire support to 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade from Fire Support Area ‘X’. Fleet destroyer HMS Kempenfelt was the flagship of Captain Destroyer Flotilla 26 and was in reserve. Fleet destroyers HMS Vigilant, HMCS Algonquin and HMCS Sioux, and HMS Kempenfelt, each four 4.7” guns. The Hunt Class HMS Bleasdale and HNorMS Glaisdale each had four 4” guns. HMS Vigilant, HMCS Algonquin and HMCS Sioux fired at beach defences on OBOE from H-40 minutes until H Hour. HMS Bleasdale gave close support fire on NAN WHITE and RNorN Glaisdale gave it on NAN RED.

A list of coastal defences was provided but Commanding Officers were to shift to other targets if such fire would assist the assault, not endanger own forces and the target justified the expenditure of ammunition. In order to identify targets Commanding Officers of destroyers were to approach as close to the shore as necessary. Hunt class destroyers could close to 3000 yards.

The Hunt destroyers were to reach a position just astern of and to the flank of the DD Tank Launching Position. They were then to proceed inshore keeping inline with the LCT’s carrying AVRE until 4000 yards from shore. They were to provide covering fire against shore defences.

Fleet destroyers allocated to pre arranged targets were to keep 1000 yards behind the Hunts. Those that were not allocated were to be available to take over any targets allocated to a ship becoming a casualty. They would also be available to fire on targets allocated to the SP artillery in LCT’s if necessary and were permitted to fire on hostile guns which opened fire.

Destroyers giving close support to the assault would continue firing until the first wave of craft touched down, regardless of time. They then shifted fire to strongpoints on the flanks. They remained in the fire support areas awaiting calls from Forward Observers Bombardment.

HMS Venus and HMS Vigilante were equipped with sets to enable them to engage targets with air spotting. This might be done if cruisers were casualties or if there were spare aircraft available.
Support Craft

Landing Craft Gun - LCG

The following would provide close support for 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- LCG 831, 1007 and 1062 - Landing Craft Gun each with two 4.7” guns
- LCF(2) 1 - Landing Craft Flak

Close support for 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- LCG 764, 681, 680 and 939 - Landing Craft Gun each with two 4.7” guns

All were to cover the launch of DD tanks. If the tanks were fired on by shore batteries then they should return fire, otherwise LCG would engage beach defences from H-30 minutes:
- LCG 831 and LCF 1 were to engage beach defences on MIKE
- LCG 1062 and 1007 were to engage beach defences on NAN GREEN
- LCG 939 and 680 were to engage beach defences on NAN WHITE
- LCG 681 and 764 were to engage beach defences on NAN RED

Landing Craft Tank (Rocket) - LCT(R)

LCT (R) operated in pairs. In each pair one would fire a pattern of rockets at H-8 minutes and the second would fire at H-5 minutes. Both would aim at the same area which would extend across the beach to be assaulted and be 300 yards deep. From their assigned position they would need to aim the entire craft:
- LCT (R) 367 and 359 would fire on MIKE on bearing 184 degrees
- LCT (R) 437 and 405 would fire on NAN GREEN on bearing 180 degrees
- LCT (R) 378 and 398 would fire on NAN WHITE on bearing 180 degrees
- LCT (R) 363 and 337 would fire on NAN RED on bearing 175 degrees

Landing Craft Support (Large) - LCS(L) would provide smoke and close support as ordered by SOAGs. Six smoke laying LCP(L) were to meet the cruisers and destroyers.

The LCG and LCF were to accompany the assault waves, giving close support as necessary. When no longer required for close support the Naval Force Commander was to informed and he would attach them to FOB’s for indirect bombardment. They were to concentrate in flotillas on the flanks and keep clear of incoming craft.

The report of Naval Commander Force 'J' simply says that all these arrangements went according to plan.

Air Spotting

Two sorties of 45 minutes each were allotted to HMS Diadem. They were ready to observe from 40 minutes before sunrise. At the end of the 90 minutes some spotting sorties were available to spot for impromptu targets.
United States Coast Guard Cutter - Sea Rescue Duties

A few weeks prior to D-Day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt suggested that Operation Neptune needed a rescue flotilla; some even claim that Winston Churchill lamented that the losses in the Channel would be prohibitive and it was too bad that the Allies did not have a dedicated rescue force on hand to which the President declared "But we do—the Coast Guard!" Roosevelt then ordered the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, to work out the details. ADM King in turn contacted the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Vice Admiral Russell R. Waesche, who noted that there were dozens of coastal patrol craft that might do the job. The Coast Guard had 83-foot patrol boats, nicknamed the "matchbox fleet," on anti-submarine duty along the East Coast of the United States. Sixty 83-footers were selected and each cutter was transported piggy-back on freighters to the U.K. where they were offloaded, formed into "Rescue Flotilla One" based at Poole, England, and modified for service as rescue craft. They were under the command of Commander Alexander Stewart, USCGR.

They were assigned to each of the invasion areas, with 30 serving off of the British and Canadian sectors and 30 serving off the American sectors. During Operation Neptune/Overlord these cutters and their crews carried out the Coast Guard's time-honoured task of saving lives, albeit under enemy fire on a shoreline thousands of miles from home. The cutters of Rescue Flotilla One saved more than 400 men on D-Day alone and by the time the unit was decommissioned in December, 1944, they had saved 1,438 souls.

Typical Rescue Cutter Specs:

- Length: 83 ft
- Speed: 20 Knots
- Endurance: 500 miles
- Beam: 16 ft
- Draught: 4 1/2 ft
- Fuel: Petrol, 70-80 Octane

Fitted with Asdic and one or two Oerlikon, radar, four depth charge racks

SEE PAGE 246 for Invasion Fleet and Convoy Assignments (including CO's where known)
Juno Beach

Forward Observers Bombardment - FOB

Forward Observers Bombardment were assigned on the following basis:

- One per battalion in the assault brigades
- One per brigade headquarters
- One at division headquarters

Each party consisted of:

- one Forward Observer Bombardment, RA
- one Observation Post Assistant, RA and
- one Telegraphist, RN

A jeep and a Telegraphist RN landed later. In addition the Brigade Headquarters and Division Headquarters had a halftrack with heavier wireless sets landing later.

The FOB's attached to battalions had a direct link to a Bombardment Liaison Officer RN on the destroyer which was supporting them. There were only six radio frequencies available for FOB so that some had to share a frequency. Brigade and Division shared the Bombardment Calling Wave which linked them to a headquarters ship which assigned a bombardment ship as available.

7th Canadian Infantry Brigade

- **FOB Party 64** worked with **HMS Venus** using frequency Jig 1. It supported Royal Winnipeg Rifles on MIKE GREEN. It was to Land at the Battalion Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75.

- **FOB Party 65** worked with **HMS Fury** using frequency Jig 2. It supported Regina Rifles on NAN GREEN. It was to land at the Battalion Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75.

- **FOB Party 66** worked with **HMS Faulkner** using frequency Jig 3. It supported Canadian Scottish on MIKE GREEN. It was to land at the Battalion Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75.

- **FOB Party 67** was assigned to Headquarters 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. It was to use Bombardment Calling Wave. It was to land at the Brigade Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75. M14 Halftrack lands H+7 hours.

8th Canadian Infantry Brigade

- **FOB Party 68** worked with **HMS Kempenfeld** using frequency Jig 4. It supported Queens Own Regiment of Canada on NAN WHITE. It was to land at the Battalion Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75.

- **FOB Party 69** worked with **HMS Vigilant** using frequency Jig 5. It supported North Shore Regiment on NAN RED. It was to land at the Battalion Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75.

- **FOB Party 70** worked with **HMCS Algonquin** using frequency Jig 6. It supported Regiment de Chaudiere on NAN RED. It was to land at Battalion Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75.
• **FOB Party 71** was assigned to Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade. It used Bombardment Calling Wave. It was to land at Brigade Commanders discretion H+30 to H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75. M14 Halftrack lands H+9 hours.

• **FOB Party 72** was assigned to Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. It used Bombardment Calling Wave. It was to land at Brigade Commanders discretion H+180. Jeep lands H+180. M14 Halftrack lands H+7 hours.

• **FOB Party 73** worked with **HMCS Sioux** using frequency Jig 6. It supported 48 RM Commando on NAN RED. It was to land at H+45. Jeep lands H+60 to H+75.

• **FOB Party 84** was to support 41 RM Commando. It used Bombardment Calling Wave. It landed under 3rd Canadian Infantry Division orders.

**Senior Officer Bombardment** was assigned to Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. It used Bombardment Calling Wave. It was to land at Division Commanders discretion. Jeep lands H+180. M14 Halftrack lands H+7 hours.

**JUNO BEACH - 8th CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE**

8th Canadian Infantry Brigade was carried across the Channel by Assault Group J2 of Naval Force ‘J’. This embarked personnel and vehicles at the Solent ports and hards and sailed on D-1. It used Channel 8 for NAN WHITE and NAN RED.

As with Assault Group J1, Assault Group J2 consisted of five groups, listed in orders dated mid May.

Because of the weather it was not practicable to deploy the dinghy with COPP1 to mark the launching position for the DD tanks of Assault Group J2. This should have been launched from miniature submarine X20 with Assault Group J1.

**Group 321**

Group 321 would be the first group to form up and move inshore from the Lowering Position. The main component was the flotilla of LCT3’s carrying DD amphibious tanks and their escorts, navigation craft, support craft etc.

• Landing Craft Headquarters 239, a converted LCI(L), was the headquarters craft for the Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group, NAN WHITE, who was also Senior Officer Group 321. The craft had a comprehensive communications fit consisting of six B28 and one B29 Navy receivers and six army wireless set No 22. One set was a transmitter/receiver on the DD net for communication with the DD tanks and their LCT’s until they launched. A TCS VHF radio telephone gave access to Senior Officers VHF Wave. The army sets were transmitter/receivers for speech and Morse and were used for communications with the army DD net and SP Field Artillery net and brigade headquarters.

• Eight LCT3 of 11 LCT Flotilla carried the DD tanks of ‘B’ and ‘C’ Squadrons, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse). These travelled in two columns to the Launching Points. The Flotilla Officer, 11 LCT Flotilla was also Deputy Senior Officer Group 321 and was carried on ML 903.
• Three LCP(L) DD Navigation Leaders, 167, 172, and 196, were to lead the DD tanks to shore. These were generally fitted with armour and carried navigation equipment including HS2 navigation equipment. Possibly one at least carried a Combined Operations Pilotage Party Officer.

• LCP(Sy) Survey 290 and LCP(L) 179 were to follow the DD tanks to provide a navigation check if necessary. The LCP(Sy) was then to survey the area off the beaches, partly to find obstacles and partly to identify the best landing places for LCT's.

• Six LCP(L) of 702 Flotilla were available to lay smoke at the Launching Point. This would normally be only if the DD tanks came under fire from shore batteries. They were also available to assist with launching and to act as rescue craft.

• Four LCG(L) of 331 Flotilla were to cover the launch of DD tanks. If the tanks were fired on by shore batteries then they should return fire, otherwise LCG would engage beach defences from H-30 minutes. The LCG were to accompany the assault waves, giving close support as necessary. When no longer required for close support the Naval Force Commander was to informed and he would attach them to Forward Observers Bombardment for indirect bombardment. They were to concentrate in flotillas on the flanks and keep clear of incoming craft.

• A further six LCP(L) of 702 Flotilla were available to lay smoke to cover the bombarding destroyers on the left flank.

**Group 322**

The main components of Group 322 were the LCT5's from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying AVRE's and the LCT(A)'s from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying Centaurs of the Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment.

• Group 322 was commanded by Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group, NAN RED on LCH 167. This was similarly equipped to LCH 239 above but with sets on the AVRE and RMASR nets. ML 123 carried the Flotilla Officer, 103 LCT Flotilla, who was also the Deputy Senior Officer Group 322.

• Ten LCT5 from 106 LCT Flotilla carried the AVRE's of the Breaching and Clearance Teams. Nine of the LCT5 each towed a LCA(HR) (Hedgehog). All nine survived the crossing and fired their hedgehogs successfully.

• Four LCT(A) and four LCT(HE) from 103 LCT Flotilla carried Centaur Close Support tanks of the Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment. One LCT(CB) (Concrete Buster) carried two Sherman Firefly 17 pdr tanks to engage concrete bunkers.

• Three LCM carrying RE parties and their equipment for beach clearance.

• LCF 21 and 32, gave anti aircraft support on the approach and then were available for AA defence off the beaches.

• Two LCS(M) towed by LCT’s. These would carry Forward Observation Officers Bombardment RA for the Field Regiments of Group 323. They would observe the fall of shot during the run in.
Group 323

• ML 198 (T/Lt D H Titcombe, RNVR) carries Senior Officer Group 323

• Sixteen LCT4 from 30 LCT Flotilla carrying SP artillery. ML 147 carries the Flotilla Officer, 30 Flotilla who is also Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group 323.

• LCT(R) 337, 363, 387 & 398 from 2 Division of 320 LCT Flotilla. LCT(R) operated in pairs. In each pair one would fire a pattern of rockets at H-8 minutes and the second would fire at H-5 minutes. Both would aim at the same area which would extend across the beach to be assaulted and be 300 yards deep. From their assigned position they would need to aim the entire craft.

• LCS(L), 204 and 205, provided smoke and close support as ordered by Senior Officers Assault Groups.

NOTE: This group strayed into Channel 7 instead of Channel 8 but does not seem to have been seriously delayed.

Group 324

This was a fast LSI Convoy carrying the assault infantry battalions. Vessels are listed in the order of sailing and therefore order of arrival and mooring at the Lowering Position. One LSI in each division carried an LCA(OC), Obstacle Clearance, in place of an LCA.

• HMS Waveney, a River Class frigate, was the headquarters ship of Captain Senior Officer Assault Group J2. She accompanied the LSI Group. She was 1,370 tons, 301 foot long and could manage 20 knots. As built she carried two 3 inch guns and ten 20mm guns. For the headquarters role she had the aft gun removed and the superstructure extended to provide extra space. Two deck houses were added for communications equipment, a mast was added for aerials and four extra radars fitted (Types 242, 253, 271 and 391). The crew was 140 and an extra 240 were carried in the headquarters role.

3 Landing Ships Infantry Division

• HMS Brigadier, LSI(H) - J34, This was the flagship of the Senior Officer LSI. She was a Southern Railway Cross Channel ferry built in 1928. She was 2,294 tons, 306 foot long and could manage 24 knots. She carried six LCA of 513 Assault Flotilla. She had accommodation for 180 troops and was armed with one 12 pdr and four 20mm.

513 Assault Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 522
- LCA 713
- LCA 717
- LCA 817
- LCA 820
- LCA 821

• SS Clan Lamont, LSI(L) - J31, Clan Lamont was one of a class of cargo liners built for the Clan Line in 1939. She was 7,250 tons and 487 foot long. She carried sixteen LCA and two LCS(M)(3) of 559 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla. She had accommodation for 900 troops and was armed with one 4” gun, one 12 pdr, one 40mm and ten 20mm.

559 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 523
- LCA 530
- LCA 609
- LCA 659
- LCA 667
- LCA 805
- LCA 869
- LCA 916
- LCA 978
- LCA 1084
- LCA 1087
- LCA 1142
- LCA 1253
- LCA 1339
- LCA 1340
- LCS(M)(3) 103
- LCS(M)(3) 104
• **HMS St. Helier - J35**, A Channel Island ferry. She was 1,952 tons, 292 foot long and could manage 18 knots. She carried six LCA from **515 Assault Flotilla**. She had accommodation for 180 troops and was armed with six 20mm.

  **515 Assault Flotilla:** *(LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)*
  - LCA 563 - LCA 827
  - LCA 691 - LCA 833
  - LCA 735 - LCA 878

• **SS Lady of Mann - J37**, An Isle of Man ferry built in 1930. She was 3,100 tons, 372 foot long and could manage 23 knots. She carried six LCA from **512 Assault Flotilla**.

  **512 Assault Flotilla:** *(LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)*
  - LCA 581 - LCA 714
  - LCA 595 - LCA 814
  - LCA 705 - LCA 826

• **MGB 330 and 317** accompanied this group.

![LCA's 826 & 814 from SS Lady of Man in foreground, and LCA's 280 & 197 from SS Monowai in background](image)

4 **Landing Ships Infantry Division**

• **HMS Duke of Wellington - J32**, This was a LMSR ferry built in 1928 and fitted out as LSI in 1942. She was 3,743 tons, 358 foot long and was capable of 21 knots. She carried six LCA from **506 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla** and had accommodation for 250 troops.

  **506 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla:** *(LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)*
  - LCA 416 - LCA 525
  - LCA 467 - LCA 768
  - LCA 519 - LCA 803
• **SS Monowai - J30**, Ex Armed Merchant Cruiser Razmak. A large and fast cargo liner built in 1924. She was 10,852 tons, 519 foot long and could make 20 knots. She carried ten LCA from 544 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla, nine LCA from 556 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla.

544 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED) Captain CGH Miers RM DSC Flotilla Officer
- LCA 1092
- LCA 1035
- LCA 289
- LCA 197
- LCA 1057
- LCA 462
- LCA 208
- LCA 683
- LCA 280
- LCA 1091 (Cpl J Baker, RM DSM)

556 Royal Marine Assault Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED) Captain GW Clelland RM, Flotilla Officer
- LCA 1034
- LCA 948
- LCA 919
- LCA 918
- LCA 729
- LCA 728 (Sgt F Turner, RM)
- LCA 565
- LCA 841
- LCA 844
- LCA 650
- LCA 84
- LCA 835
- LCA 710
- LCA 881

• **SS Isle of Guernsey - J33**, A Channel Island ferry. She was 2,132 tons, 306 foot long and could manage 19 knots. She carried six LCA from 518 Assault Flotilla.

518 Assault Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCA 84
- LCA 835
- LCA 710
- LCA 844
- LCA 650
- LCA 841

• **HMCS Prince David - J36 - CDR T.D. Kelly, R.C.N.R.**, She was one of two fast Canadian ferries converted to Armed Merchant Cruisers. She was extensively modified for the role and had the bridge moved further astern and had one funnel removed. She was 6,890 tons, 385 foot long and was capable of 22 knots. She carried six LCA and two LCS(M)(3) from 529 Assault Flotilla. She had accommodation for 550 troops. Armament: 2 X 4", 1 X 40mm, 6 X 20mm.

529 Assault Flotilla: Lt J. C. David, Flotilla Officer in LCA 1150 (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCS(M)(3) 176
- LCS(M)(3) 10
- LCS(M)(3) 83
- LCA 1150 (Lt J.C. Davie, RCNVR)
- LCA 1138 (Lt J.F. Beveridge, RCNVR)
- LCA 1137 (L/S G.R. Lavergne, RCN)
- LCA 1105 (Lt J. McBeath RCNVR)
- LCA 1151 (Lt D.F. Graham RCNVR)

**NOTE:** Replacement LCA’s on 7 June 1944 (for LCA’s lost and LCA 1374 detached on D Day)
- LCA 1115
- LCA 1346
- LCA 1359
- LCA 1391
- LCS(M) 176

- MGB 326 accompanied this group.

LCA’S 1375 AND 1150 FROM HMCS PRINCE DAVID
Group 325

This group consisted of:

- Seven LCT4 from 36 LCT Flotilla carrying ‘C’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) and priority vehicles for 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- Four LCI(L) carrying mainly Beach Group personnel
- ML 269 with Senior Officer 36 LCT Flotilla on board

The plan was that all the above groups should have arrived in the above order and then form waves for the run in to shore. Delays caused by groups entering the wrong channels and by groups simply not been able to maintain the planned speeds meant that some adjustments to H hour had to be made. At 0630 hrs the Captain, Senior Officer Assault Group J2 reported that H Hour would be postponed by 10 minutes. H Hour would now be 0755 hrs.

As a result of the postponement the first waves of landing craft would not now land in front of the beach obstacles as planned but would have to land among them. It was also not possible to clear the obstacles before the LCT's arrived. The knock on effect was that a great many craft were damaged when either beaching, or more often when retracting. However the obstacles were not as dense as expected and craft did crash through them.

8th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Brigadier K.G. Blackader

NAN WHITE and NAN RED

The coastline on which NAN WHITE and NAN RED were situated was low lying. From Courseulles to Bernieres sur Mer there was a sandy beach with short groynes to prevent lateral movement of sand by the current. From Bernieres sur Mer to St Aubin sur Mer the coast continued to be low lying and sandy but here there were many summer houses and villas. From St Aubin sur Mer eastwards there were low cliffs for a mile and a half, with a sea wall along most of it. Offshore all the way along the coast eastwards of Bernieres sur Mer there were rocky outcrops parts of which were exposed at low tide. Inland the country was gently rolling countryside and plains with large fields.
10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) - LCol R.E.A. Morton

The amphibious DD tanks of ‘B’ and ‘C’ Squadrons of 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) were timed to land at H-5 minutes, having being launched from LCT at 7000 yards from the shore. This plan was altered due to the adverse weather.

LCT Mk3 from 11 LCT Flotilla were to launch DD amphibious tanks well out to sea. The tanks were timed to beach at H-5 minutes.

Serial 1400 is LCT 384 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘B’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)

Serial 1401 is LCT 318 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘B’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
  NOTE: Squadron Commander rides in this craft therefore this should be the Flotilla Commander's craft.

Serial 1402 is LCT 341 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘B’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)

Serial 1403 is LCT 324 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘B’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
LCT Mk3 from 11 LCT Flotilla were to launch DD amphibious tanks well out to sea. The tanks were timed to beach at H-5 minutes.

Serial 1404 is LCT3 354 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘C’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)

Serial 1405 is LCT3 317 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘C’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
  NOTE: Squadron Commander rides in this craft therefor this should be the Deputy Flotilla Commanders craft.

Serial 1406 is LCT3 382 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘C’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)

Serial 1407 is LCT3 313 from 11 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 5 x Sherman MkV DD Tanks with 25 crew - ‘C’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)

Changes to orders and timings caused some confusion. The weather and sea conditions were such that it was decided not to launch at 7000 yards but at 2000 to 3000 yards. Shortly afterwards orders were received to delay H Hour by ten minutes because the craft carrying the AVRE teams were late. Eventually the DD tanks were launched very close to shore. They still used their screws and screen but were in shallow water. As a result no tanks were lost on the swim in. However one LCT was sunk by gunfire and its load lost.

Because of the delays, the tide was much was higher than expected and the beach narrow and congested. ‘B’ Squadron were unable to give much support to Queens Own Rifles of Canada on the beaches and it was almost 0930 hrs before the exits were open and the tanks could move inland and advance through Bernieres in support of Queens Own Rifles of Canada.

‘C’ Squadron landed in support of North Shore Regiment and managed to give supporting fire on the beach. Snipers caused a number of casualties to tank commanders. At H+45 there were no beach exits cleared and the reserve infantry companies were landing. The Squadron Commander decided to advance through the minefield. In doing so three tanks were lost but the remainder were able to move into St. Aubin and support the infantry. The village was cleared except for one strongpoint and one troop was left to support the infantry in its capture while the remainder moved inland. SEE APPENDIX 3 to this document.

‘A’ Squadron together with two tanks from Regimental Headquarters beached at 0900 hrs. The LCT carrying the Regimental Headquarters and Squadron Headquarters hit a mine and damaged its ramp. It put to sea again still carrying its load. It eventually beached at 1000 hrs. The remainder of ‘A’ Squadron disembarked and joined ‘B’ Squadron which was still on the beach. When the exits were clear ‘A’ Squadron moved to support La Regiment de la Chaudiere in the advance to Beny sur Mer.
NAN WHITE and NAN RED

H Hour

Breaching Teams
LCT5's from 106 LCT Flotilla will land Breaching Teams at H Hour.

80 Assault Squadron, RE - T/Major Reginald Trery Wiltshire, RE
80th Assault Squadron was attached from the 5th Engineer Assault Regiment, 1st Assault Brigade RE, 79th Armoured Division

"B" Squadron, 22nd Dragoons, was attached from the 30th Armoured Brigade, 79th Armoured Division

26 Assault Squadron, RE and "B" Squadron, 22nd Dragoons, landed under the command of 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

NAN WHITE

Green Gap, 1 Troop - Lt John Holland Saunders, RE

Serial 1408 is LCT5 2286 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 1 x Sherman Crab (Cpl Cavill) with 5 crew - 1 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
• 1 x AVRE 1D (Lt Saunders) with Log Carpet and 6 crew - 1 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE 1C (L/Sgt Burnell) with Fascine and 6 crew - 1 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE 1E (Sgt Smith - WIA 6 June) with SBG Bridge and 6 crew - 1 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE

Serial 1409 is LCT5 2436, Lt Reginald Edwards, RNVR from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 1 x Sherman Crab (Sgt G. A. K. Crewe) with 5 crew - 1 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron 22nd Dragoons
• 1 x AVRE 1B with 6 crew - 1 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE 1F Petard (Lt Oxtoby) and 6 crew - 1 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer (Spr Scott - KIA 6 June) with 2 crew - 1 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE

Yellow Gap, 2 Troop - Lt Allan Alexander Oxtoby, RE

Serial 1410 is LCT5 2183 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 2 x Sherman Crab with 10 crew - 1 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons (OC 1 Troop, Lt Charles Hammerton)
• 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 2 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE with 6 crew - 2 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE

Serial 1411 is LCT5 2441 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
• 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 1 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
• 1 x AVRE with 6 crew - 2 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE - (Captain Sir Francis Grant)
• 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 2 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x AVRE with SBG Bridge and 6 crew - 2 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE

Half Squadron Reserve

Serial 1409A is an LCT5 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying: (Captain Tracy landed in this craft)
• 1 x AVRE with Bullshorn Plough and 6 crew - 2 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x BARV with 12 crew - 23 Beach Recovery Section, REME
• 1 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 2 crew - 2 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
Both the NAN WHITE gaps were slow to be cleared and when clear were narrow. They remained congested all day.

1 Troop landed between 0815 hrs and 0820 hrs, opposite the planned gap. The Crabs flailed up to the sea wall and were followed by an AVRE with SBG bridge which it laid against the wall. The first AVRE to cross the bridge hit a mine and blocked the exit. At this time the infantry were on the beach and using the sea wall for shelter thus preventing the use of Petards to make a gap.

The flails cleared a second path to a place where the sea wall was broken down and then managed to climb through the gap. They continued flailing to the lateral road and then flailed along the road towards 2 Troops gap. When an anti tank ditch was reached an AVRE with fascine came up and filled the ditch.

In the meantime an armoured D7 had cleared the AVRE from the bridge and tanks climbed it until a Porpoise, became jammed. This was also cleared by an armoured D7. A second fascine was placed in the anti tank ditch and the crossing improved by an armoured D7.

2 Troop landed at 0805 hrs but had been carried 500 yards east of its planned gap by the cross current. The high tide and beach obstacles made it impossible to work along the beach so they had to make a gap where they landed. The Crabs flailed up to the twelve foot high sea wall but the SBG bridge was shot away and could not be positioned. It was decided to try and make a gap in the wall using Petards. Ten dustbins were fired at the lip of the wall but the crater which was formed was too steep and too soft to be climbed. By this time the infantry were ashore and sheltering under the wall so that no more rounds could be fired. The troop then moved along the beach to an existing ramp which had been blocked with Element C obstacles. These were demolished by firing ten dustbins at them. The Crabs then flailed up the ramp. AVRE's followed and dropped fascines in a ditch and a lane was eventually opened. See attached After Action Report - Appendix A
Blue Gap, 3 Troop - Captain Cecil Francis Tracy, RE

Serial 1412 is LCT5 2289 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 4 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x AVRE with 6 crew - 3 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE - (Captain Essery)
- 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 3 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x AVRE with SBG Bridge and 6 crew - 3 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE

Serial 1413 is LCT5 2479 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 4 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x AVRE with 6 crew - 3 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE - (Lieutenant Gloyn)
- 1 x AVRE with Bobbin and 6 crew - 3 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 2 crew - 3 Troop, 26 Assault Squadron, RE

Green Gap, 4 Troop

Serial 1414 is LCT5 2038 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Sherman Crab with 10 crew - 1 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons - (Lt Peter Burbridge)
- 2 x AVRE with 12 crew - 4 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE - (Lt Jack H Hornby)

Serial 1415 is LCT5 2441 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 4 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x AVRE with Bobbin and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE - (Capt Bellingham-Smith)
- 1 x AVRE with Fascine and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE
- 1 x AVRE with SBG Bridge and 6 crew - 4 Troop, 80 Assault Squadron, RE

Half Squadron Reserve

Serial 1413A is an LCT5 from 106 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x BARV with 12 crew from 23 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew - 1 Troop, ‘B’ Squadron, 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 2 crew - 2 Troop 80 Assault Squadron, RE - (Major Wiltshire)

NOTE: This craft also carried the Brigadier Commanding, 1 Assault Brigade, RE and a Headquarters Section - Brigadier G. L. Watkinson

3 Troop landed at 0745 hrs some two hundred yards left of the planned gap. A Crab flailed up to the ten foot high sea wall followed by an AVRE with a SBG bridge. The bridge was placed against the wall and the Crab crossed and went on to flail up to the lateral road. The reserve Crab followed to widen the lane. AVRE’s crossed the bridge but other vehicles crossed the dunes without difficulty. Serial 1413 arrived later having broken down.

4 Troop also landed at 0745 hrs and one hundred and fifty yards east of the planned gap and suffered a series of mishaps. Serial 1415 grounded in seven foot of water making for a difficult disembarkation. A LCT(A) landing slightly later collided with the AVRE carrying the SBG bridge, disabling it. The crew continued dismounted. The flails turned right and flailed a second path to the same gap as 3 Troop. A bobbin was laid on soft sand in the flailed track but it did not stand up to tracked traffic. The fascine was not used and was jettisoned to be used as trackway. The Lt Jack Hornby in command of 4 Troop was crushed between a tank and a D7 dozer while directing traffic and the Lt Peter Burbridge commanding 4 Troop, B Squadron, 22nd Dragoons took command.
Each of the LCT5 carrying the breaching teams towed a LCA(HR) which fired a salvo of rockets at the exit to clear any mines and wire. It is reported that all nine made the crossing and fired their rockets ‘with considerable success’. It is not clear what this means.

NAN WHITE and NAN RED
2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment

No 4 Battery, ‘W’, ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ Troops, was to land on NAN WHITE and NAN RED.

Craft carrying Centaurs tanks were either LCT(A) which were armoured or LCT(HE) which were not. Two of each were to land on each beach. It was planned that the craft should be positioned on the flanks of the line of LCT’s carrying the Breaching Teams. Two LCT(A) would be on the exposed flanks of each beach, to the left of NAN RED and the right of NAN WHITE, while the LCT(HE) were in the less exposed positions on the right of NAN RED and the left of NAN WHITE.

NAN WHITE
4 Battery, ‘W’ Troop - (Supporting Queens Own Rifles of Canada) Capt R.M. Winter RM

Serial 1416 is LCT(A) 2009 from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 2 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 4 men vehicle party - HQ RCE 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment
- 13 men - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 6 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group

Serial 1417 is LCT(A) 2283, Lt Collins, from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
- 1 x Sherman Tank with 5 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 12 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group

4 Battery, ‘X’ Troop (Supporting Queens Own Rifles of Canada) Capt K. Stead RM

Serial 1418 is LCT(HE) 2240, from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
- 1 x Sherman Tank & 5 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment. Ammunition handlers
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 2 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 4 men vehicle party - HQ RCE 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment
- 1 x Car 5 cwt 4 X 4 (Jeep) - 3 men vehicle party - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 11 men and a Truck Airborne - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE

Serial 1419 is LCT(HE) 2150, Lt N.R. Newman, RNVR from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 4 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer & 4 men vehicle party - HQ RCE 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment
- 1 x Car 5 cwt 4 X 4 (Jeep) - 3 men vehicle party - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 25 men - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE

Serial 1420 is LCT(CB) 2338, Lt Robert Pardingtons from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Sherman Vc Firefly with 8 crew - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x BARV with 6 crew - 23 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- Space for extra ammunition

Note: The BARV may have been replaced by 1 x Sherman Crab with 5 crew from ‘B’ Squadron 22nd Dragoons

NAN RED

4 Battery, ‘Y’ Troop (Supporting North Shore Regiment) Capt E.B. Norton SAUDF

Serial 1421 is LCT(HE) 2243 from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks & 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 4 x D7 Armoured Bulldozer with 8 men vehicle party - HQ RCE 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment.
- 24 men - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE

Serial 1422 is LCT(HE) 2306 from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks with 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
- 1 x Sherman Tank with 5 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 2 x D7 Bulldozer Armoured with 4 men vehicle party - HQ RCE 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment.
- 1 x Car 5 cwt 4 X 4 (Jeep) with 3 men vehicle party - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 11 men - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE

4 Battery, ‘Z’ Troop (Supporting North Shore Regiment)

Serial 1423 is LCT(A) 2455, Lt Jock Ewart, from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks with 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing porpoises.
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
- 1 x Sherman Tank with 5 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 12 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group

Serial 1424 is LCT(A) 2014 from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Centaur Tanks with 10 crew - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regt towing Porpoises
- 5 men - 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment - Ammunition handlers
- Space for extra 50 rounds per gun loose
- 2 x D7 Bulldozer Armoured with 4 men vehicle party - HQ RCE 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Special Bulldozer Increment.
- 13 men - 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 6 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group

Serial 1425 is an LCT CB from 103 LCT Flotilla carrying:
- 2 x Sherman Vc Firefly with 8 crew - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- Space for extra ammunition
‘W’ Troop Commander landed with one Sherman and two Centaur at 0820 hrs. The other LCT of ‘W’ Troop did not land until D+2. The Troop Commander could not find any other artillery on the beach and could not contact the Forward Observation Officer as he had been killed. As no targets were offered the troop eventually moved off the beach to the gun area about a mile inland. Later the troop was ordered by the commander 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade to move forward with the infantry.

‘X’ Troop landed complete 300 yards east of its intended position and could not find its intended target as groynes and other obstacles prevented movement along the beach. About 0900 hrs contact was made with the Forward Observation Officer but no targets were offered. About midday the troop moved inland to the gun area.

‘Y’ Troop landed complete at 0755 hrs. It could not contact the Forward Observation Officer and had no targets until around 0900 hrs when it joined 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA in engaging targets in St Aubin with indirect fire. The troop was later joined by the two Centaurs of ‘Z’ Troop and all six guns fired 15 round each over houses. Later they moved to support 48 RM Commando in street fighting in St Aubin.

‘Z’ Troop. One craft landed and its Centaurs joined ‘Y’ Troop. The commander and remaining two Centaurs did not land until D+1

**NAN WHITE and NAN RED**

**Obstacle Clearance**

The plans was to clear two gaps each 400 yards wide by H+75 minutes. One would be on NAN WHITE, opposite Bernieres village and the other in the centre of NAN RED. Detachments of 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE were to land at H Hour and clear obstacles with explosives and bulldozers. 11 and 12 Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units landed at the same time to help clear obstacles in water that was too deep for the Field Company personnel. Detachments of 262 Field Company, RE were to land at H+20 minutes bringing in more equipment in LCM's.

As on other beaches the tide was higher than had been planned for, partly because of delays and partly because of the weather. It was not possible to do much work on obstacle clearance. In addition 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE were particularly unlucky in their landing. One section LCA stopped in eight foot of water making it difficult to get ashore and equipment was lost. Another section only managed to get half of its personnel ashore and all but one became casualties.

The Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units landed with the infantry. They had their own LCA(LCOCU) with their equipment. These were carried on the same LSI as the infantry assault companies. They attempted to clear some of the seaward obstacles but the water was already too deep and the sea too rough. They then attempted to work on obstacles near the shore but soon had to abandon that also. Perhaps unfairly, No 11 LCOCU was criticized in the Force commanders report, considering that they ‘showed a lack of determination and failed to achieve any result.

By the time 262 Field Company, RE arrived the tide was even higher and little could be done. On NAN RED an attempt was made to clear a 200 yard gap but it was not entirely successful. The water was too deep for bulldozers to operate, personnel could not reach many of the obstacles, many charges, being underwater, did not detonate and work was hampered by craft and personnel in the water.

The Field Companies concentrated on clearing beach exits and clearing mines until the tide went out and clearance could continue. The Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units assisted on clearing exits and on rescue work in the water.
NAN WHITE and NAN RED
Assault Infantry

NAN WHITE

Forward Observation Officers (FOO) Bombardment RCA

These went in advance of the wave of LCA’s carrying the assault infantry. Their role was to observe the fire of the SP Field Regiments as they fired during the approach.

Serial 1426 is an LCS(M) from LSI(L) J30 SS Monowai:
• 3 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officers Bombardment
• Do not land at this time

Serial 1427 is an LCS(M) from LSI(L) J30 SS Monowai:
• 3 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officers Bombardment.
• Do not land at this time

Queens Own Rifles of Canada - Lt Col J.G. Spragge

Battalion Headquarters
• Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Spragge
• Second-in-Command: Major S. M. Lett
• Adjutant: Captain W. J. Weir
• Intelligence Officer: Lieutenant R. C. Rae
• Medical Officer: Captain A. Kirsch, RCAMC
• Padre: Honorary Captain J. C. Clough C.C.S.
• Regimental Sergeant Major E.W. Hartnell
• Medical Sergeant R. Wilson
• Orderly Room Sergeant S. D. Watson
• Intelligence Sergeant S. B. Roberts
• Provost Sergeant C. R. Webber

Headquarters Company
• Officer Commanding: Captain T.E. Parkinson
• Lieutenant D. Hogarth, Transport Officer
• Captain R.I.O. Stewart, Quartermaster
• Lieutenant D.M. Philp, R.C.C.S.
• Company Sergeant Major R. Hess
• Sergeant A.J. Cornett, Signals
• Sergeant T.E. Tidy, Signals
• Sergeant N.A. Tims, Technical Stores
• Arm/Sergeant C.E. Craig, RCEME
• Sergeant E.D. Shaw, RCASC
Support Company
- Officer Commanding: Captain R.A. Cottrill
- 3 Platoon (Mortars) - Lieutenant B. Dunkelman
- 4 Platoon (Carriers) Captain J.G. Price, Lieutenant S.C. Bigg
  - Sergeants. W.A. Nethery, K.A. Lang, A. Mair, F.J.M. Killick
- 5 Platoon (Anti-Tank) Captain T.A. Staunton, Lieutenant I.S. Waldie
  - Sergeants. A.W. Stiff, G.D. Tarzwell, W.B. Laffradi, C.D. Mackaskell
- 6 Platoon (Pioneer) Lieutenant J.D. Pickup
  - Sergeant. W. Ward
- Company Sergeant Major G.A. Cronkrite
- Company Quartermaster Sergeant G.C. Sutherland
  - and Sergeants J.A. Selley, W.S. Clarke, A.W. Lambie, C.T. Ashby

'A' Company
- Officer Commanding: Major H.E. Dalton
- Captain R.D. Medland (2nd-in-Command)
- Lieutenants D.D. Owen, J.L. Pond and P.C. Rea
- Company Sergeant Major C.C. Martin
- Company Quartermaster Sergeant G.C. Garrett
- Sergeants J.S. Browne W.A. Overholt, C.W. Smith, J.M. Simpson and E.R. Screen

'B' Company
- Officer Commanding: Major C.O. Dalton
- Captain J.I. Mills (2nd-in-Command)
- Lieutenants H.C.F. Elliot, W.G. Herbert and J.D. McLean
- Company Sergeant Major W. Wallis
- Company Quartermaster Sergeant H. Gale
- Sergeants F.R. Gaines; Forshaw; F.B. Harris. W.H. Middleton and G.W. Morrison

'C' Company
- Officer Commanding: Major O.A. Nickson
- Captain W.D. Stewart, (2nd-in-Command)
- Lieutenants J.C. Arber, J.A.C. Auld and J.P. Harris
- Company Sergeant Major T.J. Chivers
- Company Quartermaster Sergeant W.H. Ives
- Sergeants D.M. Kingstone, W.G. Murray, C. Anderson, C.B. Bell and K.D. Jamieson

'D' Company
- Officer Commanding: Major J.N. Gordon
- Captain R.W. Sawyer (2nd-in-Command)
- Lieutenants. R.W. Barker; H.G.W. Bean and R. Fleming
- Company Sergeant Major J. Forbes
- Company Quartermaster Sergeant G. Saltstone


Serials 1428 to 1432 are 5 LCA's from LSI(L) J30 SS Monowai:
- 129 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada plus 20 stores spaces
- 3 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 6 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE plus 3 stores spaces - Demolition Team
Serials 1433 to 1437 are 5 LCA's from LSI(L) J30 SS Monowai:
- 129 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada plus 20 stores spaces
- 3 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 6 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE plus 3 stores spaces - Demolition Team

The Queens Own Rifles of Canada received the order to make the final run in to the beach at 0805 hours, although there was no sign of the LCT's carrying DD tanks and specialist armour. They landed on NAN WHITE at 0815 hrs with ‘A’ Company to the west of Bernieres and ‘B’ in front of the Bernieres strongpoint. ‘A’ Company got off the beach quickly and reached the railway line before being pinned down by mortar fire. They eventually moved inland.

‘B’ Company landed in front of the strongpoint which had 8 machine guns in concrete emplacements, two 50mm guns, on the sea wall and two 80mm mortar posts inland. The company suffered heavy casualties including 3 officers, a CSM and two sergeants. The company scaled the sea wall and outflanked the position.

‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies together with Battalion Headquarters came ashore at 0830 hrs. The companies passed through the village and together with ‘A’ Company prepared to move forward to the next task. ‘B’ Company remained on the beach to reorganize.

NAN RED
Forward Observation Officers (FOO) Bombardment RCA

Serial 1439 is an LCS(M)(3) from LSI(L) J31 SS Clan Lamont:
- 3 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officers Bombardment. Do not land at this time

Serial 1440 is an LCS(M)(3) from LSI(L) J31 SS Clan Lamont:
- 3 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officers Bombardment. Do not land at this time

North Shore Regiment - Lt Col D.B. Buell
‘A’ Company (Major J.A.M.C. Naughton)
‘B’ Company (Major R.B. Forbes)
‘C’ Company (Major Daughney)
‘D’ Company (Major Anderson)

Serials 1441 to 1445 are 5 LCA's from LSI(L) J31 SS Clan Lamont:
- 129 men - North Shore Regiment plus 20 stores spaces
- 3 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 6 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE plus 3 stores spaces - Demolition Team

Serials 1446 to 1450 are 5 LCAs from LSI(L) J31 SS Clan Lamont:
- 129 men - North Shore Regiment plus 20 stores spaces
- 3 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Forward Observation Officer
- 6 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE plus 3 stores spaces - Demolition Team

‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies landed at 0810 hrs. ‘A’ Company on the right cleared beach front houses, losing 24 men, and had cleared its planned beachhead by 0948 hrs. ‘B’ Company had the more difficult task of clearing a strongpoint at Saint Aubin which had several machine guns, a 50mm gun and several 80mm mortars. These were mostly in concrete emplacements which had hardly been touched by air and sea bombardments. AVRE and DD tanks assisted and the area was reported clear by 1115 hrs.
Queens Own Rifles of Canada - Lt Col J.G. Spragge

NAN WHITE

'A' Company (Major H.E. Dalton)
'B' Company (Major C.O. Dalton)
'C' Company (Major O.A. Nickson)
'D' Company (Major J.N. Gordon)

Serials 1451 to 1456 are LCA's 416, 467, 519, 525, 768 & 803 from J32 HMS Duke of Wellington:
- 134 men - "C" Company, Queens Own Rifles of Canada plus 23 stores spaces - Includes alternative Battalion Headquarters
- 1 man - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Chaplain for Queens Own Rifles of Canada - H/Capt JC Clough, C.C.S.
- 3 men and a handcart - ‘K’, Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals plus 3 stores spaces
- 7 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 7 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 9 men - 22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 4 men - La Regiment de la Chaudiere - Unit Landing Officer party
- 1 man - North Nova Scotia Regiment (9 CIB)
- 11 men - 184 Field Company, RE
- 2 men - 19 Beach Signals Section

Serials 1457 to 1462 are LCA's 650, 710, 835, 841, 844 & 881 from J33 SS Isle of Guernsey:
- 137 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada plus 18 stores spaces
- 2 men - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) - Liaison Officer
- 7 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 6 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE plus 3 stores spaces
- 10 men - 22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 7 men - 184 Field Company, RE
- 2 men - 19 Beach Signals Section
- 2 men - 244 Provost Company
- 7 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
- 3 men - RN Beach Signals Section
- 2 men - RN Beach Commando - Assistant Beach Master party

Serial 1463 was LCH 239 carrying Headquarters Queens Own Rifles of Canada. Personnel are taken ashore by LCA Serial 1482 from J36 HMCS Prince David:
- 8 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada - Battalion Command Group
- 3 men - Contact Detachment
- 4 men - 14th Field Regiment, RCA
- 4 men - Detachment 'A' Troop, 3 Bombardment Unit J
- 1 man - 'K' Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 7 men and 3 handcarts - 19 Beach Signals
- 12 men - RN Beach Commando
- 10 men - RN Beach Signals
North Shore Regiment - Lt Col D.B. Buell

NAN RED

Serials 1464 to 1469 are LCA’s 522, 713, 717, 817, 820 & 821 from J34 HMS Brigadier:
- 131 men - North Shore Regiment plus 21 stores spaces - Includes alternate Battalion HQ
- 4 - Cameron Highlanders of Canada (MG)
- 2 men - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 7 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 13 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE plus 3 stores spaces
- 9 men - 22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 3 men and a handcart - ‘K’ Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals plus 4 store spaces
- 1 man - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Chaplain North Shore Regiment
- 2 men - 19 Beach Signals Section
- 3 men - RN Beach Signals
- 2 men - RN Beach Commando - Assistant Beach Master party

Serials 1470 to 1475 are LCA’s 563, 691, 735, 827, 833 & 878 from J35 HMS St. Helier:
- 135 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada - Includes Unit Landing Officer plus 21 stores spaces
- 1 man - 3rd Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (The Governor Generals Horse Guards)
- 7 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 13 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE plus 3 stores spaces
- 10 men - 22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 2 men - 19 Beach Signals Section
- 14 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group

Serial 1476 is LCH 167 carrying Headquarters North Shore Regiment.
Personnel are taken ashore by LCA 1483 from J36 HMCS Prince David

Serial 1463 was LCH 239:
- 8 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada - Battalion Command Group
- 3 men - Contact Detachment
- 4 men - 19th Field Regiment, RCA
- 4 men - Detachment ‘A’ Troop, 3 Bombardment Unit J.
- 1 man - ‘K’ Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Division Signals
- 7 men and 3 handcarts - 19 Beach Signals.
- 12 men - RN Beach Commando
- 11 men - RN Beach Signals

9th CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier D.G. Cunningham)

La Regiment de la Chaudiere - Lt Col J.B. Mathieu

NAN WHITE and NAN RED

H + 45 Minutes

‘A’ Company (Major Hugues Lapointe)
‘B’ Company (Major J.F. L'Espérance)
‘C’ Company (Major Georges Sevigny)
‘D’ Company (Major Gustave Taschereau)
Serials 1477 to 1481 are 5 LCA's from LSI J36 HMCS Prince David:
- 124 men - La Regiment de la Chaudiere plus 25 stores spaces
- 1 man - 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars)
- 7 men - 184 Field Company, RE - Reconnaissance party for Green Beach
- 10 men with 2 bicycles - 244 Provost Company plus 4 stores spaces

Serial 1482 is an LCA from LSI J36 HMCS Prince David.
Craft to collect Battalion Headquarters Queens Own Rifles of Canada from LCH:
- 2 men - 244 Provost Company
- 7 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
- 14 men - RN Beach Commando

NAN RED

Serial 1483 is an LCA from LSI J36 HMCS Prince David.
Craft to collect Battalion Headquarters North Shore Regiment from LCH:
- 1 man - Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders
- 14 men - RN Beach Commando

Serial 1484 is an LCA from LSI J36 HMCS Prince David.
Craft to report to J38 Waveney and be at the disposal of the Brigade Commander.
See Serial 1509 below

Serials 1485 to 1490 are LCA's 581, 595, 705, 714, 814 & 826 from LSI J37 SS Lady of Mann:
- 2 men - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 126 men - La Regiment de la Chaudiere plus 28 stores spaces
- 1 man from 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars)
- 10 men - 22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 11 men - 184 Field Company, RE - Reconnaissance party for Nan Green Beach
- 10 men with 2 bicycles - 244 Provost Company plus 4 stores spaces
- 11 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
- 3 men - 52 Balloon Unit RAF - Reconnaissance party

NAN WHITE

Serials 1491 to 1496 are 6 LCA's from LSI J30 SS Monowai:
- 132 men - La Regiment de la Chaudiere - Includes Battalion Command Group plus 17 stores spaces
- 1 man - 3rd Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (The Governor Generals Horse Guards)
- 1 man - Highland Light Infantry of Canada
- 2 men - 'B' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 3 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 4 men - Detachment 'A', Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J
- 5 men and a handcart - 'K' Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals Plus
- 4 stores spaces
- 1 man - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Chaplain for La Regiment de la Chaudiere
- 15 men and a handcart - 33 Field Dressing Station, RAMC plus 4 stores spaces
- 19 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
Serials 1497 to 1502 are 6 LCA's from LSI J31 SS Clan Lamont:

- 126 men - La Regiment de la Chaudiere plus 28 stores spaces
- 2 men - 'B' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 9 men - 22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 15 men and a handcart - 34 Field Dressing Station, RAMC
- 20 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group

The first troops landed on NAN WHITE at 0850 hrs. The lack of exits and the enemy resistance at Bernieres meant that the battalion had to wait on the beach for an hour, under mortar and shell fire. They moved to an assembly area inland and waited a further two hours before setting off for its objectives around Beny sur Mer. They were supported by ‘A’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)

8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Headquarters - Brig K.G. Blackader

Serial 1509 is LCH J38 HMS Waveney acting as 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Headquarters Ship. Personnel will be landed by LCA 1484 from J36 HMCS Prince David:

- 8 men - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Headquarters - Brigade Command Group
- 5 men - Headquarters 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Artillery Group Command
- 3 men - Headquarters 4 Special Service Brigade - Brigade Command Group
- 2 men - Contact Detachment
- 3 men - ‘K’ Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 4 men - Detachment ‘A’, Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J

COMMANDOS - 4 Special Service Brigade, Royal Marines & 48 Royal Marine Commando

H+45 minutes
NAN RED

48 Royal Marine Commando - Lt Col James Louis Moulton
- ‘A’ Troop - Captain Mike Reynolds
- ‘B’ Troop - Captain Jim Perry (KIA 06/06/44), 2/Lt Rubinstein
- ‘X’ Troop - Captain Hoare
- ‘Y’ Troop - Captain De Stacpool
- ‘Z’ Troop - Captain Lennard (KIA 06/06/44)
- ‘S’ (Heavy Weapons) Troop - Captain Geoff Linnell

Serial 1503 is LCI(S) 525 carrying:

- 45 men with 4 lightweight motorcycle and 6 bicycles - 48 Royal Marine Commando
- 7 men and a handcart - 4 Special Service Brigade Signal Troop
- 4 men - Detachment ‘A’, Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J - FOB No 89
- 5 men and a lightweight motorcycle - Headquarters 4 Special Service Brigade
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit RAF

Serial 1504 is LCI(S) 515 carrying:

- 77 men with 4 lightweight motorcycle and 8 bicycles - 48 Royal Marine Commando
- 2 men - 4 Special Service Brigade Signal Troop
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit RAF

Serial 1505 is LCI(S) 533 carrying:

- 75 men with 3 bicycles - 48 Royal Marine Commando
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit RAF
Serial 1506 is LCI(S) 513 carrying:
- 75 men with 3 bicycles - 48 Royal Marine Commando
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit RAF

Serial 1507 is LCI(S) 539 carrying:
- 75 men with 3 bicycles - 48 Royal Marine Commando
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit RAF

Serial 1508 is LCI(S) 540 carrying:
- 75 men with 3 bicycles - 48 Royal Marine Commando
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit RAF

48 RM Commando was to land with the reserve companies of 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which should have cleared the beach defences. It was then to move eastwards to clear the strongpoint at Langrune sur Mer before joining up with 41 RM Commando which had landed on Sword.

Although scheduled to land on Nan Red the plan recognized that 48 RM Commando might have to be diverted to another beach. It seemed that the landings on NAN RED were going satisfactorily and 48 RM Commando were ordered to land as planned. On the run in it seemed that the landing would be unopposed but as the craft approached the beach they met machine gun fire from the St. Aubin strongpoint which was almost opposite the landing point. They were also fired on from mortars and artillery.

One LCI(S), carrying ‘Z’ troop, was hit by shellfire. It then hit an obstacle and was unable to beach. Some Commandos attempted to swim ashore. Some succeeded but others were drowned in the strong undertow. The troop then managed to transfer from the LCI(S) to an LCT, and then from the LCT to an LCA and thus some forty men were able to get ashore.

The LCI(S) carrying ‘Y’ troop also hit an obstacle and was unable to beach. The Commandos on this craft also transferred to an LCT. However disembarking was slow and casualties were mounting so the LCT withdrew with some 50 Commandos still on board. These were taken back to UK.

‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘X’ troops were able to wade ashore through some three feet of water, the bicycles causing some problems. They first sheltered under low earth cliffs and sea wall until an exit could be found. By 0900 hrs these troops plus Headquarters Troop were ashore and at the Assembly Area at La Rive, some 200 yards inland.

At 1030 hrs, 48 Commando was ready to move to Langrune sur Mer. It was already considerably weakened.
- ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘X’ troops each had some fifty to fifty five men.
- ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ troops had only some forty five men between them.
- Headquarters had lost some twenty men and the support troop had only one 3” mortar and one Bren team.

The Naval Commander Allied Expeditionary Force considered that it was an error to use LCI(S) at this early stage. They were essentially raiding craft and without the element of surprise they were very vulnerable.
H+65
NAN RED

HQ 4 Special Service Brigade also landed on Nan Red, twenty minutes after 48 Commando. Two LCI(S) land Headquarters 4 Special Service Brigade and attached personnel.

Headquarters 4 Special Service Brigade - Brig B.W. Leicester

Serial 1519 is LCI(S) 526, Lt B.S.B. Lingwood, RNVR
- 23 men with 3 lightweight motorcycle and 3 cycles
- 21 men with 4 handcarts, 2 lightweight motorcycle and 4 bicycles - 4 Special Service Brigade Signal Troop
- 1 man - 4 Special Service Brigade Field Security Section
- 2 men - Special Service Group Provost
- 4 men and 1 lightweight motorcycles - LAD 4 Special Service Brigade, REME.
- 2 men and 1 balloon - 52 Balloon Unit RAF

Serial 1520 is LCI(S) 536, Lt Laidlaw carrying:
- 23 men with 3 lightweight motorcycle and 3 cycles
- 23 men with 3 handcarts, 2 lightweight motorcycle and 4 bicycles - 4 Special Service Brigade Signal Troop
- 3 men with 2 bicycles - Special Service Group Film and Photographic Unit.
- 2 men - Special Service Group Provost
- 5 men and 1 lightweight motorcycles - LAD 4 Special Service Brigade, REME.
- 2 men and 1 balloon - 52 Balloon Unit RAF

This was Brigade Main Headquarters under the Brigade Major (Major N P Wood). It landed about 0900 hrs but took some time to get its equipment ashore down the narrow ramps and through the surf. It was established just east of Bernieres by 1010 hrs. The Brigade Commander and Tactical Headquarters travelled on Headquarters Ship HMS Waveney with the Commander 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade. These two landed together on NAN WHITE and Commander 4 Special Service Brigade joined his Main Headquarters at 1130 hrs.

The first vehicles for both Headquarters 4 Special Service Brigade and 48 RM Commando arrived with the LCTs at H+60.

NAN WHITE and NAN RED
H + 60 Minutes

NAN WHITE
A flight of LCT4 beach with 'A' Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) plus priority vehicles for 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade:

Serial 1510 is LCT4 672 carrying:
- 'A' Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
  - 1 x Sherman Vc Firefly with 4 crew
  - 4 x Sherman III with 20 crew
La Regiment de la Chaudiere
- 3 x Carrier Universal
- 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
- 1 x Jeep
- 1 x Carrier Mortar
- 20 men

Plus
- 2 men - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Capt RL Bickford, Rfn J Dinsmore)
- 2 men - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots)
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Liaison Officer
- 16 men and 4 handcarts - ‘K’ Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - ‘K’ Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Carrier with 2 crew - ‘K’ Section (8 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 184 Field Company, RE
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit, RAF

Serial 1511 is an LCT4 541 carrying: SEE ‘APPENDIX D’ FOR MORE INFORMATION
‘A’ Squadron, 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 1 x Sherman Vc Firefly with 4 crew (Sgt Strawn, MM)
- 4 x Sherman III with 20 crew towing Porpoises - For Regimental and Squadron Commands (LCol Morton, Maj Blanchard, Capt Fraser, Capt Goodman)
- 1 x Jeep with Padre FGH (Capt Harrison)

La Regiment de la Chaudiere
- 2 x Carrier Mortar
- 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
- 3 x Carrier Universal with 9 crew
- 22 men

Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada
- 1 x Carrier towing 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
- 3 x Carrier Universal
- 14 men

Plus
- 2 x 15 cwt FFW with 2 crew - 375/114 LAA Regiment - Battery Command Reconnaissance
- 1 X Jeep with Tank Unit Landing Officer, 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (Capt Baldwin)
- 5 men - 375/114 LAA Regiment - Battery Command Reconnaissance
- 2 men - ‘C’ Section 4 Canadian Provost Company
- 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit, RAF

Serial 1512 is LCT4 932 carrying:
10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 3 x Sherman III with 15 crew towing Porpoises
- 3 x Stuart Light Tank with 12 crew

La Regiment de la Chaudiere
- 2 x Carrier Mortar
- 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
- 3 x Carrier
- 22 men

Plus
- 1 x Armoured Bulldozer Class II towing a Freuhauf trailer with 2 men vehicle party - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company, RCE
- 1 x Carrier Mortar with 4 crew - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 321/93 LAA Regiment, RA. ‘E’ Troop reconnaissance
- 4 men - 321/93 LAA Regiment, RA. ‘E’ Troop reconnaissance
• 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 4 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 2 men - 'C' Section, 4 Canadian Provost Company
• 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit, RAF

Serial 1513 is LCT4 934 carrying:
10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
• 1 x Valentine Bridgelayer
• 2 x Sherman Vc Firefly
• 2 x Jeep
• 2 x Sherman III towing Porpoises
• 44 men
Queens Own Rifles of Canada
• 2 x Carrier Towing 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
• 3 x Carrier Mortar
• 3 x Carrier Universal
• 21 men
Plus
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
• 4 men - 375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
• 1 x Carrier MMG with 4 crew - 'B' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
• 7 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit, RAF

NAN RED

Serial 1514 is LCT4 2230 carrying:
North Shore Regiment.
• 1 x Carrier towing 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
• 3 x Carrier Universal
• 1 x Carrier Mortar
• 18 men
Plus
• 5 x Jeeps with 6 crew - 48 Royal Marine Commando
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 4 Special Service Brigade Signal Troop
• 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - Air Support Signals Unit tentacle - For 48 Royal Marine Commando
• 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - Detachment 'A', Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J
• 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 1 x M14 Halftrack with 2 crew - 'K' (8 CIB) Signal Section, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
• 2 x White Scout Cars with 10 men - Headquarters 5 Assault Squadron, RE
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
• 4 men - 375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
• 2 men with a balloon - 52 Beach Balloon Unit, RAF

Serial 1515 is LCT4 2232 carrying:
North Shore Regiment
• 2 x Carrier towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
• 2 x Carrier Universal
• 1 x Carrier Mortar
• 1 x 15 cwt GS
• 18 men
'B' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
• 4 x Carrier MMG
• 1 x Carrier W/T
• 22 men

Plus
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters, 4 Special Service Brigade
• 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - Detachment ‘A’, Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew. Contact Detachment
• 1 x Armoured Bulldozer Class II and 2 men vehicle party - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company, RCE. Tows a Freuhauf trailer loaded with trackway material

NAN WHITE and NAN RED
H + 65 Minutes

NAN WHITE
Four LCI(L) arrive with Beach Group personnel.

Serial 1516 is LCI(L) 301 - Lt Robert M. Smith, RCNVR carrying:
• 12 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 53 men - 184 Field Company, RE
• 42 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
• 53 men - 170 Pioneer Company
• 26 men - 293 Pioneer Company - Stretcher Bearers
• 3 men - 104 RAF Beach Section
• 9 men - 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots)

Serial 1517 is LCI(L) 249 - Lt John Edward O'Rourke, RCNVR carrying:
• 24 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 25 men - 184 Field Company, RE
• 62 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
• 26 men - 293 Pioneer Company - Stretcher Bearers
• 2 men - 104 RAF Beach Section

Serial 1518 is LCI(L) 121 - Lt David Harold Botly, RCNVR carrying:
• 16 men - 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
• 30 men - 184 Field Company, RE
• 27 men - 170 Pioneer Company
• 46 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
• 4 men - ‘C’ Section, 4th Canadian Provost Company

Serial 1518a is LCI(L) 298 - Lt James Shaw Monteith, RCNVR carrying:
• 24 men - 30 Assault Unit, ‘X’ Troop - Pikeforce - target Radar de Douvres
• 30 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
• 64 men - 225 Pioneer Company
• 25 men - 170 Pioneer Company

Serial 1521 is ML 198 which does not beach but transfers personnel to LCH 239 - Serial 1463, from which they will land by LCA:
• 4 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
• 11 men - RN Beach Commando

NAN WHITE and NAN RED
H + 75 Minutes

The Field Artillery lands
A Flotilla of eight LCT4 arrive carrying 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA and priority vehicles for 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

**Serial 1522** is LCT4 637 carrying priority vehicles for 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- 3 x M14 Halftrack with 3 crew - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x Sherman III with 5 crew - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 1 x Carrier MMG with 5 crew - ‘B’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 4 men - ‘B’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 1 x 15 cwt - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
- 2 x Carrier towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
- 12 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
- 2 x Carrier towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns - La Regiment de la Chaudiere
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 155 Anti Aircraft Operations Room, RA
- 2 men - 155 Anti Aircraft Operations Room, RA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 2 crew - ‘K’ (8 CIB) Signal Section, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x BARV with 6 crew - 23 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 1 x 3 ton GS with 2 crew - 184 Field Company, RE
- 18 men with 3 handcarts - 184 Field Company, RE
- 6 men - 375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
- 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit, RAF

**Serial 1523** is LCT4 855 carrying:
- 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x Sherman OP with 5 crew
- 12 men
- 1 x 3 ton Medical with 6 crew
- 1 x Jeep with 4 crew
- 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals. ‘G’ Sig Sect, 14th Canadian Field Regiment) Section
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 1 x Jeep and airborne trailer
- 1 x M14 and 10 cwt trailer
- 18 men
- Plus
  - 1 x Sherman III with 5 crew - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
  - 1 x 3 ton GS with 2 crew - 184 Field Company, RE
  - 2 men with 2 motorcycles - ‘C’ Section, 4th Canadian Provost Company. MC's carried in signals vehicles
  - 2 x Bulldozer Class II with 6 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE - Towing 2 Jahn trailers loaded with trackway material
  - 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit, RAF
Serial 1524 is LCT4 885 carrying:
14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA.
  • 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose ("F" Troop, 81st Bty)
  • 1 x Sherman OP
  • 2 x Carrier OP
  • 1 x M14 Halftrack
  • 52 men
Plus
  • 1 x Carrier Mortar with 4 crew - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
  • 3 x Carrier with 9 crew - La Regiment de la Chaudiere
  • 1 x White Scout Car with 6 crew - 72 Field Company, RE - Reconnaissance party.
  • 3 men - Canadian Press Relations Service

Serial 1525 is LCT4 530 carrying:
14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA.
  • 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose ("C" Troop, 66th Bty)
  • 2 x Sherman OP ("C" Troop, GPO, 66th Bty & Troop Commander, 66th Bty)
  • 1 x Carrier OP
  • 1 x M14 Halftrack
  • 48 men
Plus
  • 1 x Carrier Mortar with 4 crew - La Regiment de la Chaudiere
  • 3 x Carrier with 9 crew - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
  • 3 x men - Canadian Press Relations Service
  • 1 x Amphibious Jeep with 2 crew - RN Commando

Serial 1526 is LCT4 524 carrying:
14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA.
  • 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
  • 2 x Sherman OP
  • 1 x Carrier OP
  • 1 x M14 Halftrack
  • 49 men
Plus
  • 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
  • 3 x Carrier - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
  • 14 men - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
  • 1 x Carrier Loyd with 3 crew - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment. Beach Group. Carries 1 man from 244 Provost Company and 1 man from 21 Army Group Movement Control Pool (Military Landing Officer) - Reconnaissance party for Commander 8 Beach Group and Military Landing Officer. Note: this vehicle may have been replaced by a Weasel

Serial 1527 is LCT4 516 carrying:
14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA.
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 1 x Carrier OP
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 49 men

Plus
- 3 x Carrier with 9 crew - La Regiment de la Chaudiere
- 1 x Carrier with 3 crew - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
- 1 x Carrier MMG with 5 crew - 'B' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
- 1 x Amphibious Jeep with 4 crew - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment and 1 man from 244 Provost Company. Reconnaissance party for Commander 8 Beach Group

**Serial 1528** is **LCT4 525** carrying:
14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 1 x Jeep
- 2 x Carrier OP
- 55 men

Plus
- 3 x Carrier with 9 crew - Queens Own Rifles of Canada.
- 1 x Carrier MMG with 5 crew - 'B' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)

**Serial 1529** is **LCT4 716** carrying:
14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 1 x Jeep
- 2 x Carrier OP
- 55 men

Plus
- 3 x Carrier with 9 crew - La Regiment de la Chaudiere
- 1 x Carrier with 3 crew - Queens Own Rifles of Canada
Serial 1530 is ML 147 which does not land but transfers personnel to LCH 239 - Serial 1463 from which they will land by LCA:

- 4 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 11 men - RN Commando

A Flotilla of LCT4 arrive carrying:

- 45 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - (55th, 63rd, 99th Field Battery's, RCA) - Lt Col R. G. Clarke

- 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade (priority vehicles)

Serial 1531 is LCT4 707 (Lt C. J. Holland, DOW 7Jun 44) carrying:

19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x Carrier OP with 4 crew - Regimental Headquarters
- 2 x Carrier - Regimental Headquarters
- 3 x M14 Halftracks - Regimental Headquarters
- 1 x Sherman OP - Regimental Headquarters
- 1 x 3 ton Medical - Regimental Headquarters
- 38 men - Regimental Headquarters
- 1 x Jeep and airborne trailer with 3 crew - 19th Canadian Field Regiment Signal Section

Plus
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC (Maj C.E. Baker & Maj MacPherson)
- 1 x Tractor LAA with 5 crew - 375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 34 Field Dressing Station, RAMC
- 1 x ARV with 5 crew - 23 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 6 men and a handcart - 184 Field Company, RE
- 1 x Bulldozer Class I and Jahn trailer with 3 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
- 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit RAF

Serial 1532 is LCT4 804 carrying:

19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 1 x Jeep
- 2 x Carrier OP
- 54 men

Plus
- 3 x Carrier with 9 crew - North Shore Regiment
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 48 Royal Marine Commando

Serial 1533 is LCT4 518 carrying:

19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack
- 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
- 2 x Sherman OP
- 44 men

North Shore Regiment
• 3 x Carrier
• 1 x Carrier Mortar
• 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
• 1 x Jeep
• 20 men

Plus
• 1 x Bulldozer Class I with 3 man vehicle party - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section RE.

**NOTE:** Class I is Caterpillar D8 or similar

**Serial 1534** is **LCT4 767** carrying:

19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
• 1 x M14 Halftrack
• 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
• 2 x Sherman OP
• 2 x Carrier OP
• 48 men

North Shore Regiment
• 3 x Carrier
• 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
• 14 men

Plus
• 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 48 Royal Marine Commando
• 1 x Bulldozer Class I with 3 man vehicle party - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section RE

**Serial 1535** is **LCT4 526** carrying:

19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
• 1 x M14 Halftrack
• 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
• 2 x Sherman OP
• 43 men

North Shore Regiment
• 1 x Carrier Mortar
• 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
• 9 men

Plus
• 4 x Carrier MMG with 16 crew - ‘B’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)
• 1 x Bulldozer Class I with 3 man vehicle party - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE

**NOTE:** Class I is Caterpillar D8 or similar

**Serial 1536** is **LCT4 529** carrying:

19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
• 1 x M14 Halftrack
• 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
• 2 x Sherman OP
• 2 x Carrier OP
• 48 men

North Shore Regiment
• 2 x Carrier Mortar
• 1 x 15 cwt
• 10 men

Plus
• 2 men - ‘C’ Section, 4th Canadian Provost Company
• 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 48 Royal Marine Commando
• 1 x Bulldozer Class I with 3 man vehicle party - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
  Note: Class 1 is a Caterpillar D8 or similar
• 5 men - Boom Command

Serial 1537 is LCT 501 carrying:
19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA.
  • 1 x M14 Halftrack
  • 4 x M7 Priest 105mm SP, each towing a Porpoise MkII which has 125 rounds of ammunition stowed loose
  • 2 x Sherman OP
  • 2 x Carrier OP
  • 2 x Jeep
  • 54 men
  
  Plus
  • 3 x Carrier with 9 crew - North Shore Regiment
  • 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 48 Royal Marine Commando
  • 4 men - Boom Command

  NOTE: Boom Command was a Royal Navy unit. Boom Layers were used to lay the mooring buoys in the anchorage areas. It was known that the enemy had placed booms across the entrance to Courseulles harbour and these would have to be removed. There may have been boom defences planned for Courseulles harbour but no record has been found.

Serial 1538 is LCT 602 carrying:
  • 1 x Bulldozer Class I and Fruehauf trailer with 2 man vehicle party - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company, RC
  • 2 x M14 Halftrack with 16 crew - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA Signal Section
  • 1 x Jeep and 10 cwt trailer with 2 crew - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA Signal Section
  • 1 x 3 ton tipper with 2 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
  • 2 x Dumpers with 4 crew - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
  • 2 x 3 ton Tipper with 4 crew - 26 Army Tipper Company
  375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
  • 2 x Crusader SP 40mm LAA guns with 12 crew
  • 2 x Bofors 40mm LAA guns. Towed by Crusader SP’s above
  • 28 men
  
  Plus
  • 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit, RAF

Serial 1539 is LCT 881 carrying:
  • 1 x M14 with 2 crew - ‘K’ (8 CIB) Signal Section, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
  • 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders
  • 1 x Jeep with 1 crew. Contact Detachment
  La Regiment de la Chaudiere
  • 1 x Carrier towing a 6 pdr Anti Tank gun
  • 1 x 15 cwt GS
  • 7 men
  
  Plus
  • 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment). Carries 3 men - Headquarters, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
  • 1 x Jeep FFW with 3 crew - Headquarters, 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
  • 1 x Bulldozer Class I and Jahn trailer with 3 men vehicle party - 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE

  NOTE: Class I is Caterpillar D8 or similar. Jahn trailer probably carried trackway material
375/114 LAA Regiment RA
   • 2 x Crusader SP 40mm LAA guns with 12 crew
   • 2 x Bofors 40mm LAA guns. Towed by Crusader SP’s above
   • 28 men
Plus
   • 1 x 3 ton GS with 2 crew - 184 Field Company, RE
   • 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit, RAF

Serial 1540 is LCT4 782 carrying:
   Headquarters 8th was Canadian Infantry Brigade
   • 3 x Jeeps with 7 crew
   • 1 man - Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Liaison Officer
   • 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Air Support Signals Unit tentacle
   ‘K’ (8 CIB) Signal Section, 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division Signals
   • 2 x White Scout Car
   • 2 x M14 Halftrack
   • 2 x Jeeps
   • 25 men
Queens Own Rifles of Canada.
   • 1 x Carrier with 3 crew
   • 1 x 15 cwt GS with 2 crew
   • 1 x Carrier Mortar with 3 crew
Plus
   • 1 x 3 ton Tipper with 3 crew - 26 Army Tipper Company.
   • 1 x Bulldozer Class I and Jahn trailer with 3 men vehicle party from 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE.
   \textit{NOTE: Class I is Caterpillar D8 or similar}
   • 1 x BARV with 6 crew - 28 Beach Recovery Section, REME
   • 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit, RAF

Serial 1541 is LCT4 882 carrying:
86 HAA Regiment, RA
   • 1 x Car 4 seater 4 X 4 with 2 crew - Regimental Headquarters.
   • 3 men from Regimental Headquarters
Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
   • 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - Detachment ‘A’, Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J. For 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ party
   • 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Contact Detachment
   • 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - 3 British Division. Liaison Officer
   • 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - Detachment ‘A’, Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J
375/114 LAA Regiment, RA
   • 2 x Crusader SP 40mm LAA guns with 12 crew
   • 2 x Bofors 40mm LAA guns. Towed by Crusader SPs above
   • 22 men
   • 1 x Tractor LAA with 5 crew
Plus
   • 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - North Nova Scotia Highlanders
   • 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - Highland Light Infantry of Canada
   • 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 33 Field Dressing Station, RAMC
14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Lt Col H.S. Griffin

Observation and reconnaissance parties landed with the infantry. After shooting on the run in the LCTs turned away and finally came into beach at 0925 hours. No guns were lost in landing but two other vehicles were drowned and recovered later. A lack of exits and congestion on the beach held them up for an hour. The regiment made its first gun position about 200 yards from the beach in fields west of Bernieres. At 1130 hours eighteen guns were in action but were hampered by a lack of crest clearance. Of the remainder three were held up in traffic and three were destroyed by enemy fire. Later in the day the guns gave support to the advancing infantry.

19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA - Lt Col R.G. Clarke

Observation and reconnaissance parties landed with the infantry. One officer was wounded and one other rank killed. The regiment reported that the Forward Observation Officers found few targets in the early stages when there was much close fighting but at 1030 hrs fire was called to disperse enemy armour. At 1700 hrs advanced parties moved to positions half a mile south of Bernieres.

The LCT’s turned away after firing on the run in and then returned to land from 0910 hrs. The regiment began landing, ‘D’ Troop first, at 0910 hrs. It was heavily mortared getting off the beach but had its guns in action by 1920 hrs. Three more troops followed soon after and all managed to clear the beach and come into action. One troop did not land until 1500 hrs because its LCT had a damaged propeller. ‘A’ Troop lost three guns, a halftrack and a carrier. Regimental Headquarters landed under heavy mortar fire and lost several men including an officer.

Artillery fire during the run in

When H Hour was put back by ten minutes this information was transmitted to the artillery. Orders were then sent to all the SP artillery supporting 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade to adjust their time table accordingly. This apparently caused a delay in the opening of fire by the guns. However 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade reported that Bernieres and St Aubin received ‘a terrific pounding’. 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade later reported that all SP artillery fire was switched to St Aubin, leaving Bernieres without the barrage. At the time the probable cause was thought to be the strong current which made navigation and station keeping difficult. As the SP guns had a limited traverse the entire LCT had to be aimed. The current caused all craft to point at St Aubin. This problem would be more apparent the craft came closer to the shore. A later report suggested a problem with the control craft observing and controlling fire on Bernieres. Control was transferred to the craft off St Aubin and all fire concentrated there. Whatever the cause Bernieres, and NAN WHITE, did not receive the full barrage planned.
NAN WHITE and NAN RED
Landing by Ferry Service from LSI's, using craft as available. These were LCI(L).

Serial 1542 is Ferry Service from LSI(L) J30 SS Monowai:
  For 6 Airborne Division.
  • 100 men and 100 folding bicycles - 249 Field Company, Airborne, RE
  • 63 men - 716 Light Composite Company, Airborne, RASC
  • 72 men - 195 Airlanding Field Ambulance, RAMC
  NOTE: The above units would be unable to travel along the coast to join the airborne division as the road was not open on D Day
  • 28 men - 1 Corp Defence Company
  • 125 men - 170 Pioneer Company
  • 8 men - 21 Army Group Movement Control Pool. Military Landing Officers staff, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
  • 111 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
  • 86 men - 966 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, RE
  • 48 men - 267 Port Company, RE (Rhino Ferry)
  • 70 men - 255 Pioneer Company
  • 60 men - 65 Field Company, RE and 61 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE

Serial 1543 is Ferry Service from LSI(L) J32 HMS Duke of Wellington:
  • 46 men - Headquarters 1 Corps and 777 Corps Car Company
  • 71 men - Canadian Composite Anti Tank Battery, RCA
  • 60 men with 60 folding bicycle - 249 Field Company, Airborne RE. 6 AB Division
  • 25 men and 4 bicycles - 176 Workshop and Park Company - Advanced Headquarters
  • 4 men - 104 Beach Section, RAF
  • 15 men - 240 Petrol Depot, RASC
  • 2 men - 139 Detail Issuing Depot, RASC
  • 14 men - 140 Detail Issuing Depot, RASC
  • 3 men - Port Section, RAMC
  • 61 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
  • 33 men - 15 Ordnance Beach Detachment, RAOC

Serial 1544 is Ferry Service from LSI(L) J31 SS Clan Lamont:
  • 52 men - 4 Air landing Anti Tank Battery, RA
  • 20 men - Headquarters 6 Air landing Brigade. 6 Airborne Division
  • 16 men - 273/86 HAA Regiment, RA
  • 10 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment. Beach Group
  • 4 men - 104 RAF Beach Section
  • 142 men - 144 Pioneer Company
  • 26 men - 140 Detail Issuing Depot, RASC
  • 2 men - Postal Detachment
  • 33 men - 15 Ordnance Beach Detachment, RAOC
  • 2 men - 14 Ordnance Beach Detachment, RAOC
  • 2 men - 242 Petrol Depot, RASC
  • 10 men - 240 Petrol Depot, RASC
  • 21 men - 946 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, RE
  • 143 men - 'R' Pioneer Company - Decoy and Deception
  • 83 men - 240 Field Company, RE
  • 84 men - 255 Pioneer Company
  • 96 men - 72 Field Company, RE
  • 21 men - 45 Ordnance Ammunition Company, ROAC
Serial 1545 is Ferry Service for LSI(L) J33 SS Isle of Guernsey:
• 40 men - 249 Field Company Airborne, RE. 6 Airborne Division
• 10 men - 41 Royal Marine Commando
• 9 men - Headquarters 8th Canadian Brigade Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots)
• 40 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group

Serial 1546 is Ferry Service for LSI(L) J36 HMCS Prince David:
• 96 men - 72 Field Company, RE
• 102 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment. Beach Group
• 38 men - Royal Navy Nucleus Section - Headquarters Naval Officer in Charge
• 50 men - 474 Searchlight Battery, RA

Serial 1547 is Ferry Service for LSI(L) J35 SS St. Helier:
• 142 men - 144 Pioneer Company
• 4 men - 1034 Port Operating Company RE
• 6 men - 8 Beach Group. Staff Captains Increment - A Staff Captain and small staff were
attached to the Beach Group headquarters

Serial 1549 is Ferry Service for LSI(L) J37 SS Lady of Mann:
• 70 men - 195 Air landing Field Ambulance. 6 Airborne Division
• 3 men - 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Company. RCASC. Reconnaissance Party
• 17 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment. Beach Group
• 19 men - 293 Pioneer Company
• 142 men - ‘R’ Pioneer Company - Decoys and Deception

NOTE: The Ferry service could not be planned in detail since it was not known what craft would be available
and some flexibility needed to be allowed so that some serials could be called forward out of order if
necessary

A Control Officer and staff will work from a designated ship which will fly signals and a board with the
letters SNOL (Senior Naval Officer Landing). The Control Officer and staff will have a number of small
craft also clearly marked. These will have loudhailers to communicate with landing craft. Landing craft
also have loudhailers. All returning craft will report to a Control Officer and will then be detailed to
proceed to a specific ship and collect a specific serial.

On D day the Control Officer was a Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group. He was on a headquarters
ship and had a number of LCP(L) as despatch boats.

LCA's were not generally used for the Ferry Service on D day since the LSI's were to hoist their LCA's
and sail as soon as possible. Keeping such large targets off the beaches longer than necessary was
unwise and they were needed to embark personnel of follow up units and maintain a brisk shuttle
service. However after the landing the first flight LCA's of SS Isle of Thanet were to report to Deputy
Senior Officer Assault Group NAN GREEN and those of HMS Royal Ulsterman were to report to
Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group MIKE RED for landing beach parties etc. On completion of these
tasks they returned to their parent ship, except for one from each LSI which remained for duties off the
beaches.

One LCA from each of the LSI in Force ‘J’ remained off the beaches under the control of the DSOAGs.
Their place on the LSI was to be taken by a LCA(HR) which was to be hoisted aboard for return to the
UK.
In the Ferry Service there is a chain of communication and control which should ensure a smooth operation.

- The Control Officer (RN) has a board with the serials to be landed, and their priority, and he will assign craft to serials
- The Assistant Military Landing Officer on each ship will see that the correct serials are loaded
- The Unit Landing Officer will see that his unit are all loaded before going ashore himself
- The Beachmaster (Army) checks the serials as they land and directs them to an exit
- A unit officer will check personnel and vehicles off the beach
- A unit officer will check the arrival of the serial at the Assembly Area
- At this point all vehicles and personnel revert to unit control

**NAN WHITE and NAN RED**

**H + 4 Hours**

Two LCT3 arrive, beach and dry out. They each carry 190 tons of stores which are to act as a temporary supply until depots are established.

**Serial 1550 is LCT3 474 carrying:**
- 2 x 3 ton GS with 4 crew - 184 Field Company, RE
- 9 men - 20 Works Stores Section, RE
- 3 x 6 pdr Antitank guns and 16 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
- 3 men - 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Company, RCASC
- 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit RAF
- 190 tons of stores

**Serial 1551 is LCT3 7011 carrying:**
- 2 x 3 ton GS with 4 crew - 184 Field Company, RE
- 9 men - 20 Works Stores Section, RE
- 3 x 6 pdr AT guns and 16 men - 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment - Beach Group
- 3 men - 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Company, RCASC
- 2 men and a balloon - 52 Balloon Unit RAF
- 190 tons of stores

Unlike Sword there does not seem to be any provision for handling the stores or the 6 pdr Anti Tank guns.
9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was the reserve brigade and had the task of passing through 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade and advancing to the final objective on the line Authis, Ardenne, Carpiquet. The brigade had been circling in its LCI(L)s and LCT's offshore for some two hours before at 1035 hrs it received the order to land. Wrecked craft and congestion on NAN RED led to the decision to land all the brigade through NAN WHITE. This caused further delay and the brigade touched down at 1140 hrs. First priority vehicles were to land 30 minutes later.

It was 1400 hrs before the brigade and its vehicles were all ashore and they then had to struggle through Bernieres which was still crowded with vehicles and personnel from 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade. At 1435 hrs the Divisional GOC held an ‘O’ Group and it was decided that 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade would advance as soon as Beny sur Mer was reported clear.

Finally at 1820 hrs the brigade began to move forward. It had trained as a mobile brigade and was to advance as follows:

- Stuart Light tanks of 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment)
- ‘C’ Company North Nova Scotia Highlanders in the battalion Carrier Platoon.
- One platoon of ‘C’ Company Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (machine gun).
- One troop of M10 SP anti tank guns from 105th Canadian Anti Tank Battery, RCA
- Two sections of the battalion Pioneer Platoon.
- Four 6 pdr guns from the battalion Anti Tank Platoon.
- The remaining three companies of North Nova Scotia Highlanders each carried on the tanks of a squadron of 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment)
- Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders and Highland Light Infantry of Canada each with three companies on airborne bicycles and on company carried in the battalion vehicles.

The vanguard advanced until ‘C’ Company met enemy opposition at Villons les Buissons. At the same time ‘A’ Company became involved in a fight at Colomby sur Thaon. It was decided to dig in for the night with North Nova Scotia Highlanders and 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) in the area of Villons les Buissons and Anisy. The other two battalions would remain in the Beny area. The brigade group had suffered some 30 casualties during the day.
It might appear that 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade had shown some lack of drive. However it had advanced further than the units on either flank and would have been dangerously exposed if it had continued.

9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
Naval Assault Group J3

Group 331

HMS Royal Ulsterman

An LSI(H) which was acting as Headquarters ship for Captain, Senior Officer Assault Group J3, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and Stand By HQ Ship for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. She was built in 1936 as a Glasgow to Belfast ferry. She was 3250 tons, 340 foot long and could manage 16 knots. She could carry 830 troops and 6 LCA. Armament was one 12 pdr gun and five 20mm.

ML 247 carrying Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group J3.

Twelve LCI(L) from 261 LCI Flotilla (manned by the Royal Canadian Navy). These carried all the marching personnel of the brigade.

Twenty LCT4 from 36 and 37 LCT Flotillas. These carried priority vehicles for 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade plus Division Headquarters, 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) and RAF Ground Controlled Interception.

Two LCF, No's 24, 29 from 36 and 37 LCT Flotillas. These accompanied their respective flotillas to provide AA protection

Four LCT3 carrying pre loaded stores for J1 and J2. These were to beach and dry out on MIKE and NAN Beaches. One was seriously delayed by engine breakdown and was towed across the Channel.

LCT(R) 125. This carries reloads for the LCT(R)’s already off Juno

1 US Coast Guard Cutter. Rescue craft.
3rd Canadian Infantry Division Headquarters
Landing under the control of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade

Serial 1700 - HMS Hilary
499th Ancillary Flotilla: (LCA’s LOST in Action in RED)
- LCP(L) 504
- LCP(L) 528
- LCP(L) 534
- LCP(L) 761
- LCP(L) 853
- LCP(L) 854
- DUKW - operated by 297 GT Company, RASC
- DUKW - operated by 297 GT Company, RASC

Landing from Landing Ship Headquarters HMS Hilary:
- 1 x car 5 cwt 4 x 4 (Jeep) with one crew - Headquarters I Corps - Command Group
- 21 men - Headquarters I Corps - Command Group. Carried in a DUKW lowered from the davits of LSH HMS Hilary.
  NOTE: To land at a time and on a beach at the Corps Commander’s discretion
- 1 x car 5 cwt 4 x 4 (Jeep) with one crew - Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. Command Group
- 21 men - Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Command Group. Carried in a DUKW lowered from the davits of LSH HMS Hilary.
  NOTE: To land at a time and on a beach at the Division Commander’s discretion

To land at a time and on a beach at the Division Commander’s discretion:
- 3 men - Headquarters CRA - Command Group
- 3 men - Headquarters CRE - Command Group
- 19 men - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals - Command Group
- 2 men - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 2 men - Principal Military Landing Officer and batman
- 2 men - Commander 102 Beach Sub Area and batman - Brigadier N. B. Brading
- 2 DUKW with 6 crew - 297 GT Company, RASC
- 4 men - Detachment ‘A’, Troop 3, Bombardment Unit Force ‘J’. Shore Bombardment Liaison Officer and party

Serial 1701 - HMS Royal Ulsterman
This was a LSI acting as a LSH on this occasion. It was HQ Ship for 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and Stand By HQ Ship for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division.

The following were to land at a time and on a beach at the discretion of the Commander 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- 19 men - Headquarters I Corps - Command Group
- 15 men - Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Command Group.
- 9 men - Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 4 men - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB) signals
- 2 men - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 3 men - Headquarters CRA - Command Group
- 3 men - Headquarters CRE - Command Group
- 18 men - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals - Command Group
- 1 man - Deputy PMLO
- 2 men - Deputy Commander 102 Beach Sub Area and batman
- 2 men - 17 Movement Control Group (A Echelon)
This wave was almost an hour late in landing, having been held back to allow beach congestion to clear.

**NAN WHITE**

LCI(L)s land 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. This brigade has the convenience of landing en masse as a unit. Transport lands half an hour later.

Three LCI(L) carry North Nova Scotia Highlanders

**Serial 1702 is HMC LCI(L) 118** - Lt Charles R. Bond, RCNVR carrying:
- 186 men - North Nova Scotia Highlanders
  *Damage Sustained in Landing:* Damaged by the mine set off by HMC LCI(L) 250; port ramp had to be jettisoned after being rammed by LCI(L)-250; kedge had to be cut after being fouled by HMC LCI(L) 252; starboard screw sheered off by mine while un-beaching and three holes pushed through the ship's bottom, two of them into engine room.

**Serial 1703 is HMC LCI(L) 135** - Lt John Douglas Kell, RCNVR carrying:
- 187 men with 11 bicycles - North Nova Scotia Highlanders
  *Damage Sustained in Landing:* Four holes through the bottom from obstacles and port propeller damaged.

**Serial 1704 is HMC LCI(L) 262** - Lt Peter R. Hinton RCNVR (Temp) carrying:
- 186 men with 11 bicycles GS - North Nova Scotia Highlanders
  *Damage Sustained in Landing:* Two holes in engine room starboard side from beach obstacles; engine room flooded and pumps put out of action.

**Serial 1705 is HMC LCI(L) 276** - Lt Andrew A. Wedd, D.S.C., RCNVR carrying:
- 39 men - Highland Light Infantry of Canada
- 28 men - Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders
- 26 men - 'C' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa
- 17 men - 9th Canadian Brigade Defence and Employment Platoon (Lorne Scots)
- 7 men - 'L' Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 4 men - 105th (SP) Anti Tank Battery, 3rd Canadian Anti Tank Regiment, RCA Reconnaissance Party
- 4 men - 'D' Section, 4th Canadian Provost Company
- 5 men - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals.
- 1 man - Headquarters 3rd Canadian Division - Assistant Provost Marshal
- 6 men - Canadian Press Relations Services
  *Damage Sustained in Landing:* Four obstacle holes in the bottom causing loss of oil and water.
NAN RED
H+150 Minutes
Although scheduled to land on NAN RED this wave was diverted to NAN WHITE Beach and was also delayed for almost an hour.

Three LCI(L) carry Highland Light Infantry of Canada:

Serial 1706 is HMC LCI(L) 125 - Lt Charles R. Parker, RCNVR carrying:
  • 180 men with 11 bicycles GS and 120 bicycles folding - ‘A’ Company and 1st Platoon ‘D’ Company, Highland Light Infantry of Canada
  • 2 men - ‘D’ Section, 4th Canadian Provost Company
  
  **Damage Sustained in Landing:** Holed by obstacles in the bow causing 15° list which had to be corrected by counter flooding of ballast tanks.

Serial 1707 is HMC LCI(L) 250 - Lt H.M. Harrison, RCNVR carrying:
  • 180 men with 120 bicycles folding - ‘B’ Company and Battalion HQ’s Highland Light Infantry of Canada
  • 2 men - ‘D’ Section, 4th Canadian Provost Company
  
  **Damage Sustained in Landing:** Mined on the port bow; lost both ramps when turning while getting off the beach. Rammed and damaged LCI(L) 118.

Serial 1708 is HMC LCI(L) 306 - Lt Andrew K. Stephens, RCNVR carrying:
  • 180 men with 11 bicycles GS and 120 bicycles folding - ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, Highland Light Infantry of Canada
  • plus photographer Lt G A Milne, RCN photographer

Three LCI(L) carry Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders:

Serial 1709 is HMC LCI(L) 299 - Lt William B. McGregor, RCNVR carrying:
  • 182 men with 11 bicycles GS and 120 bicycles folding - ‘C’ Company, Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders
  
  **Damage Sustained in landing:** LCI(L) 299 hit a mine on its port side, putting holes in both the engine room and mess deck

Serial 1710 is HMC LCI(L) 270 - Lt A.C. Clark, RCNVR carrying:
  • 180 men with 11 bicycles GS and 120 bicycles folding - Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders
  • 2 men - Contact Detachment
  
  **Damaged Sustained in landing:** LCI(L) 270 - mine had blown a large hole through the forward troop space causing no casualties to troops.

Serial 1711 is HMC LCI(L) 115 - Lt Vincent Dana Ramsay, RCNVR carrying carrying:
  • 180 men with 120 bicycles folding - Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders.
This wave was almost an hour behind schedule, having been held back because of beach congestion.

**NAN WHITE**

A flight of LCT carry priority vehicles for 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade units and 3rd Canadian Division Headquarters.

**Serial 1712** is **LCT4 941** carrying:
- Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
  - 3 x Jeeps with 9 crew - Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
  - 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 4 crew - 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Carries a motorcycle
  - 1 x Heavy Utility with 5 crew - Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade

**Plus attached**
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Air Support Signals Unit tentacle. For 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 1 x Jeep with 4 crew - Contact Detachment
- 1 x Jeep with 5 crew - Forward Observation Bombardment, Detachment ‘A’, 3 Bombardment Unit
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Liaison Officer
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 12th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA
- 1 x Carrier W/T with 3 crew - ‘C’ Company Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. Carries a motorcycle
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - ‘C’ Company Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa
- 1 x 15 cwt GS with 1 crew - ‘D’ Section 4 Canadian Provost Company. Carries 2 motorcycles

**Plus signals**
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals.
- 1 x Jeep with airborne trailer and 3 crew - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Division Signals
- 1 x Carrier Universal with 4 crew - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Can. Infantry Division Signals. Carries two hand carts
- 1 x White Scout Car with 4 crew - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals. Carries 2 motorcycles
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 4 crew - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals. Carries 2 Handcarts
- 1 x White Scout Car with 4 crew - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals. Carries a motorcycle
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 4 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 man - Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in a Divisional Signals vehicle
- 1 x Jeep with 10 cwt trailer and 3 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with airborne trailer and 3 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

**Serial 1713** is **LCT4 639** carrying:
- North Nova Scotia Highlanders
  - 2 x Carrier Mortar
  - 5 x Carrier Universal
  - 2 x Carrier towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
  - 2 x 15 cwt GS
  - 2 x 3 ton Lorry GS
  - 1 x 3 ton Lorry Medical
  - 4 x motorcycles
  - 58 men
‘C’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa.

- 4 x Carrier Universal with 16 crew are MMG Carriers supporting the North Nova Scotia Highlanders
- 1 x motorcycle carried on one of the above

Plus
- 1 man - Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Padre

**Serial 1714 is LCT4 943** carrying:

North Nova Scotia Highlanders
- 1 x Jeep
- 7 x Carrier Universal
- 2 x Carrier Mortar
- 2 x Carrier towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS carrying 2 motorcycles
- 54 men

Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 13th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA. Forward Observation Officer
- 3 x Jeeps with airborne trailers and 6 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA. Forward Observation Officer
- 1 x Jeep with 4 crew - Contact Detachment
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 5 crew - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

**27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - LCol M.B.K. Gordon**

A flight of nine LCT’s land 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment)

**Serial 1715 is LCT4 1008** carrying:

27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Maj E.W.L. Arnold (OC ‘A’ Sqn) and Capt B.M. Veilleux
- 2 x Sherman Tanks MkVc (Firefly) with 8 crew
- 4 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 20 crew each towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 1 x Humber Scout Car with 2 crew
- 2 x Jeeps with 4 crew

Plus
- 2 x Carriers towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns and 8 crew - Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 1 Corps Defence Company

**Serial 1716 is LCT4 1006** carrying:

27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Major J.C. Cave, Lt I.A. MacArthur, Lt I.A. Maclean
- 1 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 4 crew towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 2 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 10 crew each towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 1 x Humber Scout Car with 2 crew

North Nova Scotia Highlanders
- 2 x Carriers Mortar
- 6 x Carriers Universal
- 1 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4
- 2 x Carriers towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS carrying 8 motorcycles
- 58 men
Serial 1717 is LCT4 634 carrying:

27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Captain D.Y. Dick
- 2 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 8 crew
- 4 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 20 crew each towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 2 x Jeeps with 2 crew
- 1 x Humber Scout Car with 2 crew
- 3 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 6 crew

Plus
- 4 x motorcycles (Villiers) with 4 crew - Headquarters, 4th Canadian Provost Company
- 4 x motorcycles (Villiers) with 4 crew - 'D' Section, 4th Canadian Provost Company
- Motorcycles carried on above lorries

Serial 1718 is LCT4 938 carrying:

27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Lt A.R. Truax
- 1 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 4 crew
- 4 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 25 crew each towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 2 x Stuart Tanks with 10 crew
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 2 crew

Serial 1719 is LCT4 937 carrying:

27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Major G.S. Mahon
- 1 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 4 crew
- 5 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 25 crew each towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 2 x Stuart Tanks with 10 crew
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 2 crew

Plus
- 14 men from North Nova Scotia Highlanders

Serial 1720 is LCT4 700 carrying:

27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Lt K.S. Steeves
- 2 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 8 crew
- 4 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 20 crew towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 2 x Stuart Tanks with 10 crew
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 2 crew
- 1 x Motorcycle and 1 crew carried in above vehicle
Serial 1721 is LCT4 940 carrying:
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Capt S.V. Radley Walters and Capt M.H. Batema
- 1 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 4 crew
- 5 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 25 crew towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 2 x Stuart Tanks with 10 crew
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 2 crew
- 1 x Motorcycle and 1 crew carried in above vehicle

Serial 1722 is LCT4 670 carrying:
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - Maj V.O. Walsh
- 1 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 4 crew
- 5 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 25 crew
- 4 x Porpoise with ammunition towed by the above tanks.
- 2 x Stuart Tanks with 10 crew
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 2 crew
- 1 x Motorcycle and 1 crew carried in above vehicle

Serial 1723 is LCT4 759 carrying:
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment) - LCol M.B.K. Gordon, Capt N.H. Welsh, Capt G.W. Cote, Lt H.D. Spielman, C.F. Thompson, & T.C. Stevens
- 1 x Sherman Tank MkVc (Firefly) with 4 crew
- 6 x Sherman Tanks MkIII with 30 crew each towing Porpoise with ammunition
- 1 x Sherman ARV with 4 crew
- 1 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4 with 2 crew
- 1 x Jeep with 1 crew
Plus
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew from ‘H’ Section (CRA), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

NAN RED
H+180 Minutes
A flight of LCT4’s, 35th Flotilla, with priority vehicles for 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade arrive. Although delayed for almost an hour they did land on the planned beach.

Serial 1724 is LCT4 667 carrying:
Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - ‘N’ Section (CRE), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 1 crew - ‘D’ Section 4 Canadian Provost Company. Carries a Motorcycle
- 2 men with a handcart - Contact Detachment
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Detachment ‘A’, Troop 3, Bombardment Unit J Force.
- 1 x Jeep with 4 crew - Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 16 men - Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals. Carries 2 Motorcycles
- 2 x Jeeps FFW with airborne trailers - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep with 10 cwt trailer - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x Jeep - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 4 x Handcarts - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 15 men - ‘L’ Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
105th Anti Tank Battery, 3rd Canadian Anti Tank Regiment, RCA
- 4 x M10 SP Anti Tank
- 2 x Motorcycle. Carried on vehicles below
- 1 x Carrier Universal
• 26 men
Plus
• 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 4 crew - Highland Light Infantry of Canada
• 1 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 2 crew - ‘C’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa
• Carries 2 x Motorcycle

Serial 1725 is LCT4 679 carrying:
Highland Light Infantry of Canada
• 3 x Carrier Mortar
• 3 x Carrier Universal
• 1 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4
• 2 x Carrier each towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
• 3 x 3 ton GS Lorries
• 6 x Motorcycles. Carried on the above lorries
• 51 men
Plus
• 1 x M14 Halftrack with airborne trailer and 4 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
• 4 x Carrier Universal with 16 crew - 'C' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. Carry a Motorcycle

Serial 1726 is LCT4 632 carrying:
Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders
• 2 x Carrier Universal with 8 crew. Carry 2 x Motorcycles
• 4 x Carrier Mortar with 16 crew
Highland Light Infantry of Canada
• 7 x Carrier Universal with 21 crew. Carry 6 x Motorcycles
• 2 x Carrier each towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns and 10 crew
• 1 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4 with 2 crew
3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
• 3 x Jeep with airborne trailers and 9 crew
• 1 x M14 Halftrack with 5 crew from L Section
• 1 x Jeep with 4 crew - Contact Detachment

Serial 1727 is LCT4 669 carrying:
Highland Light Infantry of Canada
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew
• 6 x Carrier Universal with 18 crew. Carry 6 x Motorcycles
• 2 x Carrier Mortar with 8 crew
• 2 x Carrier each towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns and 10 crew
• 1 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4 with 2 crew
• 1 x 3 ton GS Lorry with 2 crew
Plus
• 4 x Carrier Universal with 16 crew - Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders. Carry 2 Motorcycles
• 2 x Jeep with airborne trailers and 6 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
• 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 19th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA

Serial 1728 is LCT4 721 - Lt Charles John Cooke, RNVR, carrying:
Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders
• 3 x Carrier Mortar with 12 crew.
• 3 x Carrier Universal with 12 crew
• 2 x Carrier each towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns and 10 crew
• 1 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4 with 2 crew
• 3 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 6 crew
6 x Motorcycle and 6 crew carried in the above lorries

Plus

4 x Carrier Universal with 16 crew - 'C' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa
2 x Jeep with airborne trailers and 6 crew - 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
1 man - 'L' Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

Serial 1729 is LCT4 636 carrying:

Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders

2 x Carrier Mortar with 12 crew
7 x Carrier Universal with 23 crew. Carry 2 x Motorcycle
2 x Carrier each towing 6 pdr Anti Tank guns and 10 crew
1 x Jeep with 2 crew
2 x 15 cwt GS 4 X 4 with 4 crew
2 x 3 ton Lorry GS with 4 crew
4 x Motorcycle and 4 crew carried in the above lorries
1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Contact Detachment

Plus

1 x M14 Halftrack with 4 crew - 'L' Section (9 CIB), 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

There follows details of some units not described in the above text.

7th Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars) - Lt Col T.C. Lewis

Divisional reconnaissance regiments were not required in their primary role on D Day and were to supply Contact Detachments. Their role was to keep the divisional commander informed as to what his units were doing. In addition 7th Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars) provided a Beach Traffic Control Group to control the flow of vehicles through the beach exits.

Contact Detachments

Detachments were formed and attached to their units in time to allow training etc. Twelve Contact Detachments were provided:

- Four to each assault brigade. This gave one for brigade headquarters and one per battalion
- Two to the reserve brigade. One for brigade headquarters and one to be deployed as the brigade commander thought necessary.
- Two to Division Headquarters

Each detachment consisted of:

1 x Jeep 1 x 22 radio set 1 x 68 radio set Batteries and chore horse
1 x Officer 1 x NCO 3 x operators

All detachments operated on the same net. They could also be used as an emergency wireless net if other means of communication failed.

In general, three man detachments landed with the unit to which they were assigned. They were on foot and carried the No 68 set. The Jeeps and No 22 sets landed from LCT's later. In the case of detachments landing from Headquarters Ships the vehicles could be ashore and waiting for them.

In the assault brigades the first three man foot detachments landed at H+20 minutes, together with the reserve companies of the assault battalions. At H+45 minutes a handcart with two men landed and

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jeeps with 22 sets and a driver landed at H+105 minutes. Troop commanders also landed at H+20 minutes.

In the reserve brigade a two man reconnaissance team landed at H+150 minutes and the remainder landed at H+180 minutes, the personnel, handcarts and jeeps landing together.

**Beach Control Group**

The Beach Control Group consisted of four detachments of a Lieutenant designated ‘Beach Exit Officer’, and two men. There was also a Traffic Major, who was responsible for the flow of traffic and liaising with other army and navy teams, and an officer who commanded the Group, probably a Captain. One team landed on each assault beach at H+20, together with the reserve companies of assault battalions.

The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the machine gun battalion of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, also provided a Beach Control Group. (see below).

![Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG)](image)

**Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) - Lt Col P.C. Klaehn**

The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa was the machine gun battalion for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. It had three machine gun companies and a heavy mortar company.

The MMG and 4.2" mortars of the MG Battalion were not considered suitable for use in the assault phase of the landing. The MMG could be carried by their crews but only for short distances and there was little they could contribute in the actual landing and clearing of beach defences. They would land later, with their vehicles, from LCT's.

A number of men from Regimental Headquarters acted as Beach Exit Control. A Major was Commander Beach Exit Control and a four man team landed on each of MIKE GREEN and NAN RED at H+20 minutes. A Jeep with three crew, and presumably a wireless set, landed at H+7 hours for the Commander Beach Exit Control.

'A' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) supported 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Major JWH Rowley

A five man reconnaissance party landed at H+20 minutes and a further five man party landed at H+45 minutes. The headquarters and liaison with HQ 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade were in place when the guns and carriers landed.

‘A’ Company landed with its guns and supported 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade onto its intermediate objective. It then dug in for the night. This was its intended role since the final objective was not reached.

'B' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) supported 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Major JM Carson

Saw more action than the other companies

- 6 Platoon supported the Queens Own Rifles of Canada - Lt. Woodward
- 7 Platoon was under the command of the North Shore Regiment in the assault on the radar station at Douvres - Lt. Sharp
- 8 Platoon supported the Regiment de la Chaudiere
A four man reconnaissance party landed at H+20 minutes. At H+60 Six Carrier MMG, one Carrier with wireless set and 26 men landed. At H+75 Seven Carrier MMG and 35 men landed.

‘C’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) supported 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Major CC Hill

‘C’ Company landed with 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. This brigade was to pass through 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade and advance the furthest. ‘C’ Company landed together, reorganized at the concentration area and moved off with the Brigade.

26 men landed at H+150

16 Carriers, one Carrier with wireless set, one jeep, 4 x motorcycles (carried on the vehicles), one 3 ton lorry and 50 men landed at H+180

‘D’ Company, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Heavy Mortars) - Major R M Ross

- 13 and 14 Platoons supported the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade - Major R.M Ross
- 12 and 15 Platoons were to support 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade but were not able to land until D+2 - Captain R.G. Armstrong

Anti Tank Artillery

Anti tank batteries were deployed for the immediate support of brigades against counter attack by armour, and the neutralization of enemy strongpoints. In any assault it is a priority to get anti tank guns in position to hold any ground gained against counter attack.

There were two Anti Tank Regiments initially deployed on Juno.

3rd Canadian Anti Tank Regiment, RCA - Lt Col J.P. Phin

Was the anti tank unit of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. It had the normal organization for a divisional anti tank regiment but for D Day the batteries were reorganized so that all were composite batteries having troops from more than one battery. 105 Composite Anti Tank Battery, RCA had the four self propelled M10 troops of the regiment, one from each battery. 52 Anti Tank Battery, RCA and 94 Anti Tank Battery, RCA each had four troops of towed 6 pdr guns.

62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA - Lt Col R.B.W. Bethell (landed from Serial 1149)

- 245th Anti Tank Bty - Major Frank Bullivant (Landed in support of 3rd British Div D+1)
- 246th Anti Tank Bty - Major A.G. St G. Pollock (Landed D+1)
- 247th Anti Tank Bty - Major H.D. Marsh (Landed D+1)
- 248th Anti Tank Bty - Major G.B.W. Woodroffe (Landed D Day))

Was the anti tank regiment of I Corps and had a different organization. 245 and 248 Anti Tank Batteries each had four troops of 4 x self propelled M10 guns. 246 and 247 Anti Tank Battery had four troops of 4 x 17 pdr guns towed by Crusader tractors.

Landing in support of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- 94 Battery, 3rd Canadian Anti Tank Regiment, RCA - Towed 6 pdrs (G,H Trps)
- 246 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA - 17 pdrs towed by Crusader Tractors (D+1)
- 248 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA - M10 SP (D Day)
Landing in support of 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- 52 Composite Battery, 3rd Canadian Anti Tank Regiment, RCA - Towed 6 pdrs (D,E Trps)

Landing in support of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- 105 Battery, 3rd Canadian Anti Tank Regiment, RCA - M10 SP (C,F,L,I Trps)
- 247 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA - 17 pdrs towed by Crusader Tractors (D+1)

When 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade passed through 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade for the final advance it would pick up 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades batteries.

Until the above batteries were ashore, from H+4 Hours, the battalions of the assault brigades depended on their own unit 6 pdrs. These landed between H+60 minutes and H+90 minutes. In the event all landings were delayed, those from LST's seriously so. It seems that 248 Battery, 'K' Troop, 62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA landed at about 1500 hrs. Three guns were not able to disembark and one was drowned so that the equivalent of two troops were landed in support of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. 'K' Troop supported the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and 'J' Troop, the Regina Rifles.

The Landing Tables list 52 Canadian Composite Anti Tank Battery, RCA as being due to land from LCM's which had made their own way across the Channel. 7 LCM's Serials 1587 to 1602 were scheduled to land on NAN Beach at H+16 hours carrying twelve carriers towing 6 pdr guns, 4 other carriers and 32 men. The rest of the personnel were already on shore having being ferried from LSI's.

Beach Groups landed their 6 pdr anti tank guns from stores LCT's. They did not land their own tractors and transport but the guns were carried ashore on 3 ton lorries of other units. They were deployed for defence of the beach

Royal Canadian Engineers and Royal Engineers

Divisional Royal Canadian Engineers - Lt Col R. S. Cassidy

The following 3rd Canadian Infantry Division engineer units are listed as having landed, at least in part, on D day:

- 6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Assault with 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 16th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Assault with 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Obstacle Clearance
- 235 Field Park Company, RE

Under Command:
- 26 Assault Squadron, RE - Breaching Teams
- 80 Assault Squadron, RE - Breaching Teams
- 262 Field Company, RE - Obstacle Clearance & Mine field Clearance
- 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Obstacle Clearance

Breaching Teams

The clearing of exits from the beaches was the task of 5th & 6th Assault Regiment, RE together with Crabs from 22nd Dragoons. Combined teams were organized to open and mark a total of eight exits as far as the first inland lateral road.

26 Assault Squadron, RE with two troops of 'B' Squadron 22nd Dragoons would clear
- Two exits in MIKE Sector
- Two exits on NAN GREEN
80 Assault Squadron, RE with two troops of ‘B’ Squadron 22nd Dragoons would clear
- Two exits in NAN WHITE
- Two exits on NAN GREEN

All Breaching Teams were due to land at H Hour and just before they did so LCA(HR) were to fire 60lb spigot mortar bombs on the proposed exits.

**Obstacle Clearance**

**5th Canadian Field Company, RCE attached to 3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Major F. A. McTavish**

5th Canadian Field Company, RCE, a First Cdn Army Troops Company, was tasked with clearing underwater obstacles and creating four gaps. For this purpose it was equipped with explosives and bulldozers. The intention was to break the obstacles up and then collect them on the beaches above the high water mark where they would be out of the way of incoming craft and traffic. They were to be landed from the LCT's carrying Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment vehicles.

5th Canadian Field Company, RCE would provide for each assault brigade front:
- four sections each of 13 men plus a jeep and 3 crew
- one platoon of 18th Canadian Field Company, RCE with six armoured D7 bulldozers
- two RN Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units (LCOCU)

Two platoons of 262 Field Company, RE per beach would land at H+20 minutes and reinforce the obstacle clearing parties.

The gaps in the obstacles were to include:
- MIKE: 600 yard wide gap
- NAN GREEN: 200 yard wide gap
- NAN WHITE: 400 yard wide gap
- NAN RED: 400 yard wide gap

**Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units (LCOCU)**

The Army Engineers were assisted in the task of clearing obstacles by RN Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units. These were specially trained and equipped to deal with obstacles in more than three feet of water. They were also to mark the gaps and any obstacles within them:
- 1 and 5 LCOCU landed on the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade front
- 11 (Lt D.J. Smith, RM) and 12 LCOCU (L/Sgt K.M. Briggs, RM) landed on 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade front

**6th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Major T.R. Murphy**

6th Canadian Field Company, RCE was attached to 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. One platoon landed with the first wave of infantry to assist the infantry with demolition and mine clearance tasks among the beach obstacles. This platoon was very unfortunate, losing twenty two men on the beaches, and was not called on to perform engineering tasks.
The remainder of the company should have landed with the reserve battalions from H+60 minutes onwards. They were to assist with work on the beach exits until relieved by sappers of the Beach Group. They were then to concentrate on opening of forward routes in their own brigade area. These included:

- Gray sur Mer, Banville, Pont de Reviere, Amblie, Le Fresne Camilly, Bretteville l’Orgueilouse.
- Courseulles, Reviers (where it joined the first route).

When the forward routes were completed the following lateral routes were to be opened:

- Bernieres, St Aubin
- Colombiere sur Seulles, La Deliverande.

The platoons landed considerably behind schedule but quickly checked and cleared the two forward routes reaching as far as Le Fresne Camilly.

16th Canadian Field Company, RCE - Major H. L. Hamilton

16th Canadian Field Company, RCE was attached to 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade. One platoon landed with the first wave of infantry to assist the infantry with demolition and mine clearance tasks among the beach obstacles. This platoon was not very busy. There was no demand for them to attack strongpoints and there few mines to be cleared. The platoon dealt with some booby trapped buildings in Berniers and then dealt with some steel road blocks in St Aubin which had been holding up tanks.

The remaining platoons landed with the reserve battalions from H+60 minutes onwards. They were to assist with work on the beach exits until relieved by sappers of the Beach Group. They were then to concentrate on opening of forward routes in their own brigade area. These included:

- Bernieres, Beny sur Mer, Basly, Villons les Buissons, Authie, Franqueville.
- St Aubin sur Mer, Tailleville, Basley.

When the forward routes were completed the following lateral routes were to be opened:

- Camilly, Cairon, Buron.
- Bretteville l’Orgueilouse, St. Germain la Blanche Herbe.

These platoons did some mine clearance in Bernieres village and helped to clear routes in St Aubin. It then cleared the route from Bernieres to Beny sur Mer by bulldozing telegraph poles (French telegraph poles were made of concrete) and clearing wires. It also cleared the road from St Aubin to Tailleville. Here the sappers became involved in fighting alongside the infantry.

By the morning of D+1 it was planned to open a return route from La Villeneuve, Rots, Rosel, Cairon, Thaon, Reviers.

Two Class 40 bridges were to be built over the River Seulles at

- Colombiers by H+11 hours.
- Pont de Reviere by H+7 hours.

3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Special Bulldozer Increment

To land from LCT's carrying Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment vehicles at H Hour for obstacle clearance with 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE. The Landing Table shows eight D7 Armoured Bulldozers landing on each beach but other sources give the figure as six each. In any case it was reported that there were plenty of dozers ashore and there was not really work for them until the tide went down.
A Divisional Field Company. One platoon was detached to assist 5th Canadian Field Company, RCE with the clearing of beach obstacles.

The main body of the company had a variety of tasks inland.

- The River Seulles could have been a major obstacle if the bridges had been blown. Reconnaissance parties were to check and classify the bridges if they were still standing and survey the site for bridge building if they were not. These parties advanced to Colombiers and Reviers with the infantry.

- The lateral road between Colombiers and Reviers was checked

- Possible sites for an airfield near Benville were checked

- A site for a quarry south of Colombiers was reconnoitred

During the evening one platoon, with armoured dozers, was located at Reviers where it was on hand to join 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade should a column be despatched to cross the River Odon.

Divisional unit. Landed with dozers towing trailers loaded with trackway material. The first to land was an Armoured D7 dozer at H+60. A D4 dozer landed at H+105. Two more Armoured D7 dozers were scheduled landed later at D+7 hours.

Under command of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. To land at H+20 minutes and reinforce the obstacle clearing parties and clear mine fields. One platoon of 19 Field Company, RE was under command. This was a late addition and not included in the available landing tables. It is known that the company came from 12 Corps Engineers. Each platoon was to land in one LCM which crossed the Channel under its own power and carried an airborne trailer, tools and explosives.

Personnel crossed the Channel by LSI and were collected at the Lowering Point by the LCM's. Some casualties were suffered while boarding the LCM's using scrambling nets. These were difficult to negotiate while carrying a full load even in good conditions. 3 Platoon’s LCM hit a mined obstacle causing further casualties.

When the company landed the tide was too high to work on beach obstacles and it worked on its secondary tasks of mine clearing on the beach and exits. At 1500 hrs the company returned to obstacle clearance. By this time the beach was to crowded with personnel and vehicles to allow explosives to be used and obstacles were towed away by tanks (presumably AVRE’s) and dozers.

1 Corp Company, under command 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. One platoon landed under the command of 262 Field Company, RE. The remainder did not land until D+1.
All the engineer units in the Beach Sub Area were Royal Engineers. They had the task of developing the beach and Beach Maintenance Areas (BMA).

Field Companies and Pioneers of 102 Beach Sub Area would begin landing at H+1. They would:
- improve the beach exits
- maintain the beach exits
- surface beach areas that were soft through clay or peat
- construct a 20 foot wide lateral road along the beach
- convert the railway line between Courseulles and Bernieres to take road traffic
- improve and maintain roads in the BMA

**D7 ARMoured BULLDOZER**

**59 Mechanical Equipment Section, REME**

At H+75 minutes landed three Armoured D7 Angle-dozer each towing a Jahn trailer loaded with trackway material. At H+135 minutes landed a further Armoured D7 Angle-dozer towing a Jahn trailer.

**85 Field Company, RE - Major James H. MacLeod**

**A Beach Group Company**

- H+20 - landed two six man reconnaissance parties
- H+45 - landed two parties each of 24 men with two handcarts
- H+75 - 49 men landed
- H+105 - one M14 Halftrack with 3 crew. Officer Commanding

Apart from reconnaissance parties no further beach group or Beach Sub Area troops landed until the second tide.

**Headquarters**

**3rd Canadian Infantry Division Headquarters - Major General R.F.L. Keller**

Landing under the control of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

The Divisional Commander and his staff would travel in, and exercise command from, HMS Hilary.

A Duplicate Divisional Staff on HMS Royal Ulsterman would land and set up Divisional Headquarters on the southern outskirts of Bernieres until approximately H+7 hours when it would move to Beny sur Mer. Headquarters was at Bernieres at 1435 hrs when the Divisional Commander held an orders group with the commanders of 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. At that time Beny sur Mer was not clear and most of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade did not advance beyond it on D day.
Landing Ship Headquarters HMS Hilary carried Headquarters 3 Canadian Infantry Division and Headquarters I Corps. It was to land the following on NAN or MIKE at the discretion of the Divisional Commander:

- Two DUKW with six crew from 297 GT Company, RASC were carried in the Headquarters Ships davits. They each carried a jeep and driver to act as the Corps Commander’s and Division Commander’s Rovers

- 21 men from Headquarters I Corp Command Group landed to form a Tactical Headquarters. One of these was the Corps Commander who lands as he decides. The remainder of Corps Headquarters remained on the Headquarters Ship and manned Corp Headquarters afloat until a Headquarters was established ashore

- 23 men from Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Command Group. One of these was the Division Commander who lands as he decides. The remainder Divisional Headquarters remained on the Headquarters Ship and manned Division Headquarters afloat until a Headquarters was established ashore.

The following are key Division Headquarters staff representing the most important arms and services in the landing:
- 3 men from Headquarters Royal Canadian Artillery - Command Group
- 3 men from Headquarters Royal Canadian Engineers - Command Group
- 19 men from 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals - Command Group
- 2 men from Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 2 men, Principal Military Landing Officer and staff
- 2 men from Headquarters 102 Beach Sub Area
- 4 men from Detachment ‘A’ Troop, 3 Bombardment Unit 4, ‘J’ Force. Shore Bombardment Liaison Officer and party.

Landing Ship Headquarters HMS Royal Ulsterman carried Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Standby Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and Stand By Headquarters 1 Corps. It was a larger ship than most Brigade Headquarters Ships.

Twelve men from Headquarters I Corp Stand By Command Group. These were to take over as Corps Headquarters if the Headquarters Ship should suffer a mishap. Otherwise the personnel were to land and, together with vehicles landing separately, establish a headquarters ashore.

Fifteen men from Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Stand By Command Group These were to take over as Division Headquarters if the Headquarters Ship should suffer a mishap. Otherwise the personnel were to land and, together with vehicles landing separately, establish a headquarters ashore.

- 3 men from Headquarters Royal Canadian Artillery - Command Group
- 2 men from Headquarters Royal Canadian Engineers - Command Group
- 18 men from 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals - Command Group
- 2 men from Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 1 man, Principal Military Landing Officer
- 2 men from Headquarters 102 Beach Sub Area
- 2 men from Detachment 17 Movement Control Group. Military Landing Officer 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
The Corps Commander and his staff would travel in, and exercise command from, HMS Hilary.

A Duplicate Corps Staff, with the vehicles of Corps Headquarters First Flight, would land and set up Corps Headquarters at the South West outskirts of Douvre la Deliverande. This would be subject to reconnaissance and in the event the area was still in enemy hands at the time it was intended that the Headquarters should land. Since 1 Corps was to exercise command over 3 British Division on Sword and 3rd Canadian Infantry Division on Juno, a headquarters close to the boundary between them was desirable.

The Corps Commander himself intended to land from HMS Hilary at any time, together with his jeep and WT set. 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was to provide a section of carriers at NAN Beach from H+4 hours onwards to act as escort to the Corp Commander.

**Landing Ship Headquarters HMS Hilary** will land the followings on NAN or MIKE. HMS Hilary carries Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and Headquarters 1 Corps.

- 1 x Jeep with 1 crew from Headquarters I Corp. Command Group. This is the Corps Commanders Rover. It carries a wireless set and will land in a DUKW carried in the Headquarters Ship's davits.
- 21 men from Headquarters I Corp. Command Group. One of these is the Corps Commander who will land as he decides. The remainder will remain on the Headquarters Ship and main Corp Headquarters until a Headquarters is established ashore.

**Landing Ship Headquarters HMS Royal Ulsterman** will land the following on NAN or MIKE. This ship carries Headquarters 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Standby Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and Stand By Headquarters 1 Corps. It was a larger ship than most Brigade Headquarters Ships.
- 12 men from Headquarters I Corp. Stand By Command Group. These will take over as Corps Headquarters if the Headquarters Ship should suffer a mishap. Otherwise the personnel will land and, together with vehicles landing separately, establish a headquarters ashore.

Due to land at H+23 hours but delayed:
- 1 x Amphibious Jeep
- 2 x Car 4 seater 4 X 4, Humber
- 1 x Car 4 seater, Ford, with 3 crew
- 1 x 15 cwt GS, Bedford, with 2 crew
- 1 x Ambulance, 4 stretcher, Austin K2, with 2 crew
- 20 men carried in the vehicles
- 77 men from Headquarters 1 Corp. Carried in vehicles of 777 Corps Car Company.

**777 Corps Car Company, RASC:**
- 5 x jeeps
- 12 x Car 4 seater 4 X 4
- 1 x 15 cwt water
- 9 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
- 1 x 20 cwt trailer
- 32 men
1 Corps Defence Company:
• 1 x 15 cwt GS with 4 crew

1 Corps Signals:
• 1 x M14 Haltrack
• 2 x Jeep towing 1 trailer
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
• 1 x Lorry Command Vehicle HP
• 1 x Jeep
• 1 x Car 4 seat
• 33 men with two handcarts

Attached:
• 1 x 3 ton Lorry Command Vehicle (Low Powered) with 6 crew from Counter Bombardment Officer, 1 Corps
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew from Inns of Court Regiment

The LST's Arrive

Group 332 (or J13) of Assault Group J3 consisted of twelve LST(2)'s, all towing Rhino Ferries. After loading at the Hards the LST’s moored in Area 22 of the Solent with the Rhinos moored alongside. They slipped their moorings at H-12 hours and 45 minutes, got the Rhinos in tow and were joined by an escort of three Corvettes and a trawler. The whole group passed the Spithead Gate at H-11 hours and 30 minutes and proceeded down Channel 7 at a speed of 6 knots. Although LST’s were capable of considerably more speed they were limited by the Rhino Ferries. The Fire Boat M.H. Stevens accompanied them.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>LTIN Serial</th>
<th>LST Ship No</th>
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**Group 333 (or J14)** consisted of a further ten LST's towing three Rhino Ferries and fifteen Rhino tugs. This group slipped their moorings in Area 22 at H-10 hours and passed the Spithead gate at H-8 hours and 30 minutes. They were escorted by five trawlers and also used Channel 7 at 6 knots.

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A further eleven US LST's arrived with Group L1. This sailed from the Thames. Naval sources suggest that the first group (Group 332 of Assault Group J3) of LST's contained twelve LST's towing eight Rhino Ferries. The April Landing Tables show fewer Rhinos assigned to this group but the additional Rhinos should not make any significant difference to the tables. Each of the LST's towing the additional Rhinos would need to find room for a D8 dozer and twenty plus personnel. Still another source gives twelve LST's and twelve Rhino Ferries.

Since there were a total of 15 Rhino and Group 333 had seven it appears most likely that there were three LST's with two Rhino Ferries for each of NAN WHITE, NAN GREEN, NAN RED and MIKE. The first twelve LST's arrived at 1120 hrs. All of their Rhinos had survived the passage. However no beaches were ready to receive Rhinos until 1445 hrs when NAN WHITE and NAN GREEN reported that they were ready. MIKE sector reported ready at 1615 hrs. The first loaded Rhinos started into NAN Beaches at 1500 hrs and into MIKE Beaches at 1545 hrs. Progress was slow because of the weather and several Rhinos were damaged by hitting Teller mines on beach obstacles.

Group 333 brought a further ten LST's of Force J together with seven Rhino Ferries plus tugs. Group L1 arrived with a further 13 LST, having lost one to mines. By 1630 hours there were 35 LST awaiting discharge but by 2300 hrs only two LST had been completely discharged and others partly so.
HMS Northway with a load of DUKW's and four preloaded coasters arrived during the afternoon. Further vehicles were due to arrive on D+1 with convoys of MT coasters and ships.

The delays in discharging and the growing backlog had implications not only for the tactical formations on shore who were waiting for their vehicles and beach groups and sub area units who needed equipment to clear and operate the beaches but also for the delayed return of the LST's for use in the Shuttle Service.

I Corps became concerned and at 2300 hrs and 2350 hrs they sent Priority Requests for the landing of 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade and anti tank guns. These were urgently needed for the defence of the beachhead and for the planned advances on D+1. Such requests however meant even longer delays in fully discharging the backlog of LST's as the requested vehicles were located and landed out of sequence.

It became increasingly clear that the Rhinos could not compete with the weather. Indeed at 2311 hrs all Rhino operations on NAN GREEN were halted.

It had been hoped that the LCP(Survey) would find areas of beach suitable for beaching LST's at high water. Such sites would need to have a steeper slope than was usual on the Normandy beaches so that the LST could remain afloat and have its ramp either on dry land, which was unlikely, or in three foot of water. Such sites would be found only near the high water mark and would therefore only be accessible for a short time. In the event the only site found likely to be suitable was at the western end of MIKE, to the west of MIKE 2 exit.

By daylight on D+1 the position had worsened as four Rhinos had broached to and were stranded on each of MIKE and NAN beaches. It was now clear that LST's would have to be beached and dried out for unloading. This was not ideal since there was always the danger that the LST would be damaged on uneven ground and would be targets for artillery and air attack. It also meant a delay in the return of the LST's since they would have to wait for the next tide to float them off. Fortunately there were suitably level beaches available

At 0721 hrs on D+1 Naval Commander Force ‘J’ asked Naval Commander Eastern Task Force to suspend further Build Up sailings from the UK until the weather improved. There were already further convoys en route including ETM1 (motor transport from the Thames) which arrived on schedule.

At 0930 hrs the first six empty LST's sailed for the UK to join the Shuttle Service, eighteen hours late. Three more sailed during the afternoon and a further seven at 2140 hrs.

By D+2 the weather had improved and the rate of build up was recovering. At 0800 hrs on D+2 twelve LST's on MIKE and nine on NAN were dried out and unloading. Since the drying out was satisfactory and caused no damage LST's were from this time on routinely beached and dried out at two hours after high water. Those Rhino ferries that were still serviceable were turned over to unloading MT ships.

The beaching and drying out of LST's solved the problem of unloading but the simultaneous arrival of a large number of vehicles on the beaches caused problems for traffic control personnel who were not prepared for such a surge.

The delay in clearing LST's also affected the evacuation of casualties. Arrangements had been made for certain LST’s to be fitted for casualty evacuation. The disruption of the schedule meant that these LST’s were not always available or identifiable and casualties were evacuated on LST's not fitted to carry them. There was then further delay on return to the UK as these LST's were not expected to be carrying casualties and arrangements for them were not in place.
The evacuation of Prisoners of War was also affected. The plan was that prisoners would be evacuated to the UK, although some could be, and were, retained as labour. The War Office provided provost personnel to escort prisoners. They would arrive on a designated LST, locate the prisoners to be evacuated, escort them to the LST and return to Portsmouth with them. Two problems occurred, either LST's were delayed and so the turn round of escorts was disrupted, or the confusion led to the escorts being unable to locate their prisoners in time and the LST sailed without them.

Although the unloading of LST's when dried out on the beach did not cause damage to the vessels it did cause problems for some of the equipment being unloaded. In particular trailers had difficulty negotiating the LST ramp which was much steeper than had been planned for. Where Rhinos were used there was no slope on the ramp, it was lowered until horizontal and met the Rhino's deck. When dried out the ramp caused the following difficulties for which drivers had not been trained:

- The angle where the LST deck met the ramp was sharp enough to cause trailers to belly and become stuck.
- The steep angle of the ramp needed careful driving, especially with a heavy trailer. Power was needed to get onto the ramp, then braking was needed to negotiate the ramp and finally a surge of power needed to exit the ramp and onto the beach.
- The angle between the ramp and the beach was sharp. In this case not generally causing bellying but putting sufficient strain on drawbars and pintles to cause damage.
- The heavy loads exiting the ramp caused deep potholes in the sand. This in turn caused further problems.

It seems that the equipment causing the most serious problems were the low loading trailers loaded with trackway stores and the heavy AA guns. Several of each suffered damage. The trailers were simply moved aside and left. The HAA guns were recovered and parked just off the beach. The damaged drawbars could not easily be repaired so the gun was not available for AA defence and had eventually to be replaced. Since these items were generally the first off the LST their problems caused delay in discharging the rest of the load.

**The Landing Tables**

The Landing Tables, dated 14 April 1944, are available for Group 332 and are given below. These give the vehicle and personnel loads for the twelve LST2 of this group. No tables have been found for Group 333. Tables for six LST2 and three LST1 of Group L1 are available below:

**LST's - Group L1**  
**MIKE BEACH**

Three LST(2)s, **Serials 1562, 1563 and 1564** arrive carrying:

**Serial 1562** is an LST2 towing a Rhino Ferry and carrying:

On the Tank Deck:
- 2 x 3 ton & 6 crew - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 1 x Stuart & 3 crew - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 42 men - 176 Workshop and Park Company, RE
- 1 x Bulldozer D8 & 1 crew - 961 Inland Water Transport Operating Company RE
- 13 men - 961 Inland Water Transport Operating Company RE
- 7 men - 267 Pioneer Company. For Rhino Ferry
- 1 x Stuart & 3 crew - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 2 x 15 cwt & 4 crew - 255 Pioneer Company
- 1 x 15 cwt Machinery KL - 35th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 4 x 15 cwt GS - 35th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 5 x trailer 20 cwt - 35th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 23 men - 35th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 5 x Sherman Flail tanks & 25 crew - 22nd Dragoons
Serial 1563 is an LST2 carrying:

**On the Main Deck:**
- 12 x M14 Halftrack - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 3 x 15 cwt Battery Charger - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x HU Computer - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 4 x 3 ton GS - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x Carrier OP - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 126 men - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 3 x Jeeps & 9 crew - 35th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - 37th Canadian LAD RCEME

**On the Rhino Ferry:**
- 1 x Coles Crane - 139 Detail Issue Depot RASC
- 1 x Coles Crane - 242 Petrol Depot RASC
- 1 x Coles Crane - 14 Ordnance Beach Detachment RAOC

**On the Tank Deck:**
- 3 x 3 ton GS & 8 crew - 282 GT Company
- 1 x 3 ton GS - 65 Field Company RE
- 1 x White - 65 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor - 65 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - 65 Field Company RE
- 8 men - 65 Field Company RE
- 2 x M14 & 5 crew - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 24 x 3 ton GS - 9th Canadian Brigade Company RCASC
- 100 men from 9th Canadian Brigade Company RCASC
- 1 x 3 ton & 10 crew - 102 Beach Sub Area Signal Section

**On the Main Deck.**
- 1 x Humber Scout Car - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 2 x Jeeps - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 8 men - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 12 x M14 Halftrack - 14th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 14th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 3 x 15 cwt Battery Charger - 14th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x HU Computer - 14th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 4 x 3 ton GS - 14th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x Carrier OP - 14th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 126 men - 14th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 2 x Humber Scout Car & 6 crew - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 1 x Jeep & 2 crew - 255 Pioneer Company
- 60 men - 255 Pioneer Company
- 2 x Jeeps & 4 crew - 35th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 1 x 15 cwt Office & 2 crew - 102 Beach Sub Area Signal Section.

Serial 1564 is a LST2 carrying:

On the Tank Deck:
- 8 x 3 ton GS & 20 crew - 282 GT Company RASC
- 1 x White Scout Car - 2nd Canadian Brigade Signal Section
- 1 x 15 cwt WT - 2nd Canadian Brigade Signal Section
- 1 x 3 ton GS - 2nd Canadian Brigade Signal Section
- 12 men - 2nd Canadian Brigade Signal Section
- 5 x 3 ton GS & 10 crew - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 5 x Sherman Flail tanks - 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x 3 ton GS - 22nd Dragoons
- 27 men - 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x White Scout Car & 2 crew - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x Tractor, Medium Breakdown with 5 crew - 31st Canadian LAD RCEME
- 1 x 3 ton GS - 12th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 1 x 15 cwt - 12th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 1 x 15 cwt KL - 12th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 20 men - 12th Canadian LAD RCEME
- 3 x 3 ton & 9 crew - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 70 men - 255 Pioneer Company

On the Main Deck:
- 5 x 15 cwt - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 1 x 15 cwt Battery Charger - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 1 x 15 cwt water - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 17 men - 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 2 x Humber Scout cars - 16th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x 3 ton GS - 16th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 17 men - 16th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 5 x Carrier OP & 10 crew - 19th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x Jeep & 2 crew - 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x Daimler Scout Car & 2 crew - 22nd Dragoons
- 1 x Humber Scout Car - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 1 x 8 cwt HUP - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 6 men - Headquarters 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 2 x Humber Scout Cars - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x White Scout Car - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 8 men - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)

Plus:

Arriving at the same time as the LST's were the following.

Serial 1566 was LSD HMS Northway - Temp LCdr A. J. Anderson, RNR carrying:
- 199 GT Company, RASC
  - 46 x DUKW & 138 crew

Serials 1567 to 1585 are 20 LCM3 carrying:
- 199 GT Company, RASC
  - 20 x DUKW & 60 crew

Serials 1586 to 1593 are 7 LCM carrying:
- 52nd Canadian Composite Anti Tank Regiment, RCA
  - 12 x Carriers towing 12 x 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
  - 4 x Carriers
  - 32 men
The LCM's crossed the Channel under their own power

**LST's - Group L1**

**NAN RED**

Serial **1153** is an **LST(2) 425**, Lt P.M. Wilcockson, RNR carrying:

On the Tank Deck:
- 6 x Crusader AT Tractor towing 6 x Trailer No 27 and 6 x 17pdr AT guns - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 3 x Jeep - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 2 x Carrier - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 72 men - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 2 x Jeep - 248 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 248 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - 248 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Battery Charging - 248 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Motorcycle - 248 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 18 men - 248 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Jeep, 2 x motorcycle & 6 men - 670 Artisan Works Company RE. Recon Party
- 4 x Jeep & 11 men - 'B' Battery, 9 Survey Regiment RA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack & 7 men - 234 Field Company RE
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Carrier Universal - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Jeep - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Motorcycle - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 12 men - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA.

On the Main Deck:
- 1 x Jeep - 'A' Flight, 652 AOP Squadron
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - 'A' Flight, 652 AOP Squadron
- 4 men - 'A’ Flight, 652 AOP Squadron
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 234 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor - 234 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt FFW - 234 Field Company RE
- 4 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Austin - 234 Field Company RE
- 4 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Winch, Karrier, - 234 Field Company RE
- 1 x Trailer, Stella Water Purification - 234 Field Company RE
- 1 x 3 M14 Halftrack - 234 Field Company RE
- 52 men - 234 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - 'A' Echelon, 17 Movement Control Group
- 1 x Car 2 seater - 'A' Echelon, 17 Movement Control Group
- 1 x Motorcycle - 'A' Echelon, 17 Movement Control Group
- 24 men - 'A' Echelon, 17 Movement Control Group
- 1 x White Scout Car - 'A' Echelon, 5 ARRE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 'A' Echelon, 5 ARRE
- 7 men - 'A' Echelon, 5 ARRE
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 155 AA Operations Room
- 1 x Generator Trailer - 155 AA Operations Room
- 1 x 3 ton Mobile Operations Room - 155 AA Operations Room
- 1 x 15 cwt Wireless House - 155 AA Operations Room
- 55 men - 155 AA Operations Room
- 2 x 15 cwt GS - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA
- 2 x Motorcycle - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Albion Machinery - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA
- 1 x Car 4 seater - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA
• 24 men - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA
• 1 x Amphibious Jeep & 4 men - 996 Port Operating Company RE
• 1 x Amphibious Jeep & 4 men - 998 Port Operating Company RE
• 1 x Amphibious Jeep & 4 men - 1018 Port Operating Company RE
• 18 men - 112 Pioneer Smoke Company
• 12 x 10 cwt trailers - CRASC 3rd Canadian Infantry Division

Serial 1154 is an LST(2) 404, LCdr H.B. Shaw, RNR carrying:
On the Tank Deck:
• 6 x Crusader AT Tractor towing 6 x Trailer No 27 and 6 x 17pdr AT guns - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 2 x Carrier - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 53 men - 246 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt Office - Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt Wireless House - Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt GS - Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt FFW - Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 25 men - Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 1 x Humber 4 seater car - 3 Heavy Mobile Signal Section RN
• 2 x 30 cwt lorry - 3 Heavy Mobile Signal Section RN
• 13 men - 3 Heavy Mobile Signal Section RN
• 1 x 30 cwt lorry towing Dennis trailer pump & 6 men - Craft Recovery Unit RN
• 3 x Sherman tanks - Headquarters 22nd Dragoons
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - Headquarters 22nd Dragoons
• 19 men - Headquarters 22nd Dragoons
• 1 x White Scout Car & 4 men - ‘A’ Echelon 5 ARRE

On the Main Deck:
• 5 x 3 ton 4 X 4 & 15 men - ‘A’ Echelon 5 ARRE
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 372 Battery, 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 1 x Motorcycle - 372 Battery, 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt GS - 372 Battery, 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt Water - 372 Battery, 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 9 men - 372 Battery, 114 LAA Regiment RA
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Austin towing 9' 7" trailers - 3 Heavy Mobile Signal Section RN
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Bedford towing 12' trailer - 3 Heavy Mobile Signal Section RN
• 28 men - 3 Heavy Mobile Signal Section RN
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Austin with 48 men - 112 Pioneer Smoke Company
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 1 Field Dressing Station RAMC
• 1 x 15 cwt Water - 1 Field Dressing Station RAMC
• 11 men - 1 Field Dressing Station RAMC
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 1 Field Dressing Station RAMC
• 1 x Jeep - 1 Field Dressing Station RAMC
• 8 men - 1 Field Dressing Station RAMC
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS & 1 man - 13 Field Transfusion Unit RAMC
• 2 x Jeep towing 10cwt trailers with 2 men - RN Beach Party
• 1 x Jeep and 9 men - Headquarters 15 GHQ Engineers
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 30 Field Dressing Station RAMC for Casualty Evacuation Point
• 1 x 15 cwt Water - 30 Field Dressing Station for Casualty Evacuation Point
• 1 x Ambulance 4 stretcher - 30 Field Dressing Station RAMC for Casualty Evacuation Point
• 42 men - 30 Field Dressing Station RAMC for Casualty Evacuation Point
• 51 men - 966 Inland Water Transport Operating Company RE
• 12 x 10 cwt trailer - CRASC 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
Serial 1155 is an LST(2) carrying:

On the Tank Deck:
- 1 x Caterpillar D8 bulldozer - 582 Field Company RE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Winch - 582 Field Company RE
- 1 x Motorcycle - 582 Field Company RE
- 29 men - 582 Field Company RE
- 3 x Stuart Light tank - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 20 men - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 6 x 40mm SP carrying 6 x motorcycle - 32nd Canadian LAA Battery, RCA
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS carrying 3 x motorcycle - 32 Canadian LAA Battery, RCA
- 77 men - 32nd Canadian LAA Battery, RCA
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS carrying 3 x motorcycle - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 4 x M14 Halftrack - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 40 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 3 x Tractor HAA - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 2 x 3.7" HAA guns - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x Trailer radar No1 MkII Receiver - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 2 x Motorcycle - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 48 men - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS towing 20 cwt trailer & 9 men - Headquarters CRE 3rd Canadian infantry Division

On the Main Deck:
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x Jeep - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x Motorcycle - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 15 men - 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 32nd Canadian LAD, RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt Machinery KL - 32nd Canadian LAD, RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS - 32nd Canadian LAD, RCA
- 20 men - 32nd Canadian LAD, RCA
- 2 x Carrier AOP - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt Battery Charging - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 10 men - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 2 x Jeep FFW with 8 men - 32nd Canadian LAA Battery RCA
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 6 men - 1st Bn Canadian Scottish Regiment
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Winch - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x Light Reconnaissance car - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 17 men - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x M14 Halftrack with 3 men - N Section, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 1 x White Scout Car - 582 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor - 582 Field Company RE
- 36 men - 582 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 18th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x Light Reconnaissance car - 18th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor - 18th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - 18th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 11 men - 18th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 'A' Company, Cameron Highlanders of Canada (MG)
Serial 1156 is an LST(2) carrying:

**On the Tank Deck:**
- 1 x Caterpillar D8 bulldozer - 582 Field Company RE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Winch carrying a motorcycle - 582 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor - 582 Field Company RE
- 1 x White Scout Car carrying motorcycle - 582 Field Company RE
- 11 men - 582 Field Company RE
- 3 x Tractor HAA - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 2 x 3.7" HAA guns - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x Trailer radar No1 MkI Receiver - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 48 men - 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment
- 2 x Carrier AOP - 13th Field Regiment RCA
- 2 x M14 Halftrack - 13th Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS carrying motorcycle - 13th Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 Battery Charging - 13th Field Regiment RCA
- 22 men, 13th Field Regiment RCA
- 6 x 3 ton 6 X 4 Searchlight Leyland, carrying 2 motorcycles - 474 Searchlight Regiment RA
- 43 men - 474 Searchlight Regiment RA
- 1 x DUKW - 22 Beach Recovery Section
- 2 x Matador MAT - 22 Beach Recovery Section
- 4 x Heavy Recovery Tractor, Scammell - 22 Beach Recovery Section
- 2 x Caterpillar D8 Recovery Tractor - 22 Beach Recovery Section
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 22 Beach Recovery Section
- 81 men - 22 Beach Recovery Section

**On the Main Deck:**
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS with 3 men - 582 Field Company RE
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS carrying 2 x motorcycles and 16 men - 13th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - Regina Rifles
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS - Regina Rifles
- 6 men - Regina Rifles
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Stores - 36th Canadian LAD, RCEME
- 1 x Jeep - 36th Canadian LAD, RCEME
- 1 x Motorcycle - 36th Canadian LAD, RCEME
- 11 men - 36th Canadian LAD, RCEME
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Winch - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 2 x M14 Halftrack - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x Light Reconnaissance Car - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 13 men - 5th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 6th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 2 x M14 Halftrack - 6th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 1 x Light Reconnaissance Car - 6th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 20 men - 6th Canadian Field Company RCE
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS carrying 3 x motorcycles - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 Battery Charging - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
- 1 x 8 cwt HU Computer - 12th Canadian Field Regiment RCA
LST's
NAN WHITE

On the April Landing table three LST arrive at H+7 hours with vehicles for 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade plus advance parties for units landing from a further three LST landing at H+12 hours. The naval orders and reports suggest that all six LST arrived at the same time, and on the first tide. It is possible therefor that some rearrangements of loads was made although the numbers would remain much the same. Vehicles and personnel carried are given in abbreviated form and in the original two parts.

I Corps

1 Corps Signals:
• 2 x M14 Halftrack
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
• 2 x Jeep with 10 cwt trailers
• 1 x Jeep
• 1 x Car 4 seat
• 1 x Lorry Command Vehicle HP
• 51 men and 2 handcarts

3rd Canadian Infantry Division

Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
• 2 x 3 ton with 16 crew
• 1 x 3 ton with 4 crew - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots)
• 1 x HU Computer with 4 crew - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew - Headquarters 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
• 3 x Jeeps towing a 10 cwt trailer with 7 crew - ‘K’ Section 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals

10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Gary Horse):
• 2 x Sherman III
• 1 x Sherman Vc Firefly
• 1 x Stuart Light Tank
• 2 x Humber Scout Car
• 11 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
• 2 x Jeep
• 73 men

Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa:
• 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - Commander Beach Exit Control
• 1 x 3 ton with 12 crew - ‘B’ Company

Queens Own Regiment of Canada:
• 1 X Jeep with 2 crew
• 1 X 3 ton with 2 crew

Regiment de la Chaudiere:
• 1 x Jeep with 2 crew
• 1 x 15 cwt water with 2 crew
North Shore Regiment:
- 1 x Jeep with 1 crew
- 1 x 15 cwt Water with 2 crew

3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals:
- 1 x 15 cwt FFW with 3 crew - 'N' Section

5th Canadian Field Company, RCE:
- 2 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 8 men

4th Canadian Provost Company:
- 1 x 15 cwt with 2 crew - 'C' Section
- 2 x Jeeps with 2 crew - 'C' Section
- 4 men with 4 x motorcycles - 'A' Section

22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 4 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
- 1 x 15 cwt Water
- 6 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Ambulance
- 83 men

9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Company, RCASC:
- 10 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS with 32 crew

3rd Canadian Infantry Division, RCASC:
- 36 x trailers 10 cwt

37th Canadian LAD, RCEME:
- 1 x Breakdown Light or Medium with 5 crew
- 1 x Heavy Breakdown Tractor with 5 crew

Inns of Court Regiment
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew

Headquarters 4 Special Service Brigade
- 2 men with 2 motorcycles
- 2 men with 2 motorcycles - 4 Special Service Brigade Signal Troop

80 AA Brigade, RA

155 AAOR, RA
- 1 x Radar AA No 4 with 5 crew

RHQ 86 HAA, RA
- 1 x Jeep with 5 crew - Second in Command’s party

273/86 HAA Battery, RA
- 1 x Jeep with 5 crew - Battery Command Reconnaissance
- 1 x Jeep with 2 crew
- 13 men
321/93 LAA Battery, RA
- 3 x Crusader SP 20mm AA - ‘E’ Troop
- 3 x Triple 20mm AA - ‘E’ Troop
- 1 x Tractor LAA 66 men - ‘E’ Troop
- 66 men - ‘E’ Troop

The Crusader SPs towed the triple 20mm ashore. The Tractor LAA was used to position the towed guns

474 Searchlight Battery, RA
- 1 x 15 cwt FFW with 3 crew. Battery Commander

6th Airborne Division

It was intended that these vehicles would land on NAN WHITE and then travel by the main lateral road behind Juno and Sword beaches, over the Orne bridges and thus to the Airborne Division area. In the event neither the main lateral road nor the coastal road were open on D Day. As the LST’s were delayed in discharging the lack of roads was not serious.

4 Air Landing Anti Tank Battery, RA
- 16 x Jeeps towing 8 x 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
- 12 x Jeeps
- 10 x motorcycles
- 106 men

195 Air Landing Field Ambulance, RAMC
- 19 x Jeep
- 1 x 100 gallon water trailer
- 5 x ambulance cars 2 stretcher
- 48 men

249 Field Company (Airborne), RE
- 2 x 15 cwt
- 8 x jeeps towing 4 airborne trailers
- 1 x 15 cwt compressor
- 18 x motorcycles
- 40 men

9 Air Landing LAD, REME
- 4 x Jeep
- 2 x motorcycles
- 16 men

716 Light Composite Company, RASC
- 10 x Jeeps with 30 crew

Beach Group and Beach Sub Area Units

5 Royal Berkshire Regiment
- 2 Carrier Loyd with 4 crew
- 8 men with 2 handcarts
- 2 Jeeps
- 12 men

NOTE: Loyd Carriers were specified for the Beach Groups. The alternative was a 4 X 4 15 cwt. It seems that some Weasels were in fact issued.
59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
- 1 x 3 ton tipper
- 1 x Water trailer
- 3 x Bulldozer Class III towing 3 Trailer Jahn
- 1 x Bulldozer Class II towing Trailer Jahn
- 3 x Tractor Scammel towing 3 Trailer 20 ton
- 1 x Excavator RB10 carried on the Rhino Ferry
- 1 x Jeep
- 44 men

112 Pioneer Smoke Company
- 3 men from Reconnaissance Party

72 Field Company, RE
- 1 x White Scout Car
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
- 8 men

65 Field Company, RE
- 1 x 3 ton winch with 3 crew

184 Field Company, RE
- 2 x 3 ton Winch
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS towing Trailer, Water Purification
- 1 x 15 cwt
- 14 men

To operate the Rhino ferries.
966 Inland Waterway Operating Company, RE

Each Rhino had the following:
- 1 x Tractor D8 & 1 crew
- 15 men from 966 Inland Waterway Operating Company, RE

267 Pioneer Company
- 8 men

15 Ordnance Beach Detachment, RAOC
- 1 x Coles Crane
- 2 men

45 Ordnance Ammunition Company, RAOC
- 1 x 15 cwt & 2 crew
- 1 man with a motorcycle

72 Field Company, RE
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS & 2 crew

34 Field Dressing Station, RAMC
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
- 1 x Ambulance 4 stretcher
- 1 x Jeep
- 68 men & 3 handcarts
46 Field Surgical Unit, RAMC
  • 1 x 3 ton & 9 crew

52 Beach Balloon Unit, RAF
  • 2 x 3 ton with 4 crew
  • 2 men with a balloon
  • 2 men with a balloon
  • 2 men with a balloon

199 GT Company, RASC
Each of the two Rhinos each carried 3 x DUKW and the towing LST’s each carried 9 crew for them.
  • 3 x DUKW on Rhino
  • 3 x DUKW on Rhino
  • 9 men for DUKWs on Rhino Ferry
  • 9 men for DUKWs on Rhino Ferry
  • 21 x DUKW & 78 crew

184 Field Company, RE
  • 1 Coles Crane - On Rhino
  • 2 men for Coles Crane on Rhino Ferry

104 Beach Section, RAF
  • 1 Jeep with 2 crew

633 GT Company, RASC
These DUKWs were for medical evacuation. Two were carried on the davits of each of the three LST’s in lieu of LCVP’s. They could be launched from the davits immediately on arrival.
  • 2 x DUKWs & 5 crew
  • 2 x DUKWs & 5 crew
  • 2 x DUKWs & 5 crew

144 Pioneer Company
  • 1 x 15 cwt & 2 crew

59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
  • 1 x Crane RB10 on the Rhino Ferry

20 Works Stores Section
  • 1 x Jeep & 2 crew

Nucleus BAN
  • 1 x Jeep & 2 crew

21 Army Group Movement Control Pool
  • 1 x Jeep & 3 crew
  • 1 x man with a motorcycle - For Principal Military Landing Officer
I Corps
Two troops from I Corps Anti Tank Regiment

247/62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA
- 4 x Crusader Tractor towing 4 x 17 pdr Anti Tank Guns and 4 x No 27 trailers
- 2 x Jeeps
- 2 x Carrier
- 42 men
- 4 x Crusader Tractors towing 4 x 17 pdr Anti Tank guns and 4 x No 27 trailers
- 2 x Carriers
- 1 x Jeep
- 40 men

3rd Canadian Infantry Division - General R.F.L. Keller

Queens Own Regiment of Canada
- 14 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Medical
- 1 x Carrier Mortar
- 1 x 15 cwt GS
- 1 x Jeep
- 101 men

North Shore Regiment.
- 13 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Medical
- 1 x Carrier Universal
- 1 x 15 cwt GS
- 103 men

Le Régiment de la Chaudière
- 13 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Medical
- 1 x Carrier Mortar
- 1 x 15 cwt
- 114 men

Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 2 crew from ‘B’ Company
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew from ‘B’ Company

10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)
- 5 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
- 7 x Stuart Light Tanks
- 1 x 15 cwt
- 54 men

16th Canadian Field Company, RCE
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor with 2 crew
- 3 x M14 Halftracks with 10 crew

106 Bridge Company, RASC
- 1 x 3 ton
- 2 x motorcycles
• 1 x 15 cwt GS
• 1 x 15 cwt Water
• 24 men

80 AA Brigade, RA
276/86 Heavy AA Regiment, RA
  • 7 x Matador MAT
  • 3 x Trailers
  • 4 x 3.7" HAA guns
  • 2 x 3 ton GS
  • 1 x Generator Trailer
  • 1 x 15 cwt water
  • 1 x 3 ton Machinery
  • 107 men from 276/86 Heavy AA Regiment RA

273/86 HAA Regiment, RA
  • 1 x Jeep
  • 1 x 15 cwt
  • 1 x 3 ton
  • 12 men

230/73 LAA Regiment, RA
  • 6 x 40mm SP
  • 2 x Tractor LAA
  • 64 men

474 Searchlight Battery, RA
  • 2 x Lorry, Searchlight
  • 2 x 15 cwt GS
  • 1 x 15 cwt Water
  • 11 men

6 Airborne Division

6 Airborne Division Signals
  • 10 x Jeeps
  • 6 x Motorcycles
  • 40 men

Headquarters 6 Airborne Division
  • 6 x Jeeps with 24 crew

Headquarters 6 Air Landing Brigade
  • 4 x Jeeps with 24 crew

6 Airborne Division Provost Company
  • 6 x Motorcycles with 12 men

Beach Group and Beach Sub Area
199 GT Company, RASC
  • 3 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
  • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Stores
  • 1 x Car 4 seater
  • 15 men
282 General Transport Company, RASC
- 6 x 3 ton with 20 crew

23 Beach Recovery Section, REME
- 1 x DUKW with 4 crew

199 GT Company, RASC
- 2 x 3 ton with 5 crew

240 Field Company, RE
- 4 x M14 Halftrack
- 1 x 15 cwt Water
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor
- 1 x 15 cwt WT
- 3 x 3 ton
- 4 x 3 ton winch
- 139 men

104 Beach Section, RAF
- 2 x Jeeps
- 8 x Motorcycles
- 22 men

102 Beach Sub Area Signal Section
- 6 x Jeeps with 12 crew
- 3 x 15 cwt with 6 crew

RN Beach Commando
- 2 x Jeeps towing 2 x trailers with 2 crew

For Rhino Ferry
966 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, RE
- 1 x D8 Tractor with 1 crew
- 13 men

267 Pioneer Company
- 7 men

240 Petrol Depot, RASC
- 1 x Coles Crane. On Rhino
- 2 men

14 Ordnance Beach Detachment, RAOC
- 1 x Coles Crane. On Rhino
- 2 men

1034 Port Operating Company, RE
- 1 x Excavator RB19
- 3 x Crane RB 10
- 8 men
Fighter Control During the Assault Phase of Operation Neptune

The responsibility for the control of the air was vested in the Commander-in-Chief of Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) - formally Fighter Command - which was based at RAF Bentley Priory. The AOC-in-C delegated the operational control of air forces to AOC 11 Group. The challenge for the air surveillance and control system was to provide adequate forward cover and the seamless transfer of control of the air to Number 85 Group once a bridgehead had been established.

FDT Filter Table

The plan that was formulated required a total of 3 Landing Ships Tank (LST) to be converted as air surveillance and control ships; these were designated as Fighter Direction Tenders (FDT). The interesting point is that the FDTs, in addition to early warning and control, also undertook the full picture compilation role with their own Filter Centres and Identification teams. A picture of a Filter Centre in a FDT is shown above. The FDTs were Royal Navy units under the command of the Allied Naval Commander of the expeditionary naval forces but were operationally controlled by AOC 11 Group.

Figure 3 - Type 15 Aerial on a FDT
The concept of using ship borne RAF radar equipment for surveillance and control was first trialled in North Africa and then used during Operation Husky when LST 305 was fitted with Ground Control Interception (GCI) radar (the Type 8 then used by GCI units in the Mediterranean at the time), control equipment and radios. The D-Day FDTs were equipped with the Type 15 and the Type 11 radars both fitted with Mark III IFF interrogators/responders, Aircraft Interception beacons and VHF radio telephony and wireless telegraphy sets. The term GCI was a rather interchangeable term that was used to denote radars that could be used for close controlled interceptions but also for those which were primarily control units although they also had an early warning and surveillance role. The FDT system proved so successful the AOC-in-C Fighter Command pressed for 4 FDTs to support Operation Neptune.

Three were produced:

- **No 216 FDT** - A/L/Cmdr Frederick Arthur Smyth, RNR. This FDT was positioned seaward of the US beaches in the western half of the assault area. Its role was to produce a tactical picture over the US area, provide raid reporting and to control both RAF and USAAF fighters tasked to operate in the area.
• **No 217 FDT** - L/Cmdr G.D Kelly RNR. This FDT was positioned seaward of the British beaches in the eastern half of the assault area to undertake the same role as FDT 216. However the ship was designated as the main coordinating FDT or Master Control FDT; the senior RAF controller was aboard this ship. The Master Control FDT had the additional role of managing fighter resources across the whole assault area.

• **No 13 FDT** - L/Cmdr Robert Arthur Crozier, RNR. This FDT was positioned in the main shipping route to provide defensive cover over the shipping lanes.

The FDT positioning in relation to the air corridors, shipping lanes and assault beaches is shown below.

There was one problem with the organisation and that was very much tied to inter-Service politics. The Royal Navy was in command of the sea forces during Operation Neptune and the HQ ships were earmarked for each assault beach. It was deemed necessary for the HQ ships to issue air raid warnings and to exercise Anti-Air Artillery fire control; in one respect this was sensible because they were well equipped with radio telephony sets. However, the main problem was that telling the information to the HQ ships built in delays and on more than one occasion air raid warnings were issued as the raid was taking place.

After a delay of 24 hours caused by bad weather, the FDTs sailed at 2200 hrs on the 5th June in very poor sea conditions. However, the sea state moderated and the FDTs arrived at their respective positions around 0430 hrs. To achieve surprise, the assault force approached the beaches under complete radio silence. All the FDTs switched on their radars at H Hour, 0725 hrs, and immediately took control of the fighter aircraft providing the defensive air umbrella. A total of 9 Spitfire and Thunderbolt Squadrons provided air cover over the assault area during daylight hours. These Squadrons were under the control of FDT 216 and FDT 217. Four USAAF Lightning Squadrons controlled the air over the shipping route and approach to the assault area and
these were under the control of FDT 13. In addition, a total of 38 night-fighter aircraft were controlled by the FDTs during the night of 6/7th June. The large number of friendly aircraft in the area combined with the dropping of ‘window’ by friendly bombers presented Filter Room personnel with a very challenging and busy time in compiling the air picture.

The next challenge was to establish a comprehensive air surveillance and control capability ashore and to do this 2 ‘GCI Units’ from 85 (Base) Group were assigned to land on the beaches on D-Day (See next pages).
Royal Air Force Ground Controlled Interception Units Ashore

85 (Base) Group Ground Controlled Interception Unit
No 15083 Ground Controlled Interception Mobile Radar Unit -
Commanding Officer - Sqn Leader R.H. McCall, RAFVR
Unit Technical Radar Officer - F/L Geoffrey Adams Harpur, RCAF, Croix de Guerre, MID
Senior Radar Technical NCO - Sgt Bews, RCAF

Serial 1730 is LCT4 671
85 Gp GCI - No 15083 GCI MRU
- 1 x Jeep with 3 crew - Recce Pty - F/L G.A. Harpur, RCAF
GCI 85 Gp 'A' Echelon - No 15083 GCI MRU
- 1 x Signals Type 405. Crossley Q 4 x 4 - Transmitter Vehicle for Type 15 Radar
- 1 x Signals Type 409. Crossley Q 4 x 4 - Receiver/Operations for Type 15 Radar
- 1 x Signals Type 416. Austin K6 6 x 4 - Carries spares and AI Beacon for Type 15
- 1 x Signals Type 457A or 458 Austin K6 6 x 4 - Carries Type 15 Radar
- 1 x Signals Type 460
- 1 x Thorneycroft Nubian 4 x 4 Winch Lorry for erecting the Type 15 aerial
- 28 men
Mobile Signals Unit Type 'P' - No 582
- 1 x Signals Type 100. Austin K6 6 x 4 with 'F' Type body - Twin VHF transmitters
- 1 x Signals Type 150. Austin K6 6 x 4 with 'F' Type body - Four VHF receivers
- 6 men
Mobile Signals Unit Type 'B' - No 554
- 2 x Signals Type 306 Signals (Type 306 is a large and heavy vehicle. 22' 6" x 8' 1" x 12' 2" x 8.56 tons)
- 4 men
Mobile Signals Unit Special 'K' - No 543
- 1 x Signals Type 30
- 1 x 30 cwt Lorry RAF
- 6 men
Plus
- 2 men and a balloon - 52 RAF Balloon Unit

Serial 1731 is LCT4 761
85 Gp GCI Type 21
- 1 x Signals Type 462. Austin K6 6 x 4 with Type 14 radar
- 2 x Signals Type 456. Austin K6 6 x 4 with 20 Kva Generator
- 1 x Signals Type 432. Austin K6 6 x 4 Receiver/Operations Room
- 1 x Signals Type 461. Austin K6 6 x 4 with Type 13 radar
- 7 men
Mobile Signals Unit Type 'Q' - No 585
- 1 x Signals Type 105
- 2 men
Mobile Signals Unit Type 'A'
- 1 x Signals Type 100. Austin K6 with 'F' Type body. Twin VHF transmitters
- 1 x Signals Type 150. Austin K6 with 'F' Type body. Four VHF receivers
- 22 x men
85 Gp GCI Type 11
- 1 x Signals Type 456. Austin K6 6 x 4 with 20 Kva Generator
- 1 x Signals Type 432. Austin K6 6 x 4 Receiver/Operations Room
- 1 x Signals Type 433A. Austin K6 6 x 4 with Type 11 Radar
- 4 men
Plus
- 2 men and a balloon - 52 RAF Balloon Unit
85 (Base) Group

85 (Base) Group was responsible for Air Defence of the beach head. It landed units which were to be ready to control aircraft over the area on the night of D Day/D+1. A controller guided the interceptor to a point where visual contact was made and the interception continued without further ground control. Normally a Type 15 radar was used for surveillance and distant tracking, with a Type 11 as back up. Radar Type 13 was used to track the aircraft. Normally two sets were required. Radar 14 gave accurate height information. Not all elements were ashore and working on the night of D Day/D+1 and Type 15 was being used for interception control.

85 (Base) Group Base Air Staff, No 24 Base Defence Sector
Advanced Party - W Cdr John L Brown and D.W.G. Mawhood
• 2 x Humber Utility with 6 crew

‘A’ Echelon
This is the heart (or brain) of the Ground Controlled Interception Unit. This is only the advanced group.

When operating the Type 15 Radar should be some distance from the other vehicles to avoid interference with radar signals. It is also probably wise to have the operations vehicles well away from such an obvious target as the Type 15 aerial array which was large and difficult to conceal.

The controller is in the Receiver/Operations vehicle. He sits in front of the PPI (Plan Position Indicator) screen. An assistant sits on his left in front of a Height/Range screen. A teller sits behind to report to Control Centre. The Type 409 has an opening to accommodate this third member. The flap can be lowered and a canvas screen erected, or another vehicle can be backed up to the opening. Type 405 is similar to 409 but does not have the side opening.

Mobile Signals Unit Type ‘P’
MSU Type ‘P’s function was to provide VHF communications to aircraft

In the early days in Normandy communications to the UK and to incoming aircraft were through the offshore Headquarters Ships and Fighter Direction Tenders.
Radar Unit Type 21
A five vehicle GCI set containing the Type 13 and 14 radars

Radar Unit Type 11
Type 11 was a backup in case of jamming or interference on the Type 15, which used a longer wavelength.

5142 Mobile Signals Unit Type ‘Q’
A VHF Direction Finding Unit

Mobile Signals Unit Type ‘B’
Group Headquarters Signals. The whole unit numbered 55 men

Mobile Signals Unit Type ‘A’
Type ‘A’ was a larger unit with 75 men. Only one section landed here
Presumably for longer range VHF communication with aircraft. The winch lorry suggests tall aerial masts with wire aerial

Additional Notes:
No 15083 Ground Controlled Interception Mobile Radar Unit
Landed on Gold Beach, KING RED at approx 1545 hrs on D Day

No 15083 GCI Mobile Radar Unit landed and was set up for operations by 2300 hrs near Banville. They took over their first Allied Night Fighter (Beaufighter from Shoreham) shortly after midnight on the 7th Jun 1944

The ABOVE units are listed in the Landing Tables for 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. It was to land as soon as it was safe and practicable. A similar unit landing in the US sector was sent in too early and suffered considerable casualties.
Force ‘J’ Post Assault

By H+360 minutes the assault forces were ashore and heading inland. The beach exits were generally clear and traffic was moving through them. As the tide turned and receded it was possible to restart work on clearing beach obstacles and recovering many of the stranded craft. The Beach Groups had assumed responsibility for the beach areas and were steadily implementing the First Key Plan and considering what modifications were required.

In most accounts of D Day the naval forces disappear from history at this point. Of course for most of the ships and craft, as for the troops ashore, the assault was only the beginning. Most of the larger craft would make the crossing many times in the weeks ahead. Most of the smaller craft would be fully employed off the beaches. Below is the story of ships and craft immediately after the assault.

The first return convoys were code named ‘Bluesky’. The first was scheduled to sail at H+1 Hour so that the area offshore would be busy with ships and craft still arriving as the first were returning. Craft remaining off the beaches are listed after the returning convoys.

The LSI's

It is a principle of amphibious landings that personnel ships should clear the area as soon as possible. Sea room and speed offer the best protection. Anchoring off an enemy shore is hazardous. On completion of discharge of personnel and the hoisting of LCA's and LCA(HR)s the LSI's were to sail for the UK as Convoy ‘Bluesky 22’ under escort. All Commanding Officers of LSI's were ordered to make every effort to clear their ships as soon as possible. When ready to sail they hoisted a signal. Senior Officers of LSI Divisions were then ordered to sail their groups as soon as their ships were ready but not to delay sailing on account of an individual ship. Such ships would sail when they were ready and catch up the convoy. The LSI's of Divisions 3 and 4 joined the ships of Divisions 1 and 2 as they passed Position QQ. The ships sailed along Channel 6 as a complete convoy until those for Newhaven, Portland and Plymouth parted company at Area Z. ‘Bluesky 22’ was to aim to be ready to sail at H+3 hours and arrive at the Isle of Wight at H+11 hours.
The Hunt Class destroyers escorted ‘Bluesky 22’. HMS Versatile escorted ‘Bluesky 22’ to Solent, arriving at Portsmouth to embark the staff of 30 Corps at 1700 hrs. HMS Wrestler escorted ‘Bluesky 22’ and then joined an escort group.

The LCT’s

The LCT’s sailed as groups. They were to tow any casualties which were not destroyed or beached.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 21’ consisted of the eight LCT(3) of Group 311 and the eight LCT(3) of Group 321. These had carried the DD tanks. Flotilla Officer 11 LCT Flotilla in ML903 commanded. They were to be ready to sail at H+1 hour and arrive at the Solent at H+16 hours.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 23’ consisted of sixteen LCT(4) of Group 324, seven LCT(4) and three LCI(L) of Group 325 and the LCT(R) of Group 323. Flotilla Officer LCT Flotilla 36 in ML 269 commanded. They were to be ready to sail at H+2 hours and arrive at the Solent at H+17 hours.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 24’ consisted of fifteen LCT(4) of Group 313, twelve LCT(4) and three LCI(L) of Group 315 and the LCT(R) of Group 312. Flotilla Officer LCT Flotilla 31 in ML 146 commanded. They were to be ready to sail at H+2½ hours and arrive at the Solent at H+17½ hours.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 25’ consisted of six LCI(L) of Group 331. They were to be ready to sail at H+3 hours and arrive at the Solent at H+12 hours.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 26’ consisted of twenty LCT(4) and three LCI(L) of Group 331. They were to be ready to sail at H+4 hours and arrive at the Solent at H+19 hours.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 30’ consisted of seven LCI(L) of Force L. They were to be ready to sail at H+11 hours and arrive at the Solent at H+20 hours.

All the LST(5) variants remained to join the ship to shore Ferry Service.

The LST's

The return sailing of LST groups was more uncertain as far as time and composition was concerned. It was acknowledged that there could be delays in discharging, as indeed there were.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 27’ consisted of the twelve LST of group 332. They were to be ready to sail at H+7 hours. Two LST (100 and 238) were available to remain and embark casualties. ‘Bluesky 27’ was escorted by the Flower Class corvettes HMS Petunia, HMS Clarkia and HMS Pink which then joined escort groups.

- Convoy ‘Bluesky 28’ consisted of the ten LST of group 333. They were to be ready to sail at H+10 hours. Two LST were available to remain and embark casualties. HMS Veleta and HMS Lord Austin returned to the Solent as escort to ‘Bluesky 28’.

- Convoy ‘FTL1’ (from France, to Thames, Force L, Convoy 1) consisted of the seven LST of Force L. They were to be ready to sail for Tilbury at H+14 hours. HMS Cotswold, HMS Narcissus and HMS Oxlip escorted ‘FTL1’.

All of these sailings were greatly delayed as none were completely discharged by the scheduled times.
**Bombardment Destroyers**

HMS Kempenfelt, HMS Venus, HMS Vigilant, HMCS Algonquin, HMCS Sioux, HMS Faulkner and HMS Fury remained and continued to answer calls for bombardment. They were sailed as necessary to Portsmouth for re ammuniotioning

The Hunt class escorted LSI's returning to the Solent and Newhaven after the assault. They then went to Portsmouth for re ammuniotioning

FS La Combattante (French) remained on call for bombardment until H+12 hours and then escorted LSD Northway to the Solent. It was emphasized that LSD HMS Northway was not to be put at risk as it was the only LSD available at the time

HMS Beagle sailed for Portsmouth at H Hour so as to embark GOC 30 Corps at 1700 hrs

HMS Versatile escorted ‘Bluesky 22’ to the Solent arriving at Portsmouth to embark staff of 30 Corps at 1700 hrs

HMS Wrestler escorted ‘Bluesky 22’ to Portland and Portsmouth and then joined an escort group

**Escorts**

Northern Foam went to Sword area. Northern Sun, Northern Spring and Northern Pride joined the anti submarine patrol

HMS Veleta and HMS Lord Austin returned to the Solent as escort to the LST's of convoy Bluesky 28

HMS Petunia, HMS Clarkia and HMS Pink escorted the LST's of convoy Bluesky 27 and then joined escort groups

HMS Cotswold, HMS Narcissus and HMS Oxlip sailed with seven LST to rendezvous with Convoy FTL1 at H+14 hours

**Coastal Craft**

ML 902. After assisting in the launch of DD tanks ML 902 escorted X20
ML 903, 146 and 269 sailed with LCT convoys Bluesky 21, 24 and 23
ML 151 reported to Captain Patrols on HMS Lawford
ML 123, 147, 198, 247, 246 and 205 joined the anti submarine patrol
ML 297 joined Senior Officer LCP(L) smoke and acted as Smoke Control
HDML 1393 and 1407, which had been marking channels, reported to Captain Southbound Sailings MGBs and US CGCs reported to HMS Scylla
Support Craft

Landing Craft Flak

On completion of the assault and when the LCT's of the Shuttle Service had sailed the LCF moved to specific areas to give AA protection:

- LCF 33 anchored in the Coaster Anchorage
- LCF 37 anchored in the LST Discharging Anchorage
- LCF 21 anchored in the MT Ship Anchorage
- LCF 32 anchored in the Sailing Area Anchorage
- LCF 24 anchored off NAN beaches
- LCF 1 anchored off MIKE beaches
- LCF 29 remained with HQ Ship

Two hours before sunset each day all LCF closed HMS Hilary and sailed in company to the eastern end of Sword area, arriving at sunset plus 30 minutes. They left Sword each morning at sunrise minus 30 minutes and returned to the above positions.

Most LCT(R) returned to the UK with the LCT groups but two remained and were reloaded from LCT(R) 215. They remained in the LCT Anchorage until required to support forces ashore.

On completion of firing the surviving LCA(HR) returned to the LSI's for hoisting and return passage to the UK. Those of J1 proceeded to the LSI of 1 and 2 Divisions at Position QQ. Those of J2 proceeded to LSI of 3 and 4 Divisions at Position PP. Each LSI hoisted one LCA(HR) and left one LCA behind for duty off the beaches. The LCA's left behind were attached to Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group.

Other Craft

On completion of the assault and the discharge of the LSI's the surviving Landing Craft Infantry (Small) anchored around HMS Hilary to provide a physical screen. At 1500 hrs D Day LCI(S) 514 and 537 reported to HMS Waveney for duty with Senior Officer Ferry control. At 1800 hrs D Day four LCI(S) reported to the anchorages, one each to the Coaster Anchorage, LST Anchorage, MT Anchorage and Sailing Anchorage, to control Duty Patrol Boats LCP(L).

Each day the remaining LCI(S) except the two with Senior Officer Ferry Control were to await the arrival of the early morning LSI convoy and proceed alongside them to assist in their discharge.

Three LCI(L) of Group 331B were detailed to remain when the rest returned to the UK with LCT convoys. They anchored close to HMS Hilary and were used for discharge of LSI's of the Build Up. It was laid down that all LCT convoys should be accompanied by LCI(L) 'for navigation purposes'. The Landing Craft Support (Large) were attached to HQ ships HMS Lawford and HMS Waveney. They were to be used mainly for smoke.

LCA(Obstacle Clearance) remained to carry on with beach clearance.

All LCT(5) variants, including LCT(A), LCT(HE), LCT(CB), remained for duty with the Ferry Service and anchored in the Ferry Craft Anchorage.
Landing Craft Headquarters 98 and 167 on completion of duties with Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group reported to Waveney for duty with Principal Ferry Craft Officer.

LCP(L) remained for smoke duties. 702 Flotilla reported to HMS Hilary at 1030 hrs and transferred to Sword area.

703 and 705 Flotillas remained off Juno under the Senior Officer LCP(L) in ML 297 for smoke duties.

On completion of the assault Landing Craft Support (Medium) reported to Senior Officers Assault Groups to augment the smoke laying craft

Motor Mine Sweepers reported to Captain Mine Sweepers in HMS Scylla (Flag Eastern Task Force). There would be plenty of work for them in the coming weeks.

LCM of the assault groups, which had carried carrying REs, reported to Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group for duty off the beaches.

LCVP arriving with the LST’s of Force L reported to Principal Ferry Control Officer in HMS Waveney.

Force J would now reorganize itself from an assault force to being responsible for the naval part of the follow up operation. This and the work of 102 Beach Sub Area ashore will form a separate and later account.

**Naval Force ‘J’**

**Post Assault Organization**

**The Transitional Period**

As soon as the assault troops landed on the beaches the naval organization began to transform itself from Assault Force ‘J’ tasked with landing the assault troops on the beaches to Naval Force ‘J’ tasked with organizing the ship to shore movement of stores and equipment. There were many changes in title and function over the period D Day and D+1 and there is plenty of scope for confusion with different documents using different terms. Fortunately there was no such confusion in reality on D Day.

Very quickly there would emerge an organization which included the Cross Channel Shuttle Service, the ship to shore Ferry Service, a defence organization, a complex administrative and ‘housekeeping’ organization and a shore organization. In addition there were the complexities of coordinating with the army beach organization and ship to shore units. It was emphasized in orders that all the various organizations were to ‘work in the closest harmony to achieve the main objectives which are the rapid unloading of stores and equipment on the beaches and the orderly clearance of these from the beaches by the Beach Groups’

Provisional plans were made in case Force ‘S’ experienced problems and had to divert part of it to Juno. It was envisaged that heavy enemy shore batteries could make it too hazardous. In this case some of the assault groups of Force ‘S’ would land on NAN RED under the control of Force ‘J’ and 102 Beach Sub Area. One Senior Officer Assault Group from Force ‘S’ was to position himself alongside Captain Senior Officer Assault Group J2. It was also envisaged that Oboe Sector could be developed as part of Sword Beach if necessary. This would be operated by Force ‘S’ Beach Parties. In the event these were not necessary although Sword Beach was forced to progressively move westwards and finally close altogether at the end of June.
Senior Officers Assault Group

The Senior Officers Assault Group had been responsible for commanding Assault Groups J1 and J2 for the assembly and crossing the Channel. On arrival off the beach they continued to command Assault Groups J1 and J2, and to provide the naval link with the three army Brigade Commanders. Once the first landing craft of the assault brigades had touched down they were responsible for coordinating the activities of the Deputy Senior Officers Assault Groups, directing craft to them as necessary depending on the situation ashore. They would decide on any alteration to the timetable, and in fact they did hold some groups back for a hour when the beaches were congested. They could also divert groups to a different beach than that planned.

The Senior Officer Assault Group J3, carrying the Reserve Brigade, remained in control of the group until it was ordered to land at which point he turned over the group to Senior Officer Assault Group J2. He then went ashore to assume the duty of Naval Officer in Charge. His Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group became his deputy as Deputy Naval Officer in Charge.

After the assault phase, about H+5 hours when the assault was complete and the Reserve Brigade had landed, the Senior Officers Assault Groups J1 and J2 took over control of the inner area from their Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group. One Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group from each sector, MIKE and NAN, was withdrawn and the remaining Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group remained as deputy to his Senior Officer Assault Group. The Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group who were withdrawn were in fact the commanders of LCT Flotillas who had assumed the additional role for the assault but now returned to their primary duty with the Shuttle Service.

In the late afternoon of D Day, when ordered by the Naval Force Commander, the Senior Officer Assault Group J1 assumed command of the seaward patrols across the whole of the Eastern Task Force area with the title of Captain, Patrols. The Senior Officer Assault Group J2 remained and was in charge of all the Juno beaches and of unloading.

Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group

The Senior Officers Assault Group each had two Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group, who commanded the groups landing the assault battalions. They maintained communication with the Senior Officers Assault Group and provided the naval link to the assault battalion commanders. Once the first craft touched down their role changed to that of being responsible for the sector on which their own assault battalion was landing. They were responsible now for the inshore control of such naval forces as the Senior Officers Assault Group assigned to them.

Naval Force ‘J’
The Final Organization

Assault Force Commander

The Commander Assault Force ‘J’ was in overall command of naval units and operations up to two miles offshore. He commanded the onshore organization through the Naval Officer in Charge, and the offshore organization through the Senior Officer Assault Group. He had operational control over all naval and merchant shipping in his area and was responsible for giving authority for the return sailings of convoys. He was also responsible for the defence of the inner anchorage area. HMS Hilary was the headquarters ship for the Commander Assault Force. It was anchored to the seaward of the anchorages, some two miles off shore.

Eventually the Assault Force Commander, now known as Naval Force Commander since the assault was long over, was withdrawn. This was about to happen around D+10, at which time the beaches
seemed to be running smoothly. However a two day storm caused damage and delays and the withdrawal was postponed. Captain, Senior Officer Assault Group (previously SOAG J2) remained and assumed the duties of Naval Force Commander. It was a policy to withdraw key personnel as soon as was practicable in order to have a pool of trained and experienced officers who could plan and command any further amphibious landings that might be ordered in support of the army as it moved up the coast. It was not envisaged that the army would spend three months fighting in Normandy.

**Senior Officer Assault Group**

The Senior Officer was responsible for the operational control of ships and craft in the inner anchorage, controlling the movement between the arrival, discharging and sailing anchorages and was responsible for the defence of the inner anchorage under the Assault Force Commander. The Senior Officer Assault Group had his headquarters on HMS Waveney. This was anchored in the centre of the anchorages, inshore of HMS Hilary and the Commander Assault Force.

**Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group**

The Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group were responsible for the various groups of LCI(L)s, LCT's and eventually LST's landing personnel and vehicles across their beach sectors. At about H+8 hours Captain, Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group J1 left the anchorage in his headquarters ship to take over his duties as Captain, Patrols. With the assault phase over the responsibilities of the two remaining Deputy Senior Officers Assault Groups changed again. They were no longer responsible for a sector. One was responsible for controlling the arrival and despatch of the Personnel Ships, LST’s and LCT’s of the Cross Channel Shuttle Service. The other was responsible for controlling the arrival and despatch of other shipping including the Motor Transport Coasters, Stores Coasters, Motor Transport Ships, Stores Ships and tankers. Responsibilities for the onshore areas was passed to the Naval Officer in Charge and his Beach Masters.

Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group MIKE Sector had his headquarters on Landing Craft Headquarters 158. This was anchored further in shore and to the west of the Ferry Craft anchorage and close to the LCI(S), headquarters of Senior Officer Ferry Control MT. Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group MIKE Sector had his headquarters on Landing Craft Headquarters 239. This was anchored further in shore and to the east of the Ferry Craft anchorage and close to the LCI(S), headquarters of Senior Officer Ferry Control Stores.

Confusingly Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group retained their original titles even though the assault groups no longer existed and their duties were quite different.

**Naval officer in Charge**

On shore there was a Naval Officer in Charge. He set up his headquarters next to that of the Beach Sub Area. The Naval Officer in Charge controlled two organizations, which necessarily worked closely together and with the Beach Sub Area. These were the Beach Masters and the Ferry Service.

**The Beach Masters**

On Juno there were three Principal Beach Masters. Initially there was one for each of the beach sectors, MIKE and NAN. As the beaches developed MIKE became the sector for motor transport and personnel while NAN became the sector for stores. The third Principal Beach Master was held in reserve. Each Principal Beach Master had three Beach Masters and their parties.

Principal Beach Master MIKE Sector had his headquarters next to that of 7 Beach Group while Principal Beach Master NAN Sector had his headquarters next to that of 8 Beach Group. Each had
executive command of all naval personnel on their beach sector. The Reserve Principal Beach Master remained on HMS Royal Ulsterman until it was decided where he would be employed. The provisional plan was for him to develop NAN RED.

**Naval Force ‘J’**

**The Ferry Service**

The Naval Officer in Charge had operational control of the various craft of the Ferry Service which operated between ships and shore. The Ferry Service itself was commanded by a Principal Ferry Control Officer. He had two Senior Officers Ferry Control, one for the unloading of motor transport and one for the unloading of stores.

**Principal Ferry Craft Control Officer**

The Principal Ferry Craft Control Officer was responsible for the allocation and operation of all ferry craft. He was responsible to the Naval Officer in Charge for the execution of the unloading programme decided by the Naval Officer in Charge and the Commander 102 Beach Sub Area. He was also responsible for the inward and outward movement of coasters between the discharging berths and the sailing areas. Principal Ferry Control Craft Control Officer had the use of a Landing Craft Headquarters which was anchored near the Headquarters of the Assault Force Commander on HMS Hilary.

**Senior Officers Ferry Craft**

There were two Senior Officers Ferry Craft, each with separate responsibilities. Senior Officer Ferry Craft 1 was responsible the execution of the programme for unloading motor transport ships and for the ferry craft assigned to this duty. Senior Officer Ferry Craft 2 was responsible the execution of the programme for unloading store ships and for the ferry craft assigned to this duty.

Each of the Senior Officers Ferry Craft had a Landing Craft Infantry (Small) as a headquarters. That of Senior Officer Ferry Craft 1 was anchored near the Landing Craft Headquarters of Deputy Assault Group Commander MIKE, to the west of the ferry craft area and convenient for the motor transport beach. That of Senior Officer Ferry Craft 2 was anchored near the Landing Craft Headquarters of Deputy Assault Group Commander MIKE, to the east of the ferry craft area and convenient for the stores beach.

Ferry craft included LCM's, LCVP's, LCT and LBV's. These could be used for vehicles or stores. Most could also be used for landing personnel but after the early hours this was mostly the role of LCI(L). Army units operated DUKW's and Rhino Ferries. Gradually the Rhinos were supplemented, and then replaced, by PBR's (Powered Barge, Ramped) and TID tugs. Rhinos, PBR's and TID's were operated by army Inland Water Transport Companies, RE.

**Senior Officer Ferry Base**

There was a Senior Officer Ferry Base responsible for the administration, maintenance, discipline and welfare of ferry craft and their crews. He was also responsible for the provision of relief craft and crews and for the allocation of despatch craft. He controlled the depot ships for the various ferry craft and also controlled the anchorage for ferry craft in the lee of Gooseberry 4. Headquarters was on the depot ship SS Ascanius.

The Ferry Service retained all surviving LCT5, LCT(A), LCT(CB and LCT(HE). This was expected to amount to up to eighteen craft from the two flotillas. In fact casualties were heavier than expected on all British beaches. In Force ‘J’ three were sunk, seven were badly damaged and eight were damaged.
or disabled. Because of these losses each beach was permitted to retain up to twenty LCT's from the Shuttle Service. Three and a half flotillas of British manned LCT5 from the US Western Task Force transferred to Force ‘J’ after the assault but did not arrive until late on D+2. Later an unknown number of USN LCT5 and LCT6 were also transferred from the Western Task Force.

Naval Force ‘J’
Build Up Force ‘J’

This consisted of three Squadrons.

• **‘A’ Build Up Squadron** consisted of 800, 801, 802, 803 and 804 Flotillas with sixteen LCVP each.

• **‘F’ Build Up Squadron** consisted of 600, 601 and 604 Flotillas each with sixteen LCM(1) and 650, 651 and 652 Flotillas each with sixteen LCM(3)

• **‘W’ Landing Barge Squadron** consisted of:
  - 1, 2 and 3 LBV Flotillas each with eleven LBV plus half of 4 LBV Flotilla with six LBV
  - Part of 30 Landing Barge (S&R) Flotilla with three LBE, four LBO, two LBW and the trawlers Chassemarie and Garola.
  - 31 Landing Barge (S&R) Flotilla with one LCE, six LBE, ten LBO, two LBW, one LBK and the trawlers King Emperor, Strathcoe, Libyan and Raetiai.
  - 37 Landing Barge (S&R) Flotilla with one LCE, six LBE, ten LBO, two LBW, one LBK and the trawlers Oriziba, Star of Britain and Ronso.

These three squadrons sailed as four groups.

• **Group JM1** assembled off Langstone and departed from the Nab at 0300 hrs D Day. It consisted of
  - 4 X LBF, 13, 37, 15 and 4.
  - 9 X LBV, 19, 34, 36, 41, 116, 123, 97, 139 and 183. All were pre loaded.
  - HMS Letma. Escort.

• **Group JM2** assembled at Chichester and departed from the Nab at 0530 hrs D Day. It consisted of
  - ‘F’ Squadron LCM. 600, 601, 606, 650, 651, 652 Flotillas. Total 96 craft.
  - ‘A’ Squadron LCVP. 800, 801, 802, 803, 804 Flotillas. 80 craft.

• **Group JM3** assembled off Langstone and departed from the Nab at 0630 hrs D Day. It consisted of
  - 33 X Landing Barge Vehicle from 1, 2, and 3 Flotillas. 26 of these were preloaded loaded.
  - 6 X Landing Barge Emergency Repair, 15, 19, 20, 44, 45 and 46 of 37 Flotilla.
  - 2 X Landing Barge Water, 3 and 16.
  - 18 X Landing Barge Oiler, 1, 2, 29, 35, 36, 58, 59, 61, 67, 78, 83, 40, 48, 45, 28, 43, 41 and 66.
  - Fuelling trawlers Chasse Marie, Garola, Strathcoe, Libyan, King Emperor and Daetia.
  - Nimico, corvette.
  - Clarinda, Yacht.
  - Smoke laying trawler.

• **Group JM4** assemble off Langstone and departed from the Nab at 0630 hrs D+1.
  - 9 X Landing Barge Emergency Repair, 9, 54, 43, 22, 36, 21, 67, 6 and 39.
  - 2 X Landing Barge Water, 2 and 9.
  - 6 X Landing Barge Oiler, 4, 7, 8, 20, 47 and 49.
  - 2 X Landing Barge Kitchen. 7, 9.
  - Landing Craft Flak 16 and 15.
  - Altona. Yacht.
  - Fuelling trawlers. Oriziba, Star of Britain and Ronso.
The Ferry Service also received:
- 202 LCI(S) Flotilla with eight craft
- Sixty US manned LCVP
- an unknown number of US LCT5 and LCT6.
- All surviving LCT5, LCT(A), LCT(CB) and LCT(HE).

Plus:
- 15 Rhino Ferries and 200 DUKW with army units.

The intention was that:
- Rhino ferries would be used primarily for unloading LST's and then for unloading MT Ships.
- LCT would be used primarily for unloading MT Ships but could be used for unloading LST's.
- LCM would be used for unloading MT Ships and Stores Coasters as required.
- LBV would be used for unloading Stores Coasters.
- LCVP would be used for unloading as required and for despatch duties
- LCI(S), LCM, LCVP and LCT could all be used for the rapid discharge of Personnel Ships when required.

Landing Barge Vehicle
These were standard steel Thames barges widely used as lighters for unloading ships. They were not of standard dimensions, being originally built for different civilian lighter companies but they did not vary greatly. Originally they were divided into three categories by size with ‘small’ being 70 foot long and 18 foot wide, ‘medium’, being 78 foot long and twenty foot wide and ‘large’ being 82 foot long and 23 foot wide. These dimensions being approximate and varying by 15% in each class. Capacity did vary considerably however from 100 tons to 200 tons.

As Landing Barge Vehicle they were fitted with a ramp at the stern which meant that they had to reverse onto the beach. They were fitted with two Chrysler engines, each driving a propeller. Protection was provided in the form of concrete to the hull sides, plastic armour on the fuel tanks and steel bulkhead doors inboard of the ramp. A steering position was added at the stern. Three 3 ton lorries or equivalent could be carried by most LBV but they were generally used for landing stores.

Accommodation for the five man crew was rudimentary and shore accommodation, or accommodation on depot ships, was necessary.

LCM Mk1
The LCM Mk1 was 44 foot 8 inches long and 14 foot wide. Draught at the bows was 30 inches. Two 60hp petrol engines were used to power twin propellers. Armour was fitted to decks, steering house, bulwarks and fuel tanks. A crew of six was carried, coxswain, stoker/driver and four deck hands. There was usually one officer for every three craft plus a Flotilla Officer. Load was only 16 tons so that it could not carry tanks.

LCM Mk3
The LCM Mk3 was a US design. It was all welded steel and was larger and heavier than the British LCM Mk1. In British service it was used as a ferry craft rather than an assault craft. Length was 50 foot and width 14 foot. Draught was 36 inches at the bow. Power came from two 225hp diesel engines. A crew of six was carried in British service. As with the Mk1 there was usually one officer for every three craft plus a Flotilla Officer. Armour was limited to the control station.

A disciplinary note. Crews of craft which were beached or dried out were not to be allowed ashore for any reason without express written orders.
Naval Force ‘J’
Supply and repair

31, 37 and part of 30 Landing Barge (S&R) Flotillas provided the supply and repair services for the Ferry Service and came under the control of Senior Officer Ferry Base. They moored at trots of buoys in the lee of Gooseberry 4.

Supply

Landing Barge Kitchen

These were converted from LBV’s and so had similar dimensions and details. A superstructure was added and the ramp removed. Additional armour was added to the tanks holding fuel tanks for the generator and cooking range. They could store, cook and issue food to provide 1600 hot meals and 800 cold meals a day. They also issued supplies to craft with their own cooking facilities.

Landing Barge Oiler

These were steel barges without ramps. They had tanks in the hold to carry either 33 tons of diesel or petrol. In view of the nature of the cargo they were protected with plastic armour over the tanks in addition to the normal concrete sides etc. They also had steel armour watertight bulkheads.

Landing Barge Water

These were similar to the LBO but with different fittings. They carried 33 tons of water in the tank plus eighty jerrycans of water.

Fuelling Trawlers

To supplement the barges there were also fuelling trawlers which carried only diesel, 33 tons in the hold.

LBO, LBW and fuelling trawlers formed two teams which worked 24 hours on and 24 hours on standby, changing at 0600 hrs daily. They were to replenish stocks during standby time. While on duty they flew Pennant ‘4’, which was hauled down if stocks were exhausted. Craft of the Ferry Service were encouraged to replenish fuel and water at any opportunity. In each S and R Flotilla, 31 and 37, five LBO carried standard Pool petrol, one carried 73 octane, one carried 87 octane, one carried 100 octane and four carried diesel. Craft had a considerable variety of engines needing a variety of fuels.

A stock of diesel, petrol, water and lubricating oil was also carried on MT ships and MT coasters, stores coasters and LST. The MT ships and coasters only carried cased fuel and water and any balance left after unloading was left as an emergency stock either on shore or on a Gooseberry ship.

Distilled water for batteries was obtained from cruisers by workboat. Kerosene for primus stoves was supplied from Ascanius. Dirty lubricating oil was collected and transferred by workboat to containers on Gooseberry ships. Loose coal was obtained from colliers but bagged coal for cooking was held on Gooseberry ships.
An Ammunition Supply Issuing Ship arrived on D+1 with all types of ammunition required by ships and craft remaining permanently in the area. Warships returned to the UK for ammunitioning, and ships and craft of the Shuttle Service ammunitioned if necessary in the UK. Ammunition was drawn in bulk and distributed to ships and craft by workboats. The exceptions were Landing Craft Gun and Landing Craft Flak which ammunitioned direct from the Ammunition Supply Issuing Ship. Headquarters ships held a reserve of 5lb charges for the ‘Alert’ patrols.

Large quantities of smoke munitions were used and these were replenished daily by a LCT from the UK. These stocks were then held by LCT(R) 125. Emergency reserves were held by headquarters ships.

Three hot meals a day, and mail, were considered vital to morale and efficiency. Craft carried emergency rations but crews were normally fed from Landing Barge Kitchens. When on duty one craft from each flotilla collected food for the flotilla from the LBK and distributed it. All ships had to be prepared to provide emergency meals for the crews of workboats and other small craft. Supplies were delivered by workboat to LBK and to larger craft and ships with their own cooking facilities. Rum was only issued on stand off periods but grog money was paid in lieu. The daily rum issue would continue to be a daily right in the Royal Navy for many years.

Work boats collected and delivered mail daily. Mail to and from the UK was carried by coaster.

**Repair**

In general ships and coastal craft returned to the UK for repair. Craft of the Cross Channel Shuttle Service could be patched up sufficiently for them to be returned to the UK. All such craft carried a stock of repair materials and had some skilled personnel so that they could effect minor repairs to get them home. Any craft of the Ferry Service suffering damage or mechanical breakdown reported to the Senior Officer Ferry Service if they were afloat or to the Naval Officer in Charge if they were on the beach. Loaded craft were to make every effort to reach the beach. There were several organizations ashore and afloat to give assistance or carry out repair work.

Fire was a constant danger when dealing with combustible materials in a war zone. It had been planned to provide each beach with four specially built fire boats but these were not delivered in time. Force ‘J’ initially had one motor fire boat which arrived on D day. To make up the shortfall six LCM1 were fitted with trailer pumps, foam equipment and breathing apparatus, plus presumably trained crews. There were also salvage tugs which carried powerful fire fighting equipment. As a last resort there were Wreck Disposal Tugs which had a qualified Salvage Officer on board and could sink ships which were on fire and a danger in the anchorages. Counter intuitively perhaps fire, together with thirst, have always been the sailors greatest fears.

**Landing Barge Emergency repair**

These were mobile repair craft for the maintenance of minor landing craft. They were similar to the LBV but had a large crew accommodation area for two officers and twenty two men. There were work benches and storage for batteries and oxyacetylene equipment. The workshop equipment consists of a 3 ton 6 x 4 Workshop lorry No 4 which could be unloaded to work ashore.

**Landing Craft Emergency repair**

These were conversions of LCV, an earlier version of the LCVP. They were equipped to carry out ‘first aid’ emergency repairs to small craft in the beach area. They carried a stock of timber, plywood and copper sheeting plus a salvage pump which also had fire fighting fittings. They were armoured and
carried a crew of an officer, three men, two motor mechanics, two shipwrights, one wireman and a stoker. They were carried to the beaches on the davits of larger vessels. There was also a repair organization ashore.

**Force ‘J’**

**Depot ships**

Depot ships were moored just to seawards of Gooseberry 4. They provided accommodation for administrative staffs and limited accommodation for craft crews. Accommodation was also available on some of the Corncob ships of Gooseberry 4.

**SS Ascanius - Captain Charles Henry Whitehouse, Master**

Most of the small craft of the ferry service, including S and R Flotillas, used Ascanius as a depot ship, although they moored in the Gooseberry. Built in 1910 she had seen service as a troopship in WWI and again in WWII before becoming a depot ship. Since Juno was in a central position on the British beaches Ascanius was also used as Headquarters Commodore Depot Ships, British Assault Area.

**HMS Hawkins (D86) - Capt John William Josselyn, DSC, RN**

The LCT's of the ferry service and most other craft in the force used HMS Hawkins as a depot ship. She was a cruiser commissioned just too late for WWI. On D Day she was part of Bombardment Force ‘A’ off Utah Beach before moving to Juno. She had seven 7.5” guns, was 9,750 tons, 605 foot long and had a top speed of 30 knots.

**HMS Southern Prince (M74) - Capt (Ret) Rudolph Henry Fane de Salís, DSC, OBE, RN**

A cargo liner built in 1929. She arrived off Juno on D+1 as the headquarters of Rear Admiral, Flag Officer British Assault Area. This officer was responsible for all ship to shore operations and gradually assumed command of the three Naval Officer in Charge. He moved the headquarters ashore on June 24th, officially assumed control of all British beaches on 30th June when Operation Neptune officially ended. Southern Prince was 10,900 tons, 514 foot long and had a top speed of 16.5 knots.

**HMS Tasajera (F125) - Lt Sydney Kingsley Stratton, RNR**

Rhinos used LST Tasajera as depot ship. Tasajera was a shallow draught tanker built in 1938 and converted to LST. She was 3,952 tons, 362 foot long. Not really suited to either working with the Shuttle Service LST’s or to landing on the Normandy beaches she made one trip carrying vehicles and remained as depot ship. Tasajera dragged her anchor in the storms of June 19 to 21 and collided with Gooseberry 4. She returned to the UK soon afterwards.

**SS George W Woodward WSAT (550) USAT -**

The USN LCVP and LCT flotillas brought their own depot ship, George W Woodward, a Liberty ship.

**Naval Force ‘J’**

**Shuttle Service**

Not all craft came under the control of the Ferry Service. LCT's and LCI's of the cross Channel Shuttle Service landed directly on the beaches. LST’s also landed directly on the beaches after the first day. It was planned that for the Shuttle Service Force ‘J’ would have the use of its surviving LCT4 flotillas. In addition there would be one flotilla from Force ‘G’, four flotillas from Force ‘L’ and one flotilla found
from new production. This would give a total of fifteen flotillas, each of eight craft and organized in three squadrons of five flotillas each.

Starting on D+3 Force ‘J’ LCT’s would load at Stanswood or Gosport Stokes bay Hards. One squadron was to sail on each tide with one tide being missed every three days. Craft were to return to the Calshot Collecting Area. Each flotilla was accompanied by one LCI(L) to carry any surplus marching personnel who could not be accommodated on the LCT’s.

LCI(L) formed LCI(L) groups and worked from Newhaven or Portsmouth, sailing once daily.

LST’s loaded at the Solent Area or Tilbury. They did not necessarily remain in their flotillas but formed groups which sailed once daily, timing the departure so as to arrive at the far shore each pm. Those LST’s fitted for casualty evacuation remained as necessary and joined a later return convoy.

Personnel ships, all ex LSI’s, sailed once daily from Newhaven and Southampton.

As soon as the fleet minesweepers had finished sweeping the channels from Area Z to the Lowering Points off the beaches they returned to widen the channels. First task was to merge the channels to each beach so that Channels 5 and 6 became Channel 56, Channels 7 and 8 became Channel 78. Each Channel was two miles wide. Eventually there would be only one wide channel for the Eastern Task Force. This was formed by clearing the area between Channels 56 and 78 to form Channel 58. Channels were marked with buoys. Channels 56 and 78 had buoys on the centreline. Those on 56 had lights flashing every 10 seconds. Those on 78 had lights flashing every 2½ seconds. Shipping was to keep to starboard side of the Channel, that is east for northbound and west for southbound.

On D Day and D+1 buoys were laid as the channels were swept clear. Two survey ships, HMS Scott and HMS Astral were used to lay buoys before going on to carry out survey work off the beaches. Trinity House vessels, Alert, Discovery II, Warden, G. de Joli and A. Blondel were also used to lay buoys. All of these vessels were equipped for and experienced in buoy laying. Survey vessels normally laid buoys to mark wrecks and obstacles while Trinity House was responsible for lighthouses and navigation buoys round the UK coasts. Eventually a Trinity House lightship would mark the centre of Area Z.

Off the Normandy Coast the Eastern Task Force controlled inward and outward convoys via Captain Southbound Sailings and Captain Northbound Sailings. Senior Officer Assault Group S2, assumed the duties of Captain, Northbound Sailings and controlled shipping returning to the UK from the Headquarters Ship HMS Dacres. HDML’s 1415 and 1416, which had been marking the northern entrance to Channels 9 and 10, reported to Captain Northbound sailings for convoy assembly duty by 2300 hrs on D day. Captain Northbound assumed responsibility for return convoy assembly and despatch at dawn on D+1. From then onwards all returning shipping was directed to the assembly area by the Naval Force Commanders of each beach and was then sailed from the Point of Departure as follows:

- Personnel convoys sailed when ready
- MT Ships and LST Convoys sailed at 0900 hrs daily
- Coasters sailed at 1100 hrs daily
- LST's sailed at 1600 hrs daily
- Any ships missing their convoy sailed at 2000 hrs

By 2000 hrs each day the Naval Officer in Charge informed the Naval Force Commander which ships were likely to be ready to sail the following day. At 0001 hrs, midnight in effect, the Naval Force Commander signalled the Captain Northbound Sailings the names of the ships sailing in each of the routine convoys. Ships were to sail from the anchorage to the Point of Departure in single file. At the Point of Departure the columns from all three beaches join and form three parallel columns. From west to east these would be from Forces ‘G’, ‘J’ and ‘S’.
For ships arriving at the Point of Departure, or in the case of delayed departure, waiting anchorages were established close Headquarters Ship. In the area to the south and south west were coasters, to the east and south east were motor transport ships, to the south and south east were LST’s and to the west and south west were personnel ships.

As soon as Captain Southbound was established, also about dawn on D+1, he assumed responsibility for all shipping arriving in the Eastern Task Force Area. He knew by signal from Portsmouth and by despatch boat what shipping was due to arrive. Convoys were met by despatch boats and divided into groups for each of the three beach areas. To assist in this each ship or craft carried a board with its serial number and the type of cargo. Despatch boats from each beach collected their groups and led them to the correct anchorages. The Captain Southbound also divided the escort to the convoy and assigned them to groups for each beach. LCT and LCI(L) convoys were not escorted. Headquarters ship was HMS Nith.

On arrival the Senior Officers of groups of LCT and LCI(L), identified themselves to the Port War Signal Station, at Courseulles, by the groups TURCO code and number of craft in the form ‘Senior Officer in ML246. 24 LCT. 2 LCF in company. Sunbeam ‘1’. Sunbeam being the codeword for southbound convoys. TURCO is Turn-round Control in the UK.

Naturally all of these organizations took time to establish and to mesh together but eventually it was a smooth, almost automatic, operation.

**Naval Force ‘J’**

**The Anchorages**

Anchorages had been laid out on charts and came into operation for the second tide. For the assault phase the LSI’s had anchored at the Lowering Position some seven miles offshore. Here they hoped to be beyond the range of coastal defence artillery. They were also well placed to sail quickly if there was a serious threat. They were anyway well placed to sail as soon as their troops had been disembarked and their LCA’s had been recovered. By 1730 hrs the LSI’s had sailed and the Headquarters Ship Hilary moved to a position some two miles off shore and in the centre of the sailing anchorages. The Naval Force Commander, Force ‘J’ was responsible for the assembly and sailing of return convoys from these anchorages, passing ships and craft to the Captain Northbound to assemble in his Sailing Assembly Area. There were two sailing anchorages off Juno, one to the west for the larger and faster personnel ships and LST’s, and one to the east for the slower LCT's and Coasters.

Inshore of the Sailing Anchorages were four anchorages for holding arrivals and for unloading those ships and craft which were not to be beached. To the west was an anchorage for major landing craft, LCT’s and LCI(L)’s. These were held here until called forward to beach or use the NL Pontoons for unloading. Next there was an anchorage for LST’s and Rhinos. It was intended that all except a small number of LST’s would anchor here and be discharged onto Rhino Ferries. This operation was soon so far behind schedule that all LST’s were beached and dried out for unloading and the anchorage became an area for LST’s to wait to be called in to beach. A large area was allocated to the anchorage for personnel ships, motor transport ships and motor transport coasters. All of these needed room to swing at anchor and all needed the Ferry Service to discharge them. Finally there was a large area to the east for stores coasters to anchor. This area was to the seaward of an area of shallow, rocky water but there was a clear channel to the west of the coaster anchorage and DUKW's had a marked route over the rocks. Again when unloading got behind schedule it was found that coasters could be beached and dried out for unloading.

Between the above anchorages and the Gooseberry 4 there was a smaller anchorage for the Ferry Service craft. It was so positioned that the routes from the other anchorages could readily pass down either side, those for the vehicle beach passing to the west and those for the stores beach passing to
the east. Inshore of Gooseberry 4 were the trots of buoys laid out for the LBV's and LCM's. Other small craft could also shelter here.

The channels from the LST and MT ship anchorages to the west and from the stores coaster anchorage to the east to the beaches were clearly marked by buoys. Those to port were black with a white light at night and those to starboard showed flag ‘Oboe’, yellow and red, with a red light at night. Ships were led from the anchorage to the correct beaching position by despatch boats.

**PLAN OF JUNO BEACH ANCHORAGE**
Naval Force ‘J’
Defence of the Anchorage

The defence of the inner anchorage was in the hands of Force J and consisted of: Destroyers HMS Kempenfelt, Venus, Vigilant, HMCS Algonquin, HMCS Sioux, HMS Faulknor and Fury. They were to be available for fire support of forces ashore or for the defence of the inner anchorage as necessary. Four destroyers were to be on station at any one time while the remaining three could be absent for ammunitioning etc. If required any or all of the destroyers could be ordered to join the anti submarine patrols.

Three anti submarine trawlers, HMS Northern Spray, Northern Sun and Northern Pride. These could also be called on to join the anti submarine patrols.

Motor Launches 123, 147, 198, 205, 246, 247 and 297 were available for anti submarine patrols.

Landing Craft Gun 680, 681, 764, 831, 939, 1007 and 1062 were available both for fire support and defence of the inner anchorage. They could also be used to lay smoke.

Landing Craft Flak 1, 33, 37, 21, 32, 24 and 29 were assigned specific areas of the anchorage for AA defence.
- LCF 33 anchored in the Coaster Anchorage
- LCF 37 anchored in the LST Discharging Anchorage
- LCF 21 anchored in the MT Ship Anchorage
- LCF 32 anchored in the Sailing Area Anchorage
- LCF 24 anchored off NAN beaches
- LCF 1 anchored off MIKE beaches
- LCF 29 remained with HQ Ship HMS Hilary

Two hours before sunset each day all LCF closed HMS Hilary and sailed in company to the eastern end of Sword area, arriving at sunset +30 minutes. They left Sword each morning at sunrise -30 minutes and returned to the above positions.

Four Landing Barge Flak, 4, 13, 15 and 37 arrived with the Build Up convoys and were used for the close anti aircraft defence of the beaches. When there was space they beached and dried out near the high water mark. They were powered barges with ramps, a steel deck and armour. Each carried two army 40mm Bofors guns with an officer and 15 men army gun crew. Eventually the guns could be landed.

Smoke

Arrangements were made to lay a smoke screen against air attack. The objective of this was given as ‘Rapid development of a smoke screen of sufficient intensity to cover all shipping off the beaches and to prevent hostile aircraft from identifying a point of aim’.

Three flotillas of LCP(L), 702, 703 and 705, were available and were equipped with CSA smoke generators, MkII smoke floats and Army Type 24 smoke generators. Initially the area to be screened was two miles wide, more or less centred on Courseulles, and seven and a half mile out to sea. This covered all D Day anchorages as far as the Lowering Positions. One flotilla was assigned to each two mile by two and a half mile square and each was divided into two divisions. One division was to start and maintain the smoke screen on the windward side of the area while the other division built up the screen within the area. The outside division formed a line ahead with craft 600 yards apart and carried out an endless chain patrol to windward.
The inside division started by using CSA generators and igniting Type 24 generators. The CSA generator was switched off when the Type 24 generators reached full volume. A fresh Type 24 generator was ignited every fifteen minutes in order to maintain a continuous screen.

On the order ‘Cease Making Smoke’ all craft threw generators overboard, presumably the quickest way of extinguishing them, and returned to the stand by position. Craft of the inside division might remain alongside larger ships and make arrangements to receive alerts from them.

On D Day all three areas were manned. After D Day the outer area was closed as shipping moved closer to shore. Eventually all shipping moved to the inshore anchorages up to two and a half miles from shore and only the inner area was manned. Flotillas were then rotated and craft could be rested or used for other duties.

The Senior Officer LCP(L) issued orders for a deployment when wireless silence was broken on D Day, at sunset each day and when the wind changed.

Usually screens were laid at dusk, dawn or when a night air attack was imminent, especially on moonlit nights. In the event of a ship being shelled from the shore the nearest LCP(L) was to lay a screen between ship and shore.

Seven Landing Craft Support Large, three Mk2 and four Mk1, were also available to fire smoke bombs from mortars against shore targets and ships and craft thickened the screens by igniting one smoke float or Type 25 generator, and igniting fresh ones every ten minutes.

LCP(L) used for smoke seem to have been fitted with two sets of low pressure CSA smoke generators and two racks of four No24 smoke generators. The CSA worked by mixing two liquid chemicals which immediately formed a mist. The smoke was effective but unpleasant and the chemicals rather dangerous to handle. The No 24 generator was a standard type used by the army and navy. It had to be ignited and once it had started to burn produced a thick smoke for some twenty minutes. Since these generators worked by burning chemicals they produced a glow which was visible from the air, especially at night, thus screens were erected over the racks.

LCP(L) could also be used to supplement the ‘Alert Patrols’.

**Alert Patrols**

It was thought that there was a real danger of human torpedoes or similar being used against ships in the anchorages. Even though there were several lines of patrol vessels to seaward and there were other beaches to east and west Force ‘J’ had a patrol organization in place.

LCVP Flotillas 800 and 801 were to provide groups of six craft to patrol each of the anchorages. Each patrol had a LCI(S) as a base. Group 1 patrolled the LST anchorage, Group 2 patrolled the MT anchorage, Group 3 patrolled the coaster anchorage and Group 4 patrolled the Sailing anchorage. A fifth group of eight LCVP was kept under the control of Senior Officer Assault Group on HMS Waveney. These were to be assigned to individual ships as the situation required.

The LCVP patrols were to patrol the anchorages if there was a risk of attack. If human torpedoes were known to be in the area then the patrol craft were to drop 5lb charges every ten minutes. The stand by flotilla of LCP(L) would augment the patrols as ordered by the Senior Officer Assault Group and would also drop 5 lb charges every ten minutes. All patrol craft were to carry a dim blue light for identification and were to return to the parent LCI(S) every thirty minutes for information and orders. Patrol craft did not carry wireless.
Assault Force ‘J’
Despatch Boats

As soon as possible a system of despatch boats was established and organized on strict timetables. There was a Cross Channel Despatch Service using Motor Launches. This ran regularly between Portsmouth and Naval Force Commander ‘G’ who then arranged for despatch boats to forward correspondence to Force ‘J’ and Force ‘S’ and collect correspondence for the UK.

In addition there was a regular despatch boat service from Naval Force Commander ‘J’ to Flag Officer Eastern Task Force on HMS Bulolo. This service used CMB 103, MTB 328 and MTB 344 departing from HMS Hilary at 0630, 0830, 1115, 1430, 1730 and 2030 hrs daily. It departed from HMS Bulolo at 0730, 0900, 1200, 1530, 1800 and 2130 hrs. This service was for urgent correspondence and Press messages. All copy from the Press correspondents and photographers was to be forwarded to the Force HQ ship marked ‘Press’ and ‘Urgent’ priority. Despatch boats were not to carry mail or passengers and were not to be diverted from their task.

There was also a despatch service operating within Force ‘J’ and providing a two hourly service to all important authorities ashore and afloat. This was operated by LCVP's.

Assault Force ‘J’
Workboats

LCVP were to be allocated as workboats as follows:

Workboats carried out all those routine tasks concerned with supply, administration, carrying personnel, carrying despatches and general run about.

Assault Force ‘J’
Gooseberry 4

Gooseberry 4 was the artificial breakwater off Juno and the sheltered water it provided. It was made by sinking elderly ships codename Corncob. The Corncob ships forming Gooseberry 4 were SS Bendoran, SS Empire Bunting, SS Empire Flamingo, SS Empire Moorhen, SS Empire Waterhen, SS Forbin, SS Formigny, SS Innerton, SS Manchester Spinner, SS Mariposa, SS Panos and SS Vera Radcliffe. The four ‘Empires’ were US ships completed too late for WWI and transferred to UK in WWII.

The Corncobs were to be sunk in two and a half fathoms or less at mid tide. That allowed the hulls of the ships to provide good protection for the beaches and small craft anchorage while leaving the superstructures above water and available for other uses.

The most important function was to provide a sheltered beach for landing craft. Second it was to provide a sheltered anchorage for small craft of the ferry service. In the anchorage there were to be buoys for mooring the various craft.
The Corncob ships arrived under their own steam and manned by some forty merchant seamen each. Each ship was provided with sufficient fuel for the journey from the Clyde to the Normandy beaches plus two extra days steaming as a reserve. They also carried two months stores. In addition to the crews there were a number of Royal Maritime Regiment, RA gunners to man the ships defensive weapons.

There were a number of Corncob convoys, only two of which included ships for Juno. **Convoy Cob 1** contained eight ships for Juno and **Convoy Cob 3** contained four ships. **Cob 1** was scheduled to arrive at 1400 hours on D+1 and was accompanied by two tugs, Empire Larch and Empire Jonathon, which would assist in positioning the Corncobs. The escorts for **Cob 1** returned to the Solent to rendezvous with **Cob 3** and escort it to the beach. Cob three was accompanied by two smaller tugs and the officer responsible for planting the Corncobs and code named ‘Planter’.

The final arrival of both convoys at the position selected for the breakwater was subject to the final approval of the Commander Eastern Task Force. The Naval Commander Force ‘J’ was to keep him informed and if there was a danger that the Corncobs might come under fire before they were positioned then their arrival was to be delayed. A Corncob sunk in the approaches would be very inconvenient.

Naval Officer in Charge was responsible overall for the erection of the Gooseberry and for routine matters concerning it.

Senior Officer Corncob had responsibility for the Channel crossing of Corncob convoys and their delivery to the correct beach. In case of doubt each Corncob ship carried a board with its number and the number of the Corncob for which it was intended. Senior Officer Corncob sent forward ships as they were required by ‘Planter’. Ships not immediately required were to be held out of everyone’s way. Senior Officer Corncob was also responsible for returning the crews of Corncobs once they had been handed over to ‘Planter’. Crews were returned on LST’s which were returning to the UK and crews were not to be allowed ashore.

‘Planter’ was responsible for calling Corncob ships as they were required for positioning and sinking. He was then responsible for positioning the Corncob with the assistance of tugs. Finally he was responsible for sinking the Corncob in the correct position. This was achieved by placing ten pound amatol demolition charges one each side of each hold and three foot below the water line. This meant that most ships had eight such charges while larger ships had ten. Hopefully the ship would settle slowly and on an even keel.

The Survey Officer Force ‘J’ on the staff of Naval Officer in Charge was attached to ‘Planter’ and was to assist him as required. He returned to the staff of Naval Officer in Charge when no longer required.

Ferry Craft had four trots each of seven buoys to take 72 LCM three abreast, and four trots each of five buoys to take 32 LBV two abreast. The positions for these moorings were to be surveyed and marked by LCP(Sy). The mooring buoys were laid out by Boom Defence vessels, which had lifting gear in the bows. They were experienced in such work, normally being used to lay and maintain anti submarine booms across harbour entrances.
Gooseberry 4 was completed at 1530 hours on D+3. ‘Planter’ and the tugs Empire Larch and Empire Jonathan returned to the UK. The two smaller tugs remained at the Gooseberry under the orders of Naval Officer in Charge.

One Corncob at each end of the Gooseberry was used as a Visual Signalling Station with a land line connection to the Port War Signal Station. These used flags and lamps to call in craft and coasters from the anchorages. Port War Signal Station and Headquarters Naval Officer in Charge were established close to the western entrance to Courseulles harbour.

It seems that the Germans were slow to realize the purpose of the Gooseberry. As late as 27 June they were reporting the presence of ships sunk, probably mined.

**Assault Force ‘J’ Survey**

After the initial assault one LCP(Sy) was transferred to Sword. The remainder carried surveying tasks on the Juno beaches. On the morning of D Day they examined the beaches in the Juno area in general. They were then to find the most suitable places for beaching LST’s at or near high water so they could discharge without drying out. They then reported to Naval Officer In Charge and Principal Beach Master.

It had been hoped that the LCP(Sy) would find areas of beach suitable for beaching LST’s at high water. Such sites would have a steeper slope than was usual on the Normandy beaches so that the LST could remain afloat and have its ramp either on dry land, which was unlikely, or in three foot of water. The only site found likely to be suitable was at the western end of MIKE, to the west of MIKE 2 exit.

In the afternoon of D Day they were to locate the off lying areas of rocky ledge and buoy the following.
- MIKE Channel. Between Roches de la Margueritte and Roches de la Valette.
- NAN Channel. Close to the west of Les Essarts de Langrune.
- Gooseberry Anchorage. To the south of the Gooseberry position.
- DUKW Channel. Across Les Essarts de Langrune where there is most water from NAN WHITE to the Coaster Anchorage.

Channels were to be two cables wide and two fathoms deep.

On the morning of D+1 they surveyed and marked positions for Gooseberry 4 as required by the officer responsible for planting the ships. He arrived with the Corncob tugs at 0500 hrs. They then surveyed and marked out positions for the Coaster Hauling Off Buoys. Two trots of buoys, parallel to the shore and as close to it as possible, were to be marked with 400 feet between buoys.

In the afternoon of D+1 they surveyed and marked the channel into Courseulles. It was hoped that the harbour could be used for unloading coasters and other craft.

In addition the LCP(Sy) were available to locate and mark dangerous wrecks which they could reach while remaining afloat (those aground were the Beach Groups responsibility). If necessary they assisted in marking beach obstructions which had not been cleared.

The LCP(Sy) remained responsible for the maintenance of all buoys, day and night, until the Naval Officer In Charge decided that they were no longer required.

In much of the work they were assisted by LCP(L) which carried buoys and other equipment so that the survey craft need not interrupt their work. A reserve of buoys was carried on headquarters ships and warships.
Air Sea Rescue

The RAF Air Sea Rescue organization was very active at this period. Most of the activity was on the flanks of the cross Channel sea routes since as far as possible aircraft avoided flying over shipping. Experience suggested that ships and craft were naturally nervous of any aircraft flying over them and were liable to open fire. It only needed one nervous gunner to fire and others would soon join in. Rescue in the swept channels was the task of US Coast Guard cutters.

From first light on D Day there were RAF high speed launches operating off the Normandy coast. Each of the three Fighter Direction Tenders off the beaches had two of these craft attached to them. Their task was to rescue aircrew of aircraft engaged in the many support missions including fighter cover, reconnaissance, spotting, fighter bombers and light bombers. These aircraft were tracked by the Fighter Direction Tenders and Headquarters Craft and the Fighter Direction Tender dispatched launches if required. Fighter pilots were ordered to bale out rather than ditch since a fighter approaching at low level would attract fire from the ground and from shipping. Larger aircraft were to ditch.

For the first three weeks the two RAF launches were relieved each day by fresh ones from Calshot on the Solent, the base of 32 Air Sea Rescue/Marine Craft Unit. There was no support organization on the far side at this time. From 26 June two high speed launches were stationed at each of the British Gooseberries. A small maintenance party was established on HMS Adventure, a repair ship at Arromanches.

From 7 July, 32 and 33 Air Sea Rescue units were attached to Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Air Forces and gradually moved to the Continent.

All the launches in the above two units were 68 foot British Power Boat craft, affectionately known as ‘Hants and Dorset’ because of a perceived similarity to busses operated by a company of that name. Their performance belied the nickname since they had a top speed of 28 knots.

Naval Force ‘J’

Shore Organization

Headquarters, Naval Officer in Charge - A/Capt Colin Douglas MAUD, DSO, DSC, RN

Some documents refer to this officer as Beach Area Naval Officer in Charge. On Landing Tables it is sometimes shortened to BAN. ONEAST documents refer to BAN/J. These are all the same person.

When Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group J3 handed over responsibility for the group he went ashore to take over the role of Naval Officer in Charge. He was to coordinate the work of the Beach Masters, be responsible for the naval units ashore, for unloading and act as the naval link to Beach Group, later Beach Sub Area, Headquarters. Naval Officer in Charge landed on NAN GREEN at 1150 hrs and his Advanced Headquarters was established near that of the Beach Sub Area Headquarters, just east of Courseulles, at 1330 hrs.

As the ferry organization arrived and developed the Naval Officer in Charge assumed responsibility for the Ferry Service. He has a Principal Ferry Control Officer and two Senior Officers Ferry Control to assist.

Each beach had a Royal Navy Beach Commando which was linked to an army Beach Group, the RN being responsible for a brigade landing beach below the high water mark and the army above it. Each Beach Commando had a Principal Beach Master who worked closely with the Beach Group Commander, a Deputy Principal Beach Master who was responsible for the day to day running of the
Beach Commando, and three Beach Masters, each responsible for a beach party and a section of the beach.

The beach organization built up slowly with the first personnel landing with the assault battalions. These were to carry out reconnaissance, identify the sites allocated to the Beach Masters and assess the suitability of the beaches. Force ‘J’ decided that Royal Navy Beach Parties were unnecessarily large and reduced them by one third for the assault. The remaining one third was kept on the LCH of the Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group and landed later. Beach Parties were carried on the LCH and Navigation Leaders MLs so that there would be separate parties in case of casualties.

An Advance Party landed with the reserve companies of the assault battalions at H+20. The first task was to dig in to the nearest suitable position and establish communications with the Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group and send him accurate situation reports.

The main party landed from the LCH soon after the reserve battalion. They landed with stores to set up beach signs and establish visual signal and wireless communication to seaward in order to guide in following craft. The Principal Beach Masters first task was to carry out a reconnaissance of the beach, fix his position and set up Beach limit signs in the correct positions. He then carried out a reconnaissance of the sector for which he was responsible and returned to the Advanced Beach Group Headquarters where he rendezvoused with the Beach Group Commander. As a result of his reconnaissance and discussions he might wish to alter the position of the Beach Limit Signs to avoid obstructions or include particularly suitable beach exits.

Royal Navy Beach Masters were responsible for activity up to the high tide mark. In effect this meant that they controlled naval activity including calling in landing craft to the beach using radio, signal lamps and loudhailers, unloading landing craft according to priorities, providing salvage parties to recover damaged landing craft, stores and equipment and providing fire fighting parties. Beach Masters were to carry out a survey of their beaches between high and low water and make a beach gradient chart. This was primarily in order to find suitable places where LST’s could beach at high water. LCP(Survey) were available to assist in this survey but Beach Masters were prepared to use simpler methods involving measuring and levelling poles.

Beach Parties were employed immediately on landing in erecting signs, marking potholes and quicksand and marking any beach obstacles. They were also available to assist the waves of landing craft in beaching and unloading. After the assault they were also engaged in helping to clear obstacles, to construct the NL Pontoon Piers and building landing craft hards.

Beach Signal Sections were an essential part of the NOICs command. These formed Beach Signal Units together with Beach Signal Section of the Royal Signals. One Beach Signal Unit was landed for each Brigade Front. They were to provide communications between the beach and the sea, between beaches and act as a link in the early stages as a link between the military inland and their headquarters afloat.

An Advanced Beach Signal Station was established on each battalion front. Half of it landed with the Beach Master and half with the Battalion Headquarters. The Advanced Beach Signal Stations should have been established ashore by H+30 minutes and two were. That on MIKE GREEN was open at 0823 hrs and that on NAN GREEN was open at 0831 hrs. NAN WHITE was slightly behind schedule opening at 0850 hrs and NAN RED was seriously delayed, not being open until 1004 hrs.

Later additional personnel landed to develop a Main Beach Signal Station on each brigade front. This established communications to seawards and between the beaches. It also acted as a link between the army ashore and the navy afloat. After the assault the Main Beach Signal Station manned the following wireless waves.
The Landing Wave maintained radio telephone communication with control craft etc. It was used for controlling the movement of craft off the beaches.

The Unloading Wave was used for radio telephone communication with control craft and parties boarding MT ships and coasters to carry out unloading. It was used for messages concerned with the discharge of cargoes. The MT Unloading Wave and the Stores Unloading Wave were for communication between the Senior Officer Ferry Control and the MT and Stores ships and coasters. The Principal Ferry Control Officer and the Senior Officer Ferry Base also manned both waves but Royal Marine signallers operated the sets on the Headquarters craft.

The Naval Beach Wave had links to Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group on his Headquarters Ship, Naval Officer in Charge on shore and to other Main Beach Signal Stations This was Simplex wave for Morse.

The VHF Lateral Wave was a duplex speech wave between Main Beach Signal Stations.

Later a BAN/J Special Wave was introduced. This used US SCR 610 VHF sets for officer to officer speech communication between Naval Officer in Charge, Principal Ferry Control Officer, Senior Officers Ferry Control, Principal Beach Masters and Senior Officer Ferry Base.

In addition there was the Common Landing Wave which controlled movements of all groups of Landing Craft arriving or departing after the initial assault when within five miles of the shore.

A VHF Link to RN Radar was provided by the RN Radar unit. A VHF Link to RAF Group Control Centre was provided by Naval Liaison Officer (Air) Signals Section.

The Naval Officer in Charge received lists of vessels and their loads by Morse, teleprinter or despatch boat from the UK. In the early stages this was simplified because the vessels and craft were preloaded and the landing tables already prepared. The Naval Officer in Charge coordinated the landing and unloading of vessels with the Principal Military Landing Officer at Headquarters Beach Sub Area. The detailed arrangements for landing and unloading were arranged by the RN Principal Beach Master and the Military Landing Officer at Beach Group level.

**Beach Commando**

Naval Officer in Charge, Juno initially had three Beach Commandos, ‘P’, ‘S’ and ‘U’. On 7 July ‘W’ Beach Commando, the only Canadian unit of this type, arrived to relief ‘P’ Commando which returned to the UK for rest and regrouping.

**'W' Beach Commando:**

- Principal Beach Master - Lt Cdr D. J. O'Hagan, GM & Bar, RCNVR
- Deputy Principal Beach Master - A/Lt Cdr R. J. Johnstone, RCNR
- Beach Master W1 - Lt D. M. Sutherland, RCNVR
- Beach Master W2 - Lt A. D. Rayburn, RCNVR
- Beach Master W3 - Lt F. Angus, RCNVR

A Principal Beach Master commanded a Beach Commando which as well as being trained in its duties on the beach had received some infantry training. The Principal Beach Master worked closely with the Military Landing Officer from the Beach Group and was usually based at the Beach Group headquarters, leaving the day to day operation of the Beach Commando to his Deputy Principal Beach Master. The small headquarters also had an Administration and Stores Officer and an ordinary seaman as orderly for the Principal Beach Master. The orderly was a messenger and bodyguard. Communications were provided by a RN Beach Signals Section.
Each Beach Commando had three Beach Parties consisting of a Beach Master, two Assistant Beach Masters, two Petty Officers, two leading seamen, six able bodied seamen and fourteen ordinary seamen.

The RN Beach Master was responsible for the management of his beaches. He assigned landing areas for different types of ferry craft, including army DUKW's and Rhinos. He informed the Control Craft by Landing Wave when incoming craft could be released and proceed to the beach. He assigned landing places to individual incoming craft. He guided individual craft to their correct landing point using flags, signal lamps and loud hailers.

Naval Beach Signs

For the guidance of incoming craft RN Commandos erected a variety of signs. Some of these were intended for the early stages when there could be considerable confusion. The centre of each beach was marked by a nine foot square the same colour as the beach (Green, White, Red). It had a six inch white border and had the sector letter in white. At night a light of the same colour of the beach flashing the sector letter in Morse was used.

The limits of all beaches were marked by a white rectangle twelve foot by four foot. These were placed horizontally on the left limit and vertically on the right. The limits of Red and Green beaches were marked with twelve foot by four foot of the appropriate colour displayed alongside the white rectangle and with the same orientation. At night the limits of the beach were marked by two lights the same colour as the beach placed eight feet apart. They were placed horizontally on the left and vertically on the right limit.
Transit beacons to guide craft were five foot sided equilateral triangles. These were placed one behind the other with the apex of the rear beacon apex down and the front beacon apex up. When the two were lined up the craft were on course for the correct beach. Where more than one transit was required, or numbered beaching berths were desired, each pair of beacons had a number painted in black, number one being on the right. At night fixed amber lights were used.

Beaching positions for individual craft or flotilla officers were indicated by a square yellow flag waved from side to side by a member of the Beach Masters team. At night a light flashing the letter ‘Q’ was used. Danger points on the beach were marked by a red flag. A red light was used at night.

All hazards on the beach were marked by the Beach Commandos wrecks, shoals or obstructions were marked with a buoy made of cross planks with a five foot wooden upright. The upright was painted in one foot green and white bands and flew a square green flag. At night a green light was shown. All landing craft were fitted with a buoy which automatically floated above a craft if it should sink. Survey teams working on shore displayed yellow poles with a yellow burgee.

Courseulles Harbour

The port of Courseulles had escaped damage from air and naval bombardment and had not been greatly damaged by the Germans. It was somewhat neglected and silted up as it had not been used for some time. The ancient lock gates, installed in 1874, were intact and in working order so the port was able to open for traffic on D+3. The first part to open was outside the lock gates where there were quays for mooring and unloading. This was tidal which was a minor inconvenience, and craft could not enter or leave for two hours either side of low water as it virtually dried out. This did not prevent the work of unloading and the outer harbour was found most suitable for LBV’s, LCM’s and other small craft.

After bulldozers and scrapers had worked on the entrance to the inner harbour it was able to accept small coasters, of less than ten foot draught, and berthing and unloading them became a regular practice. Coasters entered at or near high tide and then the lock gates were closed thus maintaining the water level in the inner harbour. This greatly assisted efficient unloading. Small Port Party 1502 B was based at Courseulles and carried out repair work inside and outside the lock. This unit had trained personnel, including divers.

The port as a whole was soon handling a thousand tons of stores a day. The limiting factor was the number of barges which could get in and out at high tide. Unloading of stores was carried out by a Port Operating Company with the assistance of RB 10 and RB 19 cranes.

The port was found a convenient way of loading casualties onto water ambulances for transfer to hospital carriers. This was done in the outer harbour at high tide when it was possible to transfer casualties when the water ambulances were near level with the quayside.

The port had a Naval Officer in Charge. He was generally referred to as the Harbour Master to avoid confusion with the Naval Officer in Charge Juno and because that was an accurate description. His function was as for the Beach Masters.
The task of 102 Beach Sub Area was ‘to maintain 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in the assault phase and then establish a Beach Maintenance Area for the maintenance of three or more divisions’. This task was seen as having three main phases, which would necessarily overlap.

The first phase was the assault during which personnel and vehicles of the Beach Sub Area would land and establish the beach organization. The second phase was the establishment of the Beach Maintenance Area and the maintenance of the assault division. The third phase would see the phasing in of a third Beach Group, No 4, and the opening up of new beaches. If all went according to plan the first phase would be from H Hour to H plus four hours, the second phase would extend to midnight on D Day.

The Beach Sub Area was commanded by Brigadier N. B. Branding. The Commander had a Staff to assist with the functions of the headquarters. This consisted of the Brigade Major, a General Staff Officer Grade III and in effect chief of staff. Brigade Major had an administrative staff of a Lance Corporal clerk RASC and a Private clerk/draughtsman for the production on sketch maps and overlays etc.

The Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General was responsible for personnel and supply matters and was assisted by a Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General. There were also a Staff Captain ‘A’ responsible for personnel matters and a Staff Captain ‘Q’ responsible for supply matters. The staff had nine clerks RASC including a Staff Quarter Master Sergeant, a Staff Sergeant, a Sergeant, a Corporal and five Privates.

Transport for the staff were a Car 4 seater 4 X 4 for the Brigadier and three Jeeps. In addition there are specialist officers attached to the staff. These are trained in the specialist operations of the Beach Sub Area.

Principal Military Landing Officers Team was trained in Movement Control and was responsible for the organization of the movement of personnel, vehicles and stores from the beaches to the dumps or assembly areas. It was commanded by a Principal Military Landing Officer assisted by a Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General (Movement). There were four Staff Captains, three for Shipping and Stores etc. and one to work with Senior Officer Ferry Craft (RN). There was also a RAF Movement Representative to advise on RAF matters.

Clerical support was provided by five clerks RE (Movement Control) including a Sergeant, a Corporal and three Privates. There was also a Motor Cycle Orderly. Transport included two jeeps and three motorcycles.

A Deputy Assistant Director of Supply and Transport was responsible for supply and transport. In effect this was RASC and therefor responsible for the supply of consumables, mainly fuel and supplies, and for transport, including DUKWs. There was one Private clerk RASC and a jeep.

An Assistant Director of Transportation and Deputy Assistant Director of Transportation were responsible for Transportation which was a Royal Engineer function concerned with rail and water transport. In this case the Inland Water Transport units. There were two clerks RE (Transportation), a Corporal and a Private and a jeep.

Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services was responsible for the supply of those items not the responsibility of the RASC, mainly ammunition but also clothing and equipment. He was assisted by an Ordnance Officer 4th Class and four clerks RAOC including a Sergeant, a Corporal and two Privates and six store-men RAOC. Transport was one jeep.
An Assistant Provost Marshall and a Deputy Assistant Provost Marshall were responsible for Provost duties in the Beach Sub Area, mainly traffic control. There were a Private clerk RASC and a motorcycle orderly. Transport was one jeep and a motorcycle.

A Deputy Assistant Director of Mechanical Engineering was responsible for REME matters, including the recovery, maintenance and repair of vehicles and signal equipment. There were a Corporal clerk REME and a Private clerk REME, plus a jeep.

An Assistant Director of Medical Services was responsible for medical services in the Beach Sub Area. There were a Corporal clerk RAMC and a Private clerk RAMC plus a jeep.

The Camp Commandant was responsible for the ‘housekeeping aspects’ of the headquarters. He found suitable accommodation for offices, messes etc., including catering and batmen. He was also responsible for the transport, drivers and maintenance. There was a pool of vehicles and drivers for administrative duties. Even though the various staff branches have assigned vehicles to ensure that they will be available and not diverted to other duties they remain the responsibility of the Camp Commandant who supplies drivers and maintenance. Key personnel were the Company Quartermaster Sergeant, the Motor Transport Corporal and the Corporal Clerk RASC. There were also a vehicle mechanic RASC, three cooks ACC, a store-man and two general duty-men.

The Camp Commandant was also responsible for the eighteen drivers RASC for the headquarters vehicles including those of the staff, twelve batmen for the officers of the staff and ten orderlies for the attached Headquarters Signals.

The Transport Pool included a 2 seater utility for the Camp Commandant, a 3 ton GS Lorry, a 15 cwt GS Truck, a 180 gallon water trailer, a lightweight motorcycle and a 350cc motorcycle.

According to the War Diary the Brigade Major and the Naval Officer in Charge landed on NAN GREEN at 1155 hrs and carried out a reconnaissance of the headquarters sites. The Commander 102 Beach Sub Area landed and established an Advanced Headquarters at grid ref: 975855 at 1230 hrs. Rear Headquarters was prepared by the defence platoon, from 8 Kings Regiment, at 1400 hrs at grid ref: 975849. Other personnel and equipment arrived and at 1700 hrs the Brigade Major opened Rear Headquarters. At 2100 hrs the Commander and two Liaison Officers were at the Advanced Headquarters and the remainder of the staff were at the Rear Headquarters. Note that in this case the normal arrangement was reversed with the Advanced Headquarters near the beach and the Rear Headquarters nearer the enemy.

The War Diary records little else apart from daily meetings and conferences until the 18th of June when Headquarters Beach Sub Area moved to 5 Rue de Bassin in Courseulles. This was convenient for the main road out of Courseulles, the lateral road along the beaches and the docks.

Telephone line communication was soon established within the Beach Sub Area and with neighbouring sub areas. Communications were also established with the UK. Until these were operating communications passed through the headquarters ship HMS Hilary. By the end of D Day two links were established ashore, one using a 30 watt set, believed to be a Canadian No 9, and a more powerful No 33 set. On D+3 a 100 watt VHF No 26 set was operating. All of these were providing communications back to Combined Headquarters at Portsmouth.

Wireless set Canadian No 9 was a good long range set when used by a skilled operator. In the cross Channel role it was used for Morse only. It was carried in a 15 cwt truck and could be set up quickly, only needing a wire aerial to be erected between two sectional poles.

Wireless set No 33 was a more powerful set and was capable of being used more flexibly. It was carried in a Bedford QLR Wireless House lorry which housed the No 33 transmitter, a Receiver 106, a generator and operators. In the fixed cross Channel communications role it was used with a wire
dipole aerial slung between forty eight foot sectional masts. An advantage was that the aerials could
be erected some distance from the vehicle so that the latter could be sheltered from the elements as
well as enemy observation. A second Receiver 106 was carried in cases and could be set up in the
headquarters it was serving. This needed separate aerials. The whole could be operated from a
remote location with the operator at the remote station using the second receiver and sending Morse
signals by wire to the vehicle for automatic transmission. An operator in the vehicle was required only
to supervise and maintain the equipment.

Wireless set No 26 was an altogether more sophisticated equipment. The Transmitter and Receiver
were carried in separate 3 ton 6 x 4 vehicles and powered by two trailer mounted generators. Large
rhomboid aerial arrays were used and these needed to be located some distance from the vehicles
and from each other. When operating the set could provide six separate two way speech channels, in
effect providing the equivalent of six telephone lines, which could be linked to exchanges on both
sides of the Channel. When fully operational an officer in Normandy could speak direct to an officer in
Portsmouth, and eventually London. A great advantage was that the aerials were directional so that
there was little or no chance of the conversation being intercepted by the enemy.

To mirror the naval system of despatch boats 102 Beach Sub Area established a regular system of
Despatch Riders within the area. These operated two circular routes which between them served all
sub unit headquarters, which in turn operated a service to their sub units. Each of the two routes took
one and half hours and left 102 Beach Sub Area Headquarters at 0330, 0730, 0930, 1030, 1230,
1430, 1630, 1830 and 2230 hrs. Route ‘A’ included the Petrol Dump, 8 Beach Group, 86 HAA
Operation Room and RE Dump. Route ‘B’ included Naval Officer in Charge, Div Rear HQ 3rd
Canadian Infantry Division, Flag Officer in Charge, 7 Beach Group and Headquarters 80 AA Brigade.

The Beach Groups

Beach Groups were formed from an infantry battalion with a minimum of changes so that it
could readily revert to its normal role, although most of the D Day battalions were disbanded
and used as reinforcements. The Battalion Headquarters became the Headquarters of the
Beach Group and controlled a variety of other units with specialist roles in the Beach Group area. The
companies of the battalion retained their normal infantry roles but were further trained to work in the
beach group areas.

Battalion Headquarters. 6 Officers and 42 other ranks. This was the normal headquarters of an
infantry battalion plus a Staff Captain and Camouflage Officer plus their small staffs. There was also a
Military Landing Officer and two Assistant Landing Officers making 3 Officers and 8 Other Ranks.

The Headquarters Company, including signals, had 3 Officers and 169 Other Ranks which provided
the various administrative services for the Beach Group. On occasion they were called on to assist on
beaches or in dumps.

Of the four Beach Companies, each of 5 Officers and 119 Other Ranks, two were trained to
manhandle stores from coasters to lorries, one was trained as working parties for the Ordnance Dump
and one was a reserve.

The Support Company gave up its specialist weapons, except for anti tank guns, and its various
carriers.

Company Headquarters of 1 Officer and 10 other ranks and the Mortar Platoon of 1 Officer and 29
Other Ranks (no vehicles or drivers) were held in reserve. The Carrier Platoon of 2 Officers and 38
Other Ranks (no vehicles or drivers) provided a working party for the supply dump. The Anti Tank
Platoon of 2 Officers and 32 Other Ranks (no vehicles or drivers) provided a working party for petrol
dump but had to be ready to man the anti tank guns. The Pioneer Platoon of 1 Officer and 17 other ranks (no vehicles or drivers) provided a working party for the petrol dump.

The Beach Battalion was responsible for providing working parties required on the beach or in the Beach Group Area, in emergencies providing men and weapons for the defence of the Beach Group Area, unloading all craft and coasters etc. and providing signal communication within the Beach Group.

102 Beach Sub Area had three Beach Groups although initially only two were deployed:
- 7 Beach Group on MIKE
- 8 Beach Group on NAN.
- 4 Beach Group was held in reserve, possibly to open NAN RED.

On D Day MIKE and NAN beaches were used for the assault but the greater part of the assault forces landed on NAN. This meant that NAN required more resources than MIKE and some reorganization was required. Later NAN would be used for the landing of stores which were taken to dumps further inland. Again this meant that 8 Beach Group required more labour and specialist units which were transferred from 7 Beach Group.

No 4 Beach Group landed and took over NAN GREEN on D+4. It was decided not to open NAN RED since it was not needed and the beach surface was poor.

**7 Beach Group - Lt Col F C Nottingham**

7 Beach Group was landed on MIKE Sector. The first personnel landed with the first assault waves.

MIKE Sector was to accept personnel and vehicles for the assault division plus 360 tons of stores landed by two LCT. These stores were to be transferred to two Beach Ammunition Dumps. The Commander of 7 Beach Group was also responsible for I Corps Assembly Area and a Casualty Evacuation Post. These were to be reconnoitred and established as soon as the situation allowed.

7 Beach Group was formed around 8 Kings Regiment. On MIKE it was to contain all of the 7 Beach Group units except that it transferred some units to 8 Beach Group for the operation of NAN GREEN. One company of 8 Kings Regiment, 242 Petrol Depot, 193 Detail Issuing Detachment and 14 Ordnance Beach Detachment were transferred. In addition one platoon of 8 Kings Regiment provided the defence for 102 Beach Sub Area Headquarters.

Some extra units came under the command of 7 Beach Group. Half of 30 Field Dressing Station and three quarters of 293 Pioneer Company were to operate the Casualty Evacuation Post. Staff were attached to operate the Corps Assembly Area.

The primary task of 7 Beach Group was the unloading of vehicles and guiding them on their way to the Assembly Area. The first tide saw units of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division landing under the command and control of the division but it was planned that MIKE Beach would receive six LST’s with four Rhino Ferries and 40 LCT’s to be handled by the Beach Group. These craft should have landed approx eight hundred vehicles. The second tide would see a further eleven LST’s with seven Rhino Ferries. These would carry a further six hundred and sixty vehicles. Of course unloading was badly behind schedule.
Some idea of the size and complexity of the Beach Group can be seen in the order of battle for D Day when the following were scheduled to land:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th Battalion, Kings Regiment, Headquarters and three companies. One Company was with 8 Beach Group on NAN: CO - Lt Col Humphrey 'A' Coy - 'B' Coy - Maj B.L O’Brien 'C' Coy - 'D' Coy - Maj M.J.H. Henley</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Captain's Increment and staff, Including Camouflage Officer and Principal Beach Master</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Beach Signal Section</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 Field Company, RE - Captain Grey</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Works Stores Section, RE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670 Artisan Works Company, RE - Recce</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>961 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, RE</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>966 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, RE</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1033 Port Operating Company, RE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>996 Port Operating Company, RE - Recce</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>998 Port Operating Company, RE - Recce</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1018 Port Operating Company, RE - Recce</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the personnel of the Port Operating Companies were on board the coasters which they were discharging and so although present are not shown as having landed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE. Coles Crane .To work with the Port Operating Companies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Field Dressing Station, RAMC</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Field Dressing Station, RAMC</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Field Dressing Station, RAMC</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Field Surgical Unit, RAMC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Field Surgical Unit, RAMC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Field Transfusion Unit, RAMC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Field Hygiene Section, RAMC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Beach Recovery Section</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242 Provost Company</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103 RAF Beach Flight - S/Ldr R.A. Sandison</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This was the plan which was prepared well in advance using maps, air photographs and any of her intelligence to hand. It was subject to change if the reconnaissance parties from the various units found the assigned areas unsuitable for their task. In the event only the RAF Assembly Area had to be relocated as the enemy were still occupying part of it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51 RAF Balloon Unit</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297 GT Company, RASC</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Army Tipper Company RASC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>633 GT Company, RASC</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282 GT Company, RASC - Major M.A. Holmes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290 Corps Composite Company, RASC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115 Pioneer Company - Major C. E. V. K. Peberdy, D.S.O., M.C.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293 Pioneer Company - Major J. Tulip</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243 Pioneer Company - Major H. Ball</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267 Pioneer Company - Major D. Gruar</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190 Pioneer Company - Major J. C. Scott</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 Transit Camp</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A' Echelon Movement Control Group</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 (triangular flag). 7 Beach Group Advanced Headquarters

7 (square flag). 7 Beach Group Main Headquarters

Drowned Vehicle Park (Wheeled)

Drowned Vehicle Park (Tracked)

REME Headquarters and bivouac area

Beach Dressing Station

Casualty Evacuation Post

Walking Wounded Collection Point

Transport Park

Mechanical Equipment Park

Beach Ordnance Dump

Ammunition Dump

RE Stores Dump

Docks Op. Docks Operating Company bivouac area

Landing Craft Recovery Unit, RN

RN Headquarters and bivouac area
The layout was logical and conformed to the ideal staff plan, except that MIKE would not have stores dumps. Each beach exit had a route running from it to the lateral road and then further forward. These were one way forward routes, at least until and unless they were widened and developed for two way traffic under a later plan. There was a Drowned Vehicle Park next to each Beach Exit.

Immediately behind the beach were the small detachments concerned with its operation, and the small dumps for use on D Day. Here were the Ordnance Dump, the Ammunition Dump, the RE Dump and RE Equipment Centre. Medical units included the Beach Dressing Station and Casualty Evacuation Post. The Beach Group Advanced Headquarters, the RN Beach Headquarters, REME Headquarters and park and the Mechanical Equipment Park.

Inland were the Assembly Areas, separate areas for personnel, wheeled vehicles and tracked vehicles, with separate routes leading to them. Here also were the MT Park, Beach Group Main Headquarters and the Field Dressing Station. Areas were set aside for the bivouac areas for the three Beach Companies.

Near the harbour at Courseulles were the Transportation Stores Dump and the Dock Operating Company bivouac area.

All of these units are described more fully below.

The first Beach Group personnel to land were the reconnaissance parties that landed with the assault troops at H+20 minutes. 7 Beach Group, 8 Kings Regiment, landed a party from ‘A’ Company on MIKE GREEN and from ‘B’ on MIKE RED. Both landed with companies of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles.

Each party was identical and consisted of seven men from a Beach Group company, a six man reconnaissance party from Field Company RE, four men from Beach Signals, two men from RN Beach Party (Assistant Beach Master) and three men from RN Beach Signals. These parties located the sites allocated them in the First Key Plan. If they were suitable and free of the enemy, then they set up an advanced headquarters which would gradually be added to as more personnel landed with subsequent waves. A separate party of seven men from the beach companies plus one man from Battalion Headquarters landed at H+20 minutes. All of the above parties landed under fire and the Officer Commanding ‘B’ Company, Maj B.L. O’Brien, was wounded as well as his 2 i/c Capt B.T. Richards. CSM Billaborrow took command until relieved later by Lt Vickers.

Personnel from the Beach Group companies were also scheduled to land with the LCT(A) and LCT(HE) which carried the Centaurs of Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment. 18 men were to land with each troop. Since not all the craft of this group arrived on time, and some not at all, it is not clear when or if the Beach Group personnel landed.

At H+90 a patrol from ‘A’ Company was sent to clear snipers who were enfilading the right flank. This problem was to continue for much of the day.

Subsequently 7 Beach Group landed personnel more or less on schedule as follows. Each company landed eight men and a handcart from LCT4 and sixteen men from LCI(L) at H+75 minutes. At H+105 minutes the following landed from LCT4’s for Battalion Headquarters, the Intelligence Officer’s party of four men in a Loyd Carrier, eleven men and two jeeps from the Pioneer Platoon to prepare the Headquarters and four men including the Beach Group Commander in a Loyd Carrier plus one man with No 46 set from Signal Platoon to carry out a reconnaissance. Loyd Carriers were specified for the Beach Groups but some or all may have been replaced by Weasels.

The following also landed from LCI(L):
- 19 men from ‘A’ Company
- 19 men from ‘B’ Company
- Medical Officer’s party for 2 Field Dressing Station
At H+135 minutes a further five men from Headquarters and three men from the Signal Platoon landed to set up a Beach Group Headquarters ashore on MIKE GREEN beach about midday. Later in the day it moved to a crossroads near La Valette.

During the afternoon a platoon from 8 Kings Regiment was sent to deal with enemy positions which were firing on, and interfering with the work of the beach from somewhere on the right flank near Vaux and the nearby Chateau. The patrol was fired on with mortars and machine guns but could not locate the positions. It moved along to the hamlet of Le Buison, near the boundary with 50 Division, and met a party of 2 Hertfordshire Regiment from that Division. The enemy seemed to be present in some strength and the platoon withdrew.

8 Beach Group - Lt Col R H Smith

8 Beach Group was landed on NAN Sector. As on MIKE the first personnel landed with the first assault waves but since there were three beaches in operation there were three parties each of three NCOs and fifteen other ranks to carry out a reconnaissance to find safe lanes across the beaches.

NAN Sector was to initially accept personnel and vehicles for the assault division plus 360 tons of stores landed by two LCT. These stores were to be transferred to the Beach Ammunition Dumps. The Commander of 7 Beach Group was also responsible for the reconnaissance of the Dump Areas in conjunction with the heads of services. He was then responsible for the layout of the dumps and for a small Assembly Area for any vehicles and personnel that might land on NAN.

8 Beach Group was formed around 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment and received the following in addition to its own integral units. One company of 8 Kings Regiment, 242 Petrol Depot, 193 Detail Issuing Detachment and 14 Ordnance Beach Detachment were transferred from 7 Beach Group. In addition I Corps provided 144 Pioneer Company, 255 Pioneer Company and 1013 Port Operating Company.

On the first four tides NAN was to receive large numbers of vehicles. On the first tide six LST's with four Rhino Ferries would carry 360 vehicles while seventy LCT's would carry a further 770. On the second tide ten LST's arrived with 630 vehicles. On the third tide nine LST's, two Motor Transport Ships and two Motor Transport Coasters brought a total of 639 vehicles. The fourth tide brought a further two Motor Transport Ships and four Motor Transport Coasters with 306 vehicles. These vehicles passed through the ‘Knee’ Assembly Area which was then retained in case further vehicles should land on NAN although vehicles should now all pass through MIKE beaches.

8 Beach Group was to be responsible for the Dump Area until it was taken over by 102 Beach Sub Area. Apart from the preloaded LCT's it was planned that the following would arrive. Four coasters carried 1800 tons of stores of which 420 tons were priority stores to be unloaded on D Day. Nine preloaded LBV were to arrive on NAN RED carrying 453 tons of stores.

Since 8 Beach Group would be handling stores, which required a considerable amount of manpower with the assistance of some machinery, while 7 Beach Group would be handling vehicles which were self unloading, resources were gradually transferred to the former from the latter. In addition 4 Beach Group was assigned to assist unloading on NAN when it arrived on D+4.

There was a provisional plan to divert part of Force ‘S’ to Juno, if Sword proved to be unsuitable or dangerous. In that case 6 Beach Group take over OBOE and NAN RED for the unloading of coasters and LBV. The stores unloaded would form a temporary maintenance area on the boundaries of Sword and Juno. In this case the reserve 4 Beach Group would be assigned to 101 Beach Sub Area on Sword.

Initially ‘A’ Company Royal Berkshire Regiment was assigned to NAN GREEN, ‘B’ Company to NAN WHITE and ‘C’ Company to NAN RED. ‘D’ Company together with ‘C’ Company 5 Kings Regiment
organized the dump areas. The Support Company worked in the petrol dump and the Carrier Platoon in the Detail Issue Depot.

On D+4, 4 Beach Group moved to NAN GREEN to relieve ‘A’ Company Royal Berkshire Regiment which then moved to NAN WHITE. ‘C’ Company also moved to NAN WHITE since it was decided not to develop NAN RED. This simplified matters since now the whole of 8 Beach Group was working on NAN WHITE, 7 Beach Group was working on MIKE & 4 Beach Group was working on NAN GREEN.

**Field Engineers**
(as opposed to Transportation)

There was always plenty of work for engineers and their associated pioneer companies. When 102 Beach Sub Area assumed control the work of developing and improving beach exits and roads continued, as did mine clearance and obstacle clearance. Much has been written about the Mulberry Harbour but turning a strip of beach into a major port must rank as at least an equal achievement.

Eventually CRE 102 Beach Sub Area found that he controlled some thirty units of various sizes. Headquarters CRE.
- Ten Field Companies
- Two Mechanical Equipment Sections plus detachments from four others
- Two Stores Sections
- One Works Section
- Two Artisan Works Companies
- One Workshop and Park Company
- One Bomb Disposal Section
- Eight Pioneer Companies
- One Tipper Company, RASC
- One Corps Composite Company

**MIKE BEACH**

On D Day MIKE Beach landed the following to work with 7 Beach Group:
- 85 Field Company, RE
- a detachment of 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE
- 19 Field Store Section, RE
- 190 Pioneer Company - Major J. C. Scott

These units remained under the command of 7 Beach Group until the Commander Royal Engineers landed and took over command of engineer units at about H+7 hours.

19 Field Stores Section was responsible for the layout and operation of the RE Beach Dump at grid ref 959856. It received and issued all the RE Stores which landed after the main body about H+180. During the day this amounted to some 150 tons with 60 tons landing in 3 ton lorries, 36 tons being landed from beached LCT’s and 49 tons being landed by preloaded DUKW’s. A further 70 tons was available on coasters but unloading was slow. The layout of the dump included sufficient space for the stacking and re issue of 200 tons a day of airfield construction stores. These would pass through from D+2 to D+6 when a new RE Dump would be available. 190 Pioneer Company provided labour as required.

85 Field Company, RE with the detachment of 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE and 190 Pioneer Company under command, had a considerable list of tasks pre assigned for D Day. These included mine clearance, developing beach exits, clearing beach obstacles and constructing beach roadways.
59 Mechanical Equipment Section landed six crawler tractors (bulldozers) including one Class II armoured, three Class II unarmoured, one Class III armoured and one Class III unarmoured. Each of the tractors towed a Jahn trailer with trackway stores. Later in the day two tippers and two dumpers were also landed. These were to be used as ordered by 85 Field Company, RE

Detailed tasks included:

- **Mine clearance**, marking safe areas and marking mine fields. This was carried out on lanes from the waters edge to the beach exits, along the beach lateral above high water and on the verges of exit routes from the beach to the main coast lateral. Mine clearance was also carried out in the areas allocated to the RE Beach Dump, the Beach Ammunition Dump, the Transit Areas, the Drowned Vehicle Park and the beach minefields. The Sherman Flails of the Breaching Teams were available to assist in mine clearance after they had completed their Phase I tasks and until they were required to move inland.

- **Beach exits.** As a priority two wheeled exits were developed at gird ref 949863 and 962858 and a tracked exit developed at grid ref 955860. Lower priorities were a further wheeled exit at grid ref 965860 and a beach entrance at 955861 to include a new road over marshy ground.

- **Obstacle clearance.** As the tide receded work continued to complete the clearance of beach obstacles from the beaches to be used for beaching Rhinos, LCT's and eventually LST's.

- **Beach roadways.** A 20 foot wide beach lateral of Sommerfeld track laid on hessian was constructed across the beach above the high water mark. Pierced Steel Planking was laid over high traffic areas, especially where tracked vehicles would cross the track. A reconnaissance was carried out as the tide fell and any soft areas on the beach and any runnels etc had Pierced Steel Planking laid over them.

190 Pioneer Company assisted in all the above as required.

An additional task for 85 Field Company, RE was the establishment of a water point to deliver 20,000 gallons a day by the evening of D Day.

On D+1, 670 Artisan Works Company arrived to join 7 Beach Group. The Beach Group engineers continued with their previous tasks until they were completed and started to construct a road over the marsh from the coast lateral at grid ref: 955858 to the beach at grid ref 955861 and made a new beach exit. They also improved the route into Courseulles over the swing bridge and made a new beach exit at grid ref 965860. Any remaining resources were devoted to road maintenance in the Assembly Areas.

MIKE was to be developed for personnel and vehicles. On D+4 a NL Pontoon Causeway was constructed in the centre of MIKE RED. This work only took two days and was carried out by 582 Field Company, RE. It was not constructed immediately as the maximum amount of beaching space was required for the landing of vehicles from beached LST's and from coasters by Rhino Ferry. When it was operational vehicles could disembark their load of vehicles onto the NL Pontoon Causeway from where they were driven straight up the beach, over a bridge over the River Seulles and then along a concrete road to the de waterproofing point near Graye sur Mer. The Causeway was also the only way in which personnel could be landed dry-shod, but LCI(L) found it difficult to use because of the cross current.

There had been a bridge over the Seulles but this was not sufficiently strong to carry tracked vehicles. A new bridge had to be built. Bailey bridge equipment was in demand for use in forward areas and there was a lack of timber and RSJ's so initiative and engineer ingenuity was used. A precast, reinforced concrete bridge was designed and built by 85 Field Company, RE. The main joists were built on the side of the river and then rolled out into position. This was a standard means of launching
beams without heavy cranes. A reinforced concrete road was then built on top of the beams. The work of building the bridge and approaches was helped by the fact that two large mechanically driven concrete mixers had been left by the Germans, who had been using them in the construction of shore defences. The mixers and a considerable amount of aggregate and sand were a mile to the west of the bridging point so the concrete was mixed on the German site and rushed to the bridge site by tippers. If the road was kept clear the journey took ten minutes and the concrete could be readily poured. The whole construction took some five weeks to build.

In the meantime two other exits were used. One exit was nearer to Courseulles and led onto the concrete lateral road behind the dunes that had been built by the Germans. The other exit was the original main exit some two hundred yards to the west. The bridge, which was formed over a ditched AVRE and improved with fascines and logs, was further improved by concreting it over.

On D+3 it was reported that some sections of MIKE Beach were suffering from craft using their engines when aground. This was understandable since craft were beaching on a rising tide and needed to move forward as the tide rose. The craft were also reluctant to use their kedge anchors to hold the craft in position and to assist with retracting from the beach since this involved considerable effort on the shallow sloping beaches and there was always the danger of getting the cable round a propeller. They preferred to use their engines. The pot holes that the use of engines caused needed to be filled. The simplest way of doing this was to rest the beach and allow the tide to fill in the potholes.

LOVE Beach was cleared with a view to developing it for unloading and on D+5 MIKE Beach was closed due to the potholes and LOVE Beach replaced it temporarily with five exits working. On D+6 MIKE RED was back in use with four exits but with bulldozers levelling the potholes since the tide had not done so.

**NAN BEACH**

On D Day NAN Beach landed the following to work with 8 Beach Group:

- 184 Field Company, RE
- 59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE (less the detachment on MIKE)
- 20 Field Store Section, RE
- 170 Pioneer Company - Major E. L. Boyd

These units remained under the command of 8 Beach Group until the Commander Royal Engineers landed and took over command of engineer units at about H+7 hours. Because NAN handled stores and initially covered a larger beach area it had the following additional resources, 72 Field Company, RE, a detachment of 240 Field Company, RE a detachment of tippers from 290 Corps Troops Company, RASC and two park sections of 176 Workshop and Park Company, RE.

When Commander RE 102 Beach Sub Area landed, about H+7 hours, 72 Field Company, RE and 58 Pioneer Company came under his command. 72 Field Company, RE was to be employed on road clearance work. The detachment of 240 Field Company, RE remained with 8 Beach Group until it was required by CRE I Corps for work forward.

59 Mechanical Equipment Section, RE landed eight crawler tractors including two Class I, one Class II armoured, three Class II unarmoured, one Class III armoured and one Class III unarmoured. Each of the tractors towed a Jahn trailer with trackway stores. Later in the day two tippers, two dumpers and two RB 10 excavators with draglines attached were also landed. Later a reserve of two crawler tractor Class IV and two Jahn trailers were landed. These were to be used as ordered by 184 Field Company, RE.
Detailed tasks included:

- **Mine clearance**, marking safe areas and marking mine fields. This was carried out on lanes from the waters edge to the beach exits, along the beach lateral above high water or over the groynes found in some areas, on the verges of exit routes from the beach to the main coast lateral and on the railway line from Courceulles Station to grid ref: 995855. Mine clearance was also carried out in the areas allocated to the RE Beach Dump, the Beach Ammunition Dump, the Transit Areas, the Drowned Vehicle Park and the beach minefields. The Sherman Flails of the Breaching Teams were available to assist in mine clearance after they had completed their Phase I tasks and until they were required to move inland.

- **Beach exits.** As a priority three wheeled exits were developed at grid ref: 975856, 993855 and 009852 and three tracked exits developed at grid ref: 874856, 992855 and 006853. Lower priorities were a further wheeled exit at grid ref: 995855 and a beach entrance at 977855 to include a new road over marshes from road at 977852 to the beach at 977855. On D+5 NAN GREEN and NAN WHITE each had two exits working and on D+6 NAN GREEN had three exits and NAN WHITE had two.

- **Obstacle clearance.** As the tide receded work continued to complete the clearance of beach obstacles from the beaches.

- **Beach roadways.** A 20 foot wide beach lateral of Sommerfeld track laid on hessian was constructed across the beach above the high water mark.

The main link between Bernieres and Courceulles was the beach lateral running some distance inland. It had been planned to take up the railway line along the coast and lay a road over the rail bed. Engineers had been trained in the rapid removal of the rails. Reconnaissance and survey showed that the foundations were soft sand and not suitable for a road which would inevitably have heavy use. Make the line into an acceptable road would require more work than was thought to be worthwhile. The lateral road was improved by rounding off corners to allow passage for DUKW’s. The beach lateral of Sommerfeld track built well above the high water mark proved to be adequate.

A reconnaissance was carried out as the tide fell and any soft areas on the beach and any runnels etc had Pierced Steel Planking laid over them.

170 Pioneer Company assisted in all the above as required.

20 Field Stores Section was responsible for the layout and operation of the RE Beach Dump at grid ref 992854. It received and issued all the RE Stores which landed after the main body about H+180. During the day this amounted to some 200 tons including 166 tons on 3 ton lorries, 36 tons on LCT’s and 74 tons on DUKW’s. 20 Field Stores Section was also to arrange for personnel to supervise the unloading of bridging material from craft after D Day to ensure that stores were not damaged by careless handling and that small components were included with larger items despatched to the Main RE Dump. 170 Pioneer Company provided labour as required.

184 Field Company, RE was responsible for providing a water point to provide 20,000 gallons a day in the Beach Maintenance Area

Headquarters 176 Workshop and Park Company, RE (Major C. T Wade, RE) was responsible for the control of all RE stores and for the final layout of the Main RE Dump. It was assisted by its two park sections and by 240 Field Company, RE until it was required elsewhere and by personnel from 58 and 66 Pioneer Companies, which were also employed on making temporary tracks in the Beach Maintenance Area.
On D+1 204 Works Section, 66 Pioneer Company, a detachment of 48 Bomb Disposal Section and two sections from 26 Army Tipper Company landed. Priority tasks on D+1 were to work on the road across the marshes, maintain forward routes in the Beach Maintenance Area, maintain the beach exits and to develop NAN RED. Survey revealed that NAN RED suffered from runnels and uneven surfaces. Since Sword Beach seemed secure and NAN WHITE promised to be able to handle all stores NAN RED was not in fact developed.

On D+2, 710 Artisan Works Company and 257 Pioneer Company landed and were to develop the Beach Maintenance Area westwards.

On D+3 the NL Pontoon sections which had been towed behind coasters were used to construct a 700 foot causeway at the west end of NAN GREEN, near the harbour entrance.

Nan was to be developed as the commodity beach. Behind the beach were the dumps and DUKW's worked from ships to the dumps. Initially NAN WHITE was developed. The beach here was good and the exit was quickly put into a useable state and then developed as resources allowed. By D+1 it was an excellent exit and there was felt to be no need to develop NAN RED.

184 Field Company, RE was a Beach Group unit which was responsible for much of the work, having other units placed under command as required. An engineer beach dump was established in the field behind the railway station. The Mechanical Equipment Section was nearby and 184 Field Company, RE in a small field east of Bernieres.

Eventually the main beach exit was developed on NAN WHITE. At first this looked unpromising as it had to cross marshes just inland. However it did provide a direct route inland and was developed by 213 Field Company, RE in two weeks. This was a good road and carried DUKW convoys for as long as the beach operated. The DUKW transhipment point was built at the top of the hill on this road. Here DUKWs unloaded stores onto platforms and GS lorries collected the stores for delivery to the dumps. There was then little need to use the lateral road.

I Corps Engineers

I Corps Engineers did not normally operate in the Beach Sub Area but did assume responsibility for the main lateral road which ran along the southern edge of the area and linked all the dumps as well as giving access to them from forward units. This road ran from Creully to Tailleville and then on to Colleville behind Sword Beach. It also linked to Bayeaux to the west and to Caen in the east. This road would be needed for beach maintenance traffic, Corps administrative traffic and for Corps operational traffic. Inspection revealed that it would soon break up under this weight of traffic and I Corps Engineer carried out work to improve it.

Two tracks with a total length of twenty two miles were constructed alongside the existing road, each to take one way traffic. Twelve miles of the track was of single width Sommerfeld track laid on a graded foundation across fields. Bulldozers, a single grader, two rollers and a lot of Pioneer manpower were used. Much of the track was tarred over using captured enemy stocks.

Since tanks were destructive of tracks they used a separate track either side of the laid track.
Port Operating Groups, RE

No 2 Port Operating Group, RE

The first personnel of Headquarters No 2 Port Operating Group, RE landed on MIKE on D+2 when
four officers, 18 other ranks and three vehicles arrived. They were to take over control of all Port
Operating Companies, RE on MIKE Sector, most of which had already arrived. The remainder of the
Headquarters landed later.

The Port Operating Companies, RE of No 2 Port Operating Group, RE were trained in unloading
vehicles from Motor Transport Ships and Motor Transport Coasters. Most of the personnel would
arrive with the ships and coasters that they were to unload.

- 996 Port Operating Company, RE
- 998 Port Operating Company, RE
- 1018 Port Operating Company, RE
- 1057 Port Operating Company, RE

All four of these companies were identical in role and composition. They also had identical instructions
for landing apart from some variation in times.

Each company landed one officer, three other ranks and one vehicle as a reconnaissance party on the
second tide. Each then landed a party of one Officer, twenty Other Ranks and three vehicles to
prepare the bivouac areas for the 318 personnel to arrive on ships and coasters. The only significant
variation was that 1057 Port Operating Company, RE would land reconnaissance and preparation
parties on D+2 and the remaining personnel would arrive on MT ships and coasters from D+2
onwards.

995 Port Maintenance Company, RE landed five officers, 79 Other Ranks and five vehicles on D+1 to
man the Beach Gear Section and to maintain equipment. A further Officer and 36 Other Ranks landed
on D+2.

11 Port Operating Group, RE - Lt Col G W Bayley

An advanced party from Headquarters 11 Port Operating Group, RE landed NAN. Three Officers and
seven Other Ranks remained on NAN while one Officer and three Other Ranks proceeded to MIKE.
On arrival at Beach group Headquarters they were responsible for the co ordination and control of
transportation units in their sector. On the second tide a further party of five officers and eleven other
ranks with two vehicles landed to establish a Transportation Headquarters at Headquarters 102 Beach
Sub Area.

Port Operating Companies were responsible for the actual unloading of coasters and ships. On NAN
they were trained in the unloading of stores while on MIKE they were trained in the unloading of
vehicles. NAN was allocated three and a half companies for unloading plus part of a 1051 Company,
RE most of which operated cranes.

1033 Port Operating Company, RE

One officer and three other ranks landed on MIKE about H+4 hours and then proceeded to NAN to
carry out a reconnaissance of the bivouac area. (They must have passed the party from group
headquarters going the other way!). On the second tide a party of one officer, seventeen other ranks
and seven vehicles landed to prepare the bivouac area for the rest of the company. A final
administrative party of ten other ranks and three vehicles landed on the third tide. The actual working
personnel arrived on the store coasters which they would unload. Eight gangs with a total of three
officers and 154 other ranks arrived on D+1 and unloaded their coasters before going ashore. The remaining three officers and 153 Other Ranks landed from personnel ships, initially to act as reliefs and then the company operated a duty rota system to maintain 24 hour working.

1034 Port Operating Company, RE

The advanced parties landed as for 1033 Company, RE except that they all landed on NAN. Thirteen gangs with a total of four officers and 251 other ranks arrived on coasters on the second tide. Three gangs with one officer and 57 other ranks landed by LCI(L).

1013 Port Operating Company, RE

This company arrived later with the advanced party of one officer and five other ranks landing on the second tide to prepare the bivouac and one officer, nine other ranks and three vehicles landing on the third tide. The remainder of the administrative personnel and vehicles landed from D+2 onwards. Sixteen gangs with five officers and 308 Other Ranks arrived on coasters on D+2.

1055 Port Operating Company, RE

Only half of this company was allocated to NAN. One officer, fifteen other ranks and one vehicle landed on the third tide. Three gangs with one officer and 58 other ranks arrived with coasters on D+1. Two gangs with 38 other ranks arrived on coasters on D+2. Three gangs with one officer and 58 other ranks landed from personnel ships on D+1.

1051 Port Maintenance Company, RE

Five officers and 76 other ranks with four vehicles landed on D+1 to man the Beach Gear Store and carry out maintenance work on cranes. One officer and 51 other ranks followed on D+2.

37 Port Ammunition Detachment, RAOC was responsible for supervising the unloading of ammunition and two men were present on each coaster carrying ammunition. One officer and 15 other ranks arrived on D Day and D+1.

When the shore organization was established the company organization was four sections of four sub sections or working gangs. Each gang was organized to work a hold and consisted of fourteen men, an NCO hatch-man, a checker, two winch drivers, six men in the hold and four men on the craft or shore. Army stevedores were trained to unload vessels by manhandling cargo into cargo nets or onto pallets in the ships holds. The nets were then hoisted using the ships own derricks, booms and winches. In some cases, especially when unloading into DUKW's, the cargo net was placed directly into an RASC vehicle. More usually cargo was loaded into vehicles by hand.

Vehicles going into Europe were mostly fitted with flanged hubs to make the unloading of vehicles simpler and quicker. A rope loop was placed round each hub flange (6 X 4 vehicles only used four) and the vehicle was then lifted by ships winch. The alternative was to use nets which were fitted under the wheels but this meant pushing the vehicle onto the nets while in the ships hold and then pushing it off them again when it was on the craft. Motor

Some Stores Coasters were beached for unloading, MT coasters were not. Stores coasters were beached as the tide went out and could then be unloaded directly into lorries. This proved an extremely valuable means of rapidly unloading stores. Interestingly although most sources say the decision to beach coasters was an innovation made necessary by delays in unloading with craft in 1943 beaching was seen as the standard way of unloading coasters.
Port Operating Companies, RE were provided with No 46 wireless sets so that progress could be reported and the efficient use of craft organized. There was also a pool of fourteen No 38 sets and five No 18 sets held by each Beach Group for issue to Port Operating Companies as required.

The system worked well in general with one serious lapse on D+3. Convoy ETM5 arrived at 0805 hours and at 1230 hours the Principal Ferry Control Officer reported that some of the MT coasters were without Dock Operating personnel and could not be unloaded. Parties of seamen were provided as an emergency measure but there was a serious loss of unloading time and the schedule was already behind. It seems there was a lack of liaison and the Commander Port Operating group was unaware that personnel were required and had assigned them to other tasks.

**Inland Water Transport Companies, RE**

961 and 966 Inland Water Transport Companies, RE plus part of 946 Inland Water Transport Company, RE operated Rhino ferries with the assistance of 243 and 207 Pioneer Companies. 972 Inland Water Transport Light Aid Workshop, REME provided maintenance and repair.

The slope of the Normandy beaches was too shallow for normal beaching and it was intended that LST's would unload using Rhino Ferries. This proved to be too slow and as described above it was soon found that LST's could be beached, dried out and unloaded without Rhinos, which were then used to unload MT coasters and ships. Rhino ferries were 175 foot long, 43 foot wide and 5 foot deep, with a ramp at the bow. They were powered by two 160 horse power outboard motors and there was a separate tug of similar construction with a further two 160 horse power outboard motors. The ferry could unload and retract itself on a falling tide. When used to unload MT coasters and ships only one round trip per shift could be made, the controlling factor being the slowness of hoisting vehicles from the ship to the ferry.

Most of the personnel arrived on the LST's which towed their Rhino ferries but on the first tide of D Day two advanced parties landed to carry out a reconnaissance and prepare bivouac areas. MIKE and NAN beaches each landed 38 personnel and two vehicles from the Inland Water Transport Companies plus 16 men from the Pioneer Company. Both bivouac areas were to be just on the NAN side of the boundary between MIKE and NAN.

The following were also to be found bivouacs near the boundary between MIKE and NAN. On the second tide MIKE received 188 personnel and 4 vehicles from Inland Water Transport Company, RE and 108 personnel from the Pioneer Company. NAN received 178 personnel and 5 vehicles from Inland Water Transport Company, RE and 93 personnel from the Pioneer Company. On D+1, 54 personnel with 7 vehicles from a Port Construction and Repair Company, RE arrived and were accommodated near the boundary of MIKE and NAN.

Each Rhino Ferry carried a Caterpillar D8 Angle-dozer to make a level sand ramp for the vehicles to use after leaving the Rhino. They could also be used to help in manoeuvring and anchoring the Rhino since they were equipped with a heavy duty winch. The D8's were operated by 42 Mechanical Equipment (Transportation) Section which also landed 17 personnel with 11 vehicles later.

**966 Inland Water Transport Company, RE**

966 Inland Water Transport Company, RE was the company initially operating Rhino ferries on MIKE while 961 operated on NAN. After D Day they worked together under 102 Beach Sub Area and worked more flexibly and eventually 966 Company, RE took over all the Rhinos remaining on Juno. The following from the War Diary of 966 gives an idea of the workings of the Rhino units.

The Company did not receive its last two Rhino Ferries until the 31st May, five days before the planned D Day, four days before they were scheduled to set sail. This did not allow much time for
preparation. Personnel had at least trained on other craft. Even then the company was still short of six Rhino tugs.

The Company embarked on LST’s on June 4th. The Rhinos and tugs were moored alongside the LST’s which would tow them across the Channel. Eight Rhinos were to be towed by LST’s. Two of these also towed a tug behind the Rhinos. Six more tugs were towed behind other LST’s. The personnel provided fifteen craft crews, one for each Rhino ferry, one for each tug being towed separately and one to work with 961 Company.

The convoy of LST’s and their Rhinos set sail at 2200 hrs on D-1. The two tugs being towed behind Rhinos broke adrift on the crossing due to bad weather and too high a speed. The convoy arrived off Courseulles about 1200 hrs on D Day. Bad weather conditions delayed operations, and prevented the use of tugs, so that the first Rhino load was not disembarked until 1700 hrs. By midnight one Rhino was aground and no tugs were serviceable.

On D+1 the Company bivouacked in Courseulles sur Mer. Weather still rough and unloading slow. At 2230 hours there was a heavy bombing and machine gun attack on bivouac area. Casualties were heavy with 12 killed and 31 wounded, plus 1 killed and 15 wounded in the attached 26 Company Pioneer Corps. The wounded were evacuated to the Beach Dressing Station and 33/34 Field Dressing Station.

The Company moved billets at the top of the town on D+2. Slit trenches were dug and the Company accommodated in them. One Rhino was unserviceable because of engine trouble but the first PBR (Powered Barge, Ramped) arrived. These barges were more reliable than Rhinos but could not carry such large numbers of vehicles.

As the beach operation was developed craft were used more flexibly. On D+3 two crews were sent to work on Sword Beach and two Rhinos were sent to Gold Beach. There were now four Rhinos, two tugs and eight crews working at Courseulles, NAN Beach. Two Rhinos were unserviceable as were the remainder of the tugs. The administrative personnel remained in their billets ashore but the Rhino crews were now accommodated on the LST HMS Tasajera (F125) which was acting as Depot Ship. Rhinos moored near by, in the shelter of Gooseberry 4.

As the beach developed further vehicles were landed on MIKE Beach and the remaining four serviceable Rhinos moved there on D+4. One Rhino struck a mine so that there were now only three working.

A Beach Party was organized to control ferries, bulldozers and keep check on tugs. Two men were sent aboard each unserviceable tug and four on board each unserviceable Rhino. In addition to the problems with ferries and tugs the company reported problems with its land transport. The headquarters Hillman Utility arrived from the Drowned Vehicle Park, having being drowned on landing. The units 15 cwt and 3 tonner also arrived but the company typewriter had been stolen from 15 cwt. The company was short of office equipment which was on board one of the tugs when it broke adrift. One 15 cwt was borrowed from Headquarters 3 Inland Water Transport Group. Finally there were administrative problems because a large proportion of the Orderly Room Staff and cooks became casualties in the air raids. However on 15th June a DUKW allotted to company for general duty arrived with a crew of two.

Officers Commanding 961 and 966 IWT Companies, RE agreed to set up a joint Beach Party which would consist of two officers, a sergeant and six lightermen plus maintenance parties.

Despite all problems the company discharged 276 vehicles by Rhino Ferry on 17th, 18th and 19th June. A gale then brought operations to a halt. The Rhinos were unable to operate and all were driven ashore, the majority being damaged.
On 23rd June, with the storm over, all Rhino Ferries operating on MIKE and NAN Beaches taken over by the Company. Six Rhino Ferries, two of which were beached, were taken over from 961 Company. All Rhinos were now operating MIKE Beach only and a special section of the beach was allocated to Rhinos. The entire Company was now bivouacked and operating from ashore and was all together.

The depot ship HMS Tasajera (F125) had been damaged in the gale and returned to the UK.

On 26th June there were only two Rhinos working with engines. Three Rhinos were being used as dumb barges and were being towed by two TID tugs attached to the Company.

At the end of the month nine Rhino Ferries were beached and under repair, one was moored at the Gooseberry and in use as dumb barge and six were working normally.

The Bulldozers attached to the company were also causing problems. No figures are available for June but at the end of the first week of July of the eight dozers, five were in RE workshops awaiting repair, the repairs held up for a lack of spares, two were awaiting repair but the workshops would not accept them until they had the spares, one required repair by unit fitter and one was working.

**The Motor Transport Ships**

MT Ships carried 135 vehicles when pre loaded and 120 vehicles subsequently. They should have had 66% of vehicles up to 5 ton and 33% over 5 ton and up to 40 ton. However vehicles of 40 ton could only be carried after a port was available. 33% of vehicles had to be under 6’ 9” high.

In addition motorcycles could be carried up to 10% of the lift. Over that proportion they should be counted as 6 motorcycles equals one vehicle.

Heavy and awkward loads were to be carried in LCT's and LST's since otherwise they presented problems in unloading. Tanks were to be carried in LCT’s as they were an uneconomic load for LST's.

**Group L5**

Force ‘L' was a Naval Force designed to fill the gap between the Assault Forces ‘S', ‘J' and ‘G’ and the Build Up timetable. It sailed from the Thames and East Coast ports with vehicles and personnel for all three beaches.

The following are two Motor Transport Ships timed to arrive at H+23 Hours and discharge onto Ferry Craft. Given the number of vehicles carried this would take some time. In the event discharging was well behind schedule due to the bad weather and shortage of ferry craft. All the first group of MT ships were US built Liberty Class.

Sound Ranging Troop, ‘A’ Battery, 9 Survey Regiment, RA
- 1 x Jeep, Ford
- 1 x 15 cwt, FFW
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Bedford
- 28 men

Commandos
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS, Ford (CMP), with 2 crew - 3 Commando
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS, Ford (CMP), with 2 crew - 4 Commando
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS, Ford (CMP), with 2 crew - 6 Commando
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS, Ford (CMP), with 2 crew - 45 RM Commando
14th Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
  • 6 x 3 ton GS with 27 crew

67 Anti Tank Battery, RA
  • 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin
  • 2 x 15 cwt GS
  • 15 men

101 Anti Tank Battery, RA
  • 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin
  • 2 x 15 cwt GS
  • 15 men

20 Anti Tank Regiment LAD, REME
  • 4 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS CMP
  • 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS Austin
  • 34 men

1 South Lancashire Regiment
  • 5 x 15 cwt 4 X 2 GS
  • 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
  • 13 men

3 Division Signals
  • 1 x Jeep - ‘L’ Section
  • 2 x Car 4 seater 4 X 4 - ‘L’ Section
  • 6 men - ‘L’ Section

Headquarters 185 Brigade
  • 1 x Car 4 seater 4 X 4, Humber
  • 2 x 15 cwt GS, Bedford
  • 1 x 15 cwt 4 X 4 GS, CMP
  • 1 x 15 cwt Water
  • 9 men

2 Warwickshire Regiment
  • 5 x 15 cwt GS, Bedford
  • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
  • 14 men

1 Norfolk Regiment
  • 5 x 15 cwt GS, Bedford
  • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
  • 14 men

2 Kings Shropshire Light Infantry
  • 5 x 15 cwt GS, Bedford
  • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
  • 14 men

2 Middlesex Regiment
  • 2 x 15 cwt GS, Bedford
  • 2 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
  • 18 men
27th Armoured Brigade Workshop, REME
- 4 x Breakdown Tractor, Scammell
- 1 x 7½ ton recovery trailer
- 1 x Car 4 seater 4 X 4, Humber
- 1 x 15 cwt gas welding trailer
- 1 x 15 cwt repair trailer
- 1 x 15 cwt water trailer
- 2 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Stores, Austin
- 84 men

Headquarters CRE, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 2 GS towing a 1 ton trailer with 4 crew

33 Brigade Company, RASC
- 1 x Jeep
- 18 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
- 52 men

19 Field Company, RE
- 4 x 3 ton Winch, Karrier, with 12 crew

Headquarters 92 LAA Regiment, RA
- 1 x Heavy Utility, Humber
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
- 1 x 15 cwt GS, Ford
- 32 men

92 LAA Regiment, RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water
- 2 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
- 4 x LAA Tractors, Bedford QLB
- 12 x SP Bofors, Morris 9/B
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Ford
- 134 men

1 Suffolk Regiment
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
- 5 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Ford
- 15 men

2 East Yorkshire Regiment
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
- 5 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Ford
- 13 men

2 Lincolnshire Regiment
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
- 5 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Bedford
- 12 men
1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers
   • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
   • 5 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Bedford
   • 12 men

2 Royal Ulster Rifles
   • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
   • 5 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Bedford
   • 12 men

8 Field Ambulance, RAMC
   • 1 x 15 cwt Water
   • 2 x Heavy Ambulance, 4 stretcher, Bedford ML
   • 6 men

9 Field Ambulance, RAMC
   • 1 x 15 cwt Water
   • 2 x Heavy Ambulance, 4 stretcher, Bedford ML
   • 6 men

Headquarters 8 Brigade
   • 2 x Jeeps
   • 3 x Car 4 seater 4 x 4, Humber
   • 1 x 15 cwt Water
   • 1 x 10 cwt trailer
   • 2 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Ford
   • 10 men

85th Canadian LAD, RCEME
   • 1 x Heavy Breakdown Tractor
   • 1 x 3 ton stores
   • 8 men

2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, RCASC
   • 33 x 3 ton GS
   • 1 x 15 cwt Workshop
   • 124 men

591 Parachute Squadron, RE
   • 4 x Jeeps and 1 airborne trailer with 10 crew

966 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, RE
   • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
   • 1 x 15 cwt GS
   • 1 x Car 2 seater
   • 10 men

1024 Port Operating Company, RE
   • 1 x Amphibious jeep
   • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
   • 1 x 15 cwt water trailer
   • 1 x fire pump trailer
   • 4 men
1018 Port Operating Company, RE
- 211 men

Naval Liaison Officer Signal Section, RN
- 1 x 8 cwt 4 x 2, Morris PU
- 1 x 30 cwt, Dodge
- 9 men
  Although unusual at this late date the 8 cwt Morris PU was actually landed. The Dodge may have been replaced by a 3 ton 4 x 4.

Landing Craft Recovery Unit, RN
- 1 x jeep, Ford
- 1 x 3 Ton 4 x 4
- 1 x Terrapin
- 1 x water trailer
- 1 x Heavy Pump trailer, Dennis
- 1 x Crane, Le Tourneau
- 1 x D8 Tractor, without blade
- 15 men

102 Beach Section RAF
- 2 x Jeeps
- 1 x 3 ton Winch, Karrier
- 4 x Motorcycles
- 9 men

39 GT Company, RASC
- 2 x Jeeps
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin
- 6 men

101 GT Company, RASC
- 1 x 15 cwt Water
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin
- 8 men

50 Beach Balloon Unit RAF
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Bedford QL, with 2 crew

9 Stores Section, RE
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 Bedford with 2 crew

297 GT Company, RASC
- 10 x DUKW with 20 crew

53 Pioneer Company
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP, with 4 crew

‘X’ Pioneer Company
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP, with 4 crew

‘Y’ Pioneer Company
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP, with 2 crew
245 Provost Company
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin, with 1 crew

53 Beach Balloon Unit RAF
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Bedford QL, with 2 crew

**Motor Transport Coasters**

Two Motor Transport Coasters arrive at H+23 hours and discharge into ferry craft.

MT Coasters carried 30 to 40 vehicles according to the type of coaster. They should have carried 80% of their vehicles up to 5 ton and 20% could be over 5 ton but under 10 ton.

27th Armoured Brigade Workshop
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 Machinery KL, Bedford
- 1 x 15 cwt Machinery, Ford WOT2
- 6 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP
- 6 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Store, Bedford
- 13 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Ford WOT6
- 6 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Stores, Austin
- 86 men

22nd Dragoons
- 4 x 3 ton 4 X 2 GS, Bedford
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 2 GS, Bedford
- 2 x M14 Halftrack
- 36 men

Corps Prisoner of War Camp. For Refugees
- 4 x 3 ton 4 X 2 GS, Ford
- 64 men

961 Inland Water Transport Operating Company, RE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 2 GS with 2 crew

267 Pioneer Company
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 X 2 GS with 2 crew

1055 Port Operating Company, RE
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS with 2 crew

1051 Port Maintenance Company, RE
- 1 x Car 2 seater
- 1 x 15 cwt Compressor
- 2 x 3 ton 4 x 2 GS
- 7 men

299 GT Company, RASC
- 3 x 15 cwt Water
- 2 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
- 7 men

9 Field Dressing Station, RAMC
- 1 x15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP, with 2 crew
12 Field Dressing Station, RAMC
   • 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP, with 2 crew

112 Pioneer Company
   • 2 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP, with 4 crew

'Y' Pioneer Company
   • 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP, with 2 crew

1018 Port Operating Company, RE
   • 27 men

223 Field Ambulance, RAMC
   • 1 x 15 cwt Water
   • 2 x Heavy Ambulances
   • 6 men

65 Field Company, RE
   • 3 x ton 4 x 4 Winch, Karrier
   • 1 x 15 cwt Water
   • 8 men

Four Motor Transport Coasters arrive at H+36 hours

I Corps Units

Air Support Signals Unit
   • 5 x 15 cwt WT with 20 crew. Five tentacles

Transportation Directorate
   • 1 x Amphibious Jeep with 1 crew

266 Forward Delivery Squadron
   • 2 x Jeeps, Ford
   • 4 x 15 cwt 4 x 4, Ford
   • 1 x M3A1 White
   • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Austin
   • 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 Store, Austin
   • 1 x Carrier Universal
   • 6 x 6 pdr Anti Tank guns
   • 50 men

55 Field Regiment RA
   • 1 x Jeep
   • 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Ford
   • 1 x 15 cwt WT Guy
   • 3 x 15 cwt Water
   • 5 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Ford
   • 1 x 3 ton Breakdown 6 x 4, Leyland
   • 59 men

Corp Meteorological Section, RAF
   • 3 x ton 4 x 4 Cipher Office, Bedford QL, with 5 crew
9 Survey Regiment, RA
- 2 x Jeeps from Headquarters
- 1 x 15 cwt GS Bedford
- 2 x 15 cwt FFW Bedford
- 2 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Bedford QL
- 1 x 3 ton Breakdown 6 x 4, Dodge
- 35 men

102 Provost Company
- 2 x 15 cwt 4 x 4 GS, CMP
- 1 x 15 cwt 4 x 2 GS, Bedford
- 6 men

1 Corps Postal Unit
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS, Bedford QL, with 2 crew

🌟 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Units

Royal Winnipeg Rifles
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 2 crew

Regina Rifles
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 2 crew

3rd Canadian Infantry Division Signals
- 3 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 9 crew. From Headquarters

1st Bn, Canadian Scottish
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 2 crew

Queens Own Regiment of Canada
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 2 crew

Le Régiment de la Chaudière
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 2 crew

22nd Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 6 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS with 27 crew from

North Shore Regiment
- 3 x 3 ton GS with 6 crew

Highland Light Infantry of Canada
- 2 x 3 ton GS with 4 crew

Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders
- 2 x 3 ton GS with 4 crew

North Nova Scotia Highlanders
- 2 x 3 ton GS with 4 crew
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade Company, RCASC
- 34 x 3 ton GS with 63 crew
- 1 x 15 cwt Workshop
- 126 men

2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME
- 1 x 3 ton GS
- 1 x 15 cwt Machinery KL
- 1 x 15 cwt Machinery ZL
- 15 men

3rd (British) Division Units

1 South Lancashire Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt water with 2 crew

1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers
- 1 x 15 cwt water with 2 crew

2 Royal Ulster Rifles
- 1 x 15 cwt water with 2 crew

2 Warwickshire Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt water with 2 crew

1 Norfolk Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt water with 2 crew

1 Suffolk Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt Water with 2 crew

2 East Yorkshire Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt Water with 2 crew

2 Kings Shropshire Light Infantry
- 1 x 15 cwt Water with 2 crew

7 Field Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water with 2 crew

33 Field Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water with 2 crew

76 Field Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water with 2 crew

Headquarters CREME, 3 Division
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 2 GS, Bedford OY
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Bedford QL
- 16 men
13/18 Hussars LAD, REME
• 1 x 15 cwt Machinery KL, Bedford
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin
• 6 men

Staffordshire Yeomanry LAD, REME
• 1 x 15 cwt Machinery KL, Bedford
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin
• 6 men

East Riding Yeomanry LAD, REME
• 1 x 15 cwt Machinery KL, Bedford
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin
• 6 men

3 Division Signals LAD, REME
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 2 GS, Bedford OY
• 1 x 3 ton 6 X 4 Breakdown, Crossley
• 10 men

15 Field Park Company LAD, REME
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 2 GS, Bedford OY
• 1 x 3 ton 6 X 4 Breakdown, Crossley
• 10 men

1018 Port Operating Company RE
• 26 men
• 27 men

112 Pioneer Company
• 1 x Car 2 seater - Headquarters
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin - Headquarters
• 1 x 15 cwt GS, Bedford - Headquarters
• 6 men - Headquarters

**Transport**

**Headquarters RASC (30 Transport Column)**

- 199 GT Company, RASC - DUKW's
- 297 GT Company, RASC - DUKW's
- 633 GT Company, RASC - 1 Platoon medical DUKW's
- 282 GT Company, RASC - 3 ton 4 x 4

DUKW's were the first RASC load carrying vehicles ashore. 21 DUKW's from 199 GT Company, RASC landed from LST's about H+7 hours. They were able to launch and swim ashore without delay since they did not need to wait for Rhino ferries. 66 more DUKW's of the same company landed about H+12, again not suffering delays. Medical DUKW's of 633 Company, RASC were also early arrivals, having being carried on the davits of LST's.

On D Day all RASC task vehicles were preloaded with 3 tons of stores. The drivers of all preloaded vehicles carried a card giving precise directions for the disposal of their load. After unloading the vehicles went to the Transport Park for allocation to stores clearing tasks. Preloaded stores for use on the beaches was dumped under Beach Group arrangements. Preloaded divisional ammunition was unloaded in a Beach Dump or Divisional Ammunition Dump until the Ordnance Beach Depot was
functioning. It was stressed that these vehicles were to be returned to the Transport Parks immediately that their contents had been off loaded. Experience had shown that local commanders tended to retain any vehicles and personnel that they thought might be useful.

All preloaded DUKW’s which landed by 1400 hrs on D Day were made available for duty with Beach Groups by 1530 hrs to ensure that there was no delay in unloading stores coasters when they arrived. At that time there was no other means of unloading coasters. So vital was the role of DUKW’s in unloading stores that all drivers of DUKWs carried an order signed by the DA&QMG I Corps to the effect that any officer or other rank diverting DUKW’s for tasks other than those laid down would be liable to trial by Court Martial.

For the landing RASC load carrying vehicles were to have the tilt in as low a position as possible. After the vehicles had unloaded preloaded stores they were to remove the tilts and tilt frames and leave them in the vehicle park. It was ordered that all RASC motorcycles should be carried ashore on RASC vehicles. Motorcycles were not allowed on the beach and attempting to ride them ashore through an unknown depth of water would be unwise.

Vehicle parks were allocated to separate companies and company headquarters were established there. Here were the administrative personnel 282 Company’s park was also to accommodate 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions RCASC vehicles which were working on store clearance.

In the early stages all RASC transport operated under the Beach Group of the sector where they landed. When the RCASC landed he assumed command of all RASC transport and allocated it to beach sectors as required. As the unloading of stores concentrated on NAN the transport parks and the greater part of the transport were concentrated there also. The DUKW platoon that landed on
MIKE on the first tide returned to NAN after discharging its preloaded stores. Presumably this movement was by water since the available lateral roads were busy and unsuitable for DUKW's. The twenty two lorries of 282 GT Company, RASC which landed on MIKE on the second tide remained there until all the stores were cleared to Beach Dumps from beached LCT's and then they moved to NAN.

As it was uncertain which exits would be available at any given time each Commanding Officer of transport companies in conjunction with Beach Group decided which exits should be used and established cushions and control points near by.

1 Platoon, 633 GT Company, RASC was trained in casualty evacuation. Its DUKW's were early arrivals on LST's, being carried in davits for a rapid launch. Like the other DUKW's they were preloaded with ammunition which was delivered to the dumps. They were to work from the Casualty Evacuation Point to certain LST’s which could be converted for casualty evacuation for the return journey to the UK. DUKW's had the advantages that by being amphibious they avoided the transfer of casualties from ambulance to boat and they could drive into a LST's tank deck with the casualties. This role was regarded as being so important that if necessary DUKW's could be taken from other companies, taking priority over stores. Each DUKW control point carried a pool of twenty metal plates, eighteen inches square, marked with a red cross to hang on DUKW's temporarily employed on casualty evacuation.

When separate DUKW beach exits were established they were marked with a yellow/light blue/yellow windsock. At night they were marked with an illuminated large white screen with a X on it.

Four LCT, two per sector, arrived, beached and dried out. They carried mainly ammunition plus smaller amounts of RE stores and ordnance stores. RASC vehicles as available transported the stores to the appropriate dump. RE stores, mainly Bailey Bridging material went to the RE Dump, ordnance stores, mainly clothing and equipment for issue to replace any lost in landing, to a Re-equipment Centre. Ammunition went to a Beach Dump or Divisional Ammunition Dump. Nine LBV preloaded with 450 tons of stores arrived on NAN WHITE and RASC transport as available transported stores to Ordnance Dumps and RE Stores Dumps which by then were established in the Beach Maintenance Area. Until Beach Group transport was landed RCASC lorries of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division were used to transfer these essential stores from LCT and barge to beach dumps.

Four medium coasters, each with three hatches, carrying 1,800 tons of stores arrived of the beaches and were discharged by DUKW's which delivered direct to the dumps in the Beach Maintenance Area. In order to move essential supplies rapidly off the beach and inland to forward units the RCASC 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had thirty six 10 cwt preloaded trailers. These would be manhandled onto the beach by Beach group personnel and collected as required by jeeps.

After D day NAN was to accept all stores except for Airfield Construction Stores, which arrived on MIKE from D+2 to D+6. All Transport Parks were then on NAN and any requirements for transport on MIKE was allocated for specific tasks by RCASC.

All stores load carrying vehicles were equipped with signs, made by the unit, to indicate the destination of the vehicle. On the completion of loading, either of DUKWs from coasters afloat or lorries from beached coasters or LBVs, the person in charge of the unloading party was to ensure that the appropriate signs were displayed. As soon as the vehicle had been unloaded at a depot or dump the personnel responsible for unloading ensured that the vehicle now displayed ‘Tpt Pk’ for Transport Park which was where the driver went next to await fresh instructions. On leaving the Transport Park for the beach the vehicle displayed ‘Beach’.

When the whole beach organization was established and working there was a daily Ferry Control Conference at 1800 hrs which was attended by the RCASC. On the basis of decisions made at the
conference RCASC allocated transport for the following day. Officers commanding GT companies maintained up to date records of the availability of vehicles so that accurate returns could be made to RCASC at any time.

Vehicles drove on the right hand side of the road.

Instructions for both Port Operating Companies and RASC GT Companies stressed the importance of cargo nets. These were essential for unloading coasters into DUKWs. Two nets were provided for each DUKW, a reserve was kept at the Beach Dump on each stores sector and all coasters carried some. However it was stressed that DUKWs must always retain their nets and if loads were transferred from DUKWs to motor transport the nets must not be transferred with it.

When the system was fully established DUKW's ran a circuit which started at the Transport Park and went to the DUKW Control Point on the beach. Sections of DUKWs were guided by the section corporal on a motorcycle. The Control Point released them to a motor boat which guided them to the coaster which they were to unload. When loaded they were guided back to the Control Point where the motorcyclist met them and guided them to the DUKW Transfer Point where they were unloaded onto platforms, remembering to collect their nets. Lorries then collected the stores and moved them on a separate circuit to the correct dump.

Coasters which were unloaded by beaching and drying out discharged their loads directly into lorries alongside them on the beach. Eventually Headquarters Line of Communications supplied some heavier transport. 10 ton lorries were found to be an efficient means of unloading beached coasters while 6 ton articulated lorries worked well between DUKW Transfer Points and dumps.

**Provost**

242 Provost Company of 7 Beach Group was responsible for provost duties on MIKE except for I Corps Assembly Areas and the Prisoner of War cage. 244 Provost Company of 8 Beach Group was responsible for provost duties on NAN except for the small Assembly Area Knee. Two corporals from each company were detailed for duty at 102 Sub Beach Area.

On D Day the following additional Provost units landed, one section of 102 Provost Company for duty at Headquarters I Corps, two sections of 13 Provost Company (Traffic Control) for Assembly Areas
and two sections of 601 Provost Company (Vulnerable Points) for the Prisoner of War cage. On D+1 one section of 73 Provost Company (Traffic Control) arrived for Assembly Areas.

Initially sections of 242 and 244 Companies were stationed at beach exits to assist the Exit Control Officers provided by 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. They were to control traffic and erect appropriate signs at the beach exits. They erected windsocks which were black/white/black for tracked exits, dark blue for wheeled exits and yellow/pale blue/yellow for DUKW exits. Large signs with 'Keep to the Right of the road' were erected at beach exits and at points on the Beach Maintenance Area road circuit.

Provosts were also responsible for traffic signs, point duty and Traffic Control Points. Traffic Control Points controlled access to the main traffic circuits. All traffic signs were illuminated by Traffic Control lights and small electric lamps, special, were available for marking beach exits.

The production of road signs was a major task for Provost units and help was given where possible by painters from other units and by civilian labour. Eventually there was an over proliferation of signs and they had to be controlled.

In the early days Provosts did not have much time to impose discipline but at the same time there was little opportunity for indiscipline. Later they did patrol populated areas and supervise ‘high value goods’. There were strict rules about behaviour and all personnel were made aware of the severe penalties for pilfering, looting and buying or bartering food stuffs from the locals. The last rule was not much observed.

Late in June, when Civil Affairs staff were available in sufficient numbers, attempts were made to tighten up security by checking on civilians. Those with homes in the area or legitimate reasons for remaining were documented and any others were regarded as refugees and evacuated.

RAF Provost units were responsible for controlling RAF traffic and producing RAF signs. They assisted army when they were not fully occupied.

**Dumps and Depots**

The three major categories of dump/depot, petrol, supplies and ordnance or fuel, food and ammunition, were organized in a similar manner. Since all stores were to be landed on NAN the two petrol, supply and ordnance depots from the two Beach Groups combined and operated as one unit.

**Petrol**

The two petrol depots, 240 and 242, from 7 and 8 Beach Groups, operated as one unit. The senior of the two depot commanders commanded the joint unit while the junior commander was second in command and responsible for stock states and returns. The Petrol Depot was responsible for the receipt and issue of petrol to all units in the area.

Reconnaissance parties of one officer and an orderly from each depot landed at different points and from different craft. They reconnoitred the sites and if they were suitable planned the layout. It was planned that the site would be ready to receive stores by 1800 hrs on D Day and begin issues by first light on D+1. The Depot was organized to hold 1500 tons of petrol, with space to expand and double in size if required. There was an area allocated for the reception, stacking and proper dispersal of returned empty jerrycans. The general rule was that a full jerrycans was issued in exchange for an empty one returned.

No petrol could be issued on D Day so all vehicles landed with tanks 90% full and carrying a reserve in jerrycans. Vehicles under 3 ton carried three jerrycans while those over 3 tons carried five.
Motorcycles were normally carried ashore on unit vehicles. They had empty tanks and the carrying vehicle had a petrol can with which to fuel them on landing.

The days supply of petrol was calculated on the basis of an amount for each vehicle ashore: tanks and Mechanical Equipment 50 gallons, DUKW's 35 gallons, Carriers 25 gallons and all B vehicles 5 gallons. For the petrol cookers an allowance of 5 gallons per hundred men was made.

A strict timetable for the issue of petrol was introduced. It was only to be issued to units in bulk and not to individual vehicles. Initially 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade was issued petrol between 1300 hrs and 1400 hrs, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade between 1400 hrs and 1500 hrs, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade between 1500 hrs and 1600 hrs, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade/3rd Canadian Infantry Division Troops/102 Beach Sub Area between 1600 hrs and 1700 hrs and Corps and Army troops between 1700 hrs and 1800 hrs.

A small Petrol Beach Dump was established on each sector for the refuelling of RN landing craft and for the filling of tanks of motorcycles which were shipped loose.

**Detail Issuing Depot**

Supplies other than fuel were issued by the Detail Issuing Depot. The two depots, 139 and 140, from 7 and 8 Beach Groups, operated as one unit in a similar manner to the Petrol Depots. The senior of the two depot commanders commanded the joint unit while the junior commander was second in command and responsible for stock states and returns. The Petrol Depot was responsible for the receipt and issue of supplies to all units in the area.

Reconnaissance parties of one officer and an orderly from each depot landed at different points and from different craft. They reconnoitred the sites and if they were suitable planned the layout. It was planned that the site would be ready to receive stores by 1800 hrs on D Day and begin issues by first light on D+1. The Depot was organized to hold 800 tons of stores, with space to expand and double in size if required.

No supplies could be issued on D Day so all personnel landed with two days rations plus an emergency reserve. Rations for consumption on the crossing were issued separately so that all personnel should have landed with two 24 hour rations (including 20 cigarettes), a tin of preserved meat, a tommy cooker and an emergency ration, mainly chocolate which was not to be consumed other than on the authority of an officer. As a further reserve all unit first line transport carried two days compo ration with another two days on second line transport. Units with AFV's carried three days AFV pack rations. All of these were only to be used when normal replenishment was not possible.

On D+1 supplies were issued for consumption on D+2. Quantities for each unit were calculated using the daily ration strength returns. Amounts to be held in the depot as a daily maintenance issue was calculated as the number of men ashore plus 10%.

From D+1 unit first line transport drew rations according to a timetable which was one hour behind that for drawing petrol thus allowing transport to load petrol, then rations and then form convoy for the return forward. Initially 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade was issued rations between 1400 hrs and 1500 hrs, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade between 1500 hrs and 1600 hrs, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade between 1600 hrs and 1700 hrs, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade/3rd Canadian Infantry Division Troops/102 Beach Sub Area between 1700 hrs and 1800 hrs and Corps and Army troops between 1800 hrs and 1900 hrs.

Medical units carry their own supplies for fourteen days. Prisoners of War and civilian labour were fed on captured supplies where possible, otherwise on special ration scale.
Small stocks of rum were stocked. These were for issue only on the orders of officers not below the rank of colonel and only to personnel who had undergone long periods of strenuous physical work, and then only when the work was finished and they could rest.

Water in containers was held for issue to medical units only.

**Ordnance Dumps**

14 and 15 Ordnance Beach Depots, with the assistance of 45 Ordnance Ammunition Company, combined to form one ammunition dump and one Ordnance Stores Dump. The Officer Commanding 14 Ordnance Beach Depot was in charge of the combined Ordnance Stores Dump with the stores officers from both 14 and 15 Ordnance Beach Depots. The Officer Commanding 15 Ordnance Beach Depot was in charge of the combined Ammunition Dump with the Ammunition Officers from both 14 and 15 Ordnance Beach Depots plus 45 Ordnance Ammunition Company. Officer Commanding 14 Ordnance Beach Depot was in overall command.

Reconnaissance parties of one officer and an orderly from each of 14 and 15 Ordnance Beach Detachments were to land at different points. They reconnoitred the sites and if they were suitable planned the layout. It was planned that the site would be ready to receive stores by 1800 hrs on D Day and begin issues by first light on D+1. The Depot was organized to hold 2500 tons of ammunition and 500 tons of ordnance stores, with space to expand and double in size if required. Both dumps came under the direct control of 102 Beach Sub Area as soon as they were established.

The main body of 15 Ordnance Beach Depot landed on D Day with 14 Ordnance Beach Depot following on D+1. 45 Ordnance Ammunition Company landed on D Day.

Initially maintenance was provided from Landing reserves which were scaled for each formation. AVRE, Flail and AA units had special Technical Landing Reserves. From D+10 maintenance changed to Beach Maintenance Packs which were landed as required.

Unaccompanied G 1098 stores and equipment was received by the Ordnance Beach Depot and units were informed that they were ready for collection. These were a unit’s equipment that could not be carried by the unit when they landed.

Re equipment of personnel who had been shipwrecked or otherwise lost their equipment was provided in the form of kit bags which contained a full set of kit and equipment. 750 such kitbags were landed, 350 for each Beach Group, and held at a centre on the beach near the Beach Dressing Station. This was organized by the Beach Group and manned by personnel provided by the Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services. Each kit bag contained battledress blouse and trousers, shirt, vest, drawers, socks, pullover, braces, boots with laces, helmet and a set of webbing equipment. There was also a water bottle, emergency ration, two 24 hour ration packs, a tin of self heating soup, field dressing, mess tin, knife, fork spoon, towel, razor with blade, shaving brush and clasp knife. One bag in every five contained a Sten gun and ammunition. 60% of bags contained medium size clothing, 20% small and 20% large.

Soap and razor blades were stocked until NAAFI stocks became available and an allowance of two ounces of soap for laundry was made until field laundries or civilian laundries became available. Until Officers Shops could be opened officers could be issued with other ranks clothing items.
Salvage

Salvage was an important part of the work of dumps and depots. Ammunition boxes and supply sacks were supposed to be returned when empty but considerable numbers were diverted to other uses. Deep wading equipment was supposed to be collected and stored until it could be returned to the UK but again much of it was diverted, mainly to make bivouacs more inhabitable.

Jerry cans were a particular concern. Initially large numbers of full cans were landed and issued. An empty can should have been returned for every one issued but many were not. It was clearly not possible to refuse to issue petrol so units were reminded that although the cans were not immediately needed there would be a time when bulk petrol arrived and the empty cans would be essential. In the meantime petrol depots collected the empty cans and used them to form a dummy dump with only partial camouflage.

Captured enemy fuel could be used after it had been tested by a Chemical Officer RASC. Three grades of captured petrol could be used in ‘B’ vehicles. Tropenkraftstoff which was dyed violet, Falurbenzin which was dyed yellow and Gemesh, a petrol/benzene mix, which was dyed red. Aviation fuel was dyed blue and was not to be used.

Captured enemy equipment was of particular interest and was not to be destroyed unless there was an immediate likelihood of it being recaptured. Intelligence Officers and Technical Intelligence staffs circulated information on new items of particular interest and these were to be guarded until handed over to Technical Intelligence staffs.

The Assembly Areas

7 Beach Group initially established Assembly Areas immediately behind the beaches. These were for use only on D Day and separate areas were arranged for wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles and marching personnel. The three categories each had their own approach roads or tracks. In general wheeled vehicles were assigned roads while tracked vehicles used cross country tracks to avoid damaging the road surface. Personnel also made use of cross country tracks avoiding all vehicles. In the Assembly Areas vehicles carried out waterproofing and were sorted into parties to move forward to join their units.

Control staffs for the Assembly Areas were under the command of 7 Beach Group and consisted of the Officer Commanding 59 Transit Camp plus personnel from the same plus small detachments of Movement Control and Traffic Control.

Later the Assembly Area was developed further inland and along the main forward route. This was intended to handle all vehicles and personnel landing on MIKE Sector, plus a sub section at ‘Knee’ behind NAN Sector.

There were five sections, named after authors (British of course). Dickens was for Army Group troops vehicles, Byron was for Army troops vehicles, Masefield was for Corps troops vehicles and Goldsmith was for personnel. Goldsmith was further divided into ‘Elbow’, initially for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, plus ‘Chest’, ‘Wrist’ and ‘Thigh’ for 51 Division. ‘Knee’ on NAN Sector handled all vehicles and personnel landing on NAN regardless of unit. There was also an Assembly Area for the RAF, rather unimaginatively called RAF3.

When ‘Elbow’ was being used for the assembly of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division personnel the responsibility for the organization was shared by 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and Assembly Area staff.
In the Assembly Areas formations and units collected into formed bodies and then moved forward to their formation concentration areas. Units and sub units left the Assembly Area as soon as they were complete. Ideally the Assembly Areas should be cleared every twelve hours. Units sent back guides to the Assembly Area Reception Points to lead the units forward to their destinations.

Phase A waterproofing was removed in the Assembly Area under the supervision of unit officers and NCOs. Incomplete removal of waterproofing could cause damage to vehicles and equipment. Every effort was made to salvage waterproofing hardware.

RAF Beach Squadrons personnel and RAF Provosts were responsible for RAF Assembly Area No 3.

**Royal Electrical and Mechanical Corps - REME**

REME was initially responsible for recovery on the beaches. 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME landed on MIKE and 23 Beach Recovery Section, REME landed on NAN. Each landed an identical number of personnel and vehicles. Forty seven personnel and ten vehicles landed on the first tide and a further thirty two personnel and ten vehicles on the second tide. Also landing on the second tide to assist each of the sections were forty nine personnel from RCEME. 22 Beach Recovery Section, REME landed on MIKE and 23 Beach Recovery Section, REME landed on NAN. Each section later received a further six personnel, a jeep, four trailers and a water trailer.

Two Line of Communication Workshops and two Line of Communication Light Recovery Sections arrived from D+3 to D+5 to further assist with beach recovery and recovery in the Beach Maintenance Area.

Drowned Vehicle Parks were established on both beaches. One was established on each of MIKE and NAN by the Beach Recovery Sections and in addition two were later established on MIKE and one on NAN. Canadian personnel could then be released to move forward with their units.

REME could give assistance to other organizations within certain limits. RASC were responsible for their own vehicles, including DUKW's, but REME could assist especially in providing welding facilities in the early days. Similarly the recovery of landing craft was a RN responsibility but REME could give assistance if so ordered or if it did not interfere with their primary roles in landing vehicles and equipment. RAF vehicles were a REME responsibility but RAF supplied spares. AVRE and Flail units had their own Light Aid Detachments but Beach group REME units could give assistance.

Two small REME detachments were attached to Beach Recovery Sections and Drowned Vehicle Parks. A small REME detachment for the 1st and 2nd line repair of RE equipment on the beaches was landed with each Beach Recovery Section. Later RE became responsible for their own repair but REME could assist if RE provide the spares. This was to prove a more difficult task than was envisaged and many RE tractors and dozers remained idle for lack of spares. Mine clearance was such a large and important task that a detachment of three REME craftsmen from the advanced Base Workshop were attached to each of the Main Drowned Vehicle Parks specifically to carry out immediate repairs to mine detectors.

Each Beach Recovery Section consisted of a Headquarters, a Drowned Vehicle Park and two sections. Headquarters had a Captain commanding, a WOII Artificer Quarter Master Sergeant and clerks, cooks, batman and drivers. Vehicles included a DUKW, an amphibious jeep, a jeep, a 3 ton 4 X 4 and two motorcycles.

A Drowned Vehicle Park consisting of a Staff Sergeant and four other ranks plus personnel attached from the LAD's of units in 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. Attached were three Other Ranks for engineer equipment and two Sergeants and three Other Ranks for AVRE's.
Each of the two sections consisted of three Sherman III Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicle and three Tractor, Crawler, Class I, Caterpillar D8. The BARV's each had a crew of Sergeant, Corporal and three men and were based on a Sherman hull fitted for deep wading. They could tow or push stranded vehicles or landing craft. The D8's had a crew of 2 men. These were also armoured but lacked the deep wading ability of the BARV. They did however have a powerful winch which the BARV lacked.

There were also a Scammel Breakdown Tractor, a Mack Breakdown Tractor and a Ward La France Breakdown Tractor. Each had a crew of three men. These were for work on the beach and the exits and each had advantages. The Scammell and Mack both had a winch and a recovery crane. Both also had low pressure balloon tyres which could be deflated to give a good grip on soft sand. An earth spade had been developed especially for beach recovery work since normal earth anchors would not hold in sand. The Ward La France with six wheel drive and dual rear tyres had a better grip on firm ground and its twin cranes could be arranged to allow a sideways pull.

**Royal Army Medical Corps & Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps**

The assault sections of No's;

- **75** 14 Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC - attached to the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- **76** 22 Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC - attached to the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
- **77** 23 Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC - attached to the 9th Canadian infantry Brigade

were the only Canadian medical units taking part in the initial landings. These units were attached respectively to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigades the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and landed with them. For the first hour or so they remained in the beach area collecting casualties, giving them first aid, and "nesting" them in the shelter of sea walls, buildings, or wherever they could be kept from the withering fire that still swept the beaches. As the assault battalions moved inland the ambulance sections followed close behind, making the wounded comfortable until evacuation was possible.

Events decreed that the field ambulance units which landed on D Day and D + 1 were to operate for the first few days without any new divisional orders, as those issued prior to the opening of the assault carried them through to the divisional objectives. Each field ambulance commanding officer maintained close liaison with his respective brigade, and moved within reach of brigade headquarters at all times.

Following its assault sections, No. 22 Canadian Field Ambulance's main party landed about six o'clock on the afternoon of D Day when the battle had moved well inland. While the main party assembled near the beach a site was chosen for an advanced dressing station at Beny-sur-Mer. It was ready to receive casualties by nine o'clock on the morning after D Day. Here the advanced dressing station was joined during the day by members of its assault sections who had landed with the 8th Brigade. This site was under enemy fire for the first 48 hours and four members of the unit were wounded. These men, together with the casualties being received from the 8th and 9th Brigades, were evacuated back to British field dressing stations at Beny-sur-Mer. Beny-sur-Mer remained the site of No. 22 Canadian Field Ambulance Headquarters until the attack on Carpiquet (4 July). Casualty collecting posts were set up further inland at Cairon, three miles from Beny-sur-Mer and at Neuf-Mer, a little further on. Fortunately, casualties during this holding period were only about 12 per day of all types of sick and wounded, and the ambulance unit was able to use the period of calm to improve its facilities.

The three assault sections of No 14 Canadian Field Ambulance landed with their respective assault battalions early on D Day. The remainder of the unit was phased to land three to four hours later,
although a reconnaissance team had been put ashore about 1100 hrs to select a suitable spot for an advanced dressing station. The vehicles and personnel from the various craft loads were assembled at Banville, where a dressing station on wheels was set up by the unit. On the following day an advanced dressing station was established in a house at Pierrepont, about four miles from the coast, but for the first few hours it was difficult to clear casualties as the jeep ambulances had not arrived. By 1800 hrs in the evening they had all come in and a scheme of evacuation was begun. Jeeps were sent forward to the battalions and casualties evacuated to the dressing station.

OTHER MEDICAL UNITS

For the assault the three field ambulances of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division were reinforced by the medical units of No. 102 British Beach Sub-Area which followed the assault units ashore and established a Beach Maintenance Area. The Beach Sub-Area was composed of a headquarters and two beach groups, one to each brigade.

Medical units of 7 and 8 Beach Groups, and 32 Casualty Clearing Station were responsible for the treatment and evacuation of all casualties of Allied Fighting Forces and for Prisoners of War in the Beach Maintenance Area. 293 Pioneer Company assisted in the collection of casualties in the Beach Maintenance Area and their embarkation on craft at the Casualty Evacuation Post and Beach Dressing Stations.

Landing on MIKE were an Advanced Surgical Centre consisting of 2 Field Dressing Station plus 33 and 34 Field Surgical Units, 110 Surgical Team and 13 Field transfusion Unit. 1 Field Dressing Station operated in its normal role. The Light Sections of 1 and 2 Field Dressing Stations each established a Beach Dressing Station. 2 Casualty Evacuation Post was established on the beach to evacuate casualties onto medical DUKWs of a platoon of 633 GT Company, RASC. Attached to the medical units of MIKE were the Headquarters and seven sections of 293 Pioneer Company. One section was attached to each Beach Dressing Station and to 1 Field Dressing Station while the headquarters and four sections were attached to 2 Casualty Evacuation Post.

Landing on D Day were:

On NAN were an Advanced Surgical Centre consisting of 33 Field Dressing Station plus 45 and 46 Field Surgical Units, 112 Surgical Team and 14 Field Transfusion Unit. 34 Field Dressing Station operated in its normal role. The Light Sections of 33 and 34 Field Dressing Stations each established a Beach Dressing Station. Attached to the medical units on NAN were three sections of 293 Pioneer Company, one section to each Beach Dressing Station and 34 Field Dressing Station.

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<td>33 Field Dressing Station, RAMC</td>
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<td>34 Field Dressing Station, RAMC</td>
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<td>46 Field Surgical Unit, RAMC</td>
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<td>14 Field Transfusion Unit, RAMC</td>
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<td>3 Field Hygiene Section, RAMC</td>
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<td>21 Port Medical Detachment, RAMC</td>
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32 Casualty Clearing Station landed on NAN on the second tide and set up in the position shown on the First Key Plan. This was a 102 Beach Sub Area unit.

293 Pioneer Company supplied stretcher bearers for the medical units to which they were attached. They were also responsible for collecting the equipment of casualties at the Casualty Clearing Station or Casualty Evacuation Post. Burial parties were also supplied by them.

The medical DUKW platoon of 633 GT Company landed in two groups. The first twenty one landed from LSTs of the first tide and were landed on time, not having to rely on Rhino ferries. Twelve more landed preloaded with stores which they had to discharge before reporting for medical duties. All reported to an area near the Casualty Evacuation Centre from which they were to operate.

21 Port Detachment, RAMC landed on NAN and proceeded to 14 Ordnance Beach Depot where they were responsible for the care of medical stores.

Medical Officers from several units of Beach Groups and 102 Beach Sub Area were attached to Beach Dressing Stations before rejoining their units later. The Medical Officers of 8 Kings Regiment, 114 LAA Regiment (Captain John Wormald, RAMC) 11 Port Operating Group were attached to Beach Dressing Stations and Advanced Dressing Stations on MIKE. Those of 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment, 86 HAA Regiment and 30 Line of Communication Transport Column were attached to the units on NAN.

Initially the Beach Dressing Stations carried on independently. They were responsible for the collection of casualties on the beach and in the area immediately behind the beaches. They were assisted by sections of 293 Pioneer Company acting as stretcher bearers. The collection of casualties from the Beach Dressing Stations was co ordinated by the Beach Group commanders.

14th and 22nd Canadian Field Ambulances, RCAMC each detached four 4 stretcher ambulances and four jeeps which were to report to 2 and 33 Field Dressing Stations. With the assistance of stretcher bearers from 293 Pioneer Company they were to collect casualties left behind by sections of the Canadian Field Ambulances when they moved forward with their Brigades. They were also used for evacuation of casualties to the Casualty Evacuation Point.

The Senior Medical officers of Beach Groups detailed sections of 293 Pioneer Company to Walking Wounded Collection Points. These points were on roads in the Assembly Areas and their position had been made known to the assault units. The pioneer stretcher bearers were to sweep the area for casualties and take them to the Walking Wounded Collection Points. Casualties were collected from the point by transport from Field Dressing Stations and evacuated them to either 2 or 33 Field Dressing Station. The Medical Officers of 11 Port Operating Company and 30 Line of Communication Transport Column were detailed to the task of collection.
The commanders of Casualty Clearing Station, Field Dressing Stations and Casualty Evacuation Point were to report to the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services at Headquarters 102 Beach Sub Area to inform him of their exact location and the time at which they would be ready to receive casualties. He could then co ordinate the activities of the medical units.

Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Embarkation) at Headquarters 102 Beach Sub Area informed the Naval Officer in Charge of the number of casualties to be evacuated. Naval Officer in Charge passed the information to Naval Force Commander who decided how many LST to retain for casualty evacuation. LST fitted for evacuation flew flag H and showed two vertical blue lights.

All casualties who were fit to travel were evacuated to the UK and were embarked at the Casualty Evacuation Point or Beach Dressing Station. LCT's could carry walking wounded, but numbers were very limited and prior arrangements had to be made with the Principal Beach Master. Medical LST's were normal LST's which were fitted with stretcher racks which were erected as necessary.

Arrangements were made to retain as many such LST as were thought necessary by DADMS and these did not return until loaded, usually next day. Initially they were loaded by the medical platoon of DUKW's but when LST's were routinely beached and dried out they could be loaded by ambulance on the beach.

Later hospital carriers, ex cross Channel ferries some of which had been used as small LSI's, arrived and anchored off the beach. There was always one available, being replaced when the previous one sailed. These carried their own water ambulances, LCP(S) converted to carry six casualty litters. The water ambulance could beach for loading but for preference they used Courseulles harbour at high tide.

Elaborate arrangements were made to ensure that there was an adequate supply of stretchers and blankets. A Beach Sub Area reserve of 750 stretchers and 2250 blankets was landed. All Beach Group vehicles landing on D day carried one stretcher and three blankets which were dropped off at the Vehicle Transit Areas to be collected by Casualty Evacuation Point and Beach Dressing Station personnel. In addition each Ordnance Beach Depot held stocks, each depot receiving 2000 stretchers and 6000 blankets on D day and 750 stretchers and 2250 blankets on D+1. Evacuation LST's carried a stock of stretchers and blankets to replace those being embarked.

Medical stores were held in Ordnance Beach Depots under the supervision of the Port Detachment, RAMC. Two and a half tons of such stores were landed each day in standard packs. They were issued through the Casualty Clearing station, the largest medical unit, until the arrival of an Advanced Depot of Medical Stores.

One Field Sanitation NCO was attached to Field Companies, RE in each Beach group to advise on water supply. The Field Sanitation Section was also responsible for advising on sanitation arrangements in the sub area. Due to the shortage of accommodation many units remained in makeshift bivouacs for weeks. In the beach area bivouacs sanitation soon caused concern.

The red cross against air attack was not displayed by medical units although small vertical red cross signs could be displayed. RAMC personnel wore a red cross brassard. Pioneer stretcher bearers wore a SB armband.

The Field Dressing Station consisted of one Heavy Section and two Light Sections. Each beach sector, MIKE and NAN arranged these in an identical manner setting up a Field Dressing Station with a Heavy Section and a Light Section serving the Beach Group area and one Light Section detached to form a Beach Dressing Station near the beach.
At the Field Dressing Station the Heavy Section had a Major plus two other officers who were medically qualified plus a subaltern for administration. Other medical personnel included a sergeant dispenser, sergeant and a private hospital cooks, two sergeants, a lance corporal and twelve private nursing orderlies plus a sergeant nursing orderly for duty as store man for stewards store, a nursing orderly as barber, a linen store man and a stewards store man. Two nursing orderlies were provided for duty with the two 4 stretcher ambulances. There were also twelve administrative personnel plus attached RASC drivers.

The Light Section added another two medical officers, seven nursing orderlies and four stretcher bearers plus four administrative personnel. The Field Surgical Unit added a Major who was a specialist in surgery and a Captain or Lieutenant who was a Graded Anaesthetist, three nursing orderlies and two operation room assistants. The Field Transfusion Unit consisted of one medical officer plus two transfusion orderlies. Each of the specialist units had a specially equipped 3 ton lorry and driver.

Chaplains were on the establishment of the Beach Sub Area and they were initially allocated to medical units.

1 and 2 Field dressing Stations, with their attached Field Surgical Units and Field Transfusion Units, established themselves in the village hall at Graye sur Mer and received 209 cases by midnight. 107 wounded were evacuated to the UK during the day.

On NAN the BDS was set up in a concrete gun bunker right on the shore.

**Burials**

The Beach Groups selected suitable burial grounds. One, immediately inland of the beaches, was for those killed on the beaches or immediately inland. One immediately inland of the Beach Maintenance Area was for those killed in the Beach Maintenance Area. All sites were fenced and clearly marked ‘Burial Area’.

Burials were in individual graves except in exceptional circumstances. The red circular identity disc was collected for forwarding to GHQ 2nd Echelon and the green hexagonal disc was left. Pegs with labels giving details were attached and placed on the grave. A supply of prefabricated crosses was landed on D+1 but there were shortages due to late delivery and many were locally made.

A Chaplain or officer conducted a burial service and was responsible for marking the grave and for reporting the burial on the appropriate form. Three copies were required with the original going to DAD Graves at Army Headquarters and two copies to GHQ 2nd Echelon which maintained personnel records.

Personal effects were held until the registered parcel service started on D+6 when they were sent to GHQ 2nd Echelon. Any money was handed to the nearest Field or Area Cashier and a receipt obtained.

The first Graves Registration personnel landed on MIKE on D+2.

**Prisoners of War, Refugees and Civil Affairs**

Since MIKE was responsible for personnel it assumed responsibility also for Prisoners of War. 3rd Canadian Infantry Division established a Prisoner of War cage well forward and on the boundary of the Beach Maintenance Area. This was manned by two sections of 601 Corps of Military Police (Vulnerable Point) Company. 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and later I Corps, was responsible for the evacuation of Prisoners of War from the front line to the cage. Prisoners who were captured on or
near the beaches were held there, first by the troops capturing them and then by Beach Group personnel including provosts.

It was permitted to keep some prisoners as labour but most were to be evacuated to the UK. The first such evacuation was by LST on the third tide and after that one LST per day was allocated for the purpose. This LST arrived with CMP (VP) personnel on board as escorts. The officer in charge of the escort reported the arrival to the Military Landing Officer who arranged for prisoners to be brought from the cage with an escort from 601 CMP (VP) Company. A LST could carry 800 prisoners, only on the tank deck.

Unwounded prisoners were not medically examined unless disease or infection was suspected. Any suspected cases of typhus were not to be evacuated. Wounded prisoners were treated and evacuated along with allied casualties.

On D+2 the remainder of 601 (VP) Company arrived to extend the cage. On D+5 603 (VP) Company arrived for duty as guards and escorts at Corps and Army cages when they were formed.

Civilian suspects were detained separately from Prisoners of War and were not evacuated to the UK. A civilian internee camp was established on D+9.

See Appendix B

Escaped Allied Prisoners of War

Until D+9 any escaped allied prisoners who reached allied lines were sent to 104 Corps Reception Camp where they were to be accommodated, fed and re equipped and be treated sympathetically. From D+9 they were sent to 101 Reinforcement Camp where they were medically examined and transferred to the UK.
Refugees

A Refugee Transit Camp was established forward of the Beach Maintenance Area and control points on all forward routes directed refugees to it. ‘B’ Refugee Transit camp was formed from a detachment of one officer and twenty nine other ranks from 218 Prisoner of War Camp which landed on Mike on the second tide of D Day. A Civil Affairs Detachment landed with them and consisted of six officers, including two Medical officers, and eleven other ranks.

After the assault eight LSI(L) were held at Portsmouth for the evacuation of refugees if this was necessary. A further eight US LSI(L) were available to supplement the British flotilla if required. These craft were not to be used for transporting troops. It is not clear if they were ever called upon. A party of 224 Prisoner of War Camp arrived on D+1 and on D+2 opened an Army Refugee Camp which received refugees from the transit camps. Three Civil Affairs Detachments each containing two medical officers and four medical orderlies arrived at the same time to handle refugees. If necessary civilian casualties could be dealt with by military medical units but any supplies used had to be replaced from Civil Affairs stocks.

Civil Affairs

Apart from the Civil Affairs detachments mentioned above there were sections to work with the civil authorities in the organization of civilian matters. In the Beach Maintenance Areas the need and scope for these was limited but there was a civilian population and there were civilian resources both of which were controlled on behalf of the military. According to the instructions Civil Affairs officers to work ‘pari passu’ with civilian authorities. Pari Passu means to rank equally or work with on an equal basis.

While certain civilian resources were to be left entirely to the French authorities Civil Affairs were to assist in the requisition or hire of vehicles, accommodation, garages, workshops and local labour. They were to organize the local police, fire and civil defence and coordinate their activities with army services. Civil telephone systems and power installations were taken over.

Accommodation was in great demand and limited supply. Certain rules were laid down but as always operational necessity overruled these. Civil medical installations could be taken over but due regard had to be taken of civil needs. Local government offices such as those of the Mairie, fire, police and civil defence were not to be taken over. Such accommodation as was available, including tents, was to allotted on the following priorities. First priority of course was for medical units followed by workshops and storage with personnel coming last.

Later a Hiring and Claims organization was set up. Since France was an ally it was ruled that any resources requisitioned should be paid for. Claims could be made for damage but this was limited to damage caused by allied forces and excluded any battle damage or damage caused by the enemy.

Postal

A regular and speedy postal service was seen as being vital for morale. One detachment from RE Postal Service landed on D Day with 140 Detail Issue Depot and a second detachment landed on D+1 with 139 Detail Issue Depot. These established a Field Post Office at the Detail Issue Depot on D+1. Eleven tons of mail arrived on coasters on D Day for delivery on D+1, to be collected by the postal orderly of units when unit transport was collecting supplies. On the same day a daily letter mail service was established to and from the UK, and postal orders could be bought and cashed.

On D+6 a parcel and packet mail service was established. In addition to normal parcels four duty free parcels a year were allowed subject to certain restrictions. Parcels had to weigh less than five pounds,
have a value of less than thirty shillings, contain no drinking spirit, no more than half a pint of scent, no more than 200 cigarettes and no more than two pounds of foodstuffs.

The postal service worked well in general. There was a period of delays which proved to be due to V1 attacks on London. Service post was re routed to avoid this. In the early days mail was put onto coasters but these were not identified. An officer in a DUKW was given the task of meeting each coaster and asking if they had mail.

**RAF Beach Units**

A considerable number of RAF vehicles and personnel passed through Juno. These were GCI, GCC, RAF Commandos and RAF Regiment. Airfield construction was not an RAF responsibility. There was also a considerable quantity of RAF stores being handled. RAF personnel, vehicles and stores were an RAF responsibility.

Headquarters No 2 Beach Squadron controlled the activities of all RAF units in the 102 Beach Sub Area and landed on NAN on the second tide.

Each of the two beaches, MIKE and NAN, had a Beach Flight and a Balloon Unit. On MIKE there was 103 Beach Flight which landed 49 personnel and two vehicles on the first tide and 26 personnel and six vehicles on the second tide. On NAN there was 104 Beach Flight which landed 15 personnel and one vehicle on the first tide and 24 personnel and three vehicles on the second tide.

Following the pattern of the rest of the sub area 103 Beach Flight handled personnel and vehicles. In the first three days this amounted to some 400 RAF vehicles and 1,400 personnel. These passed through the transit areas to the RAF Assembly Area No 3. 103 Beach Flight manned the RAF Assembly Area and RAF Provost were on duty in the Transit Area and the Assembly Area. RAF Provosts also took complete RAF units from the Assembly Area to their forward positions. They were responsible for the signing of RAF areas and routes and liaised closely with the Beach Sub Area Assistant Provost Marshal.

RAF Stores landed on NAN and delivered to RAF Dump. In the first three days some 150 tons of explosive ordnance, 15 tons of oxygen and 400 tons of 100 octane fuel were handled.

RAF Balloon units arrived on the landing craft of the first tide. Each balloon had a crew of two who flew the balloon on the craft and then took it ashore to fly on the beach under the orders of commander 80 AA Brigade.

For a time balloon units were asked not to fly them as it was thought they were being used as aiming points for enemy artillery. This was never the problem that it was on Sword but there was some shelling.

RAF Beach Squadron personnel wore red RAF brassards so that passing RAF units could recognize them. Beach Squadron Headquarters, Beach Flight Headquarters and RAF Assembly Area flew the RAF ensign.
Juno Anti Aircraft Defence

Anti aircraft cover was arranged on the assumption that enemy air effort would be directed against the beaches and shipping. It was assumed also that high and medium level enemy aircraft could be dealt with by Allied aircraft and that the main tasks of anti aircraft artillery would be defence against low level attacks by day and high flying bombers at night. In order of priority the tasks of anti aircraft protection were:

- Shipping and craft unloading off the beaches
- Beach Maintenance Areas
- Beach exits
- Bridges over the River Seulles at Reviers, Colombiers and Courseulles
- Gun areas

General Principles

It was planned that there would initially be an AA Assault Group to each Beach Group and that each such assault group would have three HAA troops and four or five LAA troops. LAA guns were to be landed as soon as possible. They would initially be tracked SP vehicles since these were the only vehicles allowed on the beach in the early LCT waves. Each tracked vehicle towed a trailer mounted gun. HAA guns would necessarily land later when the beaches were sufficiently prepared. It was planned to land the first on the second tide and have them in place in time to provide defence against night attack on D day. Searchlights were to land to provide illumination of low flying enemy aircraft and to provide illumination on the beaches if required. An Anti Aircraft Operations Room was to be landed to coordinate AA defence and to give air raid warning.

On D Day ‘O’ AA Assault Group landed in support of 7 Beach Group on MIKE and ‘P’ AA Assault Groups landed in support 8 Beach Group on NAN. ‘O’ Group was commanded by Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment and ‘P’ Group was commanded by Headquarters 86 HAA Regiment. On D day both groups would be under the command of CRA 3rd Infantry Division. Sometime on D+1 they would come under command of 80 AA Brigade at which time Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment assumed command of all LAA units and Headquarters 86 HAA assumed command of all HAA units.

‘O’ AA Assault Group (MIKE BEACH)

had the following units:

- RHQ, 114 LAA Regiment, RA - Lt Col N.W. Hoare
  - Acting as Headquarters ‘O’ AA Assault Group

- 372 Battery, Headquarters and ‘A’ and ‘B’ Troops, 114 LAA Regiment, RA
  - 12 x 40 mm LAA - Six Crusader SP 40mm towing six 40mm

- 321 Battery, Headquarters and ‘D’ and ‘F’ Troops, 93 LAA Regiment, RA
  - 12 x triple 20mm LAA - Six Crusader SP towing six 20mm on trailers

- 274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment,RA
  - 8 x 3.7” HAA guns

- 383 Battery, E troop, 86 HAA Regiment,RA
  - 4 x 3.7” HAA guns

- 114 LAA Regiment Workshop
  - Composite workshop with elements of LAA, HAA and SL workshops
Two and a Half sections 112 Pioneer Company (smoke)
• To lay smoke screens using Smoke Generators No 24

Three Landing Barge Flak
• Each with 2 x 40mm LAA manned by 139 LAA Regiment

‘P’ AA Assault Group (NAN BEACH)
had the following units.

RHQ, 86 HAA Regiment, RA - Lt Col Champness
• Acting as Headquarters ‘O’ AA Assault Group

375 Battery, Headquarters and ‘G’ and ‘H’ Troops, 114 LAA Regiment, RA
• 12 x 40mm LAA - Six Crusader SP 40mm towing six 40mm

‘E’ troop 321 Battery, 93 LAA Regiment, RA
• 6 triple 20mm LAA - Three Crusader SP towing three 20mm on trailers

273 Battery, 86HAA Regiment, RA
• 8 x 3.7” HAA guns

383 Battery, F troop, 86 HAA Regiment, RA
• 4 x 3.7” HAA guns

One troop 474 SL Battery
• 8 x 90mm searchlights

86 HAA Regiment Workshop
• Composite workshop with elements of LAA, HAA and SL workshops

112 Pioneer Company (smoke) (less two and half sections)
• To lay smoke screens using Smoke Generators No 24

Two Landing Barge Flak
• Each with 2 x 40mm LAA manned by 139 LAA Regiment

Also landing were:

HQ 80 AA Brigade
• Commanding all AA units in I Corps Area, including Sword and Juno Beaches

155 AA Operations Room
• Responsible for the operational control of AA units on Juno

32nd Battery, 4th Canadian LAA Regiment, RCA - Major Jack Cousins

This did not come under an AA Assault Group but was tasked with protecting the crossings of the River Seulles at Colombiers and Reviers. Only ‘A’ & ‘C’ Troops landed.

63 Battery of 20 LAA Regiment manned a total of 9 x 40mm LAA guns and 24 x 20mm LAA guns on the three British Gooseberries. Logically this would give 3 x 40mm and 8 x 20mm per Gooseberry.

At sea the navy had seven Landing Craft Flak and five Landing Barge Flak. The latter carried army LAA guns which would later land.
In addition to their AA tasks Light Anti Aircraft guns were to be sited with regard to likely enemy tank runs and Heavy Anti Aircraft guns might be called on to fire predicted concentrations in a ground role.

**Headquarters 80 Anti Aircraft Brigade** - Brigadier H.W. Deacon, CBE, DFC

80 AA Brigade Headquarters controlled the AA defence of I Corps area, including Sword and Juno Beaches. It had a modest increase of three jeep trailers and one 20 cwt trailer and the signals section had an additional 15 cwt FFW, two operators and a signal officer. The Brigade Headquarters Reconnaissance Group landed on the first tide with the main party landing on D+1.

**Landing On MIKE BEACH**

**H+135 minutes**

Reconnaissance party of two jeeps and 6 men:
- Jeep 1 - Brigadier, Commander 80 AA Brigade, driver/batman
- Jeep 2 - Anti Aircraft Intelligence Officer, Signals Officer, Lance Sergeant RE, driver/batman

**D+1:**
- 1 x Car 4 seater 4 x 4 - Brigade Major, driver/batman, two operator wireless and line, staff sergeant, No 22 set
- 1 x 15 cwt Wireless House - Staff Captain, driver mechanic, two operator wireless and line, No 22 set
- 1 x 15 cwt Office - Warrant Officer I, two operator wireless and line, driver mechanic, No 22 set
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - Brigade Ordnance Warrant Officer, driver IC, two cooks. Cooks equipment and stores, Bren, PIAT
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS - Signals sergeant, driver mechanic, two despatch rider, two cipher operator, Tows water trailer
- 4 x motorcycle

Main HQ arrived off coast on time but could not land. At 2130 hrs, June 7 the Brigade Major and Staff Sergeant landed on MIKE by LCP as the LST's were still waiting to be unloaded. They reported to 114 LAA Regiment RHQ which directed them to Tactical Headquarters where they reported at 0130 hrs, June 8th. Part of Main HQ landed on MIKE at 0630 hrs and arrived at Tactical Headquarters at 1030 hrs. The remainder of Main HQ arrived landed early on 9th June and deployed in an orchard at Beny sur Mer.

**155 Anti Aircraft Operations Room**

155 AAOR was organized on War Establishment III/189/2 which was different to that used in the UK for AA units. The following includes signals on War Establishment III/188/2. These were in force by January 1944 and formed the basis for planning. Some modifications were made in the light of experience gained in exercises and as equipment became available.

**R Group**
The Reconnaissance Group consisted of a jeep with the Officer Commanding, Fire Control Officer, Sergeant Operator Fire Control and a driver/batman. It landed on NAN WHITE at H+75 and ensured that the sites selected for the radars were suitable.

**A Group**
These were vehicles and personnel that it was considered must be landed on D Day to enable the unit to be operational for at least four days.

It was originally planned that A1 Group and A2 Group should be identical. They were to land at different points and set up some quarter mile apart to reduce the risk of both becoming casualties.
Later it was hoped to replace the Light Warning Set No I Mk4 with Radar Type 14. In the event one
Light Warning set was replaced and the other remained as originally planned.

A1 Group
One Radar AA No 4 MkII, Light Warning Set, of 155 AAOR landed on the first tide and broadcast
warnings and information to 80 AA Brigade units via a No 22 set. This sub unit consisted of a jeep and
batman driver for the Fire Control Officer and the 15 cwt Wireless House carrying the Light Warning
set, three Operators Fire Control (including a Corporal), a telecommunications mechanic and a No 22 set.

A2 Group
One Type 14 radar of 155 AAOR also landed on the first tide, together with 14 men, but this took
some time to set up. It was operational when the remainder of the Operation Room vehicles arrived
on the second tide. When the Type 14 was in action the No 4 Mk IV set was used to form a sub
AAOR. The Type 14 was trailer mounted and was towed by a HAA Tractor with a driver IC. It carried a
Sergeant Fire Control, three Operator Fire Control (including a Corporal) and a No 22 set.

On the second tide the AAOR landed the main part of the operations room, again in two groups.
These included two 3 ton 4 X 4 Bedford QL with RAF Type 145 body (Operations Room)

A3 Group
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 RAF Type Operations Room towing a 20 cwt trailer - Signals Officer, Sergeant
  Instrument Mechanic, Corporal Electrician Signals, six Operator Wireless and Line including two
  corporals and a Driver Mechanic. No 36 set, 2 x R109 set, 2 x Generator, 2 x Plotting Boards, 2 x
  10 line exchanges, 6 x line poles, 6 x batteries tables, chairs and a Motorcycle.
- 1 x 15 cwt Wireless House - Driver Mechanic, 3 x Operator Wireless and Line including a corporal,
  Lineman. No 22 set.
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - Gun Defence Officer, 3 x Operator Fire Control.
- Marching party - Gun Defence Officer, Sergeant Gun Defence Officers Assistant, 4 x Plotter, 3 x
  Driver Operator, Corporal Operator Fire Control.

A4 Group
- 1 x 3 ton 4 x 4 RAF Type Operations Room towing 20 cwt trailer - Captain, Second in Command,
  Corporal Vehicle Mechanic, Sergeant Gun Defence Officers Assistant, 3 x Plotter, Batman/
  Recorder, 3 x Corporal Fire Control Assistant, Operator Fire Control, 3 x Operator Wireless and
  Line including corporal, Electrician Signals. No 36 set, R109 set, R107 set, Generator, 6 x line
  poles, 6 x batteries, Tables, Chairs and a Motorcycle.
- 1 x 15 cwt Wireless House - Captain (Sector), 3 x Operator Wireless and Line including a corporal,
  Driver Mechanic. No 22 set
- 1 x 15 cwt GS. Tows 20 cwt trailer - Gun Defence Officer, Driver IC, 3 x linesman including
  corporal. 10 miles of cable
- 1 x 15 cwt GS. Tows 20 cwt trailer - Gun Defence Officer, Driver IC, 3 X linesman including
  corporal. 10 miles of cable

Group B - landed D+2
- 1 x 3 ton RAF Type Operations Room. Tows 1 ton trailer. Signal Sergeant, Driver IC, 6 x Operator
  Switch Board including 2 corporals, Instrument Mechanic
  Motorcycle, 2 x Multi-phones, Amplifier, 10 line switchboard, 2 x generator
- 15 cwt GS. Tows 10 cwt trailer. Driver IC, 3 x cooks, Driver Batman. 4 miles of cable, Cooks stores
Marching
- 5 x Plotter, Batman Recorder, 2 x General Duty-man
Y Group landed in the next week.

- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4. Driver IC - Gas Stores and 1098 stores
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4. Driver IC - Gas Stores and 1098 stores
- 1 x 15 cwt GS. Tows 10 cwt trailer - 3 X Privates and 1098 stores

1730 hours. OC arrived at Tactical Head Quarters 80 AA Brigade and reported the safe arrival of all equipment. At 1900 hours reported AAOR in action.

The Bedford QL with a Mobile Operations Room body was a house type with a large flap on the nearside which was opened upwards when in use. There were tents on both sides of the vehicle, and sometimes over the rear door. In the tent on the nearside there were map displays. Controllers sat inside the vehicle overlooking the displays. Information regarding hostile aircraft was displayed on a map display so that the Controller could quickly assess the situation and send alerts and orders to batteries. Information was received from both Army, Navy and RAF sources.

Normally one would expect that the Mobile Operations Room lorries would be assigned one to the central Operations and Plotting Room and one each to the two sector warning sets. In this case it seems that the vehicles for the Type 14 Radar and the central room were situated together while the third vehicle formed the sub AAOR with the Light Warning set. It was the task of the two radars to plot aircraft and report to the central room where information was filtered and decisions made.

**86 Heavy Anti Aircraft Regiment, RA - Lt Col G.H. Champness**

86 HAA Regiment landed Regimental Headquarters to act initially as headquarters for “P” AA assault group, and two battery headquarters, 273 and 274, to control the gun troops. The third battery headquarters, 383, was not landed and its two troops were attached one each to the other batteries. Ten extra personnel per troop were to be landed with the reconnaissance groups to act as pioneers.

Officers Commanding cars carried extra No 22 wireless sets in their cars and these were to be set up at headquarters. Extra trailers were issued to carry equipment. Regimental Headquarters had one 20 cwt trailer. Battery Headquarters had four 20 cwt trailers and two jeep trailers.

The HAA troops would land reconnaissance parties some three hours before the main body was expected to land. These parties were to see that the sites selected from maps and air photographs were suitable, and free of the enemy. If necessary changes would be agreed with beach group commanders. Each reconnaissance party included ten men to act as pioneers and prepare the sites as far as possible. High priority was given to siting the troops radars as these were essential to the operation of the troop. Radar needed a minimum of 100 yards clear all round. Reconnaissance Groups were to ‘preserve’ the radar sites (leave personnel to make sure no one else moves onto it). When the guns arrived it was expected that the site would be laid out and ready for them to go straight into action.

It was expected that HAA units would be available to fire in a ground role in support of ground forces. In fact they spent much of their time in this role. HAA troops carried a small amount of anti tank AP shell which was not used.

Apart from the various reconnaissance parties this regiment was much delayed. When the guns were landed several were further delayed when the towing pintles broke due to an excessive angle between ramp and beach.
86 HAA Regiment, RA

H+90 minutes

RHQ
- Car 4 seater. 22 set. 5 men landed from LCT on time

'A' troop 273 Battery
- 16 men landed by ferry service from LSI

H+4 hours

RHQ
- 1 x Jeep and 5 men

273 Battery HQ
- 1 x Jeep and 5 men

274 Battery HQ
- 1 x Jeep and 5 men

'A' Troop 273 Battery
- 1 x Jeep and 15 men

'B' Troop 273 Battery
- 1 x Jeep and 15 men

'C' Troop 274 Battery
- 1 x Jeep and 15 men

'D' Troop 274 Battery
- 1 x Jeep and 15 men

These from LST. Time given was time to be ready to discharge.
- Battery HQ's land reconnaissance party
- Troop HQ's land reconnaissance party and 10 men pioneer party

NOTE: All troops were identical, the only variations being in the reconnaissance groups for ‘E’ and ‘F’ troops which landed at the same time as the main body.

Troops consisted of:
- 7 x AEC Matador 4 x 4 HAA Tractor
- 4 x 3.7" HAA gun
- 1 x Radar AA No3 MkII
- 2 x Radar AA No1 MkII
- 2 x 3 ton 4 x 4 GS
- 1 x 15 KVA Generator. Towed by 3ton GS
- 111 men
- A jeep and 15 men had already landed

At H+9 hours ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ and ‘D’ Troops should have landed plus:

From RHQ.
- 1 x Jeep
- 1 x 15 cwt
- 1 x 3 ton GS
From 273 and 274 Battery HQ each:
- 1 x Car 4 seater 4 x 4
- 2 x 15 cwt GS
- 1 x 15 cwt water
- 1 x 3 ton GS
- 1 x 3 ton Machinery I30
- 24 men

At H+16½ hours. ‘E’ and ‘F’ troops from 383 Battery should have landed. Battery Headquarters did not land. One ‘E’ troop was placed under 274 Battery on MIKE and ‘F’ troop under 273 Battery on NAN. ‘E’ and ‘F’ troops land reconnaissance party and main party at the same time.

**Light Anti Aircraft (LAA)**

The first LAA units ashore were the troops equipped with Tracked Self Propelled 40mm LAA guns. These were Crusaders with 40mm mounted on them. Each troop had three such vehicles and each one towed a standard 40mm LAA on its trailer. Each Crusader landed towing a 40mm and moved into the dunes where it positioned the towed gun and then moved to its own position. The Crusaders carried ammunition and gun stores for the towed gun and dumped them at the towed gun position. The troop Commanders wireless set was also carried on a Crusader and the Troop Headquarters was set up at this Crusaders gun position.

The LAA troop with tracked 20mm LAA guns were similarly organized and equipped, having three Tracked Self Propelled Crusader triple 20mm AA guns and three triple 20mm on trailers. The vehicles deployed separately and one vehicle carried the troop wireless set for the Troop Headquarters which was situated with it.

The tracked vehicles landed as early as possible. Troops of Self Propelled 40mm guns on wheeled chassis (Morris 4 X 4) landed later and deployed forward of the tracked troops. The remaining LAA troops arrived later still with 40mm guns towed by Bedford QL Tractors. These deployed in the forward part of the Beach Maintenance Area.

Each 40mm tracked troop also landed a Bedford QL LAA Tractor to carry ammunition and gun equipment, and to reposition the towed guns using their winches if necessary.

114 LAA Regiment landed Regimental Headquarters to act initially as headquarters for ‘O’ AA assault group, and two battery headquarters, 372 and 375, to control the gun troops. All LAA units came under the command of these batteries. In the assault phase only one of the two LAA Battery Headquarters landed and was responsible for all the LAA guns in the Assault Group. The nucleus of the second LAA Battery Headquarters landed at the same time but was used as a reserve and for reconnaissance until control passed from the Assault Group.

Until the AAOR could be set up the LAA units relied on Visual Observer Posts for early warning. These were manned by LAA personnel. It was planned that they should have Loyd Carriers but no evidence of their use has yet been found.
114 LAA Regiment, RA - Lt Col N.W. Hoare
375/114 Battery

Landing Crusader Tracked SP 40mm towing 40mm on trailers.

H+60 NAN WHITE
Battery HQ landed a reconnaissance party
- 1 x 15 cwt FFW
- 7 men
At the same time 'G' and 'H' Troops each landed a reconnaissance party
- 1 x Jeep
- 6 men

H+75 NAN RED
'G' Troop
- 2 x Crusader tracked SP 40mm with 12 crew and towing two 40mm
- 28 men for the guns and a
- 1 x LAA Tractor with 5 crew
- Each of 'G' and 'H' Troops landed 3 men for the AAOR

H+90 NAN RED
'G' Troop
- 1 x Crusader tracked SP 40mm with 6 crew and towing a 40mm towed
- 11 men
'G' Troop landed as a complete unit of three
- 3 x Crusader tracked SP 40mm with 18 crew, three towed 40mm
- 39 men
- 1 x LAA Tractor with 5 crew

H+9 hours.
Battery HQ
- 1 x 3 ton GS
- 1 x 15 cwt FFW
- 1 x 15 cwt water
- 9 men

93 LAA Regiment, RA - Lt Col Holman
321/93 LAA
Landing Crusader tracked SP triple 20mm and towed 20mm on trailers.
H+60
'E' Troop lands a reconnaissance party:
- 1 x Jeep
- 6 men

H+4 hours.
'E' Troop
- 3 x Crusader tracked SP 20mm towing three 20mm on trailers
- 1 x tractor LAA
- 66 men
H+16½ hours.
   ‘F’ Troop lands a reconnaissance party:
   • 1 x jeep
   • 6 men
   • 3 x Crusader tracked SP 20mm towing three 20mm on trailers
   • 1 x tractor LAA
   • 71 men

220/73 LAA
All of this unit was delayed.

H+9 hours:
   Battery Head Quarters
   • 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS
   • 1 x 15 cwt FFW, a15 cwt water
   • 15 men

   ‘D’ Troop
   • 1 x Jeep
   • 2 x Tractor LAA
   • 6 x 40mm SP
   • 68 men

H+16½ hours:
   ‘E’ Troop
   • 1 x Jeep
   • 1 x Tractor LAA
   • 3 x 40mm SP
   • 50 men

   ‘F’ Troop
   • 1 x Jeep
   • 2 x Tractor LAA
   • 6 x 40mm SP
   • 70 men

H+23 hours:
   ‘E’ Troop
   • 1 x Jeep
   • 1 x Tractor LAA
   • 3 x 40mm SP
   • 20 men

218/73 LAA

H+9 hours:
   ‘B’ Troop
   • 1 x Jeep
   • 2 x Tractor LAA
   • 6 x 40mm SP
   • 70 men
Follow on forces to the 3rd Canadian Division arrive by LST’s, and move forward to join the Division. The 4th Cdn LAA Regiment, RCA contains - 32nd, 69th and 100th Batteries, RCA. 32nd Bty (‘A’ & ‘C’ Troops) landed on D-Day, ‘B’ Troop landed on D+2. The remainder of the Regiment arrives on the 12th Jun 44 and all men and equipment is on shore by 2200 hrs:

**LST 1026**

"F" Troop, 100th LAA Bty
- 6 x Guns
- 1 x Jeep
- 51 men

"E" Troop, 100th LAA Bty
- 6 x Guns
- 1 x Jeep
- 51 men

Plus
- 36 men walking party

**LST 1027**

4th Cdn LAA Regiment - RHQ
- 10 x vehicles
- 39 men

69th LAA Bty
- 24 x Guns
- 3 x Jeeps
- 8 x 3 Ton WB Lorries
- 147 men

100th LAA Bty
- 24 x Guns
- 3 x Jeeps
- 8 x 3 Ton WB Lorries
- 141 men
Searchlights

Searchlight batteries landed two reconnaissance parties each since they had a large area to cover. They were deployed in sections of four with some designated to carry out beach illumination duties if required. The remainder established communications with the LAA and cooperated with then in the canopy role. Searchlight Battery Headquarters was positioned alongside the AAOR.

Troop organization was straightforward.

R1 Group
- 1 x Car 5 cwt 4 x 4 Jeep. Troop Commander, clerk, two despatch riders

R2 Group
- 1 x 15 cwt FFW. Subaltern, three driver operator. No 22 set, No 17 set, Bren, motorcycle

A Group
- 1 x 15 cwt GS. Motor mechanic, telephonist. Stores, spares, tools
- 8 x Leyland Retriever 6 x 4 SL Lorry
- 8 x 90mm Searchlight with SLC (Elsie) Radar. Troop Leader, Troop Sergeant, equipment repairer, two fitter electrical searchlight, four radio mechanic, 24 NCO searchlight numbers, 74 Private searchlight numbers
- 8 x No 17 set
- 5 x motorcycle

Y Group
- 8 x 15 cwt GS. Eight driver IC, eight cooks, eight drivers IC searchlight plant, despatch rider, driver/batman

The organization allows searchlight detachments to operate independently. Communication within the troop was by No 17 set and when so ordered detachments used the Searchlight Control Radar fitted to the light to detect and track enemy aircraft. The light would be ordered to be exposed when the guns were ready to fire. LAA guns were not radar controlled and depended on visual gun laying. At this date it was usual for the 90mm Searchlight to be carried by a Tilling Stevens 3 ton lorry which had its generator mounted under the bonnet with the engine. This could not be waterproofed so the older Leyland was issued instead.

REME

For the assault stage each assault group was to have a composite workshop with a combination of personnel and equipment from HAA, LAA and SL Workshops. These were not due to land until D+4. In the meantime AA units were to land 3 ton 4 X 4 l30 (battery charging) and 15 cwt T (telecommunications workshop) vehicles. In the early stages wireless sets would be vital and they required a lot of battery power.

Balloons

RAF Barrage balloons were flown on available LCT and LST. They were not flown on the first waves of LCT, those carrying DD tanks were not intended to beach and those carrying Breaching Teams and RMASR Centaurs did not fly them as they would have breached security. 200 balloons were transported across the Channel on D day, 60 for each beach and 20 as a reserve. Those balloons which were to be established on the beach were accompanied by a hand winch and two RAF personnel. Reserve balloons were not accompanied by RAF personnel. Beach Group personnel were required to assist with carrying the winch since, except for short distances, it required four men.
A balloon barrage was established along the coast and extending some 1500 feet inland. They were to be flown at 2000 feet except near airfields. In order to avoid interference with two Rearming and Refuelling Strips the following restrictions were imposed. There were to be no balloons within 2000 yards of an airstrip. There were also funnel shaped zones leading to the airstrip runways. In these zones there were to be no balloons for 3000 yards beyond the existing 2000 yard restriction. Between 3000 yards and 6000 yards balloons were to fly at 1000 foot, between 6000 yards and 9000 yards balloons were to fly at 1500 foot and between 9000 yards and 12000 yards there was a limit of 2000 foot even if the normal 2000 foot limit was at any time increased.

The restrictions applied to Emergency Landing Strips from D day and to Rearming and refuelling strips from D+3. Initially each of the strips had only one runway. When a second runway was later added additional restricted funnel zones were imposed

102 Beach Sub Area had balloons operated by No 2 Beach Balloon Squadron, consisting of 51 and 52 Beach Balloon Units.

Balloons were also flown on Gooseberry breakwaters.

Replacement balloons were flown by LCT and LST of the Shuttle Service as required. These were unaccompanied and 102 sub area provided personnel to unload them and the winches.

Smoke

The pioneer smoke detachments were distributed along the shore and along the landward boundary of 102 Beach Sub Area. They were to be ready to use No 24 smoke generators to create a screen along those lines as required and to maintain the screen for up to three hours.

Decoys

Decoy sites were planned for the gaps between beaches in the hopes of misleading enemy aircraft into bombing them instead of the active beaches. A site was established on the boundaries of Sword and Juno and occupied part of Oboe beach. Little information has been found on these sites, probably because they were established by RAF camouflage units which had established similar decoys in the UK.

Early Warning

Initially early warning came from headquarters ships. Largs provided air raid warning for I Corps. There was an air section with air staff officers and an AA liaison staff. 155 AAOR provided a small liaison party of two officers, two plotters and two orderlies. These received information from the AAOR when it was operational and sent warnings to 80 AA Brigade units. Air raid warnings were broadcast, and were received on R109 sets.

Communications were initially by wireless with the gun batteries using No 22 sets and the searchlights No 17 sets. Each heavy troop and section of light guns will have a R109 receiver for picking up early warning from the Anti Aircraft Defence Commander Headquarters. In addition certain troop headquarters will have R208 receivers for picking up early warning from the Anti Aircraft Operations Room. Line communications were laid as soon as possible.
Anti Aircraft Deployment - 21 June 44

This date is chosen both because the information is available for that date and because it illustrates the deployment of AA units two weeks after the initial landings and after various reorganizations.

The six HAA troops of 86 HAA Regiment were so organized that the two batteries each had three troops, two located inland of the beaches and one on the edge of the Beach Sub Area. 273 Battery on NAN had ‘A’ and ‘B’ troops near the beaches and ‘F’ Troop inland. 274 Battery on MIKE had ‘C’ and ‘D’ troops near the beaches and ‘E’ Troop inland.

The LAA troops of 114 LAA Regiment and 93 LAA Regiment were distributed along the beaches and with two troops covering Courseulles and the headquarters inland of it. On NAN, 375 Battery of 114 Regiment controlled its own ‘G’ and ‘H’ troops plus ‘E’ troop of 93 Regiment. On MIKE, 372 Battery of 114 Regiment controlled its own ‘A’ and ‘B’ troops plus ‘D’ and ‘F’ troopers of 93 Regiment.

Headquarters 86 HAA Regiment and 155 AAOR were situated inland near Beny sur Mer. REME workshops were at Tailleville.

Other units which had been deployed on Juno and 102 Beach Sub Area had been redeployed by this date.

Air Attacks

The greater number of air attacks were against Sword Beach. These were generally made by aircraft flying from east to west. Dawn and dusk were relatively quiet and most raids were made in the early hours of the morning or in the afternoon. The night raids were generally made by single bombers dropping high explosive and anti personnel bombs from altitudes up to 7000 feet. Day time raids were generally by formations of fighter bombers attacking from shallow dives. Where attacks were made on Juno they came from the south.

Anti aircraft units, including LBF, claimed 15 enemy aircraft destroyed, all but one in daylight. It was reported however that radar controlled LAA fire, assisted by radar controlled searchlights deterred many attackers.

After the first week, although air raids continued, the enemy concentrated on attacking shipping, mainly by laying mines at night.

D day

- 1550 hrs - Four Ju 88 attack from east to west over Q AA Assault Group area. Low level bombing raid.
- 1700 hrs - Six Ju 88 in two groups of three from east to west over Q AA Assault Group area. Low level bombing raid.

D+1

- 2345 to 0500 hrs - Approximately twelve aircraft from east to west and circling over the beach area. Aircraft launched individual attacks diving from 4000 foot to 500 foot, mainly against shipping but some anti personnel bombs on the beaches and forward areas. LAA engaged with an undirected barrage in which the Navy joined. No radar was as yet available.
- 2315 hrs - One Ju 88 dropped one bomb on NAN.
D+2
- 0001 to 0430 hrs - Approximately six aircraft attacked QUEEN and NAN. More aircraft attacked shipping offshore.
- 0430 hrs - A Do 217 made a machine gun and bombing attack on MIKE.
- 0600 hrs - Three Me 109 flew east to west offshore of NAN.
- 1645 hrs - Ten Me 109 and FW 190 attacked shipping from east to west.
- 2300 hrs - One Ju 88 made a bombing attack on NAN from the south.

D+3
- 0024 to 0424 hrs - Seven aircraft made low level bombing attacks on the beach. They attacked separately and from different directions. QUEEN.
- 2315 hrs - A Me 210 made a low level bombing attack.
- 2340 hrs - There were several attacks by single aircraft bombing from 3000 feet.

D+6
- 1400 hrs - A number of FW 190 attacked MIKE from the north east.
- 2320 hrs - A single aircraft attacked MIKE from the north east.

D+7
- 0001 to 0050 hrs - Fifteen to twenty aircraft attacked QUEEN and MIKE from all directions, The greatest concentration was on Colleville which was bombed from 7000 to 8000 feet.
- 2315 hrs - One fighter flew from north to south against MIKE. It glided in with engine cut off and bombed without being detected.

The Gale

D+13
The gale that was to last for two days and destroy Mulberry A started. At 0330 hrs the wind suddenly increased and it soon became impossible to continue unloading. By 1030 hrs all discharge in the anchorage had ceased and ferry craft took shelter inside Gooseberry 4. Three loaded Rhino ferries were still alongside MT ships and tugs were sent to tow them to safety inside the Gooseberry. One broke adrift before a tug arrived and it drifted ashore. A second Rhino was towed safely in but the third broke lose from the tug that was towing it and it drifted alongside the outside of the Gooseberry.

At 0900 hrs Twelve LCT of the Shuttle Service had arrived. Since it was then impossible to beach them they were ordered to shelter inside the Gooseberry. Owing to the congestion inside the Gooseberry not all the LCT could get in and seven drifted ashore, six of them breaking their backs.

Shortly after midday four LST were beached, dried out and unloaded. They successfully un-beached again at 2040 hrs. As conditions were still worsening a signal was sent at 2100 hrs ordering that no more LST should be beached. Three coasters were beached during the day but they were soon broadside on to the beach. They were still there a week later although they had been discharged.

At 1240 hrs a MT ship dragged its anchor and drifted into HMS Diadem, holing her in four places above the waterline. At 1915 hrs the MT ship Fort Poplar ran aground but was later pulled off.

At 2000 hrs NOIC reported that the beach resembled D Day. Apart from the larger vessels mentioned above there were many small craft aground and damaged. All convoy sailings were suspended.
D+14
The storm worsened and the wind reached Force 8 in the early afternoon. At 1315 hrs HMS Hilary began to drag her anchors, she had put two down, and sailed further to seaward to give room to manoeuvre.

Apart from many small craft casualties LST 386 dragged her anchor and drifted ashore on NAN WHITE. She was damaged and was later towed back to the UK, after being unloaded. HMS Tasajera dragged alongside the Gooseberry and was holed. She sailed back to the UK for repairs. Chant 26 dragged ashore.

Despite all the difficulties 544 personnel and 15 vehicles were landed from the beached LST and 1354 tons of stores were unloaded from the beached coasters.

D+15
The weather remained unfavourable with a Force 6 wind and heavy seas. At 1500 hrs, fourteen LST's were ordered to try and beach, which they did successfully. They unloaded and un-beached again. Chant 7 capsized and was lost. The only stores landed this day were from the stranded coasters.

D+16
Wind and sea conditions gradually improved. The beaching and unloading of LST's continued successfully. Ferry Craft were unable to secure alongside the MT ships so they could not be unloaded. No stores were landed. HMS Hilary returned and a start was made on clearing up the damage.

D+17
Saw a great deal of activity on the part of staffs on both sides of the Channel. The unloading programmes had been seriously interrupted at a crucial time in the build up. LST's were being unloaded but the unloading of MT ships and stores coasters was at a standstill. Furthermore the number of beached and damaged craft were obstructing the beaches.

The first important decision to be implemented was the use of LST's to discharge MT ships and clear the backlog. All those LST's which had unloaded and un-beached were ordered to go alongside MT ships at first light. Port Operating personnel, using the MT ships own derricks as normal, lifted the vehicles onto the upper deck of LST's. They were then lowered on the LST's lifts to the tank deck. Vehicles were reversed into the tank deck so that they were correctly positioned for rapid unloading after beaching. When the tank deck was full further vehicles were parked on the upper deck. LST's then beached and unloaded as normal. This was very successful with British LST's which had a lift. Two LST's could discharge a MT ship. The US LST's which had ramps instead of lifts were not so successful. It was not possible for them to carry vehicles on the tank deck so that only the upper deck could be used. This method of unloading MT ships did not delay the LST's and all were ready for sailing for the UK at the usual time.

Later in the day it was possible to resume the unloading of coasters, first by beaching and then as the weather improved by ferry craft.

There were still difficulties to come. HMS Scylla, the flagship of Naval Commander Eastern Task Force, was mined and incapable of moving. The Naval Commander and his staff moved to HMS Hilary. This was inconvenient to say the least at this time of renewed activity. HMS Scylla was towed to the UK on D+18.
D+18
It was reported that all convoys were running and the normal unloading routine was resumed. However much time had been lost.

Gooseberry 4 stood up to storm very well. It protected large numbers of small craft and these were secure throughout. There was a two foot swell inside the breakwater but although uncomfortable this did not cause concern or damage. It was found that three of the Corncob ships had subsided into deeper water as a result of the storm but the protection was not compromised.

As a consequence of the storm and the extra work it had made necessary for the staffs it was decided to delay the return of the Naval Commander Force ‘J’ to the UK.

Much work remained to be done in clearing the beaches of beached and damaged craft. The Landing Craft Recovery Units and the heavier repair units were fully occupied. Sections of Port Repair Parties were landed from the depot ships to carry out repairs on the small craft stranded on the beach. Additional hull repair personnel were sent from the UK together with stocks of materials and electric welding sets which had been kept in reserve for such an emergency. Repair ship LCE1 and a reserve port repair party were sent from the UK. Although some of the small craft could be re-floated many, plus some larger craft, had to wait until the next spring tide on 8 July before they could be re-floated. The stranded coasters were also re-floated at this time.

Additional repair facilities and personnel were also found on the UK side of the Channel to repair craft and ships that were returned there.
Appendix A

Report on action in which No 1 Tp assaulted the beach defences at BERNIERE SUR MER (MR 993895 Sheet 7E/5) on 6 Jun 44 by Lt JH SAUNDERS

Intention of the tp
(1) To make, mark, and keep clear an exit from the beach at A to the first lateral rd (see sketch) and then
(2) to clear the lateral to the next exit on the left.

Method

1. Breaching team :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Sherman Crabs</td>
<td>1 G 1 H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 br AVRE</td>
<td>1 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Fascine AVRE</td>
<td>1 B 1 C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Log carpet AVRE (tp comd)</td>
<td>1 D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Petard AVRE</td>
<td>1 F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The crabs to flail through suspected mined areas among beach obstacles and above HWM. The br to be placed against the 5’ wall to the right of Ramp A. The ditch at C to be filled with a fascine.

On Tue, 6 Jun, LCT 1408 was 30 mins late, touching down at 0815 hrs. LCT 1409 touched down at 0820 hrs. Both craft touched down right among the beach obstacles which had fuzed shells tied on them, but all vehs were able to get ashore without touching any of these, and DRY was reported at approx 0830 hrs.

On touching down at 0815 hrs I observed that the log carpet was not needed and jettisoned it, and ordered the Crab on the craft to proceed with the plan by itself. A lane was successfully flailed up to the wall and the br was dropped in the correct place. The br tk then went up the br and struck a mine at the top losing a track and blocking the br.

I then ordered the Crab (Cpl Cavill) to go along the beach below HWM and flail a path up to the wall where it had been broken down to some extent at a point just to the right of 'B'.

In the meantime LCT 1409 had touched down and the other Crab (Sgt Crewe) commenced flailing up to the wall to the right of 'B' followed by Cpl Cavill. Both Crabs managed to get up the wall and "UP" was reported at approx 0840 hrs.

I then ordered the Crabs to Flail to the lateral and then along the lateral to the ramp at 'A', then to return and complete flailing of lateral to Exit No 2. This was done and IC dropped a fascine in ditch at 'C' and later destroyed by charging a steel rail obstacle at MR 997854. "CLEAR was reported at 0845 hrs.

Meanwhile the Bulldozer (Spr Scott) had been signalled up to the br and had pushed the br tk (1E ) clear of the br to one side. Sgt Smith (comd of 1E ) then dismounted and, with his crew and Lt Oxtoby (1F) , cleared mines by hand from the top of the br to the rly. Thus a second exit was completed.

Sgt Smith then directed Sherman tks up the br until a porpoise towed by one became stuck between the br girders. The Bulldozer tried to remove this but failed, and when it returned to its parking place at the side of the lane Spr Scott, the dvr, in dismounting stepped on an AVP mine which exploded, killing him and wounding Sgt Smith.

The damaged porpoise proved to be an obstacle to Bren Carriers and so light vehs were sent up exit at 'B' while tks continued the use the br.
Lt Oxtoby remained at 'A' to keep the exit clear and I remained at 'B'.

Later a second fascine was dropped at 'C' and split and spoil bulldozed over it to improve the crossing.

NOTES:

1. It was not possible to use the Petard against the sea wall as large numbers of inf were already sheltering under the wall when the AVRE arrived.

2. The Porpoise sledge is liable to jam in the br when being towed by a tk.

3. The amount of eqpt and explosives carried inside the AVRE seriously reduce the crew's capacity to fight the AVRE.

4. The Br Tk going first up the br struck a mine just at the top and blocked the gap. The bulldozer pushed this AVRE out of the way.

Périers Sur Le Dan (Sgd) JH SAUNDERS Lt RE
15 Jun 44. 1 Tp
Appendix B

TOP SECRET COPY NO. 12
OPERATION "OVERLORD"
3 CDN INF DIV ADM PLAN

SECTION XVII
PROVOST SERVICES
UNITS AVAILABLE

1.
(a) Div Provost
One section, 4 Cdn Pro Coy will be under command each of 7, 8 and 9 Cdn Inf Bdes for the assault.
One section will land at same time as Div HQ and will be directly under command of APM at Div HQ.
One section and HQ 4 Cdn Pro Coy will land 2nd tide D Day. This section will take over Traffic Control
and Refugee Control on Div Routes from Beach Maintenance Area forward.

(b) Corps Provost
One section 102 Corps Pro Coy will be under command 3 Cdn Inf Div for D and D plus 1. This section
will be employed on Traffic control of routes to Sub-Sections "KNEE" and "ELBOW" and in signing
Formation Assembly Areas within these Sub-Sections.

(c) CMP (VP)
Two sections 601 CMP Coy (VP) will be placed under command 3 Cdn Inf Div for the purpose of
establishing a Prisoner of War Cage in STAR Beach Maintenance Area. These sections will remain
under command until 1 Corps HQ resumes control, when they will revert to Corps, continuing to man
the cage.

(d) Royal Marine Police will assist 102 Beach Sub Area Provost on the beaches. APM 102 Beach Sub
Area to co-ordinate.

2. Allotment of areas will be notified when and as necessary.

PROVOST TRANSPORT

3.
(a) Sections of 4 Cdn Pro Coy are limited to 16 personnel and 3 vehicles, excluding motorcycles.

(b) Eight motorcycles (light) will be landed for each of the assault sections. In addition, four Villiers
James Machines per Assault Section will be landed.

RECI PROCAL POWERS OF ARREST

4.
(a) Military, Naval and Air Force police of all forces of the Allied Expeditionary Forces are authorized
and empowered by the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force to maintain order, enforce
authority, and make arrests within the area of their responsibility without regard to the nationality of the
personnel concerned or to the service to which they belong. Commanders of major units will publish
the provisions of this order to all members of their respective commands.

(b) Whenever practicable, arrests will be effected by the police of the same nationality as the offender.
Whenever it is necessary for the military police of one ally to arrest any offender belonging to forces of
another ally, the offender will be handed over to the nearest Unit or Formation/Organization (Army
Navy or Air Force as the case may be) of the ally to whose forces the offender belongs, together with a report of the circumstances.

STRAGGLERS

5.
(a) Div Provost will deal with stragglers by directing them: -
   (i) To the unit to which they belong or
   (ii) To Unit assembly Areas in Sub-Section "ELBOW" or "KNEE" (See Trace "P") or
   (iii) If necessary, to Medical installations.

(b) After HQ 1 Corps has assumed administrative control, stragglers in STAR Beach Maintenance area will be dealt with by Beach Pro Coy's and directed to: -

   (i) Forward coy or Detachment of 10 Canadian Reinforcement Battalion or
   (ii) After they have landed, to Corps Reception Camps, whence they will be returned to their units.

(c) Stragglers from Allied Forces will be directed as soon as practicable to the nearest appropriate formation, together with relevant reports. Escorts, if necessary, will be obtained from the allied force.
Appendix C
Appendix 6 to the FGH War Diary
Transcribed including original spellings and punctuation, 13 Feb 1994.

10 CDN ARMD REGT (FORT GARRY HORSE)
21 Jun 44
2 Cdn Armd Bde

REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF D.D. TKS IN THE
ASSAULT

1. GENERAL As a result of the Regiment's experience in the recent landing and the training prior thereto the following notes are compiled. The 1 Hussars were launched much further out than this Regt; due to the decision reached by D.S.O.A.G. Comdr R.E.D. Ryder V.C. - concurred in by the Sqn Ldr., "B" and "C" were put off very near the beach. Hence the other Regt experienced coming in on a heavy sea and arriving on the beach short of Tks due to flounderings. Personally, I agree with the D.S.O.A.G's decision not to risk the tks and mind that only one L.C.T. was damaged by shell fire in consequence causing the loss of two D.D. Tks as a result. With more infm recently, it is now possible to make a Report, up to the time of touching down upon the beach.

2. TRG PRIOR TO OP Basic Trg sound. Too much time spent at "B" Wing in "Launchings". Attempts were made to create a record no. per diem. Thus practice in navigation with and without compass and periscope was insufficient. The RN. - "N" Sqn L.C.T. were excellent throughout and a close corp was attained before the OP. - this was important. Insufficient land eqpt and time seemed available for these two sqns before the OP they complained that they were getting web footed. Fortunately, sound trg well before the special trg., and every opportunity to get land work caused the two sqns to acquit themselves well on the Day. More attention might have been given Escape Drill incl use of A.T.E.A. and the rubber dinghy.

3. LOADING Carried out satisfactorily. The L.C.T. IV is to be preferred to the III, as it has a lower ramp before the loading door and Tks can by pass on the deck. In some cases the E.S.O. fusses a bit getting the Tks. and R.N. out of step. These M.C.Os Officers needed more practice with these Tks.

4. LENGTH OF VOYAGE Impossible to arrange but too long for comfort from seasickness. Combined with the effect of the run-in upon the Tk crews, if is a factor to be considered. Quite a few crews arrived on the beach in poor shape - especially the dvrs.

5. INTERCOMN Satisfactory throughout. If was found, however, that the net with A.V.R.E's was not necessary. Afloat, Naval means used.

6. LENGTH OF LAUNCH As noted above, the launch was really a wet wade. Use of screws was, however, necessary and Tks could hardly have got ashore without them. At first it was decided to close to 3000x but as the seas was still rough there, land was further closed by the D.S.O.A.G and the A.V.R.E's were followed in. I consider that the risk to the L.C.T. by so closing was legitimate and that the saving of the Tks proved it. It is considered that 7000x is unnecessarily long, it is not needed to protect the L.C.T. and puts too much strain upon the D.D. crews. Ref paras 4 above and 7 below.
7. AIR AND S.P. A TK BOMBARDMENT The air did not appear to hit St Aubin Sur Mer at all and certainly did not touch on "assigned target" a special strong point which caused loss upon the beach. On the right on NAN WHITE, the effect seemed better. This should be improved.

The S.P. Arty seemed very patchy, again especially upon the left. The great majority of houses looking down upon the beach appeared quite untouched and were later discovered to be full of resolute snipers.

A more thorough or successful preliminary bombardment might have cut down casualties and rendered the D.D. SP task easier. Despite this the L.C.T. were able to launch close with trivial loss.

8. A.V.R.E's Those were originally planned to follow in the D.D. Tks but by Commdr Ryder's orders, they preceded them. They did their work well but took some time to complete gaps. It appeared that they took about 45' on the left and 75' on the Right. On the former fl "C" went through a mine field successfully to save time. This would seem to need improvement.

9. SP DURING RUN-IN Other than the prelim air and the S.P. arty the sp was good. The L.C.G's and the L.C.T. (C.B.) seemed especially helpful. The other types - L.C.T. (R), etc assisted. It is thought that sea borne sp fire by well trained gunners firing close in, directly, on selected objects is very good indeed and could be increased in volume.

Smoke for the actual launch might be useful, provided it was local and did not blind the assault fire.

Rescue Craft for the drowned Tks seemed adequate under the circumstances, the use of their rubber dinghies could be improved by loosing them in the rear decks and tethering them by a long rope to the Tk. They should thus be nearby for the crew when they surfaced.

10. THE RUN-IN Due to the close launching carried out, little was learnt before the actual deep wading on tracks began. As in normal tactics, it is recon that the assault on each Beach be made in two waves. This allows more dispersion afloat, distracts the defence, allows more flexibility of manoeuvre before beaching and gives a reserve or sp wave.

Well off shore, the C.C. must go under armour 3000x to 2000x and the outside brimacle is not used. This equipment and the time spent in setting it does not seem to be of any real value. In view of this, the dvr should be better equipped with periscope and front vision to drive the craft in himself, it is recon.

The .5" gun that was reco by some, to be fitted to the turret ring socket, to be used during the run-in is not thought to be necessary. The original order of landing of the assault elements would appear to be sound - i.e. Tks., A.V.R.E.s, Inf. and beach Engineers.

11. D.D. EQPT

It is considered that the Sherman III is more suitable to D.D. work as it is not susceptible to drowning. No doubt supply dictates the V, however.

Trouble in deflating was encountered after enemy fire had struck or shocked the Tank. The struts could not be broken and pillars had to be stabbed from the deck under fire. This needs mechanical attention. Inflating presented no difficulties. It is thought that the Air Bottles and valves were better placed in the stern due to danger from enemy fire.

Fire Hazard from screens should be considered. Some simple method of dripping sea water upon them might be adequate. Ashore, screens were ripped off as soon as possible.
Shell and bullet penetration of screens. M.G. or rifle bullets did not appear to materially effect the efficiency. Several near misses by 75mm shells, however, tore large holes even when the Tank was immersed.

Life Saving Eqpt A.T.E.A. - excellent. After leaving "A" wing, as much training as possible was given by having a Swim Pool in BOURNEMOUTH. "Mae Wests" too bulky for crew, though necessary to keep a heavy man up and so used.

Rubber Dinghy: Very good but suggest tethering to the A.F.V. on the rear deck, preferably opened out.

Periscopes and deck brimacle:

Ref para 10 above. The Brimacle does not seem necessary. The dvr's periscopes did not seem to fit closely enough in these Tks. or to give adequate vision on the run-in and especially beaching. When approaching the beach and the mined obs. in several cases the C.C. had to come out of armour under fire and peer over the screen to see the obs., and control the driver on the I.C.; neither could see them through their periscopes. It is reco that a greatly improved type of periscope be provided or better that some type of window be installed in the front of the screen for the dvr to see through. This would also help the dvr. to bring the Tk in and so free the C.C. to observe the beach defs.

Structural: It was found on Exercises with the Shermans that despite the metal stringing around the top of the screen, it was inclined to bend in about the middle of the sides in turbulent water. Struts out from the turret to the sides are reco. Larger hatches for the Dvr a Co Dvr are reco. as in the Radial engine version of the Sherman.

12. Conclusion: The above report embodies criticism and recos. of the equipment and employment of the D.D. Tks. in the recent landing by this Regt.

I do not consider that the D.D. equipment or trg was wasted by this Regt launching so close to the beach, without a swim. We were prepared and equipped for this swim but, under the existing circumstances, the decision to launch close in was well justified.

The screens permitted deep wading beyond normal water proof depth and will always be of great value in similar operations.

I consider 7000x, normally, too long a swim but feel that it is very important to have those special tks. and to launch them when and where they can best influence the situation. The Assault plan should include these Tks and be elastic enough to commit this flexibility to employment.

The technical and tactical recos put forward are the result of considerable experience in trg. and on "D" day, similar to the 6 C.A.R. (1H), except that their run-in was much longer.

I feel that the "D.D." employment of Tks is an important addition to their normal use and should be considered in future Ops. involving wide water obs. I think that their early arrival upon the beach on "D" day gave the Assaulting Infantry immediate valuable fire sp which may well have vitally affected the entire landing.

Providing that adequate land trg. is included with the water trg., this Regt is ready to try another landing if it is so desired at any time.
DRLS/HAND/POST (signed)

Time of Signature 2300 hrs (R.E.A.Morton Lt.-Col., RE A/drs Commanding

Fd 10 C.A.R. (Fort Garry Horse)

Reference: http://steel-chariots.22web.org/ftgrydd.htm
Commander of On Board Troops: Major H.S. Blanshard, Fort Garry Horse
Loaded at Hard 'G3': at 0730 hrs, 03 Jun 44
Landed on Beach: NAN WHITE, at H + 60, 'D' Day

The following is a diagram of a "typical" landing craft load of Fort Garry Horse tanks and soft-skin vehicles, along with universal carriers and 6 pdr AT guns from other units also landing on D-Day.

Note that the 75mm gun tanks are all Sherman III diesel vehicles and the Firefly is a Sherman VC. Landing craft were loaded with an assortment of vehicles from varying units, depending on what was deemed necessary for the initial landing. Non-essential vehicles were to follow in the days following D-Day. LCT's with the initial assault wave DD Sherman tanks would not have had any Firelys on board as both 'B' and 'C' Squadrons were totally equipped with 75mm gun tanks; DD equipment not having been able to be fitted to Firelys due to the length of the 17 pdr gun tube.

http://steel-chariots.22web.org/lndcrft.htm
### ORDER OF BATTLE

#### 3rd CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION ASSAULT GROUP

**3rd Canadian Infantry Division HQ's - Major General Roderick Keller**

- No. 3 Defence and Employment Platoon (Lorne Scots) - Lt J.D.L. Stewart
  - Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) - Lt Col P.C. Klaehn
    - 'A' Coy (MG) - Major J.W.H. Rowley
    - 'B' Coy (MG) - Major John Carson
    - 'C' Coy (MG) - Major C.C. Hill
    - 'D' Coy (Mortars) - Major R.M. Ross

- 7th Reconnaissance Regiment (17th D.Y.R.C.H.) - Lt Col T.C. Lewis
  - 'HQ' Squadron - Landed 15<sup>th</sup> July 44
  - 'A' Squadron - Landed 15<sup>th</sup> July 44
  - 'B' Squadron - D-Day: Beach Gp (Maj W.C. Bewen) & Contact Det (Capt G.V. Newsam)
  - 'C' Squadron - Landed 15<sup>th</sup> July 44

**7th Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ's - Brigadier Harry W. Foster**

- 7th CIB Ground Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots) - Lt M.D. Grant
  - Royal Winnipeg Rifles - Lt Col J.M. Meldram
    - 'A' Coy - Major Frederick E. Hodge (POW 8/6/44)
    - 'B' Coy - Capt P.E. Gower
    - 'C' Coy - Major J.M.D. Jones
    - 'D' Coy - Major L.R. Fulton

- Regina Rifle Regiment - Lt Col F.M. Matheson
  - 'A' Coy - Major Duncan Grosch (WIA 6/6/44), Capt Ron Shawcross
  - 'B' Coy - Major F.L. Peters
  - 'C' Coy - Major C.S.T. Tubb
  - 'D' Coy - Major J.V. Love (KIA 6/6/44), Lieutenant H.L. Jones

- 1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish Regiment - Lt Col F.N. Cabeldu
  - 'A' Coy - Major Plows
  - 'B' Coy - Major R.M. Lendrum
  - 'C' Coy - Major D.G. Crofton
  - 'D' Coy - Major MacEwan

**8th Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ's - Brigadier Kenneth G. Blackader**

- 8th CIB Ground Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots) - Lt Caldecott
  - Queen's Own Rifles of Canada - Lt Col J.G. Spragge
    - 'A' Coy - Major H.E. Dalton
    - 'B' Coy - Major C.O. Dalton
    - 'C' Coy - Major O.A. Nickson
    - 'D' Coy - Major J.N. Gordon
    - ‘Support’ Coy - Captain R.A. Cottrill
    - ‘HQ’ Coy - Captain T.E. Parkinson
Le Régiment de la Chaudière - Lt Col J.B. Mathieu
'A' Coy - Major Hugues Lapointe
'B' Coy - Major J.F. L'Espérance
'C' Coy - Major Georges Sevigny
'D' Coy - Major Gustave Taschereau

North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment - Lt Col D.B. Buell
'A' Coy - Major J.A.M.C. McNaughton (KIA 6/6/44), Capt J.L. Belliveau
'B' Coy - Major R.B. Forbes
'C' Coy - Major R.H. Daughney
'D' Coy - Major J. Ernest Anderson
'Support' Coy - Capt. C. C. Gammon
'Carrier' Coy - Capt. J. A. Currie

9th Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ's - Brigadier D.G. Cunningham
9th CIB Ground Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots) - Lt A.P. Graham

Highland Light Infantry of Canada - Lt Col F.M. Griffiths
'A' Coy - Major D. Durnward
'B' Coy - Captain V. Stark
'C' Coy - Major R. Hodgins
'D' Coy - Major H. Anderson
'Support' Coy - Capt D.P. Kennedy
'HQ's' Coy - Major F.A. Sparks

Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders - Lt Col F.M. Christiansen
'A' Coy - Major F.L. Fisher
'B' Coy - Major Gemmel
'C' Coy - Capt Milligan
'D' Coy - Major Ben Dunkelman

North Nova Scotia Highlanders - Lt Col C. Petch
'A' Coy - Major Léon M. Rhodenizer
'B' Coy - Major Douglas
'C' Coy - Major Don Learment
'D' Coy - Major Matson
'Support' Coy - Capt A.J. Wilson

Royal Canadian Artillery HQ's - Brigadier P.A.S. Todd

12th Field Regiment, RCA - Lt Col R.H. Webb
11th Battery - Major D.M. Wilson
16th Battery - Major J.D. Ross
43rd Battery - Major A.G. Goldin

13th Field Regiment, RCA - Lt Col F e P.T. Clifford
22nd Battery - Major J.D. Baird
44th Battery - Major J.D. Young (DOW - 6/6/44)
78th Battery - Major J.W. Bennett

14th Field Regiment, RCA - Lt Col H.S. Griffin
34th Battery - Major A.W. Duguid
66th Battery - Major J.F. Kibler
81st Battery - Major G.E. Purcell
3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA - Lt Col J.P. Phin
4th AT Battery - Major MacDonald
52nd AT Battery - Major Rose
94th AT Battery - Major Scott
103th AT Battery - Major Love

4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA - LCol C.E. Woodrow
32nd LAA Battery (‘A’ & ‘C’ Troops only) - Major Jack Cousins

Royal Canadian Engineers HQ’s - Lt Col R.S. Cassidy
3rd Cdn Field Park Coy, RCE - Major H.L. Main
6th Cdn Field Company, RCE - Major T.R. Murphy
16th Cdn Field Company, RCE - Major V.C. Hamilton (WIA 6/6/44), Maj D.W. Cunnington
18th Cdn Field Companies, RCE - Major C.E. Brown
3rd Cdn Div Bridge Platoon, RCE - Lt A. Secter

Royal Canadian Corps of Signals HQ’s - Lt Col G.O. Gamble
3rd Cdn Infantry Divisional Signals (including 14 and 19 Beach Sig Sections)

Royal Canadian Army Service Corps HQ’s - Lt Col J.R.W.T. Bessonette
7th Cdn Infantry Brigade Company - Major J.S. Rogers
8th Cdn Infantry Brigade Company
9th Cdn Infantry Brigade Company
3rd Cdn Infantry Divisional Troops Company

Royal Canadian Army Ordnance Corps
3 Cdn Infantry Division Ordnance Field Park - Major R.W. McBride

Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
14th Cdn Field Ambulance - Lt Col J.W. Merritt
22nd Cdn Field Ambulance - Lt Col M.R. Caverhill
23rd Cdn Field Field Ambulance - Lt Col L.A. Loree
5th Cdn Field Dressing Station
7th Cdn Field Dressing Station
7th Cdn Field Hyg Section
Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers HQ's - Lt Col E.M. Shields

4 Cdn L.A.A. Workshop (Type A) - Capt G.R. Currie
7 Cdn Infantry Brigade Workshop - Major R.B. Storms
8 Cdn Infantry Brigade Workshop - Maj J.B. Butterill
9 Cdn Infantry Brigade Workshop - Major L.P. Baker
35 Cdn LAD (3rd Cdn Anti-Tank Regt) - A/Capt J.H. Bourne
36 Cdn LAD (Type A - 7 Cdn Infantry Brigade) - Lt R.A. Evans
37 Cdn LAD (Type A - 8 Cdn Infantry Brigade) - Lt G.R. Belton
38 Cdn LAD (Type A - 9 Cdn Infantry Brigade) - Capt W.T. Mills
30 Cdn LAD (Type B - 3 Cdn Field Park Coy) - Lt L.G. Marks
31 Cdn LAD (Type B - 3 Cdn Infantry Div Sigs) - Capt H.G. Ambrose
6 Cdn LAD (Type B - C. H. of O. (MG)) - Lt R Merryweather
(up until 19 Jul - Lt W Mills)
32 Cdn LAD (Type D - 12 Cdn Field Regt) - A/Capt T.C. Hastings
33 Cdn LAD (Type D - 13 Cdn Field Regt) - A/Capt W.T.E. Duncan
34 Cdn LAD (Type D - 14 Cdn Field Regt) - Lt F.B. Munroe
62 Cdn LAD (Type A - 7 Cdn Recce Regt) - Capt L.C. West

Postal
3rd Cdn Infantry Division Postal Unit

Canadian Provost Corps

4 Cdn Provost Company - A/Capt G.C. Embery

Intelligence

3 Cdn Field Security Section - Capt C.R.R. Douthwaite

Misc Units

14 Cdn Met Section - Capt Steele
Det 2 Cdn Field Historical Section - Capt J.R. Martin
2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade HQ's - Brigadier R.A. Wyman

6th Cdn Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) - Lt Col R.J. Colwell
- ‘HQ’ Squadron - Major K.M. Harding
- ‘A’ Squadron - Major W. Dudley Brooks
- ‘B’ Squadron - Major J.S. Duncan
- ‘C’ Squadron - Major A.D.A. Marks

10th Cdn Armoured Regiment (Fort Garry Horse) - Lt Col R.E.A. Morton
- “HQ” Squadron - Major C.W. Fletcher
- ‘A’ Squadron - Major H.C. Blanshard
- ‘B’ Squadron - Major J.A. Meindl (WIA 6 June)
- ‘C’ Squadron - Major W. Bray

27th Cdn Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers) - Lt Col M.B.K. Gordon
- ‘HQ’ Squadron - Major F.H. Baldwin
- ‘A’ Squadron - Major E.W.L. Arnold
- ‘B’ Squadron - Major G.S. Mahon
- ‘C’ Squadron - Major V.O. Walsh

Royal Canadian Corps of Signals

2nd Cdn Armoured Brigade Signals - Major P.F. Burgoyne

Royal Canadian Army Service Corps

2nd Cdn Armoured Brigade Company - Major N. Allan

Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

2nd Cdn Armoured Bde Workshop - Major D.F. Cornish
(only “Roger Group” landed on 6th Jun 44: WO2 R Maynard)

54 Cdn LAD (Type C - 6th Cdn Armoured Regiment) - Capt P.C. Neil

55 Cdn LAD (Type C - 10th Cdn Armoured Regiment) - Capt R.G. Struthers

85 Cdn LAD (Type C - 27th Cdn Armoured Regiment) - Lt C.H. Neil

Royal Canadian Army Ordnance Corps

2nd Cdn Armoured Brigade Ordnance Field Park - Major T.J. Warner

Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps

17th Cdn Light Field Ambulance - Lt Col J.G. Jose
Canadian Provost Corps

11th Cdn Provost Section - Capt M.A. Fitzgibbon

GHO, Army and Corps Troops under command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division

Armoured

22nd Dragoons, Royal Armoured Corps (Crab tanks) - Lt Col G.H. Grosvenor
‘B’ Squadron: Major E.B.G. Oates
  1 Troop - Lt I. Hammerton
  2 Troop - Lt M.G. Barraclough
  3 Troop - Lt W. Shaw
  4 Troop - Lt Civil Burbidge

2nd Armoured Support Regiment, Royal Marines (Centaurs) - Lt Col H. S. Stephens
3rd Battery: A/T/Major M.B. Johnson RM
  P Troop - Capt L.L.A McKay, MC SAUDF
  Q Troop - Capt K.R.M. Perrott RM
  S Troop - Capt. J. Brown RM
  T Troop - Capt. R. Kaye RM

2nd Armoured Support Regiment, Royal Marines (Centaurs)
4th Battery: A/T/Major G.F. Gowland RM
  W Troop - Capt R.M. Winter RM
  X Troop - Capt K. Stead RM
  Y Troop - Capt E.B. Norton SAUDF
  Z Troop -

Artillery

19th Cdn Field Regiment SP, RCA - Lt Col L.G. Clarke
  55 Battery - Major R.H. Mewburn
  63 Battery - Major R.S. Stronach
  99 Battery - Major R.S. Hetherington
  12 Cdn LAD (Type D) - Capt D.C. Little

62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA - Lt Col R.B.W. Bethell
  245th AT (M10 SP) Battery - Major Frank Bullivant, MC & Bar
  246th AT Battery - Major A.G. St G. Pollock
  247th AT Battery - Major H.D. Marsh
  248th AT (M10 SP) Battery - Major G.B.W. Woodroffe

Engineers

5th Cdn Field Company, RCE - Major F.A. McTavish

HQ 5th Assault Regiment, RE (Det)

26th Assault Squadron, RE - Major A.E. Younger
80th Assault Squadron, RE - Major Wiltshire
1 Troop - Lt John Holland Saunders
2 Troop - Lt Allan Alexander Oxtoby
3 Troop - Capt Cecil Francis Tracy
4 Troop - Capt Mare

9 Mech Equipment Section, RE (Det)
21 Mech Equipment Section, RE (Det)

Special Service

HQ's 4th Special Service Brigade - Brig B.W. Leicester

No. 48 Royal Marine Commando - Lt Col J.L. Moulton
  Second-in-Command - Maj Sanders
  Adjutant - Capt Dan Flunder
  Intel Officer - Lt H. Smedlely
  Liaison Officer - Capt de Frieses
  Medical Officer - Capt D.M. de R. Windsor
  Chaplain - Capt J. Armstrong
  FOB (attached) - Capt J. Tyler
  RSM - RSM Colin Travers
  'A' Troop - Capt Mike Reynolds
  'B' Troop - Capt Jim L. Perry (KIA 6/6/44)
  'X' Troop - Capt W.F. Hoare
  'Y' Troop - Capt Derick R. De Stacpool
  'Z' Troop - Capt Fred C.L. Lennard (KIA 6/6/44)
  'S' (Heavy Weapons) Troop - Capt Geoff Linnell
<table>
<thead>
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<th>J2</th>
<th>J3</th>
<th>Part J4</th>
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<td>9th Cdn Infantry Bde</td>
<td>Royal Marines</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMS LAWFORD, HQ</td>
<td>HMS WAVENEY, HQ</td>
<td>HMS ROYAL ULSTERMAN, HQ</td>
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<td>LCdr RH Bristowe</td>
<td>LCdr WRK Clark, RNR</td>
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<td>SS CLAN LAMONT</td>
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<td>Capt A Campbell, O.B.E.</td>
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<td>LCdr G Timmermans</td>
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<td>HMCS PRINCE DAVID</td>
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<td>Capt GLD Gibbs</td>
<td>Cdr T.D Kelly</td>
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<td>SS CANTERBURY</td>
<td>HMS BRIGadier</td>
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<td>Capt G D Walker</td>
<td>A/Cdr HUR Paramore</td>
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### LST Groups

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<td>425</td>
<td>A/Cdr C Dalrymple-Hay, Comdr 2th LST Flotilla</td>
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<td>Lt SK Stratton</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>A/LCdr H.B Shaw, RNR</td>
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<td>T/LCdr JM Cunningham, RNR</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>T/A/LCdr J K Jones, RNR</td>
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<td>LCdr GM Dixon, RANVR</td>
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<td>T/A/LCdr J Livingston, RNR</td>
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### Sub Groups

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### Bombardment Force ‘E’
**Juno Beach**

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<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
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<th>Assigned Targets</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fire Support Area ‘Y’ - 7th Cdn Infantry Brigade</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Fire Support Area ‘X’ - 8th Cdn Infantry Brigade</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HMS BELFAST</strong></td>
<td>150mm Battery at Ver Sur Mer</td>
<td><strong>HMS VENUS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdr R.G. Tosswill</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HMS DIadem</strong></td>
<td>105mm Battery at Beny Sur Mer</td>
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<td>Capt. E.G.A. Clifford</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FS LA COMBATTANTE</strong></td>
<td>Beach Defences on LOVE from H-40 until H-Hour</td>
<td><strong>HMS FAULKNER</strong></td>
<td>In Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capitaine de Corvette Patou</td>
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<td>A/Cdr CFH Churchill</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HMS VENUS</strong></td>
<td>Close support fire on MIKE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdr JSM Richardson</td>
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<td><strong>HMS STEVENSTONE</strong></td>
<td>Close support fire on NAN GREEN</td>
<td><strong>HMS FURY</strong></td>
<td>Beach Defences on OBOE from H-40 until H-Hour</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/LCdr HM Duff-Still</td>
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<td>LCdr TF Taylor</td>
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<td><strong>HMS STEVENSTONE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HMS BLEASDALE</strong></td>
<td>Close support fire on NAN WHITE</td>
<td><strong>HMS VENUS</strong></td>
<td>In Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdr HMS Mundy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HMS KEMPENFELT</strong> (Flag)</td>
<td>Close support fire on NAN RED</td>
<td><strong>HMS VENUS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt ML Power</td>
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<td><strong>HMCS ALGONQUIN</strong></td>
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<td><strong>HMS VENUS</strong></td>
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<td>A/Cdr DW Piers</td>
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<td><strong>HMS FURY</strong></td>
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<td><strong>FS LA COMBATTANTE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Landing Craft Tank (Rocket) - LCT(R)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>In Support 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade</strong></td>
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### FORCE J - ASSAULT FORCES

**Commodore GN Oliver**  
**HQ Ship - HMS HILARY**  
**Captain Sir JF Pages**

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<tr>
<td>Capt A Pugsley, RN</td>
<td>Capt R Otway-Ruthven, RN</td>
<td>Capt A Fanshaw, RN</td>
<td>Capt R Jefferys, RN</td>
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<td>8th Cdn Infantry Bde</td>
<td>9th Cdn Infantry Bde</td>
<td>Royal Marines</td>
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**2nd & 3rd Canadian LCI(L) Flotilla**  
Carrying 9th CIB & Others

| 115 | Lt Vincent Dana Ramsay, RCNVR |
| 118 | Lt Charles R. Bond, RCNVR |
| 135 | Lt John Douglas Kell, RCNVR |
| 250 | Lt H.M. Harrison, RCNVR |
| 252 | Lt Raymond E S Wakefield, RCNVR |
| 262 | Lt Peter R. Hinton, RCNVR (Temp) |
| 263 | Lt John B B Shaw, RCNVR |
| 276 | Lt Andrew A. Wedd, DSC, RCNVR |
| 299 | Lt William B. McGregor, RCNVR |
| 306 | Lt Andrew K. Stephens, RCNVR |

**3rd Cdn LCI(L) Flotilla**

| 125 | Lt Charles R. Parker, RCNVR |
| 270 | Lt A.C. Clark, RCNVR |

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<th>LCH 168</th>
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<td>MIKE RED</td>
<td>NAN WHITE</td>
<td>Lt Wilfred Bostock</td>
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<td>(LCdr Thornton)</td>
<td>DSOAG J.2</td>
<td>RNVR</td>
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<td>DSOAG J.1</td>
<td>Cdr RED Ryder, VC, RN</td>
<td>NAN RED</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdr Jonas, RN</td>
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<td>LCdr Arbuthnot, RN</td>
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**1st Canadian LCI(L) Flotilla**  
Carrying Beach Group

| 117 | Lt Richard Laurence Gordon, RCNVR |
| 177 | Lt William Cooper Gardner, RCNVR |
| 121 | Lt David Harold is Botly, RCNVR |
| 249 | Lt John Edward O'Rourke, RCNVR |
| 298 | Lt James Shaw Monteith, RCNVR |
| 301 | Lt Robert M. Smith, RCNVR |

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<tr>
<td>Cdr Struben, RN</td>
<td>3 LC(Flak) &amp; 36 LCT’s</td>
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</table>

| 48 LCT’s | 3 LC(Flak) & 36 LCT’s |

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<tr>
<th>7th Cdn Infantry Bde</th>
<th>8th Cdn Infantry Bde</th>
<th>9th Cdn Infantry Bde</th>
<th>Royal Marines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt A Pugsley, RN</td>
<td>Capt R Otway-Ruthven, RN</td>
<td>Capt A Fanshaw, RN</td>
<td>Capt R Jefferys, RN</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Cdn Infantry Bde</td>
<td>8th Cdn Infantry Bde</td>
<td>9th Cdn Infantry Bde</td>
<td>Royal Marines</td>
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</table>

**Escorts**

**HMS STEVENSTONE**  
A/LCdr HM Duff-Still

**HMS KEMPENFELDT**  
Capt ML Power

**HMS PETUNIA**  
Lt. GL Coles

**HMS ALGONQUIN**  
A/Cdr DW Piers

**FS LA COMBATTANTE**  
Capt de Cov Patou

**HNorMS GLAISDALE**  
LCdr D Kjeholt

**HMS CLARKIA**  
Lt JO Williams

**HMS VENUS**  
Cdr JSM Richardson

**HMS BLEASDALE**  
Cdr HMS Mundy

**HMS PINK**  
Cdr GV Legassick, RNR
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<th>MINESWEEPERS</th>
<th>MINESWEEPERS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Group 320</strong></td>
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<td><strong>9th M/S Flotilla</strong></td>
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<td>(A/Cdr G Nelson)</td>
<td>(A/Cdr RW Wainwright)</td>
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<td><strong>Fleet Minesweepers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Fleet Minesweepers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>HMS FANCY</strong></td>
<td><strong>HMS BANGOR</strong></td>
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<td>A/Cdr GA Simmer, RNR</td>
<td>Lt H Sobey</td>
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<td><strong>HMS LENNOX</strong></td>
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<td>LCDr TT Euman</td>
<td>A/LCdr GH Bird</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdr WHB Wallace</td>
<td>Cdr RWD Thomson</td>
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<td><strong>HMS RIFLEMAN</strong></td>
<td><strong>HMS TENBY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>T/Lt TE Norvell, RNR</td>
<td>A/Cdr RW Wainewright</td>
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**British Yard Mine Sweepers (159th BYMS Flotilla)**

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<tr>
<td>T/Lt WM McDugall, RNVR</td>
<td>T/Lt J Hobbs, RNVR</td>
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<td>T/Lt SR Wakefield, RNVR</td>
<td>T/Lt CE Haste, RNVR</td>
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<td><strong>2055</strong></td>
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<td>T/Lt AL Molcare, RNVR</td>
<td>T/Lt D McGrath, RNVR</td>
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**DanLayers**

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<td>T/Skr. HW Lang, RNR</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>HMS DALMATIA</strong></td>
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<td><strong>HMS ST BARBE</strong></td>
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<td>T/Lt DP Thomas, RNVR</td>
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### Motor Launch’s

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<td>A/Cdr CFH Churchill</td>
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<td>HMS FURY</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCDR LWL Argles</td>
<td>LCDR TF Taylor</td>
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</table>
### EASTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE

**FORCE ‘S’**
- USCG 31 (83428) LT jg Burke I Powers
- USCG 32 (83431) Ens Kpton P Schoppert
- USCG 33 (83432) Ens Wilbur M Anderson
- USCG 34 (83435) LT jg Gordon W Crafts
- USCG 35 (83439) LT jg George C Clark

**FORCE ‘J’**
- USCG 41 (83462) LT jg Thomas J Kroetch
- USCG 42 (83463) LT jg Robert F Madden
- USCG 43 (83464) USCG 48 (83473) Arrived Poole 17 Jun
- USCG 44 (83465) USCG 49 (83490)
- USCG 45 (83466) LT jg Peter Chase

**FORCE ‘G’**
- USCG 51 (83494)
- USCG 52 (83500)
- USCG 53 (83501)
- USCG 54 (83502)
- USCG 55 (83503)

### WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE

**FORCE ‘O’ - Convoy O-1**
- USCG 1 (83300) Ens Bernard B Wood
- USCG 2 (83304) Ens George T Meekins
- USCG 3 (83320) LT jg William J Starrett
- USCG 4 (83321) LT jg James P Smith
- USCG 5 (83327) Ens Brewster G Pattyson

**FORCE ‘O’ - Convoy O-3**
- USCG 11 (83366) LT jg Arthur R Lehne
- USCG 12 (83370) LT jg Morton Frank
- USCG 13 (83372) Ens Harvey D Ronne

**FORCE ‘U’ - Convoy U-1A**
- USCG 16 (83377) LT jg R V McPhail
- USCG 17 (83378) Ens Alvis D Arnhart

**FORCE ‘U’ - Convoy U-1B**
- USCG 18 (83398)
- USCG 19 (83399) LT jg Edwin R Frost
- USCG 20 (83401)
- USCG 21 (83402)

**FORCE ‘U’ - Convoy U-3**
- USCG 22 (83407)
- USCG 23 (83408) Ens John H Kellam
- USCG 24 (83409)
- USCG 25 (83411)

**Follow Up FORCE ‘B’ - Convoy B-1**
- USCG 26 (83412) LT jg Raymond M Rosenbloom
- USCG 27 (83415)

**Follow Up FORCE ‘B’ - Convoy B-2**
- USCG 28 (83416) Ens Robert D Sisco

**Follow Up FORCE ‘B’ - Convoy B-3**
- USCG 29 (83417) LT jg William H Williams
- USCG 30 (83425)
Based at Poole, England, and modified for service as rescue craft.

They were assigned to each of the invasion areas, with 30 serving off of the British and Canadian sectors and 30 serving off the American sectors. During Operation Neptune/Overlord these cutters and their crews carried out the Coast Guard's time honoured task of saving lives, albeit under enemy fire on a shoreline thousands of miles from home. The cutters of Rescue Flotilla One saved more than 400 men on D-Day alone and by the time the unit was decommissioned in December, 1944, they had saved 1,438 souls.

*CG-54 (CG-83502) off Normandy June 1944.*
Landing Ship Infantry (LSI):
The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) bought two pre-war steamers from Canadian National Steamships, and converted them for transporting troops: HMC Ships Prince David and Prince Henry. They could carry 550 infantrymen, as well as six Landing Craft, Assault (LCA) and two Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCMs). Their role was to get within a few kilometres from the landing beach and to launch the LCAs and LCMs from their davits. The LCAs and LCMs then acted as shuttles between the ships and the beach until all men were landed. On June 6, 1944, D-Day, Prince David and Prince Henry were used for landing Canadian and British troops on Juno Beach.

Landing Ship, Tank (LST):
LST was the military designation for naval vessels created during World War II to support amphibious operations by carrying significant quantities of tanks, other vehicles, and cargo, and for landing troops directly onto an unimproved shore. Three basic versions of the LST were developed during the war and Canada made use of the second and third versions.

The original version consisted of modified, shallow draft tankers originally used in South America. However, after some operating experience, it was decided to design a purpose-built Mark 2 version, and after some initial consultation with the Royal Navy, the US Navy’s Bureau of Ships was charged with the design and construction.

The Mark 2 vessels were over 300 feet in length, and 50 feet wide. They were armed with 3-inch, 40mm and 20mm guns and in addition to their mechanized payload, they could each carry approximately 140 infantrymen.

About 1,000 of these ships were built in the United States during the Second World War for use by Allied navies.

A further refinement and improvement of the Mark 2 was carried out by the Royal Navy, resulting in a Mark 3 version. This variant was approximately 350 feet in length with a beam of 55 feet. These ships had both bow doors for landing vehicles on to a beach as well as sufficient lifting capability to launch LCA’s, LCT’s and LCM’s from the deck. Canadian shipyards produced 26 of these vessels during the War.

Landing Craft

Landing craft were specially built vessels used to convey a landing force (infantry and vehicles) from the sea to the shore during an amphibious assault. Most renowned are those used to storm the beaches of Normandy and the Mediterranean, and the many Pacific islands during WWII. This was the high point of the landing craft, with a significant number of different designs produced in large quantities by the United Kingdom and the United States.

Because of the need to run up onto a suitable beach, WWII landing craft were flat-bottomed, and many designs had a flat front, often with a ramp that could be lowered, rather than a normal bow. This made them difficult to control and very uncomfortable in rough seas. The control point was normally situated at the extreme rear of the vessel, as were the engines. They tended to be known by an abbreviation derived from the official name rather than by their full title.
**Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) LCI(L):**
The LCI(L) was capable of making sea voyages under its own power (some were sailed directly from the United Kingdom to take part in the Operation Torch landings in North Africa, and U.S. Navy LCI’s island hopped across the Pacific). LCI(L)’s were typically 158 feet long and 23 feet wide and carried around 200 troops. There were several sub-types of the craft, with the LCI(L) infantry carrier dominating; but LCIs also served as rocket (LCI(R)) and mortar (M), and gunboat (G) platforms, as well as a flotilla flagship (FF). While intended to run up on the beach, they usually had a normal type of bow with stepped ramps on each side for the troops to disembark. On June 6, 1944, the RCN had three flotillas with ten LCI(L)’s in each. They landed 4,600 men on the Normandy beaches.

**Landing Craft, Assault (LCA):**
Of the landing craft proper, the smallest were the British LCAs (13 tons). These were small wooden craft designed to be transported around by larger vessels, such as the LSI, and then lowered into the water off the target beach. Typically they could carry 36 fully armed soldiers. The American variant of this craft was the slightly smaller Landing Craft, Personnel Large (LCPL) (10 tons) that lacked a bow ramp and was eventually superseded by the LCM/LCVP described below.

**Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM):**
LCMs were developed in several sizes and configurations. The larger ones were up to 36 tons with a 15.2 m long steel hull and a landing ramp at the bow. They were typically armed with machine guns. They could carry vehicles as well as up to 100 men, and were driven on to the beach and offloaded over the lowered ramp. The American Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) was very similar in design to the LCM and has been seen in countless movies.

**Landing Craft Support (LCS)**
The Landing Craft Support was used to give some additional supporting firepower close in to the beach.

**Landing Craft Gun (Large) and Landing Craft Gun (Medium) - LCG(L) & LCG(M)**
The Landing Craft Gun (LCG) was similar and was designed to give supporting fire to the landing. In addition to standard weaponry, they had two 4.7 inch destroyer guns.

**Landing Craft, Tank (LCT)**
Landing Craft Tank, which could carry up to 4 Tanks or other vehicles. These had a ramp at the front that was dropped for the vehicles to get ashore.

**Landing Craft Flak (LCF)**
The Landing Craft Flak was a conversion of the LCT to give anti-aircraft support to the landing. They were first used in the Dieppe Raid early in 1942. The ramp was welded shut, and a deck built on top of the Tank deck.

**Landing Barges**
Landing barges were adaptations of British Thames barges and lighters as landing craft. Some were fitted with engines while others were towed to the beach. They were used for defence, transportation, supply (food, water and oil) and repair (fitted out with workshops).
**Landing Craft, Navigation (LCN)**
Nine-ton Landing Craft Navigation were used by British "Combined Operations Assault Pilotage Parties" for surveying landing sites.

**Landing Craft Rocket (LCR) or Landing Craft Tank (Rocket) (LCT(R))**
The Landing Craft Rocket, was also known as the Landing Craft Tank (Rocket) (LCT(R)) to denote that it was a modified LCT. This vessel had a large set of launchers for the British RP-3 60 lb (27 kg), 3 in (76 mm) rockets mounted on the covered-over tank deck.

**Landing Craft, Hedgehog (LCA(HR))**
The Landing Craft Hedgehog was a conversion of the British LCA which carried 24 spigot mortars - the Royal Navy's Hedgehog anti-submarine weapon - instead of personnel. The mortars were fired to clear mines and other obstructions. Having discharged its mortars, the LCA(HR) would then leave the beach area. They were towed to the beach by larger craft such as the LCT.

**Landing Craft, Control (LCC)**
The "Landing Craft Control" were 56-foot U.S. Navy vessels, carrying only the crew and newly-developed radar. Their main job was to find and follow the safe routes in to the beach - lanes which had been cleared of obstacles and mines.

**Landing Craft Support (Medium) (Mark 3)**
To provide close support for assault waves with machine guns and smoke. An improved model of previous designs utilizing the same hull (with pointed bow), engines, and other equipment.

Armament:
- Two .50 twin power-operated Vickers M.G. in turret
- Two .303 Lewis guns
- One 4" smoke mortar
- 10 lb. H. E. bombs
- Twelve Type 18 smoke generators.

Appendix G above Researched and Written by: Capt. (N) (Ret’d) Michael Braha
# Landing Ship & Craft Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BYMS</td>
<td>British Yard Mine Sweeper</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDML</td>
<td>Harbour Defence Motor Launch</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCA</td>
<td>Landing Craft Assault</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCB</td>
<td>Landing Craft Barge</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCF</td>
<td>Landing Craft Flak</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCG(L)</td>
<td>Landing Craft Gun (Large)</td>
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<td>LCG(M)</td>
<td>Landing Craft Gun (Medium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCH</td>
<td>Landing Craft Headquarters (or LC(HQ))</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCM</td>
<td>Landing Craft Mechanized</td>
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<td>LCP(L)</td>
<td>Landing Craft Personnel (Large)</td>
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<td>LCP(L)FOO</td>
<td>Landing Craft Personnel (Large) Forward Observation Officer</td>
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<td>LCP(L)Smoke</td>
<td>Landing Craft Personnel (Large) Smoke</td>
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<td>LCP(L)NAV</td>
<td>Landing Craft Personnel (Large) Navigation</td>
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<td>LCS</td>
<td>Landing Craft Support</td>
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<td>LCT</td>
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<td>LCT(A)HE</td>
<td>Landing Craft Tank (Armoured) High Explosives</td>
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<td>LCT(CB)</td>
<td>Landing Craft Tank (Concrete Buster)</td>
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<td>LCT(AVRE)</td>
<td>Landing Craft Tank (Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers)</td>
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<td>LCP(Sy)</td>
<td>Landing Craft Personnel (Survey)</td>
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Appendix H

Other Landing Tables which include Canadian Units
(Canadian Units highlighted in RED)
(British Units under command of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division highlighted in GREEN)

NAVAL FORCE ‘L’

Force ‘L’ differed from the other three Naval Forces ‘G’, ‘J’ and ‘S’, in that it had no function on the Far Side. It also differed in that it embarked on the Thames and the East Coast rather than the South Coast. There were no bombardment ships, no minesweepers, no headquarters ships, no ferry craft and no LSIs.

Transporting the Follow Up divisions, 7 Armoured Division and 51 Division, was the main task of Force ‘L’, although it also carried a variety of personnel and vehicles for corps units of both I Corps and XXX Corps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LST(1) Note A</th>
<th>7 LST Flotilla Note B</th>
<th>8 LST Flotilla Note C</th>
<th>21 US LST Division</th>
<th>98 US LST Division</th>
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<td>LtCdr PG Britten, RNR</td>
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<td>T/A/LtCdr RHE Hand, RNR</td>
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</table>

NOTES:
A. Bachaquero carries a LCP(R)
B. Each LST carries three LCP(L) and four LCP(R)
C. Each LST carries four LCP(R)
LCT’s

‘V’ LCT Squadron:
- 16 LCT Flotilla - 11 x LCT(3)
- 18 LCT Flotilla - 11 x LCT(3)
- 19 LCT Flotilla - 10 x LCT(3)

‘H’ LCT Squadron:
- 6 LCT Flotilla - 11 x LCT(3)
- 17 LCT Flotilla - 10 x LCT(3)

LCI(L)

‘A’ LCI(L) Squadron:
- 252 LCI(L) Flotilla - 10 x LCI(L)
- 253 LCI(L) Flotilla - 9 x LCI(L)

Group L1

This group consisted of LST for 1 Corps and 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and LCI(L) for 1 Corps and 51 Division. It was escorted by HMS Cotswold, Narcissus, Oxlip, Damson and Avondale.

LST’s loaded at Tilbury Dock Hards and LCI(L) loaded at Tilbury Jetty.

These ships and craft rendezvoused at Southend and formed up ready to sail at H-22 hours. They steamed at 8 knots to the K1 Buoy and then sailed at 6¾ knots, adjusting speed as necessary to arrive at the following positions at the times ordered. K1 Buoy at H-1½ hours, Lowering Position at H+9 hours and be ready to land at H+10 hours.

Formation from Southend:

Numbers are Landing Table Serials not individual pennant numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LCI (L) for MIKE Beach</th>
<th>LST’s for NAN Beach</th>
<th>LST’s for MIKE Beach</th>
<th>LCI (L) for MIKE Beach</th>
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<tr>
<td>3015</td>
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Plus 1 LCI(L) sailing empty and parting company for Portsmouth.

Columns were 1 cable apart. LST’s were 2 cables apart and LCI(L) were 150 yards apart. The cable used here was the Admiralty Cable of 600 feet.
At the K1 Buoy Group L1 was joined by the following:
- 1 x LSD for Force J
- 2 x LST for Juno
- 12 x Stores Coasters
- 2 x LCI(L) for Juno MIKE and Juno NAN - For Port Operating Company
- Escort - 143 MMS Flotilla

**Formation after K1 Buoy:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group L1 Sailing Formation from K1 Buoy</th>
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<tr>
<td>LST's for NAN Beach</td>
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<td>1562</td>
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<td>LSD (HMS Northway)</td>
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</table>

At 50 degrees North the group formed single line ahead until the enemy minefield was cleared. At this point ships and craft were warned that the swept channel might still be narrow and that they should not simply follow in the wake of the vessel ahead since wind and tide would cause drift.

When the leading ship was 8 miles short of the Lowering Position an escort was detached to proceed ahead and get orders.

The **LSD HMS Northway**, Temp/LCDR A. J. Anderson RNR, was to remain in the neighbourhood of Channel 5 Lowering Position and discharge 46 DUKWs. As this vessel was particularly valuable (RN had only one operational) an escort remained with her until relieved by FS La Combattante from Force J.

Below are the known LST’s and loads that contain **CANADIAN UNIT’s or Attached Unit’s**.

Serials from Group L1 have already been included in the Landing tables in the main body of document.

**HMS NORTHWAY**

Group L3

This group consisted of fifteen LST(2) including nine for 1 Corp and 51 Division and six for 1 Corps overheads. There were also three LST(1) for 1 Corps overheads and sixteen LCT(3) for 22 Armoured Brigade.

This group sailed in two sections, one of LST’s from Southend and one of LCT’s from Harwich.

The section from Southend sailed at H-12 hours at 8 knots and was escorted by HMS Halstead, Godetia, Flavory and one ML. The section from Harwich sailed at H-16½ hours at 8 knots and was escorted by HMS Clematis, Gairsay and one ML. The two sections rendezvoused and were then timed to arrive at K1 at H+7 hours the Lowering Point at H+15½ and be off the beaches at H+17.
LSTs for MIKE BEACH

Serial 3001 is an LST(2) carrying:

- 3 x 20 ton transporter with 12 men - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company RCE
- 7 x Jeep and 2 x motor cycle with 9 men - 46 RM Commando
- 1 x 15 cwt Wireless house (Guy) - Headquarters 80 AA Brigade
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS (Ford) towing water trailer - Headquarters 80 AA Brigade
- 1 x Humber Utility 4X4 - Headquarters 80 AA Brigade
- 23 men - Headquarters 80 AA Brigade
- 7 x Tractor - 383/86 HAA Regiment
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 383/86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x Generator Trailer - 383/86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x Jeep - 383/86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x Radar No 3 MkII - 383/86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x Radar No 1 MkII - 383/86 HAA Regiment Transmitter
- 1 x Radar No 1 MkII - 383/86 HAA Regiment Receiver
- 126 men - 383/86 HAA Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt Wireless house (Morris) - Headquarters 153 Brigade Signals
- 1 x Lorry Command Vehicle - Headquarters 153 Brigade Signals
- 11 men - Headquarters 153 Brigade Signals
- 3 x 3 ton Dodge with 7 men - 458 Company RASC
- 4 x Humber Armoured Car MkIV with 12 men - 2 Derbyshire Yeomanry
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - 209 Battery, 53 Medium Regiment RA
- 9 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS (Ford) - 209 Battery, 53 Medium Regiment RA
- 2 x carrier AOP - 209 Battery, 53 Medium Regiment RA
- 1 x White Scout Car - 209 Battery, 53 Medium Regiment RA
- 1 x Jeep with 10 cwt trailer - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x 3 ton 4X4 TEV - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x 3 ton 4X4 LCV (HP) - 1 Corps Signals
- 15 men - 1 Corps Signals.
Serial 3004 is an LST(2) carrying:

- 2 x Jeep - 1 Corps Signals
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x 3 ton Lorry Command vehicle, High Power - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x 15 cwt water - 1 Corps Signals
- 24 men - 1 Corps Signals
- 2 x Jeep - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x Loyd Carrier, Slave Battery - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regt)
- 1 x White Scout Car - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 2 x 15 cwt FFW, Ford - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Stores, Bedford - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Ford - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 16 x Sherman tanks - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 3 x 6 pdr anti tank gun - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 114 men - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x Jeep - Headquarters 51 Division
- 1 x Lorry Command Vehicle - Headquarters 51 Division
- 10 men - Headquarters 51 Division
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4, Ford, men - Headquarters 51 Division Signals
- 8 men - Headquarters 51 Division Signals
- 1 x 3 ton GS towing trailer - Light Mobile Signal Section RN
- 2 x 15 cwt GS - Light Mobile Signal Section RN
- 11 men - Light Mobile Signal Section RN
- 2 x Jeep - 'A' Squadron GHQ Liaison Regiment
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Bedford - ’A’ Squadron GHQ Liaison Regiment
- 1 x White Scout Car - ’A’ Squadron GHQ Liaison Regiment
- 1 x 15 cwt Wireless House, Morris - ’A’ Squadron GHQ Liaison Regiment
- 19 men - ’A’ Squadron GHQ Liaison Regiment
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Ford - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 20 men - Headquarters 62 AT Regiment RA
- 4 x truck 8 cwt - Local Duplex RN
- 16 men - Local Duplex RN
- 3 x 30 cwt AT Tractor - 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt GS - 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Jeep - 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Carrier, Starting and Charging - 62 AT Regiment RA
- 1 x Motorcycle - 62 AT Regiment RA
- 30 men - 62 AT Regiment RA
- 12 men - Provost Company, for Prisoner Of War escort.

Serial 3005 is an LST(2) carrying:

- 2 x 15 cwt FFW Ford - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x Sherman Flail - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x M7 Priest SP 105mm - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x M10 3” SP AT - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 15 x Sherman tanks - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 3 x 6 pdr AT gun - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 115 men - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 2 x Jeep - 1 Corps Signals.
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x Lorry Command Vehicle HP - 1 Corps Signals
• 1 x 3 ton Cipher - 1 Corps Signals
• 20 men - 1 Corps Signals
• 10 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 89 Corps Transport Company
• 21 men - 89 Corps Transport Company
• 2 x 15 cwt Office - ‘B’ Battery, 9 Survey Regiment
• 7 x 15 cwt FFW - ‘B’ Battery, 9 Survey Regiment
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - ‘B’ Battery, 9 Survey Regiment
• 3 x Jeep - ‘B’ Battery, 9 Survey Regiment
• 10 x Motorcycle - ‘B’ Battery, 9 Survey Regiment
• 95 men - ‘B’ Battery, 9 Survey Regiment
• 2 x 15 cwt GS - 48 RM Commando
• 2 men - 48 RM Commando
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
• 1 x Carrier Universal - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
• 6 men - Royal Winnipeg Rifles
• 1 x Jeep with 4 men - FOB (Forward Observer Bombardment) party
• 36 men - 927 Inland Water Transport Light Aid Company RE
• 23 men - 127 Field Regiment RA
• 18 men - 3rd Canadian AT Regiment RCA

Serial 3006 is an LST2 carrying:

• 2 x Jeep - 1 Corps Signals
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 - 1 Corps Signals
• 1 x Lorry Command Vehicle, High Power - 1 Corps Signals
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Cipher Office - 1 Corps Signals
• 21 men - 1 Corps Signals
• 1 x 15 cwt Ford - 721 Road Construction Company. Reconnaissance Party
• 1 x Motorcycle - 721 Road Construction Company. Reconnaissance Party
• 5 men - 721 Road Construction Company. Reconnaissance Party
• 2 x ARV and 10 men - 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop RCEME
• 1 x Carrier Universal - Regina Rifles
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - Regina Rifles
• 6 men - Regina Rifles
• 4 x 3 ton 4 X 2 Dodge with ten men - 458 Company RASC
• 9 x Matador MAT towing 8 X 5.5” guns with 54 men - 209 Battery, 53 Medium Regiment RA
• 1 x Jeep with one man - Forward Observer Bombardment party
• 1 x Jeep - 297 Field Park Company RE
• 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 297 Field Park Company RE
• 26 men - 297 Field Park Company RE
• 8 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Ford with 16 men - 69 Corps Troops Company RASC
• 1 x Carrier Universal - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
• 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
• 6 men - 1st Bn, Canadian Scottish Regiment
• 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS with 6 men - Highland Light Infantry of Canada
• 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS with 6 men - Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders
• 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS with 6 men - North Nova Scotia Highlanders
• 1 x 15 cwt water - 247 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt GS - 247 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 1 x 15 cwt Charging and Starting - 247 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 1 x Motorcycle - 247 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 3 x 30 cwt 4 X 4 AT tractor - 247 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 1 x Jeep - 247 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 30 men - 247 Battery, 62 AT Regiment RA
• 2 x 15 cwt water with 4 men - 4th Canadian LAA Regiment RCA
Serial 3007 is an LST(2) carrying:

- 1 x Lorry Command Vehicle, High Power - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x 3 ton TEV - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 1 Corps Signals
- 2 x Jeep - 1 Corps Signals
- 2 x 10 cwt trailer - 1 Corps Signals
- 18 men - 1 Corps Signals
- 2 x M7 Priest SP 105mm - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 2 x Sherman Flail - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 18 men - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 2 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Winch, Karrier - 562 Field Company RE
- 1 x 15 cwt Water - 562 Field Company RE
- 73 men - 562 Field Company RE
- 7 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS, Ford - 108 Battery, 79 Medium Regiment RA
- 2 x White Scout Car - 108 Battery, 79 Medium Regiment RA
- 2 x Carrier AOP - 108 Battery, 79 Medium Regiment RA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - 108 Battery, 79 Medium Regiment RA
- 1 x Jeep - 108 Battery, 79 Medium Regiment RA
- 66 men - 108 Battery, 79 Medium Regiment RA
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS - 245 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment RA
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - 245 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment RA
- 4 x Carrier AOP - 245 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment RA
- 6 x M10 SP 3” AT guns - 245 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment RA
- 84 men - 245 Battery, 62 Anti Tank Regiment RA
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Crossley - 62 Anti Tank Regiment RA
- 1 x Fordson Signals - Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
- 2 x Bedford Signals - Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
- 1 x Fordson Tender - Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
- 1 x Bedford Tender - Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
- 28 men - Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
- 1 x Motorcycle and 3 men - RAF Provost

Serial 3008 is an LST(2) carrying:

- 1 x M10 SP 3” AT gun - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 2 x M7 Priest SP 105mm - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 2 x Sherman Flail - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 20 men - 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Elgin Regiment)
- 1 x Humber 4 seater 4 X 4 car - CREs Reconnaissance Group
- 2 Motorcycle - CREs Reconnaissance Group
- 10 men - CREs Reconnaissance Group
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS and 1 ton trailer - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x M14 Halftrack - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x Jeep and 10 cwt trailer - 1 Corps Signals
- 14 men - 1 Corps Signals
- 1 x Jeep - 1 RRS Commanders Party
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Crossley - 1 RRS Commanders Party
- 17 men - 1 RRS Commanders Party
- 1 x Jeep - 2 RRS Commanders Party
- 1 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Crossley - 2 RRS Commanders Party
- 17 men - 2 RRS Commanders Party
- 1 x 4 Matador MAT towing 4 X 5.5” guns with 17men - 79 Medium Regiment
- 3 x 3 ton 4 X 4 GS towing 3 X Stella Water Purification Trailers & 9 men - 3rd Canadian Field Park Company RCE
- 1 x Fordson Tender - Mobile Signals Unit Type ‘T’ RAF
- 1 x Austin Tender - Mobile Signals Unit Type ‘T’ RAF
• 5 men from Mobile Signals Unit Type 'T' RAF
• 1 x Jeep - 'A' Echelon 23 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 1 x Humber 4 X 4 - 'A' Echelon 23 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 1 x Crossley Tender - 'A' Echelon 23 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 1 x Austin Tender - 'A' Echelon 23 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 25 men - 'A' Echelon 23 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 13 x 3 ton 4 X 4 Ford with 22 men - 89 Corps Transport Company RASC
• 2 x Austin Tender - Command Group 11 Air Formation Signals for 83 Group Main Headquarters
• 5 x Jeep - Command Group 11 Air Formation Signals for 83 Group Main Headquarters
• 1 x Humber 4 X 4 - Command Group 11 Air Formation Signals for 83 Group Main Headquarters
• 55 men - Command Group 11 Air Formation Signals for 83 Group Main Headquarters
• 1 x Fordson 30 cwt - Special Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 1 x Austin 30 cwt - Special Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 6 men - Special Mobile Signals Unit for 83 Group Main Headquarters RAF
• 1 x Humber Light Reconnaissance Car & 4 men - 125 RAFR for No 3 Advanced Landing Ground
• 2 x Motorcycle and 2 men - 47 Royal Marine Commando
• 40 men - 582 Field Park Company RE
• 54 men - 995 Port Maintenance Company RE
Appendix I

Ships of Landing Force ‘J1’

HMS LAWFORD (K514) - Landing Ship Headquarters

MV LLANGIBBY CASTLE - J16
SS LAIRD’S ISLE - J13

SS MECKLENBURG - J17
Appendix J

Ships of Landing Force ‘J2’

HMS WAVENEY(K248) - Landing Ship Headquarters

SS CLAN LAMONT - J31
(25.7.1944 commissioned into The Royal Navy and renamed H.M.S. LAMONT)
HMS ROYAL ULLSTERMAN - Landing Ship Headquarters - Commissioned in 1936, HMS Royal Ulsterman was a 3,250 ton passenger ship which served as a Royal Navy Reserve troop transport.

LANDING SHIP TANK - Force J-3 had two Landing Ship Groups with a total of 22 LST's.
Group 332 with LST's 8, 62, 65, 159, 160, 180, 199, 215, 238, 239, & 421
Group 333 with LST's 80, 323, 368, 402, 404, 405, 409, 410, 413, & 425
Appendix L

Force ‘J’ - Flagship

HMS HILARY - Landing Ship Headquarters
Appendix M

Bombardment Force ‘E’

HMS BELFAST (C35) - is a Town-class light cruiser of the Royal Navy commissioned in 1939

HMS DIADEM (84) - was a Dido-class light cruiser of the Royal Navy launched in 1942
HMS VENUS (R50) - a V-class destroyer of the Royal Navy and was launched on 23 February 1943.

HMS FAULKNER (H62) - was the flotilla leader for the F-class destroyers built for the Royal Navy during the 1930s.
HMS FURY (H76) - was an F-class destroyer built for the Royal Navy in the 1930s

FS LA COMBATTANTE - (“The Fighter”) was a destroyer of the Forces navales françaises libres (FNFL). A British-built Hunt-class destroyer, she was offered to the Free French in 1942
HMS STEVENSTONE (L16) - was a Hunt-class destroyer of the Royal Navy
Fire Support Area ‘X’

HMS KEMPENFELT (I18) - was a C-class destroyer built for the Royal Navy in the early 1930s

HMS VIGILANT (R93) - was a V-class destroyer of the British Royal Navy
HMCS ALGONQUIN (R17) - was a V-class destroyer, laid down for the Royal Navy as HMS Valentine (R17) and transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy on completion.

HMCS SIOUX (R64) - was a V-class destroyer of the Royal Canadian Navy. She was launched as HMS Vixen for the British Royal Navy before being transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy (Note: Pendant number 225 in photo was her number during the Korean War).
HMS BLEASDALE (L50) - was a Hunt-class destroyer of the Royal Navy

HNorMS GLAISDALE (L44) - Type III HUNT Class Escort Destroyer HMS GLAISDALE. The ship was laid down on 4th February 1941. She was transferred on loan to the Royal Norwegian Navy
Appendix O

Escort Trawlers
HM Trawlers Northern Pride, Northern Sun, Northern Spray, Northern Foam, Valeta, Lord Austin

HMT Northern Pride
MINE SWEEPERS

FLEET MINE SWEEPERS

HMS Sidmouth, Tenby, Bangor, Blackpool, Bridlington, Bridport, Eastbourne, Boston, Fancy, Lennox, Pelorus, Pickle, Pincher, Plucky, Recruit & Rifleman

BRITISH YARD MINE SWEEPER

159th BYMS Flotilla - To sweep inshore
BYMS 2071, 2055, 2173, 2032, 2070, 2157 & 2078
DANLAYERS

HMS Farne, Stella Rigel, Stella Leonis, St Barbe, Bryher, Ijuin, Dalmatia, & Signa

A danlayer was a type of vessel assigned to minesweeping flotillas during World War II. They were usually small trawlers, fitted for the purpose of laying dans. A dan is a marker buoy which consists of a long pole moored to the seabed and fitted to float vertically, usually with a coded flag at the top.

Dan laying was an important part of minesweeping, and boats were fitted specifically for this purpose. The task of a danlayer was to follow the minesweepers as they worked an area, and lay the dans which defined the area swept and made it obvious where the clear channels were. This would also help the minesweepers cover areas accurately without gaps and unnecessary overlaps. A danlayer worked with a minesweeper flotilla when large areas of sea were to be clear-swept.
Mine Sweepers Motor Launches

**Fairmile B Motor Launch** was a type of **motor launch** (often referred to as MLs)
ML 138, 139, 185, 208, 222, & 591 were used in the Minesweeping role off of Juno Beach

Harbour Defence Motor Launch  
HDML 1407 & 1393 were used in the minesweeping role off of Juno Beach
LANDING CRAFT GUN (LCG) & LANDING CRAFT FLAK (LCF)

All were to cover the launch of DD tanks. If the tanks were fired on by shore batteries then they should return fire, otherwise LCG would engage beach defences from H-30 minutes:
- LCG 831, 1007 and 1062 - Landing Craft Gun each with two 4.7” guns
- LCF(2) 1 - Landing Craft Flak
- LCG 680, 681, 764 and 939 - Landing Craft Gun each with two 4.7” guns
Landing Craft Tank (Rocket) - LCT(R)

LCT (R) operated in pairs. In each pair one would fire a pattern of rockets at H-8 minutes and the second would fire at H-5 minutes. Both would aim at the same area which would extend across the beach to be assaulted and be 300 yards deep. From their assigned position they would need to aim the entire craft:

- LCT (R) 367 and 359
- LCT (R) 437 and 405
- LCT (R) 378 and 398
- LCT (R) 363 and 337
HMS NORTHWAY (F142) - CASA GRANDE CLASS DOCK LANDING SHIP - 7930 TONS - 139.6 X 22.0 - 1944 NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK CO., VA AS USS CUTLASS (LSD) - 1X5IN, 16X20MM - 15 KNOTS - TRANSFERRED TO ROYAL NAVY AS HMS NORTHWAY (F142) WHILST BUILDING
Isle of Wight Area Anchorage Plan - Force ‘G’, ‘J’ & ‘S’
Anchorage Location of Force ‘J’ - LST’s in the Southampton, Portsmouth & Isle of White Final Assembly Area Pre D-Day
Anchorage Location of Force ‘J’ - HQ’s Ships and LSI’s in the Southampton, Portsmouth & Isle of White Final Assembly Area Pre D-Day
Anchorage Location of Force ‘J’ - Destroyers & Corvettes, which were part of the Escort & Bombardment Force, in the Southampton, Portsmouth & Isle of White Final Assembly Area Pre D-Day
Anchorage Location of Force ‘J’ - HM Trawlers, which were part of the Escort Force, in the Southampton, Portsmouth & Isle of White Final Assembly Area Pre D-Day
Southampton Docks

Used by Force ‘J’ for loading

(Diagram below is “modern” map of current docks, BUT Dock No’s shown are still the Original Dock numbers used in 1944)
Appendix R

Allied Deception Tactics for D-Day

As part of the planning for D-Day, the Navy carried out various diversions. These diversions were supported by air operations and did not involve the landing of troops. These operations, along with radar counter measures (named in this source diagram), were carried out at the same time as the actual landings.

Operation TAXABLE:
No. 617 Air Squadron dropped strips of tin foil known as “chaff” (to interfere with German radar signals) together with a Royal Navy deception operation, to represent an invasion convoy approaching the coast at Cap d'Antifer. RN sailed 5 Jun 44 at 1321 Hours. See chart below

Operation GLIMMER:
No. 218 Squadron carried out a similar “chaff” dropping exercise. A force of ten motor launches & 1 penance were also used to simulate an invasion convoy heading for Boulogne in the direction of Pas de Calais. This was designed to make it appear as if the Allies were invading from the shortest crossing point across the Channel. RN sailed 5 Jun 44 at 1321 Hours. See chart below

Operation BIGDRUM:
The intent of Op Big Drum was to divert the attention of enemy radar installations on the Cherburg Peninsula from the assault forces. This was a force of 4 motor launches. See chart below

Operation TITANIC:
A force of 40 aircraft dropped dummy parachutists to make it look like an airborne landing away from planned invasion area. 200 dummy parachutists were dropped south west of Caen and 200 more south west of Dieppe. Dummy parachutists consisted of a series of cloth bags that contained an explosive charge that destroyed the cloth “figure” by setting it on fire. Therefore, it looked as if the man had burnt the parachute and possibly lay hidden, ready for action.

Operation MANDREL:
Between Littlehampton and Portland Bill aircraft set up a jamming screen using Mandrel EW radar jammers to hide the real invasion fleet from German radar.

![Diagram of Allied Deception Tactics for D-Day]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDML's</th>
<th>Pinnance's</th>
<th>Covering Force MTB's</th>
<th>HDML's</th>
<th>Pinnance's</th>
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<tr>
<td>1382 (SO)</td>
<td>1282</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1390 (SO)</td>
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<td>1408</td>
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<td>616</td>
<td>522</td>
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<td>1009</td>
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<td>1064</td>
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Appendix S

The Forward Control of Air Support (TENTACLES)

How were impromptu air strikes actually called onto targets? They were requested by the various independent wireless detachments with the leading Army headquarters. These were commonly known as "tentacles," since this was what they so resembled on the radio network organization charts.

There were various sorts of tentacles, with varying configuration and equipment. These were modified somewhat over the course of the campaign, but generally they were organized along the following lines.

Standard Tentacles

These detachments were commanded by an artillery subaltern, three Royal Corps of Signals soldiers, who operated and maintained the radios, and one driver mechanic. Normally mounted in a fifteen hundredweight signals truck, they were equipped with two "Canadian Number 9" type wireless sets, which gave them an effective range of about 40 kilometres. This allowed them to "net in" to the special air support radio network and pass back air support requests directly to the Joint Battle Room at Army/Group headquarters. Coming from the artillery, the tentacle officers were specialists in fire support and could advise the local ground commander on the employment of air support. However, the primary task of a normal tentacle was to pass air requests from the leading divisional and brigade headquarters directly back to the joint Army/Composite Group headquarters via the ASSU net. Standard tentacles did not have any radios that could communicate with aircraft.

Forward Control Post (FCP)

Each Army/Composite Group had one Forward Control Post or FCP. There was only one within each Group/Army, and it was deployed to the corps headquarters deemed to be the priority for air support. FCP's were much larger than all other types of Forward tentacles, generally consisting of 10 personnel all ranks, mounted in at least two primary vehicles, either heavy trucks or M14 half-tracked vehicles, plus usually a large trailer and a jeep. The FCP's were equipped with both army type radios for the air support request net, and TR.1143 VHF radios to speak with aircraft. Unlike the ordinary tentacles, with their VHF radio an FCP could talk directly with overhead aircraft, for a range of about 30 to 40 kilometres.
## Ships Used for Gooseberry 4 at Juno Beach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>BUILT</th>
<th>HISTORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgique</td>
<td>4,606</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Built by Repner &amp; Son, Stockton.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1921 Fothergill &amp; Co, London.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1921 BELGIQUE, Cie Royale Belgo-Argentine, Antwerp.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1944 Requisitioned by MOWT and scuttled.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1910 INDRADEO, T. B. Royden, Liverpool.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1915 Alfred Holt &amp; Co, Liverpool.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1926 CAMBRIAN PEERESS, R. J. Thomas &amp; Co, Liverpool.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1931 BENDORAN, Petrogred Steamers Ltd, Leith.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944 MOWT, managed by J &amp; J. Denholm and scuttled.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1947 refloated and scrapped at Blyth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empire Bunting</td>
<td>6,448</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Built by Skinner &amp; Eddy Corp, Seattle.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1919 EELBECK, U.S. Shipping Board, Seattle.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1941 EMPIRE BUNTING, MOWT, London managed by Headlam &amp; Sons, 1944 Scuttled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1947 Refloated and scrapped at Portaferry.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1920 IOLEE, U.S. Shipping Board, Philadelphia.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1933 Lykes Bros, Houston.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1941 EMPIRE FLAMINGO, M.O.W.T. managed by G. Nisbet &amp; Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scuttled 9th June 1944.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Empire Moorhen</td>
<td>5,617</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>WWI Standard type, built by Columbia River SB Corp, Portland, Ore.</td>
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<td>1919 WEST TOTANT, U.S. Shipping Board, Portland, Ore.</td>
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<td>1941 EMPIRE MOORHEN, MOWT, London managed by Booth SS Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1947 Refloated and scrapped at Troon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Empire Waterhen</td>
<td>6,004</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Built by Oscar Daniels Co, Tampa, Fla.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1920 MANATEE, U.S. Shipping Board, Tampa, Fla.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1937 U.S. Maritime Commission, Tampa, Fla.</td>
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<td>1940 EMPIRE WATERHEN, M.O.W.T. managed by R. Chapman &amp; Son.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1944 M.O.W.T. managed by J &amp; J. Denholm Ltd.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Scuttled 9th June 1944, refloated 1948 and scrapped at Penarth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manchester Spinner</td>
<td>4,767</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Built by Irvine's S.B. &amp; DD Co, West Hartlepool</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1918 GRAMPIAN RANGE, Neptune S.N. Co, Liverpool.</td>
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<td>1921 MANCHESTER SPINNER, Manchester Liners Ltd, Manchester.</td>
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<td>1944 M.O.W.T. managed by J &amp; J. Denholm Ltd, scuttled.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1914 IOANNIS VATIS, J. L. Vata &amp; Co, Syra, Greece.</td>
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<td>1923 THEOFANO, Liveros Bros, Chios.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1926 CEFBVRYN, Brymorr SS Co, London.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1931 DEDINJE, Jadran Brodarke, Bakar, Yugoslavia.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1934 GAEB, Jugoslavenska Plovdiwa DD, Susak, Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1934 CEFBVRYN, Brymorr SS Co, London.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1935 GAEB, Jugoslavenska Plovdiwa DD, Susak.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1935 GREEK MARINER, Neill &amp; Pandelis, Piraeus, Greece.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944 MOWT, managed by J &amp; J. Denholm Ltd and scuttled.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panos</td>
<td>4,914</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Built by J. Readhead &amp; Sons, South Shields.</td>
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<td>1920 HOMECRIFKE, G. T. Readhead &amp; Co, South Shields.</td>
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<td>1934 AVON VALLEY, Mark Whitwill &amp; Son, Bristol.</td>
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<td>1937 PANOS, United Merchants Shipping Co, London.</td>
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<td>1944 M.O.W.T. managed by J &amp; J. Denholm Ltd and scuttled.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vera Radcliffe</td>
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<td>1925</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1944 M.O.W.T. managed by J &amp; J. Denholm Ltd and scuttled.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.mariners-l.co.uk/mulberry.htm](http://www.mariners-l.co.uk/mulberry.htm)
Appendix U

Typical Landing Ship/Craft Drawings used for Load Planning

CARGO SPACE - LCT(4)

[Diagram of CARGO SPACE - LCT(4) with dimensions and objects including TANK DECK, MAIN DECK, PORTABLE EXHAUST VENTS STOWAGE, HATCH CAPSTAN, 40 TON TANK, 3 TON LORRY, TRUCK 1/4 TON 4x4, RAMP RAISED POSITION, SCALE OF FEET, SECTION AT 'A' and 'B', PAGE 299.]

On the same scale as LCT.

CARGO SPACE - LST(2)

[Diagram of CARGO SPACE - LST(2) with dimensions and objects including TANK DECK, MAIN DECK, PORTABLE EXHAUST VENTS STOWAGE, HATCH CAPSTAN, 40 TON TANK, 3 TON LORRY, LVT, RAMP RAISED POSITION, SCALE OF FEET, SECTION AT 'A'.]

On the same scale as LST.
Appendix V

NEPTUNE
BIGOT
TOP SECRET
Appendix 'K' to
1 Corps Operation Order No 1
dated 5 May 44

ACTION OF ‘C’ SQN INNS OF COURT
1. COMPOSITION

(a) Comd Lt Col R.A.G. BINGLEY INNS OF COURT Regt
2 IC Maj G.H.P. STRAKOSCH INNS OF COURT Regt

(b) INNS OF COURT
‘C’ Sqn HQ
Six tps

(c) RE
Ten RE demolition parties. Each of 4 RE, each in one M 14.
The driver and co-driver of each M 14 will be found by INNS OF COURT Regt.

(d) Vehicles
Daimler Armd Cars 14
Daimler Scout Cars 13
White M 14 half-tracks 10
White 4 x 4 Scout Car 1

2. TIME OF LANDING
The det will be loaded in two LCT (4) to be found by 3 Cdn Inf Div lift. It will be landed at H + 60 mins, or as soon after as practicable.

3. ACTION ON LANDING
(a) The force will land under comd 3 Cdn Inf Div on MIKE Beach and will infiltrate forward to the R ORNE as soon as the coastal defence crust has been broken.

(b) An officer, to be appointed by 3 Cdn Inf Div, will be responsible for giving permission to ‘C’ Sqn to go. The most suitable officer would appear to be the comd Right Assault Bde. This officer will be instructed to let the det go, once he feels they have reasonable chance of getting forward. In this connection time is important and ‘C’ Sqn will be instructed to go once the enemy crust is broken and there is a gap through the beach minefields. It will not be held up owing to the presence of odd enemy patrols etc.

4. ACTION AFTER PASSING THROUGH RIGHT CDN ASSAULT BDE
It will be the duty of ‘C’ Sqn to reach the line of R ORNE as rapidly as possible.

No attempt will be made to fight enemy opposition unless it should prove absolutely necessary; instead, whenever possible, enemy posts will be by-passed.

5. TASKS IN GENERAL
In order of importance:-
FIRSTLY, to delay the adv of enemy reserve formations moving to counter attack our own tps to the WEST of CAEN.
SECONDLKY, Recce. Dispositions necessary to carry out this secondary role must on no account be allowed to prejudice the accomplishment of the primary task.
6. POSSIBLE DIRECTION OF MOVEMENTS OF ENEMY RESERVES
Details regarding the location of enemy reserve formations which can intervene on D and D + 1 days, together with an appreciation of the routes by which they may move, will be sent separately to the Comd.
Under all circumstances enemy reserve formations moving to operate against tps of 1 Corps WEST of CAEN must pass through the line VIMONT – ST PIERRE SUR DIVES – FALAISE – THURY HARCOURT – AUNAY SUR ODON – VILLERS BOCAGE. Probably the greater part of this movement will take place between FALAISE and AUNAY SUR ODON.

TASKS IN PARTICULAR

7. DELAY
(a) Line R ORNE
The det will prepare for demolition, all brs over R ORNE from incl road bridge 937471 to incl road bridge 012609 as first priority and railway bridges from incl 967554 to incl 014597 as second priority. WITHIN EACH PRIORITY, PRIORITY WILL BE FROM SOUTH TO NORTH. Instructions are contained in para 8 below regarding blowing.

(b) Line R ODON
(i) In the event of failure to reach R ORNE, Force Comd will use demolition teams to create an obstacle on the line of R ODON between incl RAGNY 8759 and excl 964650, although this bridge and the one at 972652 will be included if opportunity offers. Priority will be given to the following crossings:-
BOUGY 9160
GAVRUS 9162
931630

(ii) In view of the probable ineffectiveness of R ODON as an ATk obstacle, maximum use will be made of road cratering and mine laying.
All vehs of the det will therefore carry Hawkins grenades.

(iii) Bridges on the above line will not be blown, nor roads cratered without authority. (see para 9 below).

8. RECCE
(a) The penetration effected by the Sqn obviously will provide ample opportunity for the provision of useful information even after all the crossings over a particular river line have been blown.
(b) If this situation presents itself, the opportunity will be taken to report the strength, composition and direction of enemy movement in the area, VIMONT 1561 – ST MARTIN DES BOIS 1354 – BRETTEVILLE LE RABET 1050 – BRETTEVILLE SUR LAIZE – CLINCHAMPS SUR ORNE 0056.

13. ACTION OF SAS AND SOE
Certain operations are being undertaken by SAS and SOE on the night D – 1/D and thereafter. Details which may affect the situation have been sent separately to the comd.

14. COMD
The sqn will be under comd 3 Cdn Inf Div until Main 1 Corps opens ashore. Orders will then be issued from 1 Corps for command to pass to 1 Corps.
During its period of comd however 3 Cdn Inf Div will not issue orders to the sqn which may be outside this directive without consulting 1 Corps.

15. INTERCOMMUNICATION
(a) ‘C’ Sqn Rear Link will be netted to 3 Cdn Inf Div B. When comd changes this Rear Link will re-net to a special net established from Main 1 Corps. 3 Cdn Inf Div will have a receiver available to listen on this special net.

(b) All reports received from ‘C’ Sqn by 3 Cdn Inf Div will be passed by them to Main 1 Corps until after Command passes.
ANNEX A

LOADING PROGRAM - FORCE ‘J’

The documents below are from Operation Neptune Naval Orders
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*12 Shinos - Numbers will be published later.*

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*5 Shinos - Numbers to be published later.*
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**Notes:**

1. H.M.S. PRINCESS ALISON and H.M.S. PRINCESS JAMES will embark 4 Commando direct from H.M.E.F. These ships will however proceed alongside berths at Southampton in order to top up with water and military stores.

2. L.C.I.(s) attached to Force "A" are shown in Force "B" Loading Program.
ANNEX B

BERTHING & SAILING PROGRAM - FORCE ‘J’

The documents below are from Operation Neptune Naval Orders and show the berthing locations in Southampton and the time of departure of each Assault Group.
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### Notes
- All measurements are in feet and inches.
- Time of Letting column indicates the time at which the letting process was completed.
- Time of Leasing column indicates the time at which the leasing process was completed.
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ANNEX C
DETAILS OF BERTHS FOR LSI, LST AND SHIPS ATTACHED TO FORCE 'J'

NOTE: Berths are given short titles as follows:
(a) First 2 figures denote the area.
(b) Second 2 figures denote the berth.
(c) One letter in between denotes the line.
(d) Two letters in between denote first North or South, second the line.

E.g. 18 07 = Area 18, Berth 7.
31 F 01 = Area 31, Line F, Berth 1.
26 W 05 = Area 26 North, Line A, Berth 5.

H.Q. SHIPS.
H.M.S. Hilary - 19 W 00
H.M.S. Lewinor - 19 W 01
H.M.S. Waveney - 19 E 02
H.M.S. Royal Ulsterman - 19 E 04

LSI.

1. 07 07 S.S. C.S. Prince David 18 04 S.S. Homowoai
07 02 S.S. Biserritz 18 05 S.S. Clan Lamont
07 09 S.S. Isle of Guernsey 18 07 H.M.C.S. Prince Henry
07 04 H.M.S. Duke of Wellington 18 08 S.S. Llangibby Castle
07 05 Boom Carrier 22 A 01 H.M.S. Invicta
07 06 S.S. S.S. Neckerberg 22 B 02 S.S. Isle of Thanet
07 07 H.M.S. Prince Albert 22 B 03 S.S. Recklingberg
07 06 S.S. Princess Margaret 22 C 01 S.S. Duke of York
07 09 H.M.S. Princess Charlotte 22 C 02 H.M.S. Queen Anne
07 10 S.S. Victoria 22 C 03 H.M.S. Lulworth
18 01 S.S. Lady of Mann 22 C 04 S.S. Leerd's Isle
18 02 H.M.S. St. Helier 22 A 11 H.M.S. Princess Astrid
18 03 H.M.S. Bragadiar 22 B 13 S.S. Maid of Orleans

* Those vessels are NOT attached to Force 'J'.
### DETAILS OF BIRTHS FOR L.S.T., L.S.T. AND SHIPS ATTACHED TO FORCE "U" FOR THE OPERATION (Cont'd).

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### CONTACTS

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### Minesweepers

- 7th Flotilla and Landing 29 A 01 to 29 A 10
- 9th Flotilla and Landing 31 A 02 to 31 A 06
- 159th B.Y.M.S. Flotilla Area 30

### Appendix "M"

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Sources:

- Landing table synopsis with the permission WW2 Talk Members and Compiled/Edited by M Simpson
- Additional research, information and editing by Lt (Retired) Barry N Miller, CD, CME
- Operation "Neptune" Force 'J' Operation Orders - dated 19 May 1944 (DND - R24, C17, Vol 17,763, Reel T-7620, Library and Archives Canada)
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- Canadian Army Headquarters Historical Report No 54
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- History of The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers, Vol 2
- U.S. and British Army Task Organization Operation OVERLORD: 6 June 1944
  ANNEX A: Task Organization to Operation OVERLORD
  Gen Bernard L. MONTGOMERY
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War Diaries - 62 Anti Tank Regiment, RA

War Diaries - 114 LAA Regiment, RA

War Diaries - 8th Kings Regiment

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“Green Pages”, 5 June 1944 - Landing Ships, Landing Craft and Landing Barges - Operations Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty - ADM 210/8 in British National Archives
Tactical Air Power Controversies in Normandy: A Question of Doctrine
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GROUND CONTROLLED INTERCEPTION RADARS IN OPERATION NEPTUNE/OVERLORD
“THE ALLIED INVASION OF FRANCE” JUNE, 1944.

The story of the Fighter Direction Tenders used during the “D-Day” Assault
and

The Mobile Radar Convoys that Landed on the Beaches.

HMS FDT 13
HMS FDT 216
HMS FDT 217
Convoy 15073
Convoy 15082
Convoy 15083

Prepared by Horace R. (Red) Macaulay

Fighter Control During the Assault Phase of Operation Neptune
http://www.raffca.uk/cms/ddayfc.html


Combined Opeerations Handbook 1945

Army Air Forces Historical Study No. 36
About the Juno Beach Landing Tables presented above:

The Juno Beach Landing Tables document started with the work of ww2Talk.com membership, and is detailed information on the Canadian & Allied Forces landing at Juno Beach on D Day, 6th June 1944 and a short time period after the initial landings.

The Tables outline the "load out" of each landing craft (or group of landing craft) or vessels, including sailing times, support craft, bombardment information, convoy information etc and a brief synopsis of each group on landing. Information was collected from various sources included the Canadian & British Governments Juno Beach Landing Tables (Archive Information), and War Diaries of Various unit.

ww2Talk's work was expanded by Barry N Miller, who added information including full Unit Names, pertinent photo's and documents from various web base sources, including Unit War Diaries, expanded the Units presented to include supporting Air Force and US Coast Guard ships and added detailed maps. Also adding Unit/Ship Commander's who occupied key positions in Army and Navy units, and Vehicle Tactical Marking information, where available. His intention was to assist reader's, that may not have a military background (the geology researcher), understand these details.

As the Landing Tables were documents produced for the "Planning" of the D-Day Operations by Allied Command Organizations, it must be remembered that the "Actual loading" of landing craft may have differed from the "Planning Landing Tables". Where it was possible to identify the "actual" vessel loads, this record was modified to reflect those changes.

Information compiled by:

ww2Talk.com

A Second World War website called ww2Talk (www.ww2talk.com). It's members research “anything WW2” and have thousands of posts and forums for discussion and research on this topic. The Members of ww2Talk started a thread that included information about the Juno Beach landing, which much of the basic information was gleaned from that site.

ww2Talk.com have kindly agreed to allow this information to be included and used in this document.

Lieutenant (Ret’d) Barry N Miller, CD - Canadian Forces

Born in Alberta, Canada, he spent 16 years in the Canadian Forces, Canadian Military Engineers, enlisting as a “Sapper” (Private) and rising thru the ranks to Warrant Officer. He was then “Commissioned from the Ranks” as a Lieutenant, Canadian Military Engineers. Serving at many Army and Air Force bases across Canada and in Germany he retired from the Canadian Forces and joined the Canadian Public Service, as an Executive in the Federal Government, and served 17 year until retirement. His last position was Regional Director, Assets & Procurement, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “E” Division Headquarters, Vancouver, B.C., Canada.

Now fully retired after 33 years service to Canada, he spends his time helping people connect with their relatives military past on a web site called “Wartimes.ca” (www.wartimes.ca) and ww2talk.com and travelling ......and continues to modify this document as pertinent new information becomes available.